Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: January

Beijing closed out 2025 by tightening the screws on Taiwan and stress-testing Washington’s China posture. Eleven days after the United States unveiled a record $11.1 billion arms package for Taipei, China sanctioned U.S. defense firms and individuals, then launched “Justice Mission 2025,” large-scale drills around Taiwan that simulated a blockade-like encirclement. Chinese officials warned that China’s military would “take forceful measures to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” signaling that coercion is shifting from episodic shows of force to routinized pressure campaigns with legal, economic, and operational components.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy foregrounds U.S. “preeminence” in the Western Hemisphere and adopts a softer China frame. Its Asia section — “Win the Economic Future, Prevent Military Confrontation” — signals an emphasis on stability and commercial upside with China, not clear-eyed competition. That rhetorical pivot risks normalizing win-win assumptions about a coercive, illiberal rival, and the missing National Defense Strategy leaves unclear how the White House plans to back words with military deterrence.

The administration’s sharpest contradiction came in technology policy. Washington greenlit sales of Nvidia’s advanced H200 chips to Beijing under an arrangement that gives the U.S. government a 25 percent cut. Seven U.S. senators warned that chips like the H200 are “integral to modern military applications.” Beijing has reportedly told some firms to pause orders while it weighs fears that the chips contain hidden backdoors. The likely outcome is asymmetric: China will take what chips it can get now while racing to replace them, and Washington will have boosted a rival’s compute in the meantime.

The raid in Venezuela marked a watershed moment in public discussions about U.S. offensive cyber capabilities. President Trump indicated that the United States used cyber operations to “turn off the lights” in Caracas during the raid. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Dan Caine also explained that U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Space Command worked together using layered effects “to create a pathway” for the operation.

These public statements mark a positive step forward for acknowledging cyber’s integration into military operations. Whether the United States revealed a previously undisclosed capability or took advantage of a known vulnerability in Venezuela’s critical infrastructure remains to be seen.

In December, a Department of Energy restructuring established specific offices focused on quantum and artificial intelligence. Meanwhile, the State Department stepped up its Rewards for Justice initiative, which offers millions of dollars in exchange for information about malign cyber actors from adversarial nations.

Unfortunately, the future of the Federal Communications Commission’s Cyber Trust Mark Program, which improves the transparency and security of Internet of Things devices, is in doubt after the lead administrator of the program withdrew over an investigation into its ties to China.

Looking ahead, the administration’s cyber policy will be driven by its release of the anticipated national cyber strategy — which has reportedly stalled — and its ability to rapidly renominate the much-needed Sean Plankey to lead the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency after the Senate adjourned without confirming him.

President Trump directed the U.S. military to support law enforcement in the successful capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro on January 2. The audacious joint operation included over 150 aircraft and special forces. After the operation, Trump said the United States would “run” Venezuela, did not rule out American boots on the ground, and failed to articulate clear objectives for U.S. military forces.

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth outlined the administration’s forthcoming National Defense Strategy on December 6, saying the Pentagon would prioritize defending America’s homeland, deterring China, increasing allied burden-sharing, and “supercharging” the defense industrial base. Hegseth also stressed that the administration would avoid “interventionism, undefined wars, regime change […] and feckless nation building.” Hegseth’s speech came after the administration released its National Security Strategy, which failed to identify Russia and China as adversaries and largely reserved its criticism for America’s allies.

U.S. Central Command struck over 70 ISIS targets across Syria on December 19 in response to the ambush that killed two American soldiers and an American interpreter on December 13. U.S. and partner forces also conducted 11 operations from December 20 to 29 that killed or captured more than 20 additional ISIS operatives.

The administration announced an $11 billion arms sale to Taiwan on December 17 that included High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), self-propelled howitzers, loitering munitions, and Harpoon missile repair follow-on support. This large arms sale can help make Taiwan a steel porcupine to deter the predator in Beijing. The administration should now move heaven and earth to expedite delivery.

