Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: October

The much-hyped Trump-Xi phone call on September 19 produced little of substance. While the tone was constructive, there were no binding outcomes on tariffs, TikTok, tech controls, or rare earths. The decision to defer a leader-to-leader summit to early 2026 underscored persistent gaps. Both sides appear to have adopted a mutually-assured disruption mindset — managing optics and keeping channels open while preserving pressure tactics. If a summit materializes, expect stage-managed gestures: agricultural buys, selective civil-aviation approvals, and limited fentanyl cooperation — not structural concessions on technology, trade, or Taiwan.

Meanwhile, the TikTok deal reportedly under White House consideration risks leaving ByteDance’s influence intact. Reports suggest the arrangement could include a board seat for ByteDance and partial retention of TikTok’s core algorithm — an outcome inconsistent with Congress’ divestiture mandate. The law authorized the president to enforce a clean break, not negotiate around it. Anything short of full separation would squander U.S. leverage, invite future evasions, and signal that national security statutes are negotiable when Beijing pushes back.

Adding to the confusion, Washington abruptly canceled a $400 million arms package to Taiwan, including key air defense upgrades. The move, disclosed on September 18, followed earlier decisions to deny Taiwanese President William Lai a U.S. transit and to postpone Taiwan’s defense minister’s visit to Washington — hinting at a softening U.S. posture just as Beijing watches for signs of wavering. With pressure mounting across multiple fronts, China may interpret Washington’s hesitations as license to press harder, which is why the administration should promptly greenlight the sale and reinforce a credible deterrence posture in the Taiwan Strait.

Washington’s cyber policy included several positive and negative developments in September. Commendably, the Federal Communications Commission banned seven Chinese Communist Party-controlled testing labs on September 8 from participating in its certification processes for consumer electronics, implementing an earlier May decision to bar labs that pose national security risks.

The White House announced its research and development budget priorities in a new September 23 memo from the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The memo promotes public-private R&D and encourages agencies to invest in R&D that supports cyber resilience, including postquantum cryptography, AI, and advanced technologies such as space-based communications.

Ahead of the UN General Assembly, the Secret Service thwarted what could have been a disruptive attack on New York’s telecommunications systems. The agency dismantled a network of electronic devices that could have shut down cell service and emergency communications systems.

Despite these positive developments, the nation’s cyber posture remains vulnerable. On September 24, Google announced the discovery of yet another Chinese malware operation targeting technology companies and law firms to gather information about U.S. national security and international trade. At least one federal agency was affected.

Ongoing cyber workforce cuts across government remain concerning. The president’s budget proposes cutting $500 million from the FBI’s budget, which lawmakers warned could slash the bureau’s cyber capabilities.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency finally has some permanent leadership in place. Yet despite the agency’s assurances that staffing cuts are not impacting the agency’s work, the future of important initiatives like the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative, CyberSentry, and the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Program remains in limbo.

Pentagon officials reportedly notified European allies in late August that the United States would cut key security assistance funding for deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank with Russia. That notification came as Putin was blowing off warnings from Washington about his war in Ukraine. The Kremlin apparently interpreted the move as a green light for dangerous belligerence against NATO itself. On September 10, at least 19 Russian drones penetrated Polish airspace, forcing NATO fighters to scramble and shoot some down. On September 13, a Russian drone penetrated Romanian airspace. On September 20, three armed Russian MiG-31 fighters breached Estonian airspace.

The Trump administration approved on September 16 the first package of arms sales to Ukraine under the NATO-led Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which enables NATO allies to purchase American weapons for Ukraine, authorizing up to two $500 million shipments. The administration should make maximum use of PURL to arm Kyiv, bolster America’s defense industrial base, and replenish and modernize U.S. military stockpiles. The administration should also augment PURL with any remaining previously committed aid and urge Congress to pass additional security assistance funding for Ukraine, which is necessary and sustainable.

The Pentagon is finalizing the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and reports suggest it may prioritize the Western Hemisphere and domestic missions over countering China and Russia. If resources devoted to forward defense and deterrence are reduced, expect more aggression and conflicts that could have been prevented. If additional missions closer to home are added without additional resources, expect U.S. military readiness to erode.

