Iran’s Nuclear Disarmament

The threat of a nuclear-armed Iran remains the defining security challenge of our time. In “Iran’s Nuclear Disarmament: The Only Deal That Protects U.S. and Allied Security,” Orde Kittrie, Andrea Stricker, and Behnam Ben Taleblu outline a strategy to achieve the permanent dismantlement of Tehran’s nuclear weapons enterprise. Drawing from historical precedents and lessons learned from the deeply flawed nuclear deal with Iran in 2015 and leveraging today’s rare opportunity to force a weakened Iran into nuclear submission, this report presents a comprehensive road map for ensuring that the Islamic Republic is never allowed to cross the nuclear weapon threshold.

This report rejects the incrementalism of past approaches, including the 2015 nuclear deal, which provided temporary restrictions while allowing Iran to retain the infrastructure needed for a rapid nuclear breakout. As Kittrie, Stricker, and Taleblu argue, any agreement must go far beyond arms control to the complete and verifiable dismantlement of Iran’s uranium enrichment and plutonium production capabilities, its nuclear weaponization efforts, and its ballistic missile program. Transparency and accountability, verified through robust oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with anywhere, anytime access to Iran’s nuclear and relevant military sites, must be the cornerstone of such a deal.

The urgency of this framework is made clear by Iran’s current nuclear status. With sufficient highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce multiple nuclear weapons within months, Tehran is closer than ever to becoming a nuclear-armed state. Most of this nuclear expansion did not occur during the remainder of President Donald Trump’s first term following his May 2018 withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal. It occurred after the January 2021 inauguration of President Joe Biden who abandoned Trump’s maximum pressure campaign. The clear lesson: The Islamic Republic will escalate when it senses American weakness; it will back down when it perceives American strength.

The regime’s ambitions to develop a nuclear arsenal represent a profound threat to regional and global security. This report makes clear that anything less than wholesale dismantlement would leave the Islamic Republic with the tools to advance its nuclear and missile programs. Kittrie, Stricker, and Taleblu also wisely emphasize that the risks posed by Iran’s nuclear program cannot be separated from the regime’s broader revolutionary ideology and destabilizing foreign policy. Iran’s ballistic missile development, its history of exporting terrorism, and its efforts to subvert peace in the region demand an agreement that addresses these interconnected threats.

Negotiating with Tehran creates the risk that its theocratic regime will stall for time while advancing its nuclear program. The Islamic Republic is a master at rope-a-doping American presidents, delaying, offering reversible concessions, and heading off U.S. power. Previous administrations have even rewarded Iran with sanctions relief simply for staying at the negotiating table. Thus, any reduction in pressure on the Islamic Republic should occur only if Iran agrees to permanently and verifiably dismantle all of its potential pathways to, and capabilities for, developing nuclear weapons.

The report outlines an approach blending diplomatic, economic, and military tools to leave Tehran with no viable alternative but to comply. Restoring UN Security Council sanctions, applying maximum economic pressure, and maintaining a credible military deterrent — American and Israeli — are key components of this strategy. Sanctions must be true economic warfare — targeting Iran’s primary sources of revenue, including its oil and petrochemical exports, and enforced with an intensity that punishes circumvention by any actor whether or not they are U.S. allies. Irregular warfare operations, such as cyberattacks and sabotage, will play a critical role in exposing Iran’s vulnerabilities and degrading its nuclear and military capabilities. The Trump administration must provide Israel with the materiel support that Jerusalem needs to destroy Iran’s nuclear and economic assets and those of its leaders. If Tehran understands that Israel has both the will and the capabilities to put the regime at risk, this will bolster American coercion and sharpen the choice for Tehran.

This report is more than just a policy paper — it is a call to action.

I have spent decades confronting the Iranian threat. The regime sanctioned and threatened FDD, my colleagues, and me. I have watched in recent months as Israel, a tiny country of 10 million people with a small army, air force, and intelligence apparatus, has severely weakened Iran’s axis of proxies, destroyed most of its long-range strategic air defenses, and dramatically reduced its ballistic missile production capabilities. There is now no better time for an American president to demand the deal outlined below or, failing that, to use military force against regime assets. This report offers a clear and actionable road map for policymakers, diplomats, and security experts. It outlines the steps necessary to secure not just a temporary reprieve but a lasting solution that ensures that one of the world’s most dangerous regimes never acquires the world’s most dangerous weapon.

Mark Dubowitz
CEO, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
March 2025

President Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire for a negotiated agreement with Iran.¹ On February 4, 2025, he signed a presidential memorandum that restored maximum pressure sanctions against Tehran and that declared, “[i]t is the policy of the United States that Iran be denied a nuclear weapon.”² The following day, Trump posted, “I would much prefer a Verified Peace Agreement, which will let Iran peacefully grow and prosper.”³ In a subsequent interview, the president said of Iran’s nuclear quest, “There’s two ways of stopping them. With bombs, or with a written piece of paper.”⁴ Trump reiterated this choice soon after, indicating, “I’d much rather see a deal with Iran where we can do a deal — supervise, check it, inspect it and then blow it up or just make sure that there [are] no more nuclear facilities.”⁵

It therefore appears that the administration plans to use coercive means (what Trump’s memorandum refers to as “maximum pressure”) to obtain a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, employing a credible threat of military force to strengthen its negotiation position. This is a sound strategy, but the specific contours of an agreement matter tremendously. Any reduction of pressure on the Islamic Republic must only occur as part of a deal in which Iran agrees to a full, permanent, and verifiable cutting off of all its potential pathways to nuclear weapons.

In particular, the administration must avoid an agreement replicating the flaws of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).⁶ Since the JCPOA’s restrictions had preset expiration dates, or “sunsets,” it failed to permanently block Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons. Nor did the deal ensure that Tehran’s covert nuclear weapons research program had ended. It also did not include “anytime, anywhere” inspections to verify Iran’s compliance. Moreover, the JCPOA did not address Iran’s growing ballistic missile arsenal, which the regime could use to deliver nuclear weapons.