The Trump administration convened a G20 Sherpa meeting in Washington from December 15 to 16 in which countries agreed to focus on reliable and affordable energy options — code for cheaper baseload energy instead of high-priced intermittent sources. While many members of the G20 will not admit to it, the forum is on track to make American energy dominance priorities the centerpiece of conversation for the next year, reversing past concentration on renewables and climate change.

Separately, the administration supported Chevron in securing a $35 billion natural gas export license on December 17 from Israel — the largest in the country’s history. The gas deal is expected to enable Chevron to expand exploration and development off Israel’s shores while unlocking new diplomatic opportunities for Israel-Egypt relations and potentially wider regional export of Israeli gas.

On the domestic front, the Department of Energy (DOE) on December 18 announced a partnership with 24 AI innovation organizations as part of the White House’s Project Genesis to help “drive energy innovation.” DOE on December 2 also announced up to $800 million in federal cost-sharing funding for the Tennessee Valley Authority and Holtec Government Services to support early deployments of light-water small modular reactors.

Finally, the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) on December 10 held the first offshore oil and gas lease sale directed by last year’s “One Big Beautiful Bill.” BOEM offered approximately 15,000 unleased blocks across the Western, Central, and portions of the Eastern Gulf Planning Areas and reported strong bidding.

Weeks of shuttle diplomacy, kicked off in November after the Trump administration attempted to pressure Ukraine to swallow a Russia-favorable peace plan, have brought Washington closer to consensus with Kyiv and Europe. Numerous meetings between American, Ukrainian, and European officials yielded a revised draft peace framework with accompanying documents on security guarantees and economic support for Ukraine. Key issues remain unresolved, however. These include Russia’s territorial demands, which the White House has urged Kyiv to accommodate.

In part to encourage Ukrainian territorial concessions, the administration has offered Kyiv remarkably forward-leaning security commitments, including an “Article 5-like” guarantee. This has enthused Kyiv and Europe. But that promise rings hollow given that no American leader, least of all President Trump, would likely prove willing to fight Russia over Ukraine. Trump seems overconfident that Moscow will not call his bluff. The more immediate problem, of course, is that the Kremlin rejects core elements of the current peace plan, and the administration still has not done enough to pressure Russia to compromise.

Despite the improved transatlantic unity on Ukraine, the administration has continued to erode allied trust in the United States. Trump’s new National Security Strategy, published on December 4, casts America as a mediator between Russia and Europe rather than NATO’s leading member. Further, it excoriates Europe for supposed “civilizational erasure” and democratic illegitimacy while seemingly asserting the right to meddle in European politics. In January, the administration poured more salt on the wound by renewing demands to acquire Greenland, even absurdly suggesting that military force is an “option.”

While Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan held meetings in Washington with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast, editorials in state-backed Saudi media attacked President Trump’s foreign policy, with one arguing that arresting Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro was part of Washington’s “pursuit to maintain exclusive hegemony over the world and setting Israel’s hands free” in the Middle East.

In its readouts, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Bin Farhan’s meetings in Washington focused on the “historic and strategic” relations between the two countries. Meanwhile, an editorial in the daily Al-Riyadh stated: “Wherever Israel is present, there is ruin and destruction. [Israel] pursues policies that disregard international law, do not recognize human rights, and do not respect the sovereignty of states or the integrity of their territories, while working to exploit crises and conflicts to deepen divisions.”

The Saudis’ conflicting rhetoric is alarming given a noticeable drift in the kingdom’s foreign policy, growing closer to the Islamist axis of Qatar and Iran and further away from moderate American allies like the United Arab Emirates and Israel. Saudi incitement against the Abraham Accords and normalization with Israel has also been evident in official statements and state media.

“Trump’s new doctrine represents an era characterized by violent and direct intervention based on exploiting technological and informational superiority to impose a new political reality that aligns with [his] right-wing populist ideology,” wrote Rami Al-Ali in Okaz.

