Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: June

After months of tariff escalation, U.S. and Chinese officials announced a limited trade détente following talks in Geneva in mid-May. Washington agreed to drop select tariffs on Chinese goods, while Beijing offered modest reciprocal cuts and pledged cooperation on fentanyl.

But the ceasefire was short-lived. Weeks later, the Trump administration tightened export controls on electronic design automation software for China’s chip industry and restricted the supply of U.S. jet engine components bound for Chinese aerospace firms. The Treasury Department also sanctioned over 20 companies tied to Iranian oil shipments to China. In parallel, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced plans to “aggressively” revoke Chinese student visas, targeting individuals affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party or studying in “critical fields” in which Beijing has sought to siphon U.S. research and development.

China declared victory after the Geneva talks, with state media portraying Washington’s concessions as weakness. But beneath Beijing’s bravado, Chinese leaders appeared rattled. Domestic unemployment is climbing, and fears are mounting that tariffs — combined with tech export controls — could inflict lasting damage. These concerns may prompt Beijing to accelerate efforts to insulate its economy while retaining coercive leverage over the United States in areas such as rare earths and magnets.

The risk now is miscalculation. If Chinese leader Xi Jinping overestimates his position — or if President Trump believes Beijing is backsliding — trade tensions will almost certainly spike again. Without any planned leader-to-leader engagement or a viable framework to resolve other disputes, U.S.-China relations remain on a downward and highly unstable trajectory.

In May, the Trump administration released its FY26 budget proposal. The budget slashes cybersecurity funding at a number of agencies, including the nation’s civilian cyber defense agency, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which would lose $491 million, or 17 percent of its budget. While the administration has argued this cut only targets the agency’s counter-disinformation work, CISA’s effective efforts to thwart foreign malign influence by U.S. adversaries accounted for a very small fraction of its 2024 budget.

To make matters worse, CISA continues to hemorrhage personnel. By the end of May, nearly all the agency’s top officials had departed, including those leading its 10 regional offices. These offices are critical for connecting the federal government with local critical infrastructure owners and operators and for providing support to local government.

Equally concerning, the administration’s proposed $325 million cut at the National Institute of Standards and Technology would devastate funding for regional innovation hubs and research partnerships. The president’s budget would also eliminate $4.7 billion from the National Science Foundation, which included funding to build, train, and support America’s STEM workforce, which was already under duress.

Meanwhile, the State Department’s planned reorganization — reaffirmed again at the end of May — will degrade efforts to bolster allied cyber capabilities. The administration intends to break up the bureau responsible for these efforts and return appropriated cyber assistance funds to Congress.

A rare bright spot is the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which is actively proposing policies to degrade China’s cyber and technology capabilities. Most recently, the FCC issued a rule banning China from participating in testing labs that certify American technology.

The Trump administration requested an $892.6 billion base defense budget for fiscal year 2026, the same as this year and well below the $1 trillion the administration promised. While the administration presented its request as a 13 percent increase, the White House’s figure included $150 billion in defense appropriations in the reconciliation legislation that Congress has yet to pass — money that will be spent over several years. President Trump will struggle to achieve “peace through strength” with a base defense budget that does not even keep pace with inflation.

The administration announced on May 2 that it had approved a potential $310 million sale to Ukraine for F-16 training, sustainment, and equipment. That is smart, but Kyiv also needs more artillery shells, ground and air-launched munitions, and air defense systems and interceptors.

The U.S. ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whittaker, announced on May 16 that the administration will begin talks with NATO allies later this year on reductions in U.S. forces in Europe. Kremlin propaganda quickly touted Whittaker’s remarks on social media. Putin will view a premature or excessive reduction of U.S. military posture in Europe as a welcome green light for additional aggression.

On May 21, Trump announced details about the “Golden Dome” missile defense initiative, saying the system would cost about $175 billion and would be “fully operational” by the end of his term. While both predictions are overly optimistic, Golden Dome is an important opportunity to better address growing missile threats, especially from China and Russia.