Trump exited the JCPOA in May 2018. His successor, President Joe Biden, subsequently sought to revive it. While Biden attempted to negotiate, Iran massively expanded its nuclear program, arriving at the threshold nuclear weapons status it has reached today.

Rather than aim for a freeze or JCPOA-style modest rollback of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the administration should press for the full, permanent, and verifiable nuclear disarmament of the Islamic Republic. This is an admittedly high bar, but it is the only agreement currently worth seeking with Tehran. Moreover, there are several past examples of countries agreeing to completely dismantle illicit nuclear weapons programs. Four countries peacefully rid themselves of complete, functioning nuclear weapons arsenals, and at least two additional countries peacefully dismantled their own significant nuclear weapons programs before they had achieved functioning nuclear bombs.⁷ While circumstances for each case differ, dismantlement is not outside the realm of possibility.

An agreement with Iran must ensure an end to nuclear fuel production, weaponization — that is, technical work on the steps needed to assemble a nuclear device — and development of nuclear-capable delivery systems. Iran must permit full access by the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, to verify all steps. Notably, the U.S. Congress has already formalized the requirement that Iran verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in return for sanctions relief.⁸

Trump should agree to enter into negotiations with Iran only if Tehran agrees at the outset, and takes actions on the ground to prove, that an agreement will achieve all those objectives. Trump’s negotiating team will also need to carefully determine the timing of entry into force of deal provisions and whether certain elements must be implemented as preconditions. In the past, Tehran has secured concessions, including sanctions relief, simply for consenting to nuclear negotiations. It has used negotiations to mitigate U.S. and international pressure while bolstering its nuclear program and making irreversible knowledge-based and technical gains. The Trump administration should not fall for this. Nor should it accept a negotiation process or deal that leaves Iran with its nuclear infrastructure intact to simply wait out the Trump administration and resume its nuclear threats and extortion once he leaves office.

To achieve Iran’s full and permanent nuclear dismantlement, Trump will need to impose maximum economic pressure on Tehran and underscore that the United States will, if necessary, use force to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Trump may also need to make clear that unless the regime promptly dismantles its nuclear program, Washington will move to explore other policy options against Tehran, to include assuring the success of the Iranian people’s goal of replacing the theocratic regime.⁹

Limited Time Left to Stop Iran

Iran’s nuclear weapons development entails two key steps: 1) making nuclear fuel, produced either via uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing; and 2) constructing a nuclear weapon through relevant weaponization activities (key scientific and engineering work integrating a fissile core, a triggering mechanism, and explosives). Those steps are sufficient to construct a crude nuclear weapon. Tehran is also working on a third step: building ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons and developing nuclear weapons small enough to be carried on such missiles.

The Institute for Science and International Security has estimated since 2021 that Iran could build a “crude nuclear weapon” within about six months of a decision to do so. According to the institute, a crude nuclear weapon “made from 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU) would be suitable for underground nuclear testing or delivery by a crude delivery system.”¹⁰

A successful test detonation of a crude nuclear weapon underground in Iran would serve to establish Iran’s arrival among the small group of nations possessing nuclear weapons. While a crude device would be too large to be delivered to a foreign target by an Iranian missile, it could be dropped from an airplane (similar to the crude U.S. nuclear weapons detonated over Hiroshima and Nagasaki) or delivered to its target by a ship or truck. A crude nuclear weapon would thus be easier to intercept than a nuclear-tipped missile (which would require both 90 percent weapons-grade uranium and additional work miniaturizing the weapon).

U.S. officials have typically posited that Iran would need about one year to build a device suitable for a nuclear-tipped missile.¹¹ Some Israeli assessments, shared with the media prior to Iran’s progress in recent months, posited that Iran could need as long as two years.¹²

Once Iran starts the six months of work it reportedly still needs to produce a crude nuclear bomb, it may only need to divert enriched uranium from international safeguards to a secret site, for further enrichment and/or weaponization, around four months into the six-month weaponization timeline. While Iranian diversion of enriched uranium would trigger international alarm bells, the United States and its allies could potentially be left with only weeks to disrupt Iran’s sprint to a nuclear weapon.¹³

Nuclear Fuel

Iran already possesses enough 60 percent HEU for about six or seven crude nuclear weapons.¹⁴ Producing 60 percent HEU represents about 95 to 99 percent of the technical effort to make 90 percent enriched uranium (also known as “weapons-grade” uranium). Such a crude nuclear weapon would require about 42 kilograms of 60 percent HEU.¹⁵ Iran could either use its 60 percent HEU stock directly in crude nuclear weapons, or it could further enrich this material, as well as its lower-enriched material, to 90 percent purity to render all of that uranium suitable for missile warheads.

A nuclear warhead compact enough to fit atop a ballistic missile would likely require 25 kilograms of uranium enriched to weapons grade,¹⁶ a quantity that Iran apparently does not currently possess.¹⁷ In October 2024, William Burns, the CIA director at the time, said that Iran’s breakout time — the amount of time needed to produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear weapon — was then “a week or a little more.”¹⁸ As of March 2025, the Institute for Science and International Security assessed that Tehran could make enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in less than one week, enough for 10 nuclear weapons in one month, and enough for 17 weapons in four months.¹⁹

On December 6, 2024, a confidential IAEA report reportedly warned IAEA member states of a dangerous increase in enrichment activities at Iran’s underground plant at Fordow.²⁰ Iran’s acceleration of enrichment there means that Tehran can produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for seven nuclear weapons per month²¹ at a deeply buried location, which presents unique challenges for military planners wishing to destroy it.²²

Weaponization

Iran acquired vast knowledge and experience regarding key steps in the weaponization process during the early 2000s under the regime’s “Amad Plan,” as part of which the regime planned to build nuclear weapons.²³ Under international pressure, Tehran downsized the program in mid-2003 but maintained limited activities and progress.²⁴

Iran is currently working to reduce the time it would need to complete weaponization after a decision to do so. The 2024 U.S. Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment, published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in February 2024, stated that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.”²⁵ But this phrase was absent from July²⁶ and November²⁷ 2024 ODNI assessments of Tehran’s nuclear program.