In its National Security Strategy, the Trump administration reiterated its commitment to establishing deterrence in the Indo-Pacific — a position backed over the past month through a range of security dialogues and military drills with regional allies and partners.

In a meeting between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and their Australian counterparts on December 8, Hegseth noted the U.S. military’s efforts to upgrade basing infrastructure in Queensland, the Northern Territory, and Darwin to host larger contingents of U.S. Marines and bomber squadrons. During his remarks, Hegseth also called for both Washington and Canberra to accelerate co-production of hypersonic attack cruise missiles and air-to-air missiles — systems crucial to targeting Chinese air and naval capabilities within the First Island Chain.

Washington’s commitment to defending the First Island Chain appears to have prompted reforms among United States Forces Korea (USFK), with General Xavier T. Brunson calling on USFK to adopt a position of “strategic flexibility” in preparation for a possible deployment in the event of a Taiwan crisis.

The United States also executed numerous shows of force with its closest treaty allies in the region — Japan and the Philippines. After Chinese jets targeted Japanese planes over the Sea of Japan on December 6, U.S. nuclear-capable bombers and Japanese fighters conducted snap exercises, while the State Department issued a statement criticizing Beijing’s provocative actions. Following rising tension in the South China Sea, American forces also initiated exercises with Filipino air and naval forces to enhance both forces’ growing interoperability.

The Trump administration announced in early December that it was considering imposing terrorism-related sanctions on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for its “proven track record of aiding and abetting terrorists.” Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Marco Rubio sanctioned two additional International Criminal Court judges for their efforts to “investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute Israeli nationals, without Israel’s consent.” These sanctions are pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order 14203 of February 2025, which targets the court for its “illegitimate and baseless actions targeting America and our close ally Israel.”

Meanwhile, the administration announced on December 29 that it is piloting a new funding mechanism for UN humanitarian programs. Administered by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the new mechanism will provide flexible funding vehicles that prioritize life-saving aid around the world. According to the administration, the new paradigm will streamline aid distribution, save an estimated $1.9 billion, and ensure alignment with U.S. interests.

Finally, on January 7, the White House announced that Washington is withdrawing from 66 international organizations, conventions, and treaties, approximately half of which are part of the United Nations. The decision is consistent with Executive Order 14199 of February 2025, which directed a review of all international organizations, conventions, and treaties that the United States participates in or provides funding for to determine whether they serve American interests.

President Trump offered support for Iranian protesters in a Truth Social post on January 2, saying that if the regime kills demonstrators, “the United States of America will come to their rescue.” The State Department’s Persian-language X account has also continued to offer support for the Iranian people and warnings to the clerical regime.

Iranians took to the streets beginning on December 28 to protest the country’s dire economic state, but the uprising quickly moved to demands for regime change, with Iranians appealing to President Trump for assistance. The Islamic Republic may have killed thousands, according to reports. However, the exact number is difficult to confirm, as the regime turned off the internet on January 8. When asked if the regime’s violent response to protests crossed a red line, President Trump said, “they’re starting to — it looks like it.” He said the military is considering options for action.

When asked about supporting potential Israeli strikes on Iran’s weapons programs after his December 29 meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Trump said, “If they will continue with the missiles, yes. The nuclear, fast.”

The Trump administration has continued to target Iran’s shadow fleet by designating an additional 29 vessels involved in Iran’s illicit oil trade, their management companies, and an Egyptian businessman associated with the network. The Treasury Department also designated individuals and entities involved in the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) trade between Iran and Venezuela, Iran’s procurement network for chemicals necessary for missile production, and aerospace and UAV programs controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The Gaza ceasefire is holding despite repeated Hamas violations, including the failure to return the last remaining hostage in the territory. However, President Trump reportedly expressed his frustration with Israel in mid-December for potentially derailing the deal by eliminating a top Hamas commander. Washington and Jerusalem seemed to smooth things over in late December, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Trump.