The importance of American liquified natural gas (LNG) came into sharp focus in September as Interior Secretary Doug Burgum and Energy Secretary Chris Wright pitched Europe on rapidly replacing Russian gas with American LNG. Speaking to Gastech, the world’s premier gas forum, Burgum and Wright told world energy envoys that the United States would double its exports of natural gas in the next five years. They also urged European leaders to abandon a proposed methane standard that would hinder the continent’s access to American LNG. Secretary Burgum later visited an LNG import facility in Greece to showcase how American LNG is transforming Europe, and he expressed support for the energy relationship between Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and the United States.

Meanwhile, President Trump used his September 23 address to the UN General Assembly to demand countries end their purchases of Russian oil and gas, criticize countries that have become overly dependent on unreliable intermittent energy sources, and promote American oil, gas, and coal.

On September 18, the Department of Energy launched a “Speed to Power” initiative to help companies and investors accelerate the build-out of large-scale power transmission and generation infrastructure in America. The department issued a request for information inviting the private sector to flood the government with information about near-term investment opportunities, project readiness, load growth expectations, and infrastructure constraints that the department’s funding and financing authorities may be able to help expand or expedite. The initiative is in line with the administration’s intense focus on ensuring America has enough power to win the AI arms race.

President Trump, frustrated with Kremlin intransigence, appears to be adopting a tougher stance toward Russia. After meeting with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Trump ridiculed Russia’s military shortcomings and economic woes. He asserted that Ukraine could restore its original borders — a marked change from his earlier contentions that Kyiv has scant leverage and should cede land in exchange for peace. Although Ukraine unfortunately has little prospect of ejecting Russian troops, Trump’s rhetorical shift appears aimed at pushing the Kremlin to strike a deal.

On October 1, The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump had signed off on providing Ukraine with intelligence for long-range missile strikes on Russian energy infrastructure. The administration is also considering providing Kyiv with Tomahawk missiles and other long-range munitions, an issue Zelenskyy raised at his meeting with Trump. Previously, the Pentagon banned Ukraine from using American-supplied missiles and targeting data for deep strikes in Russia.

Meanwhile, in recent weeks, the president has repeatedly threatened tariffs and sanctions against Russia, but he has yet to follow through. Trump insists that Europe mirror the potential U.S. actions and end its remaining imports of Russian oil and gas — a demand he reiterated during his speech to the UN General Assembly. EU officials have proposed various measures they hope will satisfy Trump despite continued resistance from Hungary and Slovakia, the bloc’s main purchasers of Russian hydrocarbons. While Trump is right to push Europe to cease funding Russia’s war machine, that is no reason to delay long-overdue U.S. economic punishment.

Following Israel’s September 9 strike on Hamas operatives in Qatar, Secretary of State Marco Rubio traveled to Doha to meet with Qatar’s emir and prime minister. While in Doha, Secretary Rubio “reaffirmed the enduring U.S. Qatar security partnership” and thanked the Qataris for their “ongoing mediation efforts to broker” a Gaza ceasefire and hostage deal. The damage control continued on September 29, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu phoned Qatar’s emir from the White House to apologize for the Israeli strike in Doha.

Qatar subsequently endorsed President Trump’s 20-point plan for Gaza. On September 29, Qatar released a joint statement with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan, affirming “their readiness to engage positively and constructively” with the U.S. proposal.

President Trump then appeared to reward Qatar for its support by signing an executive order (EO) assuring Qatar’s security. The EO states that, “The United States shall regard any armed attack on the territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure of the State of Qatar as a threat to the peace and security of the United States,” and that, “In the event of such an attack, the United States shall take all lawful and appropriate measures,” to defend American and Qatari interests.

The EO is the latest indication that the Trump administration views Qatar as an indispensable Gulf ally. Despite Qatar’s recent alignment with the White House on Gaza, Doha continues to harbor Hamas leaders. Extending such an extraordinary security guarantee may have prematurely rewarded a country that has long served as a haven for terrorist groups and their financiers.