During an October 2024 counterstrike against Iran, Israel reportedly eliminated an active nuclear weapons research facility within Iran’s Parchin military complex called Taleghan 2.²⁸ According to U.S. and Israeli officials, Iran was conducting renewed experiments at the site related to high explosives used to trigger a nuclear detonation, and the Israeli strike destroyed key equipment.²⁹ On February 3, The New York Times reported that new intelligence has convinced U.S. officials that a “secret team” of Iranian weapons engineers and scientists is exploring how to build a crude nuclear weapon “in a matter of months.”³⁰

Ballistic Missiles

Iran already has the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East,³¹ which U.S. intelligence long ago assessed would be the regime’s “preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon.”³² Iran can be expected to continue improving the design, maneuverability, and survivability of its reentry vehicles, which protect the missile’s payload as it reenters the Earth’s atmosphere until it reaches its target. Earlier IAEA reports³³ as well as the atomic archive³⁴ relate previous Iranian efforts in this space, and newer Iranian ballistic missiles indicate evidence of continuing advances.³⁵

Iranian ballistic missiles (Illustration by Anton Petrus/Getty Images).

The JCPOA contained major flaws that rendered it ineffective as a means of preventing Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability. One of its foremost flaws was the legitimization of Iran’s nuclear program, enabling Tehran to eventually become a nuclear threshold state. The agreement also included restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program that were only temporary, failed to permanently dismantle Iran’s nuclear assets, did not account for the regime’s past and possibly ongoing work on nuclear weapons, included weak verification mechanisms, and did little to address Tehran’s missile program.

Sunsets

The JCPOA authorized a gradual sunset of limitations on Iran’s nuclear activities. The sunsets began to take effect in 2024 and, had the deal remained in effect, would have culminated in a complete end to restrictions by January 2031, including those limiting uranium enrichment and plutonium production.³⁶ For example, until January 2031, the JCPOA imposed a cap of 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent low enriched uranium (LEU), after which Tehran could enrich as much as it wanted, even to weapons grade.

Ongoing Enrichment and Advanced Centrifuge Research and Development

Throughout the deal’s term, Iran retained its uranium enrichment facilities — the underground plant at Fordow and two at Natanz — together containing thousands of early-generation centrifuges and some advanced machines.

The JCPOA also permitted Iran to carry out research and development activities on advanced-generation (fast) gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment, store more than 1,000 previously manufactured advanced centrifuges, operate limited quantities of the advanced machines, and by 2024, manufacture and eventually operate thousands of new advanced units per year.³⁷ This enabled Iran to rebuild its nuclear weapons program quickly once the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018.³⁸

Weak Verification

The JCPOA failed to require an intensive IAEA investigation to definitively account for and determine whether Tehran’s military nuclear activities (weaponization and missile-delivery research and development) had ceased. The IAEA had begun investigating the regime’s nuclear program in 2002 following public revelations about undeclared nuclear sites and activities in Iran but was mostly treated to Iran stonewalling over questions about its nuclear weapons program. Tehran periodically sanitized and destroyed evidence at key sites.³⁹

The JCPOA mandated by December 2015 a “final” IAEA assessment of the agency’s investigations into the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, along with an inspection of a sole site associated with weaponization efforts, but Tehran failed to provide truthful answers for the report. Nevertheless, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China — plus Germany) proceeded with implementing the JCPOA anyway. The IAEA’s investigation remained unfinished, and it was unable to inspect Iran’s suspicious work at numerous other sites.⁴⁰

President Barack Obama announces Iran nuclear deal, July 14, 2015. (Photo by Andrew Harnik via Pool/Getty Images)

Thus, means were insufficient to verify Iran’s JCPOA commitment that “under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” (The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty also prohibits Iran from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.) There was also insufficient authorization for the IAEA to verify Tehran’s additional JCPOA commitment not to carry out specified weaponization-related activities.⁴¹ The regime succeeded in maintaining secrecy over past and possibly ongoing nuclear weapons efforts, the details of which were revealed further in mid-2018 when Israel seized a vast archive of nuclear documents from Iran that detailed extensive progress in Tehran’s plans to build atomic weapons.⁴²

In 2018, the IAEA began investigating this work by asking Iran for access to and/or information about four sites where the regime may have carried out nuclear weapons work using undeclared nuclear material. The IAEA concluded, with little cooperation from Iran, that Tehran had carried out such work at two sites, in violation of its safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not been able to close its investigation of two other sites due to Iran’s lack of cooperation.⁴³

The archive, notably, also indicated that in mid-2003, Iran planned to hide and continue weaponization activities even after the program’s discovery.⁴⁴ The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that the IAEA still has not yet visited as many as two dozen sites associated with Iran’s past and possibly with its ongoing nuclear weapons program.⁴⁵

Finally, Tehran was also not required to ratify the Additional Protocol (AP), which provides the IAEA with more-intrusive inspection and access rights at nuclear and associated sites.

