Can the U.S. Arm Itself and Ukraine?

Donald Trump announced on Monday that the United States will continue arming Ukraine through a deal with NATO, whereby European allies will pay for American-made weapons to be delivered to Kyiv. That pivots from the Pentagon’s decision to pause critical munitions deliveries, driven by claims that dwindling U.S. weapons stockpiles could not be spared for Kyiv and would endanger U.S. readiness to counter China.

While there are legitimate concerns related to U.S. Patriot interceptor stocks, several of the munitions that were originally held up are not in short supply, not badly needed to counter China, and should be delivered to Ukraine.

The Pentagon reportedly paused delivery of at least six types of munitions, including 92 AIM air-to-air missiles (likely including at least some AIM-9 Sidewinders), 30 Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors, 8,496 155 mm artillery rounds, 142 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, 252 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) guided rockets, and 25 Stinger missiles.

A closer look at production levels, inventories, budget documents, and strategic considerations demonstrates the sustainability of continuing to provide weapons to Ukraine.

Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE)

Ukraine uses the PAC-3 MSE to intercept aircraft and cruise missiles and is one of Ukraine’s only means of defending against Russian ballistic missile attacks. Of the paused weapons, U.S. stockpiles of PAC-3 MSE are likely the most strained, especially after U.S. forces used them to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles. The Army is short of air defense capacity across multiple theaters, but manufacturing capacity has expanded significantly, and the Trump administration could take steps to further improve production.

The maximum annual production capacity of PAC-3 MSE rose from 300 in 2021 to 500 in 2024, with contracts awarded to bring capacity to 650 in 2027. The Trump administration requested 245 PAC-3 MSEs in the fiscal year (FY) 2026 Presidential Budget, with another 96 added through reconciliation by Congress for a total of 341. The remainder of the production capacity will fulfill foreign military sales to U.S. allies and partners. But the administration could do more to strengthen Patriot interceptor production: the Army’s unfunded priorities list includes $300 million to modernize the PAC-3 line, suggesting that the Pentagon has not pursued all available steps and underscoring an opportunity for congressional action.

Supplying Ukraine with PAC-3 MSE will slow the buildup of U.S. stockpiles, but the Trump administration can mitigate the challenges by maximizing production and working with allies on the provision of Patriot systems and munitions to Ukraine. Withholding interceptors will result in more Ukrainian casualties and less U.S. leverage in negotiations with Putin.

AIM-9 Sidewinder Missile

The Sidewinder is a short-range, heat-seeking missile that can engage aircraft and drones and is particularly useful for defending Ukrainian civilians and critical infrastructure against Russian cruise missiles. The U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy need Sidewinders, and production is growing, but the Department of Defense (DOD) could grow it even more.

DOD awarded contracts to increase the production of AIM-9X Block II Sidewinders from 1,200 to 2,500 per year. The Trump administration requested 603 Sidewinders in the FY26 Presidential Budget, compared to 846 acquired in FY20. Both Sidewinder and AMRAAM (which is also used by Ukraine as an interceptor) are apparently on the Air Force’s unfunded priority list, indicating that the Trump administration and Congress could do more to support the Sidewinder industrial base. If stockpiles are indeed depleted, the answer is to better fund the Sidewinder industrial base instead of diminishing Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

FIM-92 Stinger Missile

The Stinger missile is a shoulder-fired, man-portable air defense system that Ukraine can use to target low-flying Russian jets and helicopters operating near the frontlines, as well as some larger models of drones. U.S. forces use Stingers for short-range air defense in Europe, the Pacific, and the Middle East, although other weapons such as APKWS II now fill the counter-drone role more effectively, and the Army is in the process of acquiring a replacement for the current generation Stinger. While the production of Stingers has been slow to ramp up, that is changing.

The production line for manufacturing new Stinger missiles largely closed approximately 20 years ago, with the line intermittently producing small batches for foreign customers. Refurbishment of older systems continued, and the Army is increasing the rate of Stinger production/refurbishment to 60 per month in 2025, a 50 percent increase compared to 2023. Because the line was largely shut down, a key component went out of production. But the industrial base has made progress, and deliveries to the U.S. Army are expected to increase significantly in 2026. Moreover, industry is ready to produce more if funding is provided. Providing Ukraine with Stinger missiles to shoot down Russian aircraft makes it less likely that American servicemembers will have to do so in the future.