For the briefest of moments, Washington and its European allies seemed to be on the same page on Russia. The Kremlin had rejected a U.S.-proposed framework for peace with Ukraine. President Trump’s Ukrainian and European counterparts lobbied for tougher sanctions if Moscow continued to refuse an unconditional 30-day ceasefire. Following a May 10 phone call, the Europeans indicated Trump was on board.

But the apparent consensus quickly collapsed. Vladimir Putin countered the European ultimatum by proposing direct Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, offering to pick up where they left off in spring 2022 negotiations during which Moscow sought to impose harsh peace terms. Under pressure from Trump, Kyiv agreed to the talks — and challenged Putin to appear himself. Putin declined, instead dispatching a low-level delegation.

Two rounds of negotiations yielded little. Russia has doubled down on its hardline demands, making clear Putin is ready for peace only if it means Ukrainian capitulation. Yet rather than following through on his repeated economic threats, Trump has let Moscow off the hook, resisting tougher sanctions while signaling his desire to disengage from the talks.

The good news is that, at least for now, Ukraine continues to receive American arms and intelligence. After Washington and Kyiv signed a long-awaited minerals deal in late April, the administration greenlit a sale of F-16 training, sustainment, and related equipment and approved a German transfer of GMLRS rockets and Patriot missiles to Ukraine. Trump has also continued to deliver materiel pledged by his predecessor, though he remains unwilling to ask Congress to fund new aid.

President Trump visited Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi during his first foreign trip since taking office in January, signaling that the Middle East remains a key priority for his administration. While in the region, the president struck deals worth $2 trillion, joined a Gulf Cooperation Council summit, and met with Syria’s self-declared president, former al-Qaeda operative Ahmad al-Sharaa.

“Oh, what I do for the crown prince,” Trump remarked while in Riyadh, addressing Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS), at whose behest the American president met with Sharaa and lifted U.S. sanctions on Syria. In return, Trump apparently asked MBS to normalize Saudi ties with Israel. By recognizing Israel, “you’ll be greatly honoring me,” the president told his Saudi hosts, calling on Riyadh to join the Abraham Accords, the Arab-Israeli peace agreements Trump brokered during his first term.

After departing Saudi Arabia, Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to pay Qatar a state visit. He accepted a Qatari jumbo jet gift to become Air Force One, prompting bipartisan congressional concerns about malign Qatari influence and potential counterintelligence risks.

The president’s final stop was in Abu Dhabi, where he visited a compound that houses a mosque, a synagogue, and a church, built after the United Arab Emirates signed the Abraham Accords in 2020. Washington and Abu Dhabi signed a framework agreement that puts the United Arab Emirates on a pathway to acquiring the advanced semiconductors it wants in order to fulfill its ambition of AI leadership.

The Trump administration continued its efforts to enhance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific by improving the capabilities of America’s regional allies and partners while working to economically isolate China — a message delivered by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth during his address at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue.

On May 9, the United States and the Philippines marked the successful conclusion of Exercise Balikatan, the largest annual combined military exercise between American and Philippine forces. In addition, the administration announced plans to upgrade a key Philippine naval base responsible for patrolling the heavily contested Second Thomas Shoal.

Meanwhile, the United States has made progress in strengthening trade ties with Vietnam and India, two key partners being actively courted by China. While negotiations remain ongoing, Hanoi announced progress in curbing trade fraud — a key irritant in previous talks. The administration is also drawing closer to negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with India, though New Delhi has indicated that recent court decisions regarding the legality of President Trump’s tariffs may delay the deal’s finalization.

Nonetheless, China has continued to extend its influence within the region, with a Chinese state-owned firm reopening a former military airfield on the Woleai Atoll in the Federated States of Micronesia — only 400 miles south of Guam. The ceremony, which was not attended by any American officials despite Micronesia’s status as a Freely Associated State, signals Beijing’s interest in enhancing its capacity to project power into the broader Pacific.