No Missile Production Restrictions and Limited Testing Prohibitions

The JCPOA did not address Iran’s ballistic missiles. It was silent on missile production caps, eliminating certain classes of weapons, enshrining range caps, and other useful arms control measures. This was borne of a distinction the Obama administration made during negotiations between a nuclear weapon and the means to deliver it, which could be a ballistic missile.⁴⁶ In its sanctions relief annexes, the JCPOA paved a pathway for the removal of Iran’s defense industrial base and major missile manufacturers from European sanctions lists.⁴⁷ UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, watered down a previous UN prohibition on ballistic missile tests and transfers. It only stated, “Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology,” for eight years. Iran systematically flouted the call and celebrated when it lapsed.⁴⁸ 

Lifting Missile and Military Embargoes

The deal also permitted through UNSCR 2231 the lifting in 2020 of a UN embargo on international military trade with Tehran and the lifting in 2023 of a UN embargo on ballistic missile transfers and activities including testing⁴⁹ even though Iran violated both while the UNSCR was in force.⁵⁰ Earlier UN Security Council resolutions lacked expiration dates for these prohibitions and failed to take into account Iran’s status as the foremost sponsor of terrorism. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Tehran first began arming Moscow with drones⁵¹ and following the termination of the missile embargo, with missiles.⁵²

Sanctions Relief That Supported Iran’s Terrorism

The deal quickly relinquished leverage over Iran by providing immediate, rather than gradual, sanctions relief. After Iran took initial steps to implement the deal, the regime gained access to up to $150 billion that was used to bolster its state sponsorship of international terrorism, including proxies Hamas and Hezbollah, among others.⁵³

Now assassinated leader of the Palestinian Hamas movement, Ismail Haniyeh (2nd R), shakes hands with Iranian Chief of Staff for the Armed Forces Mohammad Bagheri (L) and the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard force, General Hossein Salami (C), during the swearing-in ceremony for Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Tehran, August 5, 2021. (Photo by Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Images)

To ensure that Iran would be permanently and verifiably blocked from acquiring nuclear weapons, a new nuclear agreement with Tehran would need to contain the following obligations designed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear weapons program:

1. Require Iran to Adhere to International Obligations:

• Permanent adherence to all obligations in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 

These include Iran’s NPT Article II commitment “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons … and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons”⁵⁴ and its Article III safeguards obligations. Iran’s obligation to permanently abide by its NPT obligations would need to override the withdrawal provisions of Article X of the NPT. This is particularly important because Iran has periodically threatened to withdraw from the NPT.

• Restoration of prior UN Iran resolutions and associated trade prohibitions on Iran’s nuclear, missile, and military programs and restoration of relevant expert panels.

This would require the so-called “snapback” of UN sanctions and other restrictions imposed on Iran by several UN Security Council resolutions enacted between 2006 and 2010, all of which were suspended by UNSCR 2231. Alternatively, the Security Council could adopt a new resolution achieving the same objective.

• Compliance with other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) conventions.

Iran is in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)⁵⁵ and must come back into compliance with it. Given Iran’s past chemical weapons use and transfer,⁵⁶ as well as its more recent experimentation with pharmaceutical-based agents,⁵⁷ this is of great urgency.

2. Eliminate Iran’s Access to Nuclear Fuel:

• Full, permanent, and verifiable dismantlement, export, or in-place destruction of Iran’s uranium production assets.

Such facilities and capabilities enable Iran to produce highly enriched and weapons-grade enriched uranium, key fuels for nuclear weapons. Relevant assets may include but are not limited to converted and enriched uranium stocks; uranium enrichment infrastructure, including gas centrifuge plants; gas centrifuge production parts, components, and materiel, manufacturing plants, and assembly facilities; uranium conversion facilities; and all associated support equipment.

• Full, permanent, and verifiable dismantlement, export, or in-place destruction of Iran’s plutonium production assets.

Such facilities and capabilities enable Iran to produce weapons-grade separated plutonium, a key fuel for nuclear weapons. Relevant assets may include but are not limited to reactors suited to proliferation-relevant plutonium production, plutonium reprocessing plants, associated support equipment, and research efforts.

• Verified import of reactor fuel to run permitted research reactors and verified export of spent reactor fuel.

Iran must be limited to importing reactor fuel and exporting spent fuel for medical isotope production in research reactors only and granted the same allowances to maintain nuclear power reactors for electrical power generation purposes only. Iran must be prohibited from having any ability to produce its own nuclear fuel. Removing Iran’s spent fuel will also reduce both proliferation and environmental risks.

Iran has no justifiable need to enrich its own uranium. Uranium enrichment technology is tightly controlled globally due to its dual applications in producing fuel for reactors and nuclear weapons.⁵⁸ As such, only some 14 countries currently enrich uranium.⁵⁹ Iran can obtain enriched uranium fuel for reactors at market cost from authorized global suppliers, such as the United States, France, or the nuclear fuel consortium Urenco.

Moreover, Tehran could obtain fuel from a multinational fuel bank. The multinational low enriched uranium bank, located in Kazakhstan but owned and controlled by the IAEA, is a mechanism of last resort for IAEA member states in case the supply of LEU to a nuclear power plant is disrupted due to exceptional circumstances that prevent securing the fuel from the commercial market or any other supply arrangement.⁶⁰ Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has suggested that the LEU bank “be expanded to guarantee that any [Persian Gulf] state can fuel its commercial nuclear reactors from an IAEA fuel bank on the condition of forgoing domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing.”⁶¹ This idea was also reflected in a Senate resolution co-sponsored by Sen. Graham in 2022.⁶² Either option — imports from reliable Western suppliers or from the IAEA fuel bank — would help minimize the risk of a remaining civil Iranian nuclear program while addressing Tehran’s proclaimed need for a reliable supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes.

• Full, permanent, and verifiable dismantlement, export, or in-place destruction of Iran’s heavy water production plant and associated equipment.

This will protect against Iran’s ability to use heavy water for covert plutonium-producing reactors.

• Permanent and verifiable prohibition on Iran’s reconstitution of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium production and reprocessing capabilities.

