September 11, 2025 | Policy Brief

Moving To Secure Electronics Supply Chain, Federal Communications Commission Bans 7 Chinese Test Labs

September 11, 2025 | Policy Brief

Moving To Secure Electronics Supply Chain, Federal Communications Commission Bans 7 Chinese Test Labs

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has accelerated its efforts to keep Beijing out of America’s electronics supply chains. On September 8, the FCC announced plans to withdraw recognition of seven equipment testing facilities — which screen and certify consumer electronics’ compliance with federal safety and security regulations — controlled or owned by the Chinese government. The decision builds on the FCC’s vote in May to bar Chinese labs considered national security risks from participating in the FCC’s equipment testing program. 

This decision marks a step toward reducing China’s influence over a process that underpins the security of American supply chains by preventing unsafe or compromised devices from entering the domestic market. 

FCC Targets Major State-Controlled Test Labs

The current wave of revocations targeted seven of China’s most prominent test labs, including the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, the Chongqing Academy of Information and Communications, and the Shanghai Institute of Measurement and Testing Technology. These labs primarily fall directly under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, giving Beijing a clear line of control over their operations.

The FCC also announced that certifications for four other Chinese labs, whose authorizations expired in May, will be phased out. Taken together, these moves are likely only the first step in a broader campaign to sever Chinese state-linked test labs from the U.S. market, many of which the FCC has accused of operating under the auspices of state-owned enterprises and the People’s Liberation Army.

China Uses Lab Ownership To Threaten Integrity of US Supply Chains

China’s role in the equipment testing process represents a systemic risk to U.S. supply chains. Roughly 75 percent of FCC-recognized testing currently occurs in China, giving Beijing the ability to combine technical control over the authorization process with its leverage over the electronic device market. This dominance allows Beijing access to sensitive and proprietary information, increasing the risk of data exfiltration and device compromise.

China’s dominance within the testing sector also allows its domestic firms to benefit from significant regulatory advantages, fueling Beijing’s broader “Made in China 2025” industrial policy. Along with relying on substantial state subsidies, domestic firms have been able to illicitly capitalize on faster and more flexible review processes, weaker compliance checks, and lower costs, placing U.S. manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage. The result is a market dynamic that places pressure on American firms to shift testing and production to China to get the same advantages, further deepening dependence on Chinese manufacturing while extending supply chains that could be severed in the event of a crisis in the Indo-Pacific.

FCC Should Continue To Target Chinese Labs and Expand Domestic Testing Capacity

The FCC’s efforts to decertify Chinese testing facilities are a necessary first step to securing American supply chains, but the Commission should move quickly to build resilient alternatives.

In addition to continuing investigations and allowing Chinese certifications to lapse without renewal, the FCC should accelerate the accreditation of domestic and allied labs while offering financial incentives for manufacturers to use them. Fast-tracking accreditation for facilities based in the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, coupled with public-private partnership programs to expand lab capacity within strategic locations, would help close the gap. This effort should be paired with programs to ensure small and medium-sized businesses are not left behind. The Commission should provide targeted incentives, including reduced filing fees and expanded grant eligibility, to support their transition away from Chinese test labs.

Jack Burnham is a research analyst in the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Jiwon Ma is a senior policy analyst at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at FDD. For more analysis from Jack, Jiwon, and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Jack on X @JackBurnham802. Follow Jiwon on X @jiwonma_92. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CCTI. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.