FAQ: Understanding Saudi Arabia’s Uranium Enrichment Request

Q: What type of nuclear cooperation agreement is Saudi Arabia requesting from the United States?

Bloomberg reported on June 14 that National Security Council officials have briefed members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the contours of a U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement. While the administration apparently provided few details during that briefing — citing ongoing, sensitive negotiations — some information has leaked over the past year via media reports.

One version of the agreement would reportedly permit Riyadh to receive a U.S.-operated uranium enrichment plant stationed on Saudi territory. Earlier press reports noted that the United States would retain control of the technology and facility, and Saudi Arabia has requested the construction of the plant on either long-term U.S.-leased land or on one of several U.S. military bases.

Another proposed version would entail an agreement by Washington and Riyadh to revisit in 10 years the matter of whether Saudi Arabia could have uranium enrichment technology on its soil. During that time, there would be a moratorium on enrichment and reprocessing in Saudi Arabia, followed by a bilateral review mechanism to decide whether Washington should provide Riyadh with an enrichment plant or other related assistance.

Q: What else are the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel negotiating?

The United States and Saudi Arabia have also been continuing discussions on a bilateral defense pact. A U.S.-Saudi defense treaty would require a two-thirds majority vote in the U.S. Senate, which would be challenging to attain in any scenario and especially if it lacks Israel’s support. The two countries could also opt for a defense pact that falls short of a treaty but could be finalized via executive action.

The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are attempting to reach a trilateral “mega deal” but face issues that are reportedly difficult for the Israeli government to surmount. The Wall Street Journal reported on June 9 that Riyadh is conditioning its participation in such a deal on an end to the war in Gaza and “irreversible and irrevocable steps within several years toward the establishment of a Palestinian state.”

Q: Why do the United States and like-minded partners seek to limit the spread of uranium enrichment capabilities?

The export of uranium enrichment, as well as plutonium reprocessing, technologies, and equipment, is tightly restricted by the 14-15 states that have the ability to produce fuel that can be used for both nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. The technologies have inherent commercial nuclear energy applications and proliferation potential with regard to nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), for example, is a broad collaborative effort among many of those possessor countries, boasting 48 member states that work to restrict the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies. NSG members also include the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) that are officially recognized as possessing nuclear weapons by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Despite past efforts among some to proliferate enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, the five have adhered over the past few decades to strict technology controls.

Q: What is longstanding U.S. policy regarding sharing uranium enrichment technology with foreign countries?

For several decades, the United States has declined requests from allies and partners to share uranium enrichment technology or use U.S.-origin nuclear fuel and equipment to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium. Thus, today, only 14 or 15 countries possess such uranium enrichment technology. Washington has deemed it more important to maintain a strong precedent against proliferating this technology and to improve international supply controls.

Q: What is the key proliferation concern about providing uranium enrichment to Saudi Arabia?

As recently as September 2023, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia stated his intention to acquire nuclear arms if Iran does so. Therefore, providing Saudi Arabia with the ability to enrich uranium could be a way for Riyadh to match Tehran’s uranium enrichment and nuclear-threshold capabilities. As a result, the Biden administration cannot credibly present a potential U.S.-Saudi enrichment program as intended solely for peaceful purposes.

To the international community, a uranium enrichment deal would implicitly mean Washington acquiesced to a nascent Saudi nuclear weapons program. Housing an enrichment facility on a U.S. military base, moreover, would further militarize the plant and undermine arguments that it is for a civilian purpose. Even opening a door to enrichment via U.S. approval in several years would erode the precedent against other regional actors, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Egypt, seeking uranium enrichment. Should they seek and acquire unfettered enrichment, multiple states in the region could end up on the threshold of nuclear weapons.

Q: Why does Saudi Arabia want nuclear energy if it possesses one of the world’s largest oil reserves?

Saudi Arabia seeks parity with Iran’s existing nuclear capabilities. In January 2023, Riyadh said it intends to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining, conversion, enrichment, and nuclear fuel fabrication. It also says it seeks to diversify energy exports and develop commercial nuclear power to produce and export electricity to the Middle East as well as continental Europe.

Q: Can rolling back Iran’s enrichment program negate the Saudis’ desire to obtain enrichment?