Once Iran has dismantled, exported, or permitted the destruction of its uranium and plutonium fuel cycle assets, its commitment not to rebuild them, either overtly or covertly, must be permanent and verifiable.

• Permanent IAEA monitoring of Iran’s uranium mines, mills, and ore processing facilities and activities. 

This obligation, which is supplementary to IAEA enhanced safeguards, will protect against diversion to military nuclear efforts or illicit/non-approved exports.⁶³

Rafael M. Grossi, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
(Photo by Thomas Kronsteiner/Getty Images)

3. Require Iran’s Complete Disclosure of Past and Current Nuclear Weaponization Work:

• Iran must provide a correct and complete description of past Iranian nuclear activities, including what the IAEA refers to as “possible military dimensions.”

Critical parts of Iran’s nuclear program are not fully understood by the international

community. Thus, Iran must be required to provide a baseline of information about sites, equipment, material, persons, and activities sufficient to make Iran’s nuclear program transparent. Until Iran correctly and completely answers previous questions from the IAEA about such activities and explains who was involved, what actions were taken, and where they took place, there can be no international confidence that the development of nuclear weapons capabilities has ceased. It is vital that the agreement’s data declaration provisions capture past Iranian activities in sufficient detail to provide a baseline understanding of how far Iran may be along the path to nuclear weapons.⁶⁴

• Iran must, immediately upon entry into force of the agreement, provide a correct

and complete data declaration of its current nuclear sites, activities, material, and equipment.

This will provide a baseline for accountancy and function as the equivalent of a tax return or internal audit. Declarations are compliance tools that help test Iran’s willingness to be transparent. Declarations also help establish those areas where Iranian nuclear equipment, material, and activities are located and that should therefore be subjected to persistent inspection and monitoring.⁶⁵

4. Require Unimpeded Access to Suspect Sites and Ensure Verification:

• Ratification of and permanent adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol and implementation of standard safeguards obligation Modified Code 3.1.

Iran’s parliament must immediately ratify the AP. The AP, supplementary to Iran’s comprehensive IAEA safeguards obligations stemming from the NPT, permits short-notice IAEA inspections of sites that may have possible relation to undeclared nuclear activities.⁶⁶ The AP would require Iran to permit IAEA access to any site the agency suspects may be engaged in such illicit activities. The AP would also require Iran to report to the IAEA additional information about various nuclear-related activities, including its nuclear imports and exports.⁶⁷ One hundred forty-one countries, plus the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) with its 27 member states, have entered into AP agreements with the IAEA.⁶⁸

Iran must also implement Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements Part to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Modified Code 3.1 requires Iran to provide early notification and design information to the IAEA about the construction of new nuclear facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is earlier.⁶⁹ The code is a legally binding commitment of IAEA safeguards that Iran has persistently violated.⁷⁰

• Intensive IAEA investigation and reporting on Iran’s past and ongoing nuclear weapons program.

The IAEA’s goal must be to determine an absence of undeclared nuclear material and nuclear weapons research and activities in Iran, or a “Broader Conclusion Plus,” and direct IAEA follow-up investigations as needed.⁷¹

• No sanitization, dismantlement, destruction, or relocation by Iran — without IAEA participation — of nuclear program documentation, equipment, and sites.

In the past, Iran has engaged in such concealment activities prior to IAEA inspections or visits.

• Facilitate full and timely IAEA access, by inspectors of the IAEA’s choosing, to current and former nuclear program personnel, documentation, equipment, and sites, including military sites.

The agreement, and potentially an accompanying UN Security Council resolution, should specifically require Iran to permanently provide the IAEA with “access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons, and documents requested by the IAEA,” as UNSCR 1929 previously required.⁷²

• Quarterly IAEA reporting on activities taken toward the dismantlement of Iran’s non-civil nuclear program and the status of IAEA investigation, as well as the status of any remaining approved civil nuclear activities and facilities.

Such IAEA reporting will allow member states to independently review implementation of the deal.

• Establishment of a designated committee for oversight of the dismantlement of relevant Iranian nuclear facilities and activities.

Such a committee would comprise the United States and any other Western countries that are parties to the deal. It would liaise with the IAEA and provide guidance and interpretations to the agency on the deal’s implementation. This committee would provide public, quarterly reports on its activities and Iran’s compliance with the provisions.

5. Terminate Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Research and Development:

• Declaration of and verified permanent closure or reorientation of civilian and military research institutions and personnel that engage in nuclear weapons-related research.

All relevant institutions and personnel must verifiably and permanently halt weaponization-related work, including work that the committee and IAEA assess have possible weaponization applications.

• Declaration and verified permanent dismantlement, destruction, or export of all components, equipment, computer programs and models, weapons designs, research, and facilities relevant to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, including archived assets.

Iran must eliminate all such assets that the committee and IAEA assess have possible weaponization applications.

• Permanent verifiable ban on weaponization-related research and activities.

Iran must commit to a permanent ban of such research and activities and verification that it has not reconstituted such research.

6. End Iran’s Illicit Imports and Exports: 

• End to non-approved imports for Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and end to any non-approved exports from these programs.

This provision must include facilities and commodities covered by Nuclear Suppliers Group Part I and II lists and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I and II items.⁷³ These import and export restrictions would limit Iran’s ability to covertly reconstitute illicit nuclear facilities and activities or to proliferate key assets abroad.

• Reporting by Iran and by supplier states of proposed nuclear- and missile-related imports by Iran, including those with dual civil and military uses, to the committee for approval or denial. 

The committee must be informed of such procurements and empowered to approve or deny them on a case-by-case basis. Iran must permit the IAEA to conduct checks of Iran’s ultimate use of the commodity to verify Iran’s stated use.

