Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: August

The Trump administration drew sharp criticism for reversing its ban on exports of Nvidia’s H20 semiconductor chip to China following intense lobbying by Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang. The move comes despite widespread evidence that China’s military and state-linked firms have acquired these chips to support advanced AI development. Specifically, H20 chips power frontier AI models used by Chinese tech giants such as Tencent and DeepSeek — an AI lab already flagged by the State Department for aiding the People’s Liberation Army. The reversal marks a major departure from earlier tech controls and risks undermining U.S. national security objectives.

Meanwhile, trade talks in Stockholm — the third round of U.S.-China negotiations since May — produced little progress. While Chinese officials floated extending the current tariff pause beyond its mid-August expiration date, U.S. representatives made no such commitment. Absent an extension, sky-high tariffs on Chinese exports could be reinstated, factoring in duties from President Trump’s first term, fentanyl-related penalties, and the 34 percent “reciprocal tariff” imposed this spring. Further complicating matters, China continues to import Iranian and Russian oil in circumvention of sanctions as well as transfer dual-use technology to Russia — three thorny issues that Beijing is unlikely to address without sustained U.S. pressure.

All told, Beijing’s reluctance to deliver concrete trade concessions reflects a familiar playbook: delay, dilute, and hope Washington backs down. If the White House delays new export controls or other competitive actions in hopes of securing a leader-level summit this fall, as press reports suggest, it risks repeating the same missteps as previous administrations and emboldening Beijing.

On July 1, the State Department’s reorganization took effect, restructuring the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP) and dividing its taskings among multiple other offices. Cuts to State Department staff, including senior CDP personnel, have also left the bureau with a fraction of the subject matter experts necessary to fulfill its cyber diplomacy mandate.

A ProPublica investigation published in July revealed that a Pentagon contract with Microsoft permitted engineers in mainland China to service Defense Department information technology systems. Chinese nationals reportedly had access to “high impact” data, including information about military operations. Separately, a Chinese hack of Microsoft products led to the compromise of multiple government agencies.

The White House rolled out its AI Action Plan, a roadmap for U.S. leadership in AI innovation, security, and tech diplomacy. The plan acknowledges the need to accelerate U.S. AI development while grappling with AI-enabled threats and the technology’s inherent risks. However, many parts of the blueprint are vague or contradictory.

In more positive news, the executive branch took action against various malign operators. The FBI disabled the network infrastructure of a group of Chinese hackers. The Treasury Department sanctioned a Russian internet hacker hosting provider for enabling cybercriminal activity. And Washington issued indictments and sanctions against North Korean operatives involved in a long-running IT workers scam.

Finally, the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee advanced the nomination of Sean Plankey to serve as director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency after he reaffirmed the importance of the agency’s cybersecurity mission.

The Defense Department conducted two large-scale military exercises in the Indo-Pacific in July to demonstrate and improve its ability to surge forces into the theater and operate alongside partners. REFORPAC 2025 is part of a “Department-Level Exercise” series that includes roughly 400 U.S. and coalition aircraft operating at over 50 locations spanning 3,000 miles. Talisman-Sabre, held in Australia, included 35,000 troops from 19 nations. U.S. and UK aircraft carriers participated. Meanwhile, following a series of aggressive Chinese military drills, Taiwan conducted its own exercise aimed at thwarting a Chinese invasion.

In the latest evidence of a positive but insufficient policy shift on Ukraine, the Trump administration approved four arms sales to Kyiv on July 23-24, totaling $652 million, to strengthen Ukrainian air defenses and artillery and provide additional armored fighting vehicles. The sales came after President Trump reversed the Pentagon’s July 1 decision to pause delivery of critical munitions to Ukraine. On July 14, he announced that European allies would pay for the provision of some American-produced weapons to Ukraine.

In concert with tougher sanctions on Russia’s war machine and oil revenue, the administration should ensure the new agreements with the Europeans are used to help fund the full range of additional American weapons and munitions Ukraine needs as well as the replacement of weapons and munitions transferred from U.S. stocks.