AGM-114 Hellfire Missile

The Hellfire is a precision missile typically launched from attack helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and drones that Ukraine can use to engage Russian tanks, armored vehicles, and personnel. The United States increased Hellfire production during the campaign against ISIS and has procured an estimated 170,000 in total. However, the Pentagon did not procure any Hellfire missiles in FY25 and requested no additional Hellfires in the FY26 Presidential Budget. That suggests inventory requirements were already met. Additionally, the services are procuring more advanced munitions, such as the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM), which is slated to replace several munitions, including the Hellfire.

Because the Hellfire is primarily suited for anti-armor missions in theaters such as Europe and Korea or counter-terror operations in the Middle East, it would have limited utility in a conflict with China where U.S. forces are expected to employ much longer-range munitions targeting primarily maritime and air assets. Therefore, it is unlikely that providing modest numbers of Hellfire missiles to Ukraine seriously undermines U.S. readiness. In Ukraine, however, Hellfires could be used against the Soviet-legacy tanks and armored vehicles they were originally designed to destroy.

Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS)

GMLRS are guided rockets that can target infantry, vehicles, positions, and bases. GMLRS is Ukraine’s primary long-range weapon for striking targets up to 70 km beyond the line of contact, and its absence would make it easier for the Russian military to mass its forces instead of conducting piecemeal assaults on Ukrainian defenses, as is currently the case. While Ukraine’s prolific use of drones plays a roughly similar role closer to the frontlines, the loss of GMLRS would seriously undermine Ukraine’s ability to disrupt Russian forces further behind the front.

GMLRS is also an important munition for the U.S. military in Europe and Korea and has seen some use in the Middle East. Over 50,000 GMLRS were produced by 2021, and production will increase to 14,000 per year in 2025 from 6,000 in 2022. That will help refill U.S. stockpiles and progressively decrease the risks associated with providing Ukraine with GMLRS. Cutting off the supply of GMLRS would enable Russia to more freely mass its forces and conduct offensives that could force Ukraine to expend other munitions at even greater rates, such as Javelins and 155 mm artillery rounds, which are in shorter supply, causing more severe problems.

155 mm Artillery Ammunition

155 mm artillery rounds are fired by howitzers that Ukraine can use to target Russian infantry, armored vehicles, positions, and artillery. They are in high demand, and the United States has committed over 3 million rounds to Ukraine, which has stretched U.S. stockpiles to near-minimum levels. While Ukraine once faced a 10:1 disadvantage in artillery rounds fired, that ratio has dropped to around 2:1 after increases in U.S. and allied production capacity. Relative to other systems, 155 mm artillery rounds are a low priority for counter-terror missions in the Middle East and are likely to play a less significant role in a conflict with China dominated by long-range munitions.

155 mm artillery production is expected to grow from 9,000 rounds per month in February 2022 to 100,000 per month by spring 2026. Europe is also expanding its production. The German company Rheinmetall, for example, is building a new factory and plans to produce up to 700,000 rounds annually later this year between all of its plants. Cutting off the supply of 155 mm artillery rounds would diminish Ukraine’s ability to hold the frontlines and could lead to faster and more successful Russian advances. In Ukrainian hands, these rounds help attrit Russian forces, making Russian aggression that would involve U.S. forces less likely.

Conclusion

In concert with tougher sanctions on the Kremlin, supporting Kyiv while expanding U.S. defense production and stockpiles is a wise, sustainable, and necessary strategy to secure American interests, compel Putin to negotiate seriously, and deter new aggression in Europe or the Pacific. Those who would abandon Ukraine argue that “hard realities” require withholding critical munitions. This analysis demonstrates that those assertions do not withstand scrutiny, and Trump is wise to finally adopt a more assertive policy to help Ukraine.

This finding is consistent with the analysis and comprehensive recommendations in FDD’s April 2025 monograph, Arsenal of Democracy. These include, but are not limited to:

• Increasing defense spending 3-5 percent above inflation each year;
• Maximum procurement of key munitions;
• Prioritizing the speed and scale of procurement over risk mitigation;
• Using multiyear procurement authorities;
• Revamping the Pentagon requirements process to include the projected needs of partners;
• Revising war plans and requirements to prepare for possible simultaneous major wars involving the United States in Europe and the Pacific; and
• Pushing European allies to honor their defense spending and Ukraine assistance commitments.

Ryan Brobst is the deputy director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Cameron McMillan is a research analyst, and Bradley Bowman is the senior director. For more analysis from the authors and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Ryan @RyanBrobst_on X and Brad @Brad_L_Bowman. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.