The JCPOA created, and UNSCR 2231 endorsed, the creation of a Procurement Channel to review proposals by states seeking to participate in or permit particular transfers of nuclear or dual-use goods, technology, and/or related services to Iran.⁷⁴ But the Procurement Channel did not fulfill its potential.⁷⁵ While the Procurement Channel was theoretically still functioning as of December 2024, submissions to it have petered out.⁷⁶

• Reporting by states to the committee of any suspicious or illicit Iranian nuclear- and missile-related imports or exports, including dual-use.

Countries must formally report such instances to the committee so it can proactively address Iranian noncompliance.

• Iran’s establishment of a fully transparent strategic trade control system to oversee and monitor any permitted nuclear- and missile-related procurements and exports.

Such a system must be separate from Iran’s military, which co-opts civilian institutions for cover to covertly import or export illicit nuclear and missile commodities and deceive suppliers about, for example, the end user, end use, or destination.

7. Require Iran to Terminate WMD Delivery Vehicle Efforts and Abide by Arms Embargoes:⁷⁷

• Full declaration to the committee of Iran’s ballistic missile, cruise missile, and drone arsenals and plans for their elimination.

Iran must declare those missiles that exceed MTCR Category 1 thresholds, commit to cease their production, and develop a plan and timetable to dismantle, export, or destroy these capabilities in-place. This should also include disclosing Iran’s domestic supply chain and other facilities involved in the production of these projectiles. 

• Termination of all tests of surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and space launch vehicles (SLVs) as well as any space-related activities that can be used to develop medium-range, intermediate-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Flight-testing offers the Islamic Republic a more ready and reliable missile force, and its space program is a way to grow its long-range strike capabilities while it claims to adhere to a self-imposed 2,000-kilometer ban.

• Adherence to other UN Security Council resolutions containing arms embargoes.

Tehran should commit to abiding by all applicable existing UN arms embargoes, including those relating to jurisdictions where it has partners, including Yemen (UNSCR 2216), Lebanon (UNSCR 1701), and North Korea (UNSCRs 1718 and 2270).

8. Terminate Iran’s Nuclear, Missile, and Arms Cooperation With Russia, China, North Korea, and Other States:

• Termination of Iranian military and technical assistance to the Russian Federation, including but not limited to support for weapons, material, and training for drones, ballistic missiles, or other platforms.

Iran’s transfer of missiles and drones to Russia is not covered by an active UN Security Council resolution and represents the first-ever large-scale Iranian export of these systems to the European continent.

• Iran must detail its past, and any ongoing, nuclear and missile cooperation with North Korea, China, Russia, and other states.

It will be far easier to deter, detect, and interdict future nuclear assistance to Iran if it has to make a declaration of its past nuclear cooperation with any outside actors. This will guard against the significant risk that Iran could circumvent restrictions on nuclear weapons activities on its own territory by acquiring fissile material from a foreign country such as North Korea or having such a country conduct nuclear or nuclear-related tests for it.⁷⁸

Iranian and North Korean officials during a meeting in Tehran, 2018.
(Photo by ATTA KENARE/AFP via Getty Images)

There are several precedents for Iran agreeing to completely dismantle its illicit nuclear weapons program. Four countries have peacefully rid themselves of complete, functioning nuclear weapons arsenals. At least two additional countries have peacefully dismantled their own significant nuclear weapons programs before they had achieved functioning nuclear bombs. Thus, the elements of an effective nuclear deal with Iran, as laid out in this report, are not impossible to achieve. Rather, these elements specify how to ensure that Iran follows through on commitments that other nations have made and kept.

The preeminent example of a country agreeing to dismantle its own nuclear weapons program is that of South Africa. Starting in 1990, South Africa dismantled its six active nuclear weapons and the associated infrastructure for enrichment and weaponization.⁷⁹ South Africa also dismantled its program to develop ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.⁸⁰ IAEA inspections played an important role in verifying the accuracy of South Africa’s declarations, and Pretoria provided full access to sites, documentation, and personnel to ensure no nuclear weapons or associated program remained.⁸¹

When the Soviet Union ceased to exist on January 1, 1992, and Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine became independent, those three new countries inherited hundreds of former Soviet nuclear warheads. Belarus had at least 81 nuclear weapons on its territory, and Kazakhstan had at least 1,400 nuclear warheads on its territory.⁸² Ukraine had more than 1,300 strategic nuclear warheads and approximately 4,200 nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons.⁸³ Pursuant to international agreements, Belarus transferred all the nuclear weapons in its territory to the Russian Federation by November 1996,⁸⁴ Kazakhstan did so by April 1995,⁸⁵ and Ukraine did so by June 1996.⁸⁶

Libya agreed to dismantle its own nuclear weapons program before it had achieved functioning nuclear bombs.⁸⁷ In October 2003, the United States and European allies seized a shipment that was part of a turnkey nuclear weapons program that Moammar Gadhafi had purchased from the Pakistani A.Q. Khan network. Caught red-handed, Gadhafi then “allowed unhindered access to IAEA inspectors, in addition to the full-scale removal of the program from the country, which included nuclear weapons designs, components, and documentation.”⁸⁸

Parts manufactured for Libya’s nuclear weapons program, Malaysia, 2004. (Photo by Jimin Lai/AFP via Getty Images)

Under U.S. pressure, Taiwan chose to shutter its nuclear weapons program in 1988.⁸⁹ After two decades of actively seeking nuclear weapons, Taiwan had reportedly advanced to within a year or two of completing a bomb.⁹⁰ The shutdown included closing Taiwan’s uranium enrichment work, plutonium reprocessing program, heavy water reactor, and nuclear weaponization research and development, as well as its nuclear-missile delivery work, which was fully verified by U.S. and IAEA inspections.⁹¹

In order to ensure Tehran’s disarmament, Washington will have to draw on all tools of national power to leave the Islamic Republic with no alternative to accepting the framework above. Specifically, Washington will need to combine intense diplomatic and economic pressure, covert action, and a credible military option.