On July 10, eyeing lessons from Ukraine and threats in the Pacific, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth outlined steps to increase the production and fielding of low-cost drones. To succeed, this vital effort must sidestep or overturn entrenched Pentagon acquisition maladies.

President Trump quickly reversed a Pentagon freeze on deliveries of key munitions to Ukraine in early July. Then, on July 14, he announced a new initiative under which allied countries, coordinated by NATO, will buy American arms for transfer to Ukraine or to backfill their own donations, with U.S.-made replacements provided on an expedited basis. Germany later announced it will provide Kyiv with two much-needed Patriot air defense systems, while Washington agreed to bump Berlin up the queue for purchase of replacements. Other European countries subsequently announced $1 billion in funding for the supply of American materiel, including Patriot missiles.

Expressing frustration with Russian obstinacy, Trump on July 14 also gave Russia a 50-day deadline to make a “deal” or face tougher economic punishment. He later moved the deadline forward to August 8 after Moscow flouted his warning. On August 6, Trump imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on India, effective August 27, citing its purchases of Russian oil, and threatened similar measures against Russia’s other customers. The same day, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff made a last-ditch diplomatic effort in Moscow even as Vladimir Putin has made clear he remains committed to his hardline demands for a peace settlement.

Meanwhile, Washington and Brussels struck a framework trade deal under which most EU exports will face a 15 percent tariff. Europeans widely denounced the agreement as capitulation by the European Commission, which sought to avert a larger trade war and keep Trump onside on security matters.

The Trump administration continues to pressure the Houthi terror group in Yemen by targeting its sanctions-evasion networks. On July 22, the Treasury Department designated five entities and two individuals involved in illicit imports of petroleum products and money laundering. This followed a similar sanctions package in June against Yemeni entities, individuals, and vessels involved in Houthi imports of oil and other goods. In April, the U.S. military destroyed Yemen’s Houthi-controlled port Ras Issa. These actions have curtailed Houthi revenue and caused acute fuel shortages in areas they control.

Further measures are needed. Oman, a U.S. partner and Yemen’s neighbor, has facilitated overland fuel smuggling to Houthi territories. Omani banks, integrated into the U.S.-led international financial system, have provided services to the Iran-backed militia, allowing Houthi officials to transfer funds, including in U.S. dollars, in circumvention of sanctions. Since 2015, Oman has also enabled Houthi weapon smuggling. In 2017, drones bound for the Houthis entered Yemen via Oman, and a 2018 UN panel reported that Burkan-2H missiles likely arrived through Omani land routes. In 2024, Yemen’s internationally recognized government seized advanced military equipment at the Sarfayt crossing on the Yemen-Oman border, likely intended for Houthi attacks on Red Sea vessels.

Even as the Yemeni people suffer, the Houthis have not engaged in meaningful peace talks to end the decade-long war. Instead, they persist in attacking Israel and Red Sea shipping. On July 28, the Houthis announced a new phase of their anti-Israel operations, threatening to attack merchant ships from any company doing business with Israeli ports, regardless of nationality.

American and Australian forces, along with those from over a dozen allies and partners, held their biennial Talisman Sabre exercise from July 13 to August 4. The drills included the first live fire of the Typhon missile system in the Western Pacific, demonstrating the U.S. military’s growing capability to strike maritime targets in the theater.

The United States also announced a series of framework trade deals with Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea, which broaden U.S. market access while combating Chinese tariff evasion. Details of the agreements still need to be worked out. Negotiations with India, another key regional partner, remain stalled. On August 6, President Trump imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on the country effective August 27, citing its imports of Russian oil.

Along with strengthening economic ties, the deals with the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea will bring Washington closer to three of its key regional allies. As part of the agreement with Manila, President Trump promised to expand military ties to counter China’s aggression in the South China Sea. Japan and South Korea pledged to invest a total of $900 billion in the United States, bolstering their capacity to compete with China in defense production, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors.

In addition, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, along with his counterparts from Australia, Japan, and India, launched the “Quad Critical Minerals Initiative.” Under the initiative, which comes as China has weaponized its hold over rare earth magnets in recent trade negotiations, the four countries will cooperate to “secure and diversify critical minerals supply chains.”