Anticipating possible funding cuts stemming from the Trump administration’s ongoing review of U.S. funding for intergovernmental organizations, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres briefed UN member states in mid-May on his UN80 Initiative aimed at improving efficiency and cutting costs across UN agencies.

Meanwhile, the administration nominated former National Security Advisor Michael Waltz to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the UN on May 1, hours after he was dismissed from his role as President Trump’s national security advisor. Senate Republicans have yet to announce a timeline for Waltz’s confirmation.

Building on previous moves to limit UN operations in Gaza, the new U.S.-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) began operations on May 26. GHF is the first relief organization in Gaza that is completely independent from UNRWA and other UN organizations, which have failed to stop Hamas from stealing and diverting aid since the war began on October 7. Alleging that the new aid organization weaponizes aid, the United Nations and other aid organizations have refused to cooperate with GHF, while Hamas warned Palestinians “not to cooperate with GHF’s system.”

Finally, Trump’s sanctions against International Criminal Court chief prosecutor Karim Khan have begun to take effect. Microsoft cut off the prosecutor’s access to his email, and American NGOs severed ties with the court. The sanctions are a response to Khan’s decision to investigate both the United States and Israel and issue arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.

The Trump administration continued to seek a nuclear deal with Iran, holding several rounds of talks in Muscat and Rome moderated by the Omanis. These efforts have yet to yield progress, however. Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency warned that Iran continues to increase its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity (a stone’s throw from weapons grade) and frustrate investigations related to traces of man-made uranium at several previously undisclosed nuclear sites.

Despite varied reporting about the U.S. negotiating position, high-ranking American officials, including Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, reiterated several times that Washington will not permit Tehran to retain a domestic uranium enrichment capability. Later, the United States reportedly sent Iran several proposals involving an idea for a multinational regional enrichment consortium as well as a pause in enrichment in exchange for recognizing an Iranian “right” to enrich.

On the sanctions front, the administration rolled out new designations against Iran’s illicit petroleum exports, including refiners and port operators in China as well as a network of front companies enabling the transfer and sale of oil. Additionally, Washington sanctioned a multinational network supporting Iran’s domestic ballistic missile production and identified Iran’s construction sector as being controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, increasing sanctions costs and political risk for those doing business with that sector.

Within Iran, the regime is grappling with trucker strikes that have spread to over 100 towns and cities. Yet despite President Trump’s forward-leaning posture toward supporting the Iranian people during his first term, Washington has yet to lend rhetorical support to the current protesters.

President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared misaligned in May. The White House ended its campaign against the Houthis in Yemen on May 6 without guaranteeing the Iran-backed terror group would stop attacking Israel. Washington also engaged in direct negotiations with Hamas, though Israelis cheered when these talks resulted in the release of U.S.-Israeli dual citizen Edan Alexander from Hamas captivity on May 12. Most significantly, Trump omitted Israel from his May 13-16 Middle East trip and warned Jerusalem not to attack Tehran amid negotiations over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program.

On May 18, Israel decided to resume aid to Gaza after an 11-week pause following Hamas’s refusal to extend ceasefire talks and release Israeli hostages. The aid resumption coincided with the start of Israel’s latest military offensive and the launch of a U.S.-Israeli plan to distribute the supplies at secure locations, preventing Hamas from seizing aid. A U.S. diplomat implored the UN Security Council to cooperate with the new aid mechanism. The diplomat opened his remarks with condolences to the two Israeli Embassy staff members murdered in Washington by a far-left gunman on May 21. Trump condemned the murders, which he said were “based obviously on antisemitism.”

At the end of May, Trump said Israel and Hamas were close to signing a ceasefire deal approved by Israel. Hamas officials reportedly want to amend the proposal to get assurances that Israel will not resume attacks on Hamas and that the aid will revert to the previous UN-controlled distribution methods.

The U.S. Department of Defense is reportedly developing plans to withdraw 4,500 troops from South Korea and move them to other locations in the Indo-Pacific. Despite Pentagon statements that the U.S.-South Korean alliance is “ironclad,” the potential troop drawdown raises concerns about American security assurances and the alliance’s ability to deter North Korean aggression.