The United States continues to demonstrate its willingness to deploy military force to enhance its regional deterrence posture, but has so far failed to achieve significant economic breakthroughs with key allies and partners.

Continuing a string of unprecedented military exercises with key Indo-Pacific allies, 19,000 American and Japanese forces engaged in Exercise Resolute Dragon throughout the month — the largest iteration of the annual drill to date. This exercise was paired with the first deployment of the Typhon missile system to Japan, allowing U.S. forces to target both Russian and Chinese forces within the region.

Pushing back against Chinese incursions in the South China Sea, the United States, Japan, and the Philippines also held joint naval exercises on September 13, cementing Washington’s commitment to its treaty allies and enhancing their interoperability.

However, these moves have largely been overshadowed by rising economic tensions stemming from the administration’s trade agenda. Despite President Trump’s signing of an executive order on September 4 to implement a new U.S.-Japan trade agreement, Japanese political leaders have pushed back against some of the deal’s main components — including Trump’s right to direct private Japanese investment into the U.S. economy.

Tensions between the United States and South Korea have also grown following a September 6 immigration raid that targeted 300 South Korean workers at a Hyundai plant in Georgia. While the firm plans to maintain its U.S. operations, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has expressed concern over the fate of future investments, threatening to erode a key strategic partnership that counters China.

In early September, the Trump administration sanctioned three Palestinian NGOs for facilitating the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) efforts to “investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute Israeli nationals without Israel’s consent.” According to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the sanctions are consistent with the administration’s ongoing fight against the ICC’s “politicized agenda, overreach, and disregard for the sovereignty of the United States and that of our allies.”

On September 15, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright led the U.S. delegation to the 69th International Atomic Energy Agency’s General Conference, where he reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to global civil nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation. He also reiterated the administration’s commitment to the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear weapons pathway, citing Iran’s “continued violations of its safeguards obligations.” Meanwhile, the UN Security Council rejected a bid to continue sanctions relief for Iran after the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, collectively known as the E3, triggered the snapback of UN sanctions on August 28.

Following months of delays, the Senate confirmed Mike Waltz to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations on September 19, just days before the UN General Assembly convened in New York, where Waltz joined President Trump. The president addressed the General Assembly on September 23, criticizing the body’s failures. At a UN Security Council meeting the same day, Waltz repeated Trump’s call for Hamas to return the Israeli hostages and decried other UN member states that had recognized a Palestinian state, which he said rewarded Hamas for the October 7 massacre and the war that ensued.

On September 27, the UN Security Council reimposed sanctions on Iran for “‘significant non-performance’ of its nuclear commitments” following the failure of two resolutions to stop the snapback process triggered by the E3 in August. The Trump administration said negotiations remain an option; however, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has ruled out direct discussions with the United States.

The Treasury Department sanctioned Iranian financial facilitators and elements of a shadow banking network that support the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran’s military. Treasury also targeted Tehran’s partners, sanctioning Houthi financing and weapons procurement networks and Sudanese Islamists with ties to the Islamist regime.

The Trump administration did not respond to Iran’s ballistic missile test on September 18. An Iranian parliamentarian claimed it was an intercontinental ballistic missile.

The State Department issued a statement to honor the September 16 anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death, but the Trump administration has yet to sanction Iranian human rights abusers.

Israel’s unsuccessful attack on Hamas leadership in Qatar on September 9 led to friction between the United States and Israel. President Donald Trump said that Israel would not strike Qatar again and called the Hamas patron “a very good ally.” White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said that the president “feels very badly about the location of this attack” but that “eliminating Hamas, who have profited off the misery of those living in Gaza, is a worthy goal.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio traveled to the region September 13-18 to reassure the Qataris and to discuss with the Israelis issues related to the ongoing war in Gaza and prospects for a ceasefire.

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Trump revealed to a group of Arab and Muslim countries the contours of his 20-point plan to end the war in Gaza. The plan calls for dismantling Hamas’s military capabilities, the release of all hostages, the free flow of aid to Gaza, an Israeli commitment not to annex the West Bank and Gaza, and a transitional mechanism to stabilize Gaza.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Trump at the White House on September 29 and called the Qatari emir to apologize for the Doha strike. In a joint press conference with Netanyahu, Trump thanked the Israeli leader for agreeing to Trump’s ceasefire plan and warned Hamas that if it did not agree to the plan, Israel would have a green light to eliminate the terrorist group as a threat.