The Trump administration on July 22 announced its intention to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The withdrawal will go into effect in December 2026. This decision follows the administration’s 90-day review of UNESCO’s alignment with U.S. interests.

The July 22 State Department announcement cited UNESCO’s 2011 decision to admit the “State of Palestine” as a member, a choice the administration deems “highly problematic.” Trump administration officials also cited concerns over UNESCO’s “woke” policies and China’s potent influence over the UN body. UNESCO has benefitted from Chinese Communist Party (CCP) funding, signing a formal agreement in 2018 with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In March 2025, UNESCO launched a Chinese-funded project to support African World Heritage sites. Beijing has leveraged UNESCO to whitewash the Uyghur genocide, providing cover as the CCP has attempted to erase Chinese minority culture.

Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee advanced former Trump National Security Advisor Mike Waltz’s nomination to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. During congressional testimony in mid-July, Waltz emphasized the importance of reform but continued engagement with the United Nations. He committed to countering Chinese influence and fighting “one-sided anti-Israel resolutions.” Waltz awaits a confirmation vote on the Senate floor.

Finally, on July 9, Washington imposed sanctions on UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese for supporting International Criminal Court investigations against Israeli and U.S. persons. Albanese has repeatedly advocated boycotts of Israel as well as U.S. companies operating in Israel or the West Bank.

Following its strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June, the Trump administration sought to resume nuclear negotiations with Tehran. However, President Trump warned he will strike Iran’s nuclear facilities again if the regime attempts to resume activity at the damaged sites.

To try to enhance its negotiating leverage, Washington moved to tighten the screws on Iran’s economy. The Treasury Department sanctioned elements of Iran’s oil smuggling network in Iraq, which generates $1 billion annually for Tehran. Treasury also targeted transnational shadow banking and shipping networks that facilitated Iranian sales of oil and petroleum products, reportedly accruing tens of billions of dollars for the regime. These designations came as Iranian oil exports surged during the first half of 2025 despite Trump’s efforts to squeeze Iran economically.

Nuclear negotiations have yet to make progress. Tehran insists on “confidence-building measures” from Washington, including compensation for the war with Israel. The regime also continues to insist on its right to enrich uranium — a red line for Trump. European powers reportedly agreed to snap back UN sanctions on Iran if no deal is reached by the end of August.

Meanwhile, on July 21, Tehran announced it had tested a space-launch vehicle (SLV) for the first time since the war with Israel. Iran’s investment in SLV technology supports the regime’s quest for longer-range ballistic missiles. Iran has also increased domestic repression following the 12-day war, arresting hundreds. So far this year, the regime has executed over 600 people. Tehran’s execution rate may grow amid the regime’s post-war paranoia.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Washington in early July following Israel’s 12-day war with Iran. Netanyahu announced his nomination of President Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, but the trip yielded no apparent progress on stalled ceasefire negotiations with Hamas.

On July 9, Washington sanctioned Francesca Albanese, the UN special rapporteur tasked with scrutinizing Israel, for supporting International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations of Israelis and advocating boycotts of American companies operating in Israel. On July 31, Washington sanctioned Palestinian officials for supporting terrorism, glorifying violence, and internationalizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in forums such as the ICC.

Trump pulled the U.S. negotiating team out of Doha on July 24, concluding that Hamas was not acting in good faith. Hamas had grown increasingly inflexible, encouraged by mounting international pressure on Israel over the dire humanitarian conditions in Gaza. Trump’s response to those concerns has been mixed. He has said there is “real starvation” in Gaza, but he later declared that the easiest solution is for “Hamas to surrender and release the hostages.”

Meanwhile, Western countries, including France, the United Kingdom, and Canada, pushed for recognition of a Palestinian state in September. Trump responded by telling London it is “rewarding Hamas” and warning Ottawa that recognizing a Palestinian state would complicate U.S.-Canada trade negotiations.