Meanwhile, as North Korea prepared to launch a new destroyer, a serious accident occurred, severely damaging the warship. Pyongyang arrested several officials responsible for the shipyard and fired several cruise missiles toward the East Sea in an attempt to repair its damaged image.

In other news, Pyongyang’s hackers continue to run amok. Multiple press reports in May detailed the extent to which North Korea has tricked large companies, including cybersecurity and technology firms, into hiring its hackers as information technology system administrators. Located in China and Russia, these operatives have used artificial intelligence deepfakes and chatbots to deceive human resources departments and have recruited American citizens to aid their efforts. Justice Department indictments against North Korean hackers have not restrained Pyongyang’s capabilities.

In South Korea, opposition candidate Lee Jae Myung emerged victorious in the country’s snap presidential election. Throughout his campaign, Lee emphasized his intent to return to a policy of engagement with the North. In the event of renewed diplomatic negotiations over Pyongyang’s nuclear program, U.S.-ROK coordination and an ironclad U.S. commitment to South Korean security will be critical to enhance the alliance’s leverage at the negotiating table.

The Trump administration has remained relatively silent on Lebanon in the past month while maintaining its position that Beirut must fulfill its commitments under the November 2024 ceasefire agreement with Israel, in which Lebanese authorities promised to remove Hezbollah’s forces from the area south of the Litani River and disarm the terror group. Lebanon’s progress on these matters has been sporadic and deficient. While reports indicate the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have seized hundreds of Hezbollah posts south of the Litani River, the LAF may merely be taking over abandoned positions previously struck by Israel.

Meanwhile, an Israeli security source told Al-Arabiya that Hezbollah “decides when and where it is permissible for LAF to confiscate weapons” and that the group still “possesses strategic weapons it does not intend to surrender.” Hezbollah officials, including Secretary-General Naim Qassem, have made clear the group has no intention of surrendering its arms to the Lebanese state. This refusal comes despite Hezbollah’s ongoing dialogue with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun — who, in turn, insists on maintaining open-ended dialogue with Hezbollah over its arms.

Underscoring Lebanese inaction, the Israelis have continued and even intensified their operations against Hezbollah over the past month. Many of these strikes targeted Hezbollah commanders and operatives whom the IDF alleges are involved in rebuilding the group’s military forces and installations in southern Lebanon. This dovetails with reports that Hezbollah is actively trying to reconstitute. The Trump administration is reportedly providing Israel with political cover to continue these strikes, perhaps recognizing Beirut’s deficiencies in discharging its commitments under the ceasefire deal.

The Trump administration continued to push for a nuclear agreement with Iran following the president’s ultimatum in March that Tehran dismantle its atomic weapons program or face military action. However, ahead of an upcoming sixth round of nuclear negotiations, Washington reportedly presented Tehran with a proposal permitting some uranium enrichment prior to its eventual elimination. This could allow the regime to retain a key means of producing fuel for nuclear weapons while waiting out Trump and reaping the benefits of U.S. sanctions relief.

Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released to member states a comprehensive report on Tehran’s nonproliferation violations. The IAEA Board of Governors will consider penalties against Iran at an upcoming meeting that begins on June 9. For the first time since 2005, the United States and European countries plan to seek a resolution finding Iran in non-compliance with its legal nonproliferation obligations, including the regime’s concealment of nuclear weapons work and failure to cooperate with the IAEA. The move tees up Tehran’s possible referral to the UN Security Council, where the West could move to reimpose suspended multilateral UN sanctions against Iran before their expiration in October.

President Trump also released a set of executive orders intended to reinvigorate the U.S. nuclear industrial base. One order intends “to accelerate the secure and responsible development, demonstration, deployment, and export of United States designed advanced nuclear technologies.” Trump directed the secretary of state to reach 20 new nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign countries within the next several years, and he ordered the secretary of energy to make specialized nuclear fuel called HALEU available for the operation of small next-generation reactors in the United States.

