Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: August

July produced a narrow humanitarian win while underscoring Beijing’s use of unlawful detention to gain diplomatic leverage over the United States. Chinese authorities released Pastor Ezra Jin Mingri, founder of Zion Church, after nine months in custody, allowing him to reunite with his family in the United States. President Trump raised his case with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in May. But Chinese authorities continue to persecute independent Christian communities; at least eight Zion Church members reportedly remain imprisoned; and Beijing has since arrested other U.S. citizens, including Youlin Chen and Min Zin, on unsubstantiated national-security grounds.

The administration also eased pressure on Hong Kong without securing a visible concession. Washington allowed the national emergency tied to Trump’s 2020 Executive Order 13936 to expire, lifting some sanctions imposed after Beijing dismantled Hong Kong’s autonomy and cracked down on pro-democracy activists. China’s Commerce Ministry welcomed the move; however, Hong Kong’s basic freedoms have not been restored, and Beijing gave no sign it would release political prisoners or reverse its crackdown.

Xi then used July’s World Artificial Intelligence Conference to cast China as the champion of a “just and equitable” global artificial intelligence (AI) order. The message served a strategic purpose: Beijing wants to shape AI rules, standards, and access while narrowing America’s compute advantage. Trump can pursue tactical deals with Xi, but July showed the danger of giving Beijing concessions for limited returns. Strategic stability requires leverage, and Washington should preserve its advantages, especially in advanced semiconductor manufacturing, before the next round of bilateral bargaining this fall.

In an address to the nation on July 16, President Donald Trump drew attention to the critical issue of election security and integrity. Unfortunately, over the past 18 months, his administration gutted election security initiatives across government.

Still, July brought several positive developments. The administration announced its long-awaited AI-enabled vulnerability coordination initiative, dubbed Gold Eagle, stemming from the executive order creating a voluntary mechanism for government review of AI models before they are released to the market. The mechanism is particularly timely in light of reports that OpenAI’s latest model escaped its test environment and hacked other companies.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) finally launched the Alliance of National Councils for Homeland Operational Resilience – Critical Infrastructure (ANCHOR-CI), the information-sharing framework to replace the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, which then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem disbanded in 2025. CISA also teamed up with Australian partners to issue guidance on hardening critical infrastructure operational technology against potential cyber incidents.

Likewise, U.S. agencies issued an advisory on Iran’s ongoing efforts to compromise internet-connected critical infrastructure systems and joined Five Eyes partners and other European allies to warn of Russian attempts to compromise network devices across multiple critical infrastructure sectors.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced new visa restrictions for individuals “responsible for, or complicit in” cybercrimes, representing an overdue step to combat international cybercrime. The Federal Communications Commission also banned new foreign-made advanced robotics and power inverters to protect the U.S. market from Chinese technology.

The Trump administration reimposed a naval blockade of Iranian ports on July 14 following Iranian attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. A few days later, three American soldiers were killed by an Iranian attack in Jordan, and a fourth American soldier was killed in Iraq during a controlled detonation of a downed Iranian drone. U.S. forces conducted 13 consecutive nights of strikes against Iranian targets before President Trump paused the strike campaign on July 24. Trump’s decision was reportedly influenced by concerns about U.S. munitions stockpiles. Despite Trump’s claim that the administration was engaged in “good talks” with Iran on July 27, the regime launched a “surprise” ballistic missile attack on U.S. forces the following day.

As part of its efforts to address acute munitions shortages, the Pentagon announced on July 15 framework agreements with Anduril, CoAspire, and Zone 5 to quickly produce a new family of low-cost, air-launched cruise missiles. On July 27, the Pentagon announced deals to expand production capacity for components of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) weapon system.

The administration began a review of U.S. military force posture in Europe on July 27 to “ensure that NATO is moving fast and irreversibly toward Europe taking primary responsibility for its conventional defense.” The administration has already taken a series of steps that dangerously erode American combat power and deterrence in Europe. Further hasty reductions risk inviting Russian aggression.

The relationship between Presidents Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy remained refreshingly warm in July, with the American leader apparently impressed by Ukraine’s recent battlefield successes. On July 8, during a friendly meeting at the NATO summit in Ankara, Trump said he would grant Ukraine a license to produce much-needed Patriot air defense missiles. Technical discussions have begun, though Trump has since cast doubt on that commitment. Regardless, the deal will not bear fruit anytime soon.

While Trump began the NATO summit by publicly lambasting Europe over various grievances, his closed-door meeting with allied leaders went far better. Trump subsequently described the gathering as filled with “love” and “unity.” On July 27, however, the Pentagon launched a review of U.S. force posture in Europe that Secretary Pete Hegseth had announced in June. The Pentagon leadership appears to be angling for further cuts.

On July 28, Trump and Zelenskyy held another meeting in Washington ahead of Sen. Lindsey Graham’s (R-SC) funeral. Zelenskyy said they discussed, inter alia, how to reinvigorate peace talks with Russia, which have been paused since the Iran war began in February. Reportedly, Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner finally agreed to visit Kyiv, having already made numerous trips to Moscow.

After the funeral, Zelenskyy observed from the Senate gallery as the chamber voted 86-12 to advance a Russia sanctions bill that Graham had championed before his death. While the legislation’s potential passage would be positive, Trump already has ample authorities to tighten sanctions on Russia. The question is whether he will use them.

Israel was excluded from the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) security dialogue held in Manama on July 1. Hosted by the Bahrain Defense Forces, the high-level conference brought together military leaders from 12 nations, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, and — remarkably, for the first time — Syria and Lebanon. CENTCOM said the meeting focused on regional defense collaboration and securing maritime commerce in the Strait of Hormuz.

Israel’s exclusion comes despite its formal integration into CENTCOM’s area of responsibility and its active involvement in the regional effort against Iran. The omission overlooked the fact that Israel has provided critical air defense support to the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, the Israeli military has intercepted Houthi missiles targeting Jordanian airspace, maintains a direct coordination hotline with Syria, and actively liaises with Lebanese forces to enforce the Trilateral Framework Agreement signed in June.

The exclusion underscores the persistent diplomatic friction that complicates public, multilateral coalition-building in the Middle East. While behind-the-scenes military intelligence sharing and integrated missile defense coordination continue to expand, formal political constraints limit open solidarity. Analysts suggest that maximizing regional readiness against shared threats will ultimately require bridging these political gaps and formally incorporating Israel’s advanced defensive capabilities into CENTCOM’s collective framework.

The United States highlighted its commitment to a stable and secure Indo-Pacific, with much of Washington’s focus falling to Southeast Asia during the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit.

During his trip to Manila to attend the ASEAN meeting, Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Philippines alliance while strongly condemning China’s coercive behavior in the South