Trump envoy Steve Witkoff visited Israel on July 31 to discuss the ceasefire negotiations and to monitor the situation in Gaza. Witkoff told Israeli hostage families that Trump is pushing an “all or nothing” deal to return all hostages and end the war.

On June 30, the Justice Department announced a series of “coordinated, nationwide actions” to arrest individuals and seize bank accounts and computers involved in what is known as Pyongyang’s “IT workers scam.” North Korean individuals had fraudulently secured employment at more than 300 U.S. companies, sending their paychecks back to Pyongyang and simultaneously conducting malicious cyber operations. On July 24, a federal court sentenced an Arizona woman to 8.5 years in prison for facilitating the scheme, which generated more than $17 million for her and Pyongyang.

The Treasury Department issued two sets of DPRK-related sanctions in July. The first targeted a North Korean hacker who helped North Korean IT workers seek employment with U.S. firms, as well as a Russian businessman and four companies for facilitating the employment of North Korean IT workers in Russia. The second package targeted a North Korean individual and three companies for evading UN sanctions and funneling money to North Korea’s weapons program.

On July 30, Seoul and Washington announced they had concluded a trade deal reducing the U.S. tariff rate to 15 percent rather than 25 percent. This came after President Trump threatened South Korea and other countries with higher tariffs beginning August 1. As part of the deal, South Korea is supposed to buy $100 billion worth of American liquified natural gas and invest $350 billion in the United States, including the shipbuilding industry, though details about these arrangements remain scarce. Trump is now preparing to host South Korea’s new president, Lee Jae Myung, for a summit.

The Trump administration’s new de facto envoy for Lebanon, Ambassador Tom Barrack, has adopted a more conciliatory tone toward Beirut but remains as uncompromising as his predecessor in insisting the Lebanese must deliver on their promise to rein in Hezbollah. Barrack’s bottom line, doubtlessly echoing instructions from Washington, has been that Lebanon must begin disarming Hezbollah and enacting vital political, economic, and judicial reforms. If Beirut fails to do so, Barrack warned, it would face abandonment by Washington and the international community as the surrounding region pursues progress.

In its November 2024 ceasefire agreement with Israel, Beirut pledged to disarm Hezbollah and clear the terror group’s forces from the area south of the Litani River. Yet despite some initial steps, Beirut has largely failed to implement those commitments. Consequently, Israel has continued to conduct airstrikes against Hezbollah assets and maintains ground forces at five points along the Israel-Lebanon frontier. Washington is not pressuring Israel to end its operations until Beirut makes good on its promises. “As long as Hizballah retains arms, words will not suffice,” Barrack wrote on X on July 27.

Barrack’s visits to Lebanon have included some verbal missteps. On July 8, he insisted that Hezbollah also must feel it has a future in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the crux of his message is one the Lebanese have needed to hear for decades: Lebanon faces a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to correct course, first and foremost by disarming Hezbollah. Beirut must lead this effort, as no outside power can or is willing to do so in its stead.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the “E3”) held talks with Iran in late July ahead of an October 18 deadline to reimpose UN sanctions against Iran. As the remaining Western members of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the E3 have agreed, in coordination with Washington, to trigger the accord’s sanctions “snapback” mechanism by the end of August unless a new nuclear deal is reached. The Western allies plan to act due to Tehran’s refusal to permit international monitoring of its nuclear sites and account for missing stocks of highly enriched uranium following U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear program in June. Tehran has also refused to foreswear future uranium enrichment. If the United States and E3 restore UN sanctions, the regime has threatened to exit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A team from the International Atomic Energy Agency will visit Iran in the coming weeks to discuss resuming safeguards over Tehran’s nuclear facilities, material, and activities.

President Trump indicated his desire to reach an agreement with Russia on retaining caps on both countries’ nuclear weapons deployments under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the sole remaining U.S.-Russia nuclear arms treaty, which expires in February 2026. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced a pilot program to accelerate private sector testing and construction of new small modular reactors for domestic energy production. DOE is undertaking a similar approach to resuscitate U.S. nuclear fuel production. DOE warns that America “currently lacks the sufficient domestic nuclear fuel resources to meet projected demand.”