During his trip to Saudi Arabia in mid-May, President Trump met with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist who led al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria, and has begun to lift sanctions on Syria. Trump described Sharaa as a “tough guy” with a “very strong past” and a “fighter” despite Sharaa’s being a veteran jihadist who reported to al-Qaeda’s central command and fought against U.S. forces in Iraq.

After Trump’s visit, Damascus integrated the Turkistan Islamic Party into the Syrian military. The Turkistan Islamic Party is led by a member of al-Qaeda’s executive council who is based in Afghanistan and directs the group from there. The Trump administration approved of Sharaa’s integration of foreign terrorists into the Syrian military. Sharaa has refused to commit to expelling foreign jihadists, including Hamas and other al-Qaeda-linked groups.

The Taliban continues to deny the presence of foreign fighters within Afghanistan. Taliban deputy spokesman Hamdullah Fitrat said there is “no independent or non-state armed group within the territory of Afghanistan.” Fitrat’s claim is false. It is well documented that groups such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, the Turkistan Islamic Party, Jamaat Ansarullah, and many other foreign jihadist groups are based in Afghanistan and — with the exception of the Islamic State — are supported by the Taliban. Al-Qaeda is known to operate training camps in 13 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces as well as other infrastructure such as madrassas, safe houses, a media operation center, and a weapons storage depot.

For months, the Trump administration approached Syria cautiously, uncertain of how to engage with the government of interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, the former al-Qaeda commander whose forces overthrew the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Then President Trump executed one of the sudden reversals that have become a signature of his presidency. During a May 13 speech in Saudi Arabia, Trump announced he would lift all sanctions on Syria “to give them a chance at greatness.” The president attached no conditions to his offer nor required any concessions from Damascus. Until that point, the State Department had been holding out the prospect of sanctions relief as an incentive for Sharaa to address a number of persistent U.S. concerns, including the appointment of foreign jihadis as senior commanders in the reconstituted Syrian military.

On May 14, Trump met Sharaa in Riyadh, describing him afterward as a “[t]ough guy. Strong past. Very strong past. Fighter.” To effect the new American policy, the Treasury Department issued a general license indefinitely authorizing most previously prohibited transactions. Despite the absence of formal conditions for sanctions relief, the White House said the president urged his Syrian counterpart to “[t]ell all foreign terrorists to leave Syria.” Instead, Washington condoned Sharaa’s plan to integrate thousands of foreign jihadis from an al-Qaeda-related organization into the Syrian army.

Desperate for relief after more than a decade of civil war, Syrians rejoiced at the U.S. policy reversal. Yet the president who wrote The Art of the Deal neglected American interests while surrendering Washington’s leverage in Damascus.

Turkey was a big winner from President Donald Trump’s mid-May visit to the Middle East. Although the American president did not visit Ankara, he met with Syria’s Turkish-backed leader, former al-Qaeda commander Ahmad al-Sharaa, and agreed to lift sanctions on the war-torn country. On May 23, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio officially announced the sanctions relief, a decision Trump said he made at the urging of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. Lifting sanctions on Syria and legitimizing the Sharaa regime could harm U.S. national security interests given Sharaa’s ties to jihadist organizations.

Turkey is now positioned as a key partner for Washington in implementing Trump’s vision for post-Assad Syria. Since the sanctions-relief announcement, Turkey, along with Gulf Arab and European powers, has sought to conclude economic and trade deals related to Syria, most notably a $7 billion trilateral memorandum of understanding with the United States and Qatar to generate electricity for Syria.

In addition, Ankara has increased its diplomatic efforts pushing for the Syrian state to take control of prison camps housing captured Islamic State fighters. These camps are currently administered by the U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-majority military organization that Ankara deems a terrorist organization affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey (PKK). Turkey’s goal is for the SDF to disband and integrate into the new Syrian military and for the SDF’s American backers to leave Syria.