But the deal’s next steps have proven more elusive. No country, including Azerbaijan, seen as a prime candidate for sending peacekeepers, has offered to contribute soldiers to the International Stabilization Force envisioned in the deal. Meanwhile, in a positive development, Nickolay Mladenov, a seasoned Bulgarian diplomat who has earned the trust of the Israelis for his pragmatism, appears set to lead the Board of Peace overseeing Gaza’s future.

Separately, on December 18, the State Department commendably announced sanctions on additional International Criminal Court judges for “politicized actions targeting Israel.” The administration clarified that it rejects the court’s attempt to insert itself in the matters of countries that have not submitted to its jurisdiction. In another positive development, in early January, Syria and Israel, under American auspices, agreed to a “joint fusion mechanism” to coordinate on “intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement, and commercial opportunities.”

However, in an apparent nod to Trump’s goal of reducing foreign funding, Netanyahu expressed his intention to eliminate U.S. military assistance to Israel within 10 years. This could reduce Washington’s leverage over Jerusalem while also making Israel’s already high defense spending prohibitive.

After building positive momentum with South Korea following his trip to Seoul in October, President Trump has largely overlooked developments on the Korean peninsula. The National Security Strategy, released in December, included no mention of nuclear, missile, or cyber threats posed by North Korea.

The lack of attention comes as the threat posed by North Korea is increasing. North Korean state media outlets reported that Pyongyang’s military successfully tested new hypersonic missiles in early January. If the tests were indeed successful, this would mark a significant increase in the missile capacity of the North Korean military.

Meanwhile, South Korean President Lee traveled to China to meet with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping. While there, President Lee stated his desire to reopen dialogue with North Korea and gain China’s support in such diplomatic efforts. President Lee’s actions in Beijing signal Seoul’s desire to rely more on Beijing — and less on Washington — to help navigate the North Korea issue. This, in turn, indicates that Washington has not provided enough reassurances to Seoul’s leadership on its North Korea policy interests and that bilateral trade issues between the United States and South Korea are interfering with national security concerns.

The Trump administration should demonstrate Washington’s commitment to the alliance’s core interests to preserve peace on the peninsula. If the Trump administration fails to regain Seoul’s trust, and Seoul becomes reliant upon China to navigate its engagement efforts with North Korea, the United States risks allowing Beijing to manipulate inter-Korean relations to China’s benefit.

Lebanon’s self-declared deadline for disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River came and went on December 31, 2025. However, as Israeli strikes on Hezbollah assets south of the waterway, and personnel involved in the group’s regeneration efforts, continued past that deadline, evidence suggests this objective remains far from completed.

Israel has nevertheless credited Lebanon for the steps it has taken against Hezbollah. At the same time, Jerusalem has emphasized that these efforts — in the words of Foreign Minister Gideon Saar — are “far from sufficient … in light of Hezbollah’s efforts to rearm and rebuild.” In response to Lebanon’s shortcomings, reports indicate that the IDF has presented Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with plans for a limited offensive, or several intense operations short of war, inside Lebanon aimed at further degrading Hezbollah and reversing its regeneration.

Netanyahu also raised Hezbollah’s virtually unimpeded rearmament with President Donald Trump during their December 29 meeting at Mar-a-Lago. Reports suggested the president expressed Washington’s support for an Israeli military escalation in Lebanon if Beirut continued its hesitation to restrain or act against the group.

The last remaining U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control treaty, New START, is set to expire on February 5, and the Trump administration has not yet formally responded to Russia’s proposal to preserve its limits. The treaty caps both nations’ deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems. In September 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed that both sides voluntarily adhere to New START’s central limits for one year beyond the expiration.

However, Moscow has maintained its 2023 suspension of compliance with the treaty’s verification provisions, including on-site inspections and data exchanges. President Trump has expressed interest in nuclear arms limitations but seeks China’s inclusion in any future agreement. Beijing, amid its ongoing large-scale nuclear expansion and modernization, has ruled out such talks.