Possibly. In an unprecedented shift in policy, after long opposing Iranian enrichment, the United States tacitly accepted Tehran’s enrichment program under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, passed in July 2015 to endorse the Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA also reversed successive UN Security Council resolutions passed from 2006 to 2010 demanding that Tehran halt enrichment. Moreover, starting this year, the JCPOA’s restrictions on the growth of Iran’s enrichment program start to lift. It should not be surprising that Saudi Arabia (and other countries) would seek similar enrichment capacities.

Washington can reverse these precedents by working to roll back Iran’s enrichment efforts and reimpose prior UN sanctions against Tehran, including the prohibition against uranium enrichment. This would be a start toward mitigating the Saudis’ drive to match Tehran and convince the kingdom that the United States is serious about reversing Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts.

Put differently, stemming regional proliferation will not be achieved by granting enrichment or reprocessing to additional Middle Eastern states, which risks endowing them with the capability to make nuclear weapons on short order.

Q: Besides the United States, what other countries might become involved in Riyadh’s quest for nuclear energy?

Saudi Arabia is seeking foreign contractors to build its first nuclear power reactors. South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corporation, possibly with the American company Westinghouse in an advisory or support role, has expressed interest in the contract. Westinghouse could also become a late contender to build the reactors as the prime contractor. Other potential suppliers are France’s Framatome, Russia’s Rosatom Corporation, and China’s National Nuclear Corporation.

Q: Would Saudi Arabia obtain enrichment from China instead of the United States?

While possible, it is unlikely that China would provide Saudi Arabia with a uranium enrichment capability. Beijing is attempting to emerge as a commercial nuclear fuel supplier and could be averse to creating another competitor. In addition, Riyadh is likely aware of — and sees the downsides to — the fact that a close defense relationship with China would almost certainly entail an expectation on the part of Beijing that Saudi Arabia would become a subservient or vassal-type state that would primarily serve to provide a steady supply of oil to China.

Riyadh most prizes a U.S. defense guarantee against Iran as well as the continued flow of billions of dollars in U.S. military equipment, defense collaboration, and intelligence. Case in point: Saudi officials told The Wall Street Journal that they were using the possibility, however remote, of choosing Chinese nuclear supply as leverage to obtain more advantageous terms from Washington in negotiations.

Q: Does Saudi Arabia need uranium enrichment to achieve its nuclear energy goals?

No. Riyadh does not require enrichment to achieve its goal of becoming a nuclear electricity-producing powerhouse. President Biden could agree to significant U.S. nuclear assistance with the rest of the uranium fuel cycle while rejecting the Saudi enrichment request. The United States could offer its nuclear safety, security, and technical expertise while assisting Riyadh’s uranium mining and milling endeavors.

Instead of enriching uranium at home, Saudi Arabia could ship the material to France, the European Urenco consortium, or the United States for reliable and affordable nuclear fuel fabrication. Washington might also offer an assured reactor fuel supply, should the kingdom require it.

Q: What is U.S. law governing American nuclear cooperation and technology-sharing with foreign countries?

The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, Section 123, requires that the United States enter into a nuclear cooperation agreement prior to sharing major civil nuclear materials or technology with a foreign country. Section 123 provides nine nonproliferation criteria that must be included in the agreements. The State Department, the lead U.S. agency that negotiates 123 agreements, notes that the “criteria require 123 agreements to legally obligate our partners to observe specific standards in a multitude of areas including peaceful uses; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards (technical measures through which the IAEA seeks to verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses); physical security of nuclear materials; and prohibitions on enriching, reprocessing, and transfer of specific material and equipment without our consent.”

The National Nuclear Security Administration reported that as of July 9, 2024, the United States had 24 Section 123 agreements covering 48 countries, the IAEA, and Taiwan.

Q: Is congressional approval required to reach a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia?

No, and Congress has a high bar to stop an agreement. The president must submit a draft 123 agreement to Congress for review along with a nuclear proliferation assessment. The agreement becomes effective after two time periods totaling 90 days of continuous session unless Congress adopts a joint resolution of disapproval. (The law requires the president first to submit the text of the proposed agreement and unclassified nonproliferation assessment and consult with Congress for not less than 30 days of continuous session. Then, the president must submit the agreement to Congress along with a classified nonproliferation assessment and statement of approval and determination that the agreement does not harm U.S. national security interests, after which Congress has another 60 days of continuous session to consider the agreement.)