History demonstrates that the Tehran regime will alter certain policies and strategies only when faced with meaningful risks to its top priority — staying in power — without which it would be unable to pursue any of its other objectives. For example, profound military and other considerations led Tehran to end the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, a conflict that the regime styled “the Sacred Defense,” and accept a UN-sponsored ceasefire it previously rejected.⁹² To effectively deter or coerce Iran now, the United States need not issue a direct threat to end the regime. However, U.S. policy should credibly threaten to impose costs that would, if sustained, clearly pose an existential threat.⁹³

U.S. President Donald Trump holds a document he signed reinstating sanctions against Iran after announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. (Photo by Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images)

First, to prevent Tehran from creating and exploiting political cracks between the United States and its allies, the new administration and its key partners should agree to a road map with deadlines for both pressure and negotiations, as well as desired end states. Specifically, the administration should ensure Europe adopts Washington’s goal of full disarmament rather than resurrection of the JCPOA or a modified version of the previous deal since those options would leave Iran’s atomic infrastructure in place.

Washington should also work with its trans-Atlantic partners to apply diplomatic pressure against Iran at international forums including IAEA Board of Governors meetings. They must hold Iran accountable for limiting and circumventing IAEA monitoring and otherwise failing to comply with legally mandated safeguards obligations, using the IAEA censure mechanism to require compliance and penalize nuclear escalation.

Similarly, the United States should work with its European partners to leverage an impending comprehensive IAEA report on Iran’s outstanding safeguards issues⁹⁴ as a pathway toward triggering the snapback mechanism in UNSCR 2231 before the mechanism sunsets in October 2025. Doing so will restore UN Iran sanctions and restrictions contained in previous UN Security Council resolutions, including the open-ended bans on Iranian missile tests and transfers, open-ended bans on Iranian exports and imports of conventional arms, and sanctions against Iran’s nuclear and defense-industrial base. The snapback would also reimpose more stringent nuclear limitations, such as the open-ended requirement in Resolution 1737 of 2006 that Iran “suspend … all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.”

Second, since the bulk of the Trump administration’s efforts are likely to be in the economic domain, Washington should vigorously enforce existing sanctions as part of the “maximum pressure” policy to sharpen the choice for Tehran. Compared with 2018 when Washington left the JCPOA, however, the United States has less time to wait given Iran’s considerable nuclear advances under Biden, and Tehran has considerably more nuclear leverage.⁹⁵ Additionally, Tehran’s deepening political, economic, and military ties with U.S. near-peer competitors like Russia and China mean that the sanctions tool alone may not be as effective as in years past. The United States will therefore need to ramp up sanctions quickly and aggressively.

In particular, the United States should strenuously enforce existing sanctions against Iranian persons, banks, businesses, or any other entities and their shell companies involved in major revenue generation operations for the Islamic Republic, such as the export or trade of oil, petrochemicals, natural gas, electricity, industrial metals like iron and aluminum, precious metals, and even lithium. For example, Iran’s oil exports brought in $53 billion in 2023.⁹⁶ China purchases over 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports.⁹⁷ Given the critical role energy exports to China play in the Iranian economy, Washington must robustly target those involved in Iran’s oil trade with China, including shippers, port operators, insurers, refiners, and financial institutions. This must include levying new sanctions where possible while also confiscating tankers illicitly shipping this oil.⁹⁸

Third are cyber and other irregular warfare operations. The U.S. Department of Defense defines the term “irregular warfare” to mean “a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities.”⁹⁹ These operations should expose Iranian vulnerabilities, damage or destroy certain capabilities, and highlight for Iranian decision-makers the depth of the penetration of their regime by foreign intelligence services. The United States should also partner with Israel, which has engaged in a broad array of these operations, including cyber-enabled economic warfare and sabotage.¹⁰⁰ Irregular warfare can help constrain the regime’s increasing desire to exploit its threshold nuclear status in response to its increasingly weak domestic hand.¹⁰¹

Fourth, the administration should work with regional military partners, such as Israel, to make sure Tehran understands the constellation of military options available for use against it. Washington and Jerusalem should intensify the pace and scope of joint military exercises. In particular, the Trump administration should repeat, expand, and strengthen the Juniper Oak exercises conducted by CENTCOM and the Israel Defense Forces in January 2023.¹⁰² The joint exercises aimed to send a message to Tehran that America and Israel were prepared to use force against Iran’s nuclear facilities and sought to demonstrate the interoperability and preparedness of the U.S. and Israeli militaries to undertake such a strike.¹⁰³

For a new exercise, Bradley Bowman, senior director of FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power, “suggests using American B-2 aircraft in addition to the B-1 and B-52 aircraft used during the last Juniper Oak exercise, as well as American KC-46 refueling aircraft. That would provide Israeli fighter pilots the opportunity to rehearse refueling from the KC-46 in anticipation of Israel receiving its own KC-46 refuelers.”¹⁰⁴

In addition, as part of that and other future exercises, the U.S. and Israeli air forces should rehearse attacks against deeply buried nuclear facilities like Fordow. Currently, only the United States possesses the bunker-busting GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) and the B-2 aircraft that carry that munition. Additionally, the stealth capabilities of the B-2 “give it a reasonable chance of evading Iranian air and missile defenses in repeat missions over key nuclear sites.”¹⁰⁵ Washington should consider providing the MOP to Jerusalem and explore ways to ensure Israel has the means to deliver it effectively.¹⁰⁶

To underscore his seriousness, Trump should also consistently issue statements that underscore Washington’s unwavering commitment to preventing a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic of Iran. This must include specifying — as done by Trump’s predecessors Barack Obama and Joe Biden — that the United States is prepared to use military force if necessary to prevent this. He should also reiterate his dedication to bolstering the American commitment to Israel, to include support for Israeli action against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The United States should also engage in other visible contingency planning in the region, such as bringing in additional forces, bolstering the air and missile defense assets of its allies, and hardening its own military bases. Should Iran test American resolve with increased maritime or proxy harassment in response to maximum pressure sanctions as it did during Trump’s first term,¹⁰⁷ decisive military responses will be needed to signal credibility and commitment to partners and adversaries alike.