In December, two European research groups identified new signs of China’s expanding nuclear weapons production capabilities. The latest U.S. Defense Department report on China’s military power, also released in December, projects that Beijing’s operational nuclear arsenal could reach over 1,000 warheads by 2030, amid indications that China is pursuing lower-yield weapons suitable for limited battlefield use.

Meanwhile, new activity at Iranian nuclear sites indicates Tehran’s intent to rebuild its nuclear weapons program following U.S. and Israeli strikes in June 2025. The Institute for Science and International Security has observed limited construction and excavation efforts in recent months. These steps could provoke further strikes from Washington or Jerusalem aimed at keeping Iran far from the nuclear threshold.

On December 19, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it conducted “a large-scale strike” against ISIS “infrastructure and weapons sites in Syria,” hitting more than 70 targets. The U.S. military operation came in response to the December 13 attack near Palmyra, Syria, that killed two members of the Iowa National Guard and a civilian interpreter as they were meeting with Syrian security forces.

However, the target of the operation — ISIS — is curious as the Islamic State neither carried out the attack nor claimed credit for it. The attack was carried out by a member of Syria’s security services, who ironically was under investigation for jihadist ties. The operation was ironic as well because the Syrian security services are composed of thousands of foreign and domestic jihadists, many of whom are loyal to or allied with al-Qaeda, or have served in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, al-Qaeda’s former branch in Syria. Some leaders of the Syrian government are also members of al-Qaeda.

The Trump administration has decided to ally with the new Syrian regime despite its roots as an al-Qaeda branch whose leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, was the head of al-Qaeda in Syria. U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack said in July 2025 that there is “no Plan B” in Syria and that the administration is committed to working with Sharaa.

The United States played a central role in mediating negotiations between senior Israeli and Syrian officials in Paris. According to a State Department readout, the talks focused on “Syria’s sovereignty and stability, Israel’s security, and prosperity for both countries.” Both Israel and Syria also agreed to coordinate in a U.S.-supervised mechanism to facilitate cooperation on critical issues facing both countries, including intelligence sharing and military de-escalation. This is particularly significant given the shared threats both countries face from Iran’s proxy networks, most notably Hezbollah, and the rise in military tensions between them in recent months.

However, U.S. mediation has not been successful on all fronts in Syria. The U.S-brokered March agreement between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which was supposed to be implemented by the end of 2025, collapsed. Efforts to revive the talks also failed, as a Damascus meeting on January 4 produced no tangible outcomes.

As a result, tensions escalated into ongoing clashes between government forces and the SDF in the SDF-controlled Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh in Aleppo, signaling a renewed slide toward conflict that harms U.S. interests concerning stability and counterterrorism in Syria. The State Department stated that it is monitoring the situation “closely” and urged both parties to “exercise restraint.”

In a January 5 phone call with President Trump, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticized the U.S. attack on Venezuela that removed Nicolas Maduro from power. Erdogan said that Venezuela must not descend into instability and that Washington must respect national sovereignty and international law. At the same time, Erdogan reaffirmed Turkey’s support for the Venezuelan people.

However, since Maduro’s capture by U.S. forces, Ankara’s bilateral ties with Caracas have come under increased scrutiny. Erdogan was an important external backer of Maduro, providing diplomatic cover, economic engagement, and access to international markets for Venezuela. Turkey has also violated U.S. sanctions by engaging economically with Venezuela’s energy and mining sectors. Since 2018, Turkish entities have partnered with Caracas in state-run gold mining ventures in southern Venezuela’s Orinoco Mining Arc, a region plagued by illegal mining, environmental devastation, and human rights abuses.

These actions bolstered Maduro’s regime, yet Washington has not penalized Turkey for its conduct. The Trump administration should sanction Turkish-linked entities and individuals tied to circumventing sanctions against Venezuela. Under the provisions of Executive Order 13884, Washington should also deny complicit foreign nationals entry into America and freeze their assets. Additionally, the Trump administration should apply diplomatic pressure that highlights the incongruity of a NATO ally aiding a sanctioned regime.