Since the current Congress lacks a remaining 90 days of session, members would need to return from recess specifically to address a proposed U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement. Thus, unless Congress proactively blocks or conditions a 123 agreement, it could be adopted by the administration before the end of Biden’s term. The short timeframe to conclude an agreement means it may fall within the next administration’s purview.

Q: What can Congress do to block or condition a 123 agreement?  

Congress could pass a law that a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia requires Riyadh to forgo enrichment and reprocessing and to sign an enhanced nuclear inspection agreement with the IAEA called the Additional Protocol (AP). However, President Biden could veto the measure.

Other avenues are possible, such as a May 2024 proposal by Rep. Brad Sherman for the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2025 to amend rules governing the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology. Specifically, Congress could block nuclear transfers if the administration cannot certify that Riyadh is not seeking enrichment or reprocessing and that the kingdom has not signed an AP. However, the next NDAA may not take effect until December or later, and the amendment could ultimately be cut.

Q: What is a ‘gold standard’ 123 agreement?

In 2009, the UAE concluded a 123 agreement with the United States that created a “gold standard” of nonproliferation: Both sides went beyond the requirements of the AEA when Abu Dhabi agreed to forgo enrichment and reprocessing of any nuclear material (whether or not the United States is the source).

Since 2009, successive U.S. presidential administrations, both Democratic and Republican, have stated that a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia should match the gold standard. Riyadh has thus far rejected Washington’s request. Washington’s unwillingness to stop Iran’s uranium enrichment program while limiting the options of allies and partners has not gone unnoticed in the region.

Q: What will happen to the gold standard if the United States acquiesces to Saudi Arabia’s demands?

U.S. acceptance of Riyadh’s request would potentially open a Pandora’s box of demands from U.S. allies and partners — such as Turkey and South Korea — that Washington revise nuclear cooperation agreements to specifically consent to enrichment or reprocessing or offer similar facilities on their territories. Egypt and Jordan may request similar capabilities in future nuclear cooperation agreements. Moreover, the UAE’s 123 agreement provides Abu Dhabi with the right to “consult” with the United States “regarding the possibility of amending” the terms of its nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States should another Middle Eastern country receive less restrictive terms. 

Q: Could the United States negotiate guardrails to ensure that Saudi Arabia cannot seize a uranium enrichment plant to make fuel for nuclear weapons?

Any guardrails are vulnerable to defeat. Press reports have suggested that Washington and Riyadh have discussed several different guardrails, including remotely shutting down a future plant or providing some mechanism to destroy the centrifuges or the entire plant in the event of a takeover. But these provisions do not address the crucial problem: Once the technology is in Saudi Arabia, and if its engineers and experts gain experience operating the plant, Riyadh could use those lessons to build an entirely separate plant. Moreover, even if Saudi officials are not allowed inside the plant, it would be vulnerable to espionage.

It is also instructive that Saudi Arabia has pointed to the example of Aramco, which was a joint U.S.-Saudi oil venture that Riyadh eventually nationalized. Its takeover provides a stark reminder that any safeguards put in place for a “nuclear Aramco” can be discarded.

It is also worth noting that the United States had inspection rights at Taiwan’s nuclear facilities in the 1970s and 1980s, but this did not prevent Taipei from pursuing a secret nuclear weapons program. In the Saudi case, Washington might not have enough leverage, as it did with Taiwan, to shut down such a program.

Q: If the United States agrees to provide significant nuclear assistance to Saudi Arabia without uranium enrichment, can the IAEA ensure that the program remains peaceful?

The Saudis recently rescinded an outdated safeguards agreement with the IAEA, known as the Small Quantities Protocol. This rescindment enables suspended provisions of Riyadh’s comprehensive safeguards agreement to come into effect, thereby providing greater IAEA inspection rights at sites where Saudi Arabia will produce nuclear material. The rescindment also requires Riyadh to provide more information about its nuclear activities, including its planned nuclear expansion. Yet the Saudis still have not committed to signing a strong AP inspection agreement with the IAEA to allow the agency both to inspect nuclear-related sites where nuclear material is not present and to prevent Saudi diversion of assets or activities relevant to an atomic weapons program.