Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: First 100 Days

The Trump administration has launched the most aggressive China policy in modern history. Within its first 100 days, it doubled tariffs on Chinese imports to 20 percent, then imposed sweeping “reciprocal tariffs” that pushed effective rates on key sectors into the triple digits, citing Beijing’s role in the fentanyl crisis and systemic trade abuses. Officials are also weighing potential de-listings of Chinese firms from U.S. stock exchanges to curb Beijing’s access to American capital. These actions form part of a broader effort to reengineer global trade and accelerate economic decoupling from China.

The administration also expanded export controls on dozens of Chinese firms, including subsidiaries of technology companies Inspur and Sugon, due to their ties to China’s military and hypersonic weapons programs. U.S. chipmakers must now seek government approval before selling to these entities — a move aimed at closing loopholes left under Biden-era rules. Meanwhile, the Treasury Department sanctioned two Chinese refineries that purchased more than $500 million in Iranian oil, sending a warning to Chinese companies that help Tehran defy U.S. “maximum pressure.”

While President Trump has expressed openness to engaging with Xi Jinping, the two leaders have not spoken since the inauguration. A call appears unlikely anytime soon. Xi, facing economic headwinds at home, has responded to Trump’s moves with defiant rhetoric, deepened ties with Moscow, and efforts to exploit rifts within the U.S. alliance network. With both sides convinced they hold the advantage — and neither signaling a shift in posture — the U.S.-China relationship is entering a new era of heightened confrontation.

In its first 100 days, the Trump administration dismantled some of America’s most essential cyber programs. Cuts to the U.S. Agency for International Development included more than $175 million in grants and contracts for partner capacity building. Cyber assistance to allies and partners bolsters critical infrastructure cybersecurity and cyber defenses and facilitates U.S. forces’ mobility. U.S. efforts to combat foreign malign influence were also gutted. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) fired staff combating foreign malign influence, and the FBI dismantled its foreign-influence task force.

Furthermore, the administration dismantled Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, crucial soft-power tools projecting democracy and freedom of information to populations under authoritarian oppression. Additionally, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) faced its final demise with the closure of the Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference office, which had absorbed the GEC’s staff following Congress’ failure to reauthorize the GEC last December.

Meanwhile, CISA weakened public-private collaboration on cybersecurity. The agency paused the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, which brought together public and private critical infrastructure owner-operators through Sector Coordinating Councils. These bodies were essential to public-private collaboration and are no longer functioning properly.

In better news, the Federal Communications Commission stood up a national security team placing particular emphasis on securing U.S. telecommunications and undersea cables. And President Trump nominated Sean Cairncross to be the next national cyber director and Sean Plankey to be the next CISA director. Congress should quickly confirm both outstanding nominees.

The Trump administration instituted dramatic changes in U.S. defense policy and strategy during its first 100 days, including a tectonic shift away from Europe and a counterproductive approach toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. President Trump briefly paused military aid and intelligence sharing to Ukraine and offered preemptive concessions to Russia, revealing confusion about the identity of the invader (Russia) and the invaded (Ukraine).

The administration initiated a major effort to strengthen homeland missile defense and deployed U.S. military forces to the southern border. Trump also took an important first step to reform U.S. defense sales to allies and partners, but the administration’s global trade war and alienation of European allies will hamper laudable efforts to increase U.S. arms sales.

In the Middle East, the United States launched a more aggressive military campaign against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, deploying additional naval power to the region and targeting Houthi leaders. The administration’s more forceful response is welcome, but its disclosure of operational details via an unsecured messaging app risked the safety of U.S. servicemembers.

The administration fast-tracked the approval of Israeli weapons requests, but it also apparently pressured Israel not to attack Iran’s nuclear program as Washington pursues a nuclear deal with Tehran. It remains to be seen whether Trump will learn from past failures and avoid a bad deal with Iran.

The administration fired several exceptionally capable senior U.S. military officers, potentially giving servicemembers the corrosive impression that some things are more important to the White House than competence and loyalty to the Constitution.