Despite positive optics at the U.S.-South Korean bilateral summit at the end of August, relations between the allies were rocky in September. Seoul remains concerned about rising tariffs as well as the Trump administration’s demands that South Korea invest $350 billion in U.S. businesses and purchase $100 billion worth of U.S. liquefied natural gas.

While South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has indicated he is open to the trade agreement that he verbally reached with President Trump at the end of July, he has also expressed concerns that withdrawing the funds necessary to make such large investments could trigger a financial crisis unless the terms include a currency swap. President Lee also warned that an immigration raid at a Hyundai Motors plant in Georgia and other visa issues are making investing in the United States challenging.

On September 23, President Lee addressed the UN General Assembly, where he focused on the need to reduce tensions with North Korea and implement a phased approach to denuclearization. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, meanwhile, reportedly said on September 22 that he would be willing to meet with American leaders if the United States “drops the absurd obsession” with denuclearization.

Days later, South Korea’s unification minister revealed that Pyongyang has stockpiled as much as 2,000 kilograms of enriched uranium, enough for dozens of nuclear bombs. South Korean officials pointed to this figure as evidence of the failure of U.S. and UN sanctions. On September 25, though, Washington issued new sanctions on five individuals and one entity financing Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs by selling weapons to the Burmese regime. However, these sanctions will have limited efficacy unless Washington also targets third-party financial institutions such as Chinese and other foreign banks that are facilitating financial services for the sanctioned individuals and entity.

Washington is rightly pressuring Lebanon to take stronger steps to disarm Hezbollah. On September 5, and after a month of anticipation, the Lebanese government failed to explicitly adopt the plan to disarm Hezbollah that it had tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to draw up a month prior. Instead, Beirut ambiguously “welcomed” it. Beirut’s opacity extended further by insisting the LAF’s plan and monthly progress updates would remain secret.

Beirut also set no timeline for either its initiation or its completion. Meanwhile, the LAF has suggested that pursuing Hezbollah’s disarmament even south of the Litani River — where the group itself has agreed to disarm — may have to await Israel ending its presence and operations in Lebanon.

Israeli operations did, in fact, decrease during most of August and large parts of September — likely a response to American pressure seeking to provide Lebanon with sufficient space to unveil and begin implementing its disarmament plan. But American frustration with Lebanon grew as the façade of Beirut’s seriousness to finally tackle Hezbollah began to crumble.

In a September 22 interview with Sky News, U.S. envoy Tom Barrack voiced what appeared to be bubbling frustrations with the Lebanese, insisting, “All they ever do is talk. There’s never been one act,” and stressing that Washington “told them, ‘Do you want our help? We’ll give you our help.’ We gave them a playbook. They can’t get there.” He also said he would no longer waste President Donald Trump’s “time anymore with rhetoric.” Highlighting Hezbollah’s ongoing regeneration efforts and Lebanon’s failure to curb them, Barrack then seemed to sanction continued Israeli operations to degrade the group.

On September 27, UN sanctions on Iran lifted by the 2015 nuclear deal snapped back into effect. The development came after nine countries, including the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on September 19 to continue the lifting of sanctions against Iran. These events followed an August 28 decision by France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to trigger their reimposition in the Security Council.

The snapback will restore lapsed arms, drone, and missile embargos against Tehran, and sanctions against proliferation-related Iranian entities and officials. It will also prevent the expiration of nuclear restrictions, such as bans on Iran enriching uranium and reprocessing plutonium. In February, President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran had ordered the finalization of sanctions snapback. Trump had also demanded that Tehran fully, permanently, and verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program in order to reap sanctions relief.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia inked a defense agreement that Islamabad says includes protection for Riyadh under Pakistan’s nuclear weapons umbrella. Saudi Arabia allegedly bankrolled Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in the 1970s and may expect a return on investment — potentially also in the form of assistance on a uranium enrichment program, which the kingdom seeks.