Achieving an agreement with the Islamic Republic to dismantle its nuclear program will not be easy even though Iranian officials claim that proving to the international community that they do not harbor weapons aspirations is “not a problem.”¹⁰⁸ This section outlines select opportunities and pitfalls inherent in deal-making with the Islamic Republic.

Tehran has on occasion slowed or paused elements of its nuclear march. According to a U.S. intelligence report from 2012, the Islamic Republic’s “nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran’s security, prestige, and influence, as well as the international political and security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program.”¹⁰⁹ However, Iranian concessions have typically been designed to deflect foreign pressure and to reconstitute the nuclear program at a time of the regime’s own choosing.

For example, despite decelerating elements of its nuclear weapons work in 2003 following the George W. Bush administration’s invasion of neighboring Iraq, Iran split its nuclear effort into overt and covert parts while retaining an archive of past weaponization-related studies.¹¹⁰ Similarly, despite multilateral economic pressure forcing Iran to negotiate over domestic uranium enrichment, which led to the JCPOA in 2015, the restrictions to which Iran agreed were not permanent, nor did they require Tehran to give up its enrichment capacity.¹¹¹

But 2025 is not 2015. Despite the Islamic Republic being closer to a nuclear weapon now than at any point in its history, regional and domestic factors, particularly in the post-October 7 Middle East, offer an increased likelihood of being able to use pressure successfully against Tehran.

Should the regime respond militarily to maximum pressure, the United States and Israel have a proven ability to intercept the majority of Iranian projectiles. In addition, following Israel’s October 2024 retaliatory strikes against Iran, the regime reportedly does not possess the sort of long-range strategic air defense that could complicate a major military operation against above-ground targets on its territory.¹¹² With its national currency in freefall and social unrest continuing, the regime can ill afford to absorb pressure and run the clock as it did during the first Trump administration. Accordingly, the opportunity to use pressure now against Tehran need not be seen through the same pessimistic lens as in earlier points during the U.S.-Iran nuclear crisis.

This strategic context is seemingly forcing a change in Iranian discourse about deal-making with Washington.¹¹³ One advisor to Iran’s supreme leader said in a late January 2025 interview, “If negotiating with Satan is necessary for the interests of the regime, we will go to the depths of hell and negotiate.”¹¹⁴ Meanwhile, Iran’s foreign minister has more recently dismissed the idea of direct nuclear talks with the United States so long as Washington’s maximum pressure policy is in force.¹¹⁵ Various Iranian outlets, from newspapers¹¹⁶ to social media, however, continue to debate, if not occasionally promote, the idea of negotiations with Washington.¹¹⁷

But the president will have to proceed carefully and would be wise to recall his own previous comments about Iran’s negotiating prowess.¹¹⁸ Tehran likely sees talks as a way to slow-roll the return of maximum pressure sanctions and block Israeli or American military action.

Should talks commence, however, one challenge for the Trump administration will be how to square its diplomatic nonproliferation aims with its broader counter-Iran policy. While Trump has declared, “With me, it’s very simple. Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon,”¹¹⁹ his National Security Policy Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) of February 4 echoes his 12-point agenda from 2018¹²⁰ that encompassed not just nuclear issues but also regional destabilization, terrorism, and the regime’s hostage-taking.

However, negotiations are unlikely to yield a useful agreement on Tehran’s support for proxy forces. Hypothetically, Tehran could offer a political promise to not arm or fund certain groups or even make a legally binding commitment to refrain from such. But Iran’s track record in this area is not good, and the Islamic Republic is reportedly already diversifying how it supports its terrorist apparatus.¹²¹ By contrast, as Israeli forces have demonstrated over the past year, military action has a far greater potential to limit or roll back the capabilities of Iran’s proxy forces.

Another challenge inherent in negotiations is that Washington will have to offer concessions of its own to secure Tehran’s agreement to dismantle its nuclear weapons capability. The regime is likely desperate for sanctions relief, yet relief of any kind will end up underwriting regime stability and is likely to flow to Tehran’s regional terror proxies and the supreme leader’s business empire as well as entities owned or controlled by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) veterans at home.¹²²

Relatedly, if sanctions relief and other concessions strengthen the regime, then even a sound nuclear-only agreement will miss an opportunity to address the roots of Tehran’s foreign aggression and domestic suppression, which is the nature of the regime. Worse, it would be a setback to Iran’s democratic movement and brave protesting Iranians for whom Trump shattered political taboos in his first term to strongly support.¹²³ In the wake of nationwide anti-regime demonstrations like the 2022-2023 “Women, Life, Freedom” movement¹²⁴ that have shown the depth of the chasm between state and society in Iran, policymakers in Washington should know that any agreement with Tehran’s theocrats — even one that achieves the vital objective of permanently and verifiably dismantling Iran’s nuclear weapons program — would not only run counter to other U.S. values but would also rest on a rocky foundation.

If history is any indicator, Iran will use negotiations to continue its nuclear march and deflect the most stringent sanctions. Thus, while the president seeks a deal with the Islamic Republic, he will need to sustain and amass significant leverage via maximum economic pressure and a credible threat of military force.

To make a deal that stands the test of time and solves the Iran nuclear crisis, Trump must insist upon the wholesale and irreversible disarmament of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear weapons program.