President Trump’s first 100 days have witnessed seismic shifts in transatlantic relations and U.S. policy toward Russia. As he promised during the campaign, Trump has sought to broker a speedy end to the Russia-Ukraine war, ultimately aiming to improve relations with Moscow. Trump’s desire for peace is laudable. But the way he has pursued it — undercutting Ukraine while putting no tangible pressure on Russia — leaves much to be desired.

Trump’s relationship with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy quickly soured. Following their confrontational February 28 meeting, Trump suspended military assistance. Aid resumed after Kyiv agreed to a U.S. proposal for a 30-day ceasefire. The Kremlin rebuffed that idea, aiming instead to continue pressing its battlefield advantage. Nevertheless, Trump has not made good on his threats to punish Russia economically. Meanwhile, he has tried to strong-arm Ukraine into a predatory economic agreement, seeking to “recoup” U.S. aid.

Frustrated with slow progress in the peace talks, the administration in mid-April threatened to walk away absent significant movement within “days.” This ultimatum — seemingly directed mainly at Kyiv rather than Moscow — came a day after Washington outlined a proposed peace framework that jarred Ukrainian and European officials. The proposal would, inter alia, bar Ukrainian membership in NATO, grant formal U.S. recognition of Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea, and lift all sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014.

The shift in Washington’s Ukraine policy under Trump has contributed to a broader erosion of European trust in America. The silver lining: Europe now appears more serious than ever about stepping up on defense.

President Trump has strengthened bilateral ties with Gulf countries, accepting $1.4 trillion in pledged Emirati investments in the United States while promising to make Saudi Arabia the destination of his first overseas trip. However, the Trump administration has made Gulf capitals nervous with its nuclear talks with Iran, slow progress against the Houthi terrorists in Yemen, and disengagement in Syria.

In mid-April, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff suggested Washington could accept a nuclear agreement in which Iran retains the capability to enrich uranium, as was allowed by the 2015 deal. Witkoff’s statement sent Saudi Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman hurrying to Iran to court its leaders. Coupled with its statements indicating a willingness to allow Riyadh to enrich uranium, the Trump administration seems to be putting the Middle East in the fast lane toward nuclear proliferation.

Meanwhile, despite the American air campaign against the Houthis, begun in mid-March, the terror group remains defiant. The Houthis still retain much of their military capability even as the operation strains U.S. munitions stocks. Gulf capitals have encouraged Washington to step up its efforts by supporting a potential ground invasion by local forces allied with Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Washington reportedly is open to the idea but has yet to make a decision.

In Syria, Trump’s hands-off policy has prompted regional powers — mainly Israel and Turkey — to race to carve out their spheres of influence. Gulf capitals have been urging Washington to take the lead in working with Damascus and regional partners to help move Syria forward.

The Trump administration has sought to strengthen ties with key allies and partners while bolstering U.S. capacity to deter growing Chinese aggression. President Trump’s approach has generally maintained continuity with the Biden administration’s priorities while placing greater emphasis on countering China’s economic role in the region.

Trump’s initial meetings with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba focused on strengthening economic ties in a range of sectors, particularly energy and advanced technologies. In contrast to the collapse of the previous administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the Trump team has launched trade negotiations with Vietnam, Cambodia, South Korea, and Japan in a bid to counter China’s unfair trade practices.

Outside of Washington, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s first tour of the Indo-Pacific reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to defending the Philippines and Japan against coercive Chinese behavior in the South and East China Seas. Along with promising to expand training exercises and defense-industrial cooperation with Manila, Hegseth announced that the Pentagon had begun upgrading U.S. Forces Japan into a joint force headquarters, which will work alongside Japan’s new Joint Operations Command.

Meanwhile, the administration is looking to expand the U.S. military’s presence in the region. The U.S. Army announced plans to deploy a second Typhon missile system to the Pacific, expanding its capacity to strike targets in and around China. The United States has also continued combined air patrols with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal — a South China Sea feature heavily contested by China.

In its first 100 days, the Trump administration sought to reset America’s approach to the United Nations and other international organizations. The administration has emphasized increased oversight and cuts to spending seen as unnecessary.

Weeks after taking office, the administration launched a 90-day review of U.S. membership in the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and a 180-day review of all other international institutions. These reviews are supposed to determine whether U.S. participation in and funding for these institutions aligns with U.S. strategic objectives.

In February, President Trump withdrew from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). He later blasted the UNHRC for renewing Francesca Albanese’s mandate as UN special rapporteur for Palestinian rights.

In addition, the administration in February permanently extended a ban on U.S. funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). On April 25, the Department of Justice, in a reversal of previous U.S. policy, allowed families of victims of Hamas’s October 7 massacres to sue UNRWA for its role aiding and abetting the attack.

In mid-April, the White House’s Office of Management and Budget introduced a preliminary proposal that would slash almost all funding for international organizations. The State Department and Congress will likely reject such excessive cuts, which could damage U.S. interests.

Concerned about the GOP’s thin House majority, Trump in late March pulled Rep. Elise Stefanik’s nomination to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. While Trump has pointed to potential replacements for Stefanik, the White House has yet to put forward an official nomination.

On February 4, President Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum-2, restoring “maximum pressure” sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Accordingly, the administration has zeroed in on Iran’s illicit oil trade and the network of ships, firms, and individuals that help export this commodity. To date, the administration has issued seven rounds of energy-related sanctions against the Islamic Republic, aiming to build leverage for nuclear talks with Tehran.

In early March, Trump sent a letter to Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, threatening military consequences unless Tehran quickly negotiates an agreement containing its nuclear program. The Iranians ultimately agreed to hold indirect talks despite the regime’s vociferous rejection of engagement with Washington during Trump’s first term. This about-face by Tehran stemmed from the regime’s sense of both threat and opportunity given its weakened security and economic outlook as well as Trump’s clear desire for a diplomatic resolution.

To date, the United States and Iran have engaged in three rounds of talks, but confusion persists over the nature of the agreement Washington is seeking. U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff initially proposed terms similar to the fatally flawed 2015 agreement, though he later walked his comments back. Nor is there insight into when Trump would resort to using force given his reported rejection of an Israeli plan to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities preemptively. Also missing is U.S. coordination with transatlantic allies. Absent such coordination, it is unclear when or under what conditions Paris, Berlin, and London would “snap back” UN sanctions on Iran, an option which expires this October.

Before taking office, President Trump’s team worked with the Biden administration to secure a Hamas-Israel ceasefire that saw 38 hostages returned. Trump often went further than Israel, demanding that Hamas release all hostages immediately, “not in dribs and drabs.” However, Trump envoy Adam Boehler held unprecedented direct negotiations with Hamas, causing friction with Jerusalem. Trump’s proposal to take control of and redevelop Gaza spurred Arab leaders to finally offer an alternative solution and to admit a small number of Palestinians fleeing the war zone.

The White House overturned President Biden’s hold on the delivery of 2,000-pound bombs to Israel and expedited the sale of billions of dollars in weapons to the Jewish state. Also unlike its predecessor, the Trump administration stopped criticizing Jerusalem over humanitarian issues, canceled Biden’s sanctions against Israelis, pulled out of anti-Israel UN bodies, and sanctioned the International Criminal Court for targeting Israeli leaders. When Israel resumed combat operations in Gaza in March after peace talks broke down, Trump blamed Hamas.

In February, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu became the first foreign leader to meet with Trump this term. Trump hosted Bibi again in April to inform him of the U.S. decision to enter nuclear talks with Iran. Though Trump later said he and Bibi “are on the same side of every issue,” the White House reportedly blocked Israeli plans for military action against Iran’s nuclear program. Jerusalem worries that Trump will accept an agreement with Tehran that fails to contain the regime’s nuclear ambitions.

In its first 100 days, the Trump administration did not announce new policies toward North Korea, though it did reaffirm its commitment to North Korean denuclearization and signaled its intent to continue leveraging financial sanctions against Pyongyang. The administration’s trade and energy policies, meanwhile, are creating both challenges and opportunities for the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

The “Liberation Day” tariffs risk alienating Seoul and pushing it closer to China. South Korea has announced monetary and trade policy changes to address the negative impacts of the tariffs, including by revisiting previously stalled free-trade negotiations with Japan and China. The latter could be particularly problematic if Beijing increases its economic leverage over Seoul.

Despite the bilateral tensions caused by the tariffs, the Trump administration’s energy policies are opening new doors in U.S.-ROK cooperation and allowing Seoul to play a more significant role in helping Washington diversify global energy supply chains. On April 18, Tommy Joyce, the U.S. Department of Energy’s acting assistant secretary for international affairs, outlined a plan for greater involvement in U.S.-led energy infrastructure, focused on a liquefied natural gas (LNG) pipeline in Alaska that will be geared toward exports to Asia. The prior week, South Korea’s acting president, Han Duck-soo, spoke directly with President Trump. According to a social media post by Trump, the two leaders discussed the Alaska pipeline and South Korean imports of American LNG in addition to trade issues and U.S. military commitments.

The Trump administration has demanded that Lebanon uphold its commitments under the November 2024 ceasefire agreement with Israel, which requires Beirut to disarm Hezbollah and remove the group’s forces south of the Litani River. Despite the ceasefire, Israel has continued to attack Hezbollah almost daily, both north and south of the river. These airstrikes testify to Beirut’s slow progress in fulfilling its obligations. In recent weeks, however, Washington has eased pressure on Lebanon, deferring to its complex domestic politics, which Beirut has previously used to justify inaction. Israeli activity dropped in early April, likely due to Lebanese and French diplomatic pressure communicated via U.S. officials.

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have begun taking apparent steps to rein in Hezbollah. The LAF has apprehended actors responsible for rocket attacks against Israel in late March and allegedly foiled another planned attack. In April, the LAF, with Hezbollah’s consent, continued dismantling Hezbollah positions south of the Litani River — and in isolated cases, north of it as well. The LAF has also confiscated some of the group’s weapons. A senior Hezbollah official claimed these weapons were already damaged by Israel, but this could not be verified.

Despite these positive signs, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun still demonstrates insufficient willpower to disarm Hezbollah. Although he says the state must have a monopoly on the use force and has ruled out integrating Hezbollah into the LAF, Aoun insists the group’s disarmament will happen only through open-ended bilateral dialogue. Hezbollah, however, insists Aoun’s position will change. The group has explicitly and repeatedly rejected disarmament now or in the future.

The Trump administration’s first 100 days delivered mixed results on nonproliferation and biodefense. On the positive side, CIA Director John Ratcliffe quickly released a new intelligence estimate, begun under the previous administration, regarding COVID-19’s origins. The agency assessed, albeit with low confidence, that the virus leaked from a Chinese lab in Wuhan rather than originating in animals.

The Trump administration in February restored “maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran. The president also threatened Tehran with military action if it failed to negotiate restrictions on its nuclear program within 60 days. Initially, the administration demanded that Iran eliminate all three pillars of its nuclear weapons program — uranium enrichment, weaponization, and work on delivery systems — under a new accord. Yet after the two sides entered negotiations in April, it remains unclear whether Washington will stick to that demand. Moreover, the administration is divided on whether to follow through with military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities if diplomacy fails. This lack of resolve encourages the regime’s penchant for time-wasting negotiations. Only the full, verifiable, and permanent disarmament of Tehran’s nuclear weapons capabilities would constitute a lasting solution to the Iran nuclear threat.

In April, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a plan for State Department downsizing and reorganization that includes folding the Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation and the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability into a new bureau called Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Stability. It remains to be seen whether the move will help or hurt Washington’s ability to deal with growing nonproliferation and arms control challenges.

In the sphere of Sunni jihadism, the Trump administration appears to be focusing on a policy of general disengagement and, in some cases, accommodation. While the administration has yet to articulate concrete policies toward major terrorist groups or terror hotspots such as Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, and the Sahel, its actions are not encouraging.

Since the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda, with the Taliban’s help, has established training camps and other terrorist infrastructure throughout the country. The Trump administration has taken no action to dismantle this infrastructure. Meanwhile, in exchange for two American hostages, the administration revoked a $10 million reward for information leading to the capture and prosecution of deputy Taliban emir Sirajuddin Haqqani.

In Syria, the administration appears to be ignoring or even engaging with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that now rules the country. Meanwhile, the administration is withdrawing some U.S. military forces from eastern Syria, undermining efforts to combat the Islamic State.

The administration has conducted some counterterrorism airstrikes, including one that killed a top Islamic State leader in Iraq. However, sporadic targeted strikes will not translate into long-term strategic gains. Terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State can replace key leaders, and such strikes cannot prevent these groups from holding ground.

In Somalia, al-Qaeda’s branch al-Shabaab is regaining ground, threatening the U.S.-supported government. The U.S. military has stepped up its operations targeting al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in the region, but these groups have endured decades of U.S. airstrikes and raids.

The central dilemma facing the White House is how to deal with a government in Damascus led by former al-Qaeda commander Ahmad al-Sharaa, who insists he will govern in a lawful and inclusive manner. Sharaa wants the United States to lift permanently all the sanctions it imposed while Bashar al-Assad was in power. Yet Washington designated Sharaa as a terrorist in 2013, and he has appointed foreign jihadis to senior positions in the Syrian armed forces.

In late March, a State Department official handed Syria’s foreign minister a list of conditions to be met prior to the removal of sanctions. While the document remains confidential, multiple news reports paint a similar picture of its contents, and there are two requests Damascus may resist. Washington does not want foreign jihadis to hold military leadership positions, and it wants Damascus to ban Palestinian terrorist groups from operating inside Syria. Apparently absent from the list are provisions related to human rights or representative government.

Besides sanctions, a top concern for the administration is the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led militia that played a crucial role in the campaign to defeat the Islamic State. American military officers helped broker an agreement for the SDF’s integration into the national armed forces, but the odds of that happening are low. On April 18, the Pentagon announced a “conditions-based” withdrawal of about half its troops in northeast Syria, reversing a brief surge that began in December.

After 100 days, U.S. policy toward Syria remains a work in progress.

In its first 100 days, the Trump administration missed opportunities to hold Turkey accountable for adversarial behavior and to prevent Ankara from undermining U.S. allies, including requiring Ankara to relinquish the Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missile system and refrain from destabilizing actions inside Syria.

During a March 16 phone call, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asked President Trump to lift U.S. sanctions on Turkey and consider readmitting Ankara into the F-35 program. In 2019, Washington ejected Turkey from that program over Ankara’s purchase of the S-400. Turkey maintains possession of the S-400 but has yet to deploy it. Co-locating the F-35 and S-400 could allow Moscow to glean information on the fifth-generation fighter’s stealth capabilities. Reportedly, Trump is considering readmitting Turkey into the F-35 program if Ankara renders its S-400 batteries inoperable. However, the administration has intimated that Turkey may not have to divest completely from the S-400 to be readmitted.

Meanwhile, Ankara continues to threaten the stability of post-Assad Syria. During the presidential transition period, Erdogan urged Trump to withdraw the roughly 2,000 U.S. troops deployed in northeastern Syria. Turkey has pushed for the disarmament and dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a key U.S. partner against ISIS. In mid-April, the United States began withdrawing some of its forces from Syria, raising concerns that ISIS members currently imprisoned and guarded by the SDF could escape if Turkey were to attack the SDF. Concerned about Ankara’s growing influence in Syria, Israel has bombed Syrian bases where the Turkish military reportedly intended to deploy troops and equipment.