Despite ongoing nuclear cooperation talks with the Saudis, the United States has not formally agreed to provide enrichment technology to Riyadh. Doing so would likely trigger nuclear-fuel racing in the region, open the door to requests for nuclear technology from U.S. allies in Asia, and position several new states closer to acquiring nuclear weapons.

Ahmad al-Sharaa, the self-appointed president of Syria who previously served as the head of Al Qaeda’s branch in Syria and himself a former Specially Designated Global Terrorist, was warmly greeted at the United Nations even though his regime was complicit in two massacres in Syria during his first eight months of rule.

The U.S. military continues to target the Islamic State’s network in Iraq and Syria. A combined operation by U.S. Special Operations Forces and Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service killed Omar Abdul Qader, whom U.S. Central Command described as “an ISIS member actively seeking to attack the United States.” Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service described Qader as the Islamic State’s “head of external operations and security” who was “responsible for planning and supervising” Islamic State operations in its “governates” worldwide.

President Trump said he wants U.S. forces to return to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, primarily to keep tabs on China’s nuclear infrastructure near the Afghan border. However, the Taliban has rejected the return of U.S. forces, with one Taliban-run media outlet describing the plan as a “fantasy.” The Doha Agreement, which the Trump administration, in its first term, negotiated with the Taliban, did not stipulate a continuing presence of U.S. forces at Bagram or anywhere else in Afghanistan.

The Trump administration secured the release of Amir Amiry, one of three American citizens who are unlawfully imprisoned by the Taliban. It is rumored that the United States will release Mohammad Rahim, a Taliban and Al Qaeda facilitator who is the last Afghan prisoner held at Guantanamo. The Taliban has previously demanded Rahim’s release.

Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa held several meetings with U.S. officials during his visit to New York for the UN General Assembly. He met briefly with President Trump at a UN reception dinner. On September 22, Sharaa met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who “underscored [the] opportunity for Syria to build a stable and sovereign nation,” according to a State Department spokesman.

Ahead of the UN gathering, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani held meetings with 12 U.S. lawmakers, the first time a Syrian government representative has engaged in official talks in the United States in 25 years. The discussions focused exclusively on repealing the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, a move that would require congressional action.

Sharaa previously hosted U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) Adm. Brad Cooper in Damascus on September 12. CENTCOM later released a statement praising Sharaa for fighting against the Islamic State in Syria.

Washington has also pushed for restoring stability in Syria’s Suwayda Province, where violence between government forces, Druze militants, and Sunni Arab tribes in July killed more than 1,000 people, most from the Druze community. On September 16, al-Shaibani, U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack, and Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi jointly announced an initiative that expands humanitarian aid, assigns security responsibilities to government-aligned authorities, and holds perpetrators of crimes against civilians accountable.

Meanwhile, Washington has been helping Syria and Israel reach a security agreement, brokering a meeting between Shaibani and Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer in London on September 17. Barrack signaled that, “Syria and Israel are close to striking a ‘de-escalation’ agreement.”

President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met in Washington on September 25 in their first face-to-face summit in six years. Their talks yielded open-ended promises of advancing U.S. interests across the domains of defense, trade, and regional diplomacy.

Erdogan committed to purchasing 75 Boeing 787 aircraft along with 150 737 MAX planes for Turkish Airlines, signaling renewed U.S.-Turkey trade momentum. The two presidents also signed a cooperation agreement over civilian nuclear energy generation, without releasing specific details. Finally, Turkey signed a 20-year deal to purchase natural gas from the United States in a deal worth $43 billion.

President Trump expressed openness to lifting sanctions currently hampering Turkish defense firms and readmitting Turkey into the F-35 fighter jet program, contingent on Turkey halting its purchase of Russian oil and natural gas. The United States removed Ankara from the F-35 program and sanctioned Turkey in 2019 for purchasing the S-400 missile defense system from Russia. Erdogan, however, has not committed to ending Russian oil purchases. But the Trump administration has still made no commitments to readmit Turkey into the F-35 program. Congressional opposition likely prevented any breakthroughs.

The two leaders also discussed Syria and backed the integration of parts of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into official governance structures.