The U.S. military continued its operations against both the Islamic State and al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in Somalia. During the month of July, U.S. Africa Command publicized six raids against the Islamic State and two against Shabaab. A raid against the Islamic State in Somalia’s Puntland region reportedly led to the capture of Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf, an Islamic State finance emir and foreign fighter facilitator. Shabaab continued to retake ground that it lost in a recent government offensive, seizing control of two key towns in central Somalia.

In Syria, U.S. Central Command killed senior Islamic State leader Dhiya’ Zawba Muslih al-Hardani and his sons, who were also associated with the Islamic State, in a raid in al-Bab. Elsewhere in the country, Syrian military forces under the command of U.S.-backed President Ahmad al-Sharaa, the former head of al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria, participated in the massacre of Druze in Suwayda.

Meanwhile, a UN monitoring team noted that “foreign terrorist fighters” are “returning to Central Asia and Afghanistan” with the encouragement of al-Qaeda’s leadership. Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers “maintain a permissive environment for a range of terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida and its affiliates,” the team noted. Despite the Taliban’s firm grip on Afghanistan and al-Qaeda’s continued operation of training centers in the country, the Trump administration has not taken any action to deal with the threat. The United States did, however, designate the Resistance Front, a Lashkar-e-Taiba cutout and al-Qaeda ally, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

July began on a hopeful note. The White House formally lifted most sanctions on Syria on June 30. U.S. envoy Thomas Barrack reported “meaningful” talks between Damascus and Jerusalem and reiterated the president’s hope that Syria would join the Abraham Accords. Two weeks later, ethnic violence pitting Bedouin against Druze engulfed Suwayda province in southern Syria. Government forces entered the fray alongside the Bedouin, and Reuters documented “execution-style killings” of Druze civilians. The reported death toll surpassed 1,000, with little clarity on each side’s casualty figures. Israel launched airstrikes to defend the Druze, hitting targets in Suwayda and elsewhere, including Damascus. Washington scrambled to contain the conflict, helping to arrange ceasefires between both Syria and Israel as well as Syrian government forces and the Druze.

The July atrocities echoed the March slaughter of Alawites, a minority group, by government-aligned forces. The renewed violence underscores doubts that Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa can either control his own forces or hold perpetrators accountable. A government investigation confirmed over 1,400 deaths in March, yet there is no clear process for prosecuting those responsible. By lifting sanctions without demanding any concessions from Sharaa, the Trump administration surrendered much of its diplomatic leverage. Sharaa has granted himself nearly autocratic power while refusing to create protections for minority groups. He has also integrated Islamist extremists into the armed forces, some of whom participated in the massacre of Alawites. The White House should make clear that if Sharaa does not change course, it can still impose sanctions on those responsible for terrorism and atrocities.

Turkey continued to demand that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) disband and integrate into the Syrian army — something the SDF is unwilling to do. The SDF, a Kurdish-led fighting force located in Syria’s northeast, has been a key U.S. partner against the Islamic State. But Turkey considers the SDF a terrorist organization, directly related to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, and wants to see the SDF dissolved. The U.S. ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria, Tom Barrack, has also leaned on the SDF to make concessions to Damascus. Both Ankara and the Trump administration are making the case that Syria’s future stability lies in a unified Syria, with a strong central government and military. But the SDF believes that Syria’s interim government, led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, cannot safeguard the rights of Syria’s minorities. In refusing demands to disband, Mazloum Kobane, leader of the SDF, cited the ongoing Sunni violence against Syrian Druze in the southern province of Suwayda.

On July 17, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan condemned Israel following Israeli airstrikes in Damascus that Jerusalem said it conducted in defense of the Druze. Turkey’s Defense Ministry followed suit, threatening that “in the event Syrian authorities make the request, we will do what is necessary to assist them.” Simultaneously, Erdogan warned the SDF not to “exploit the unrest in Syria.” U.S. and Turkish officials helped broker a fragile ceasefire in mid-July, but fighting in Suwayda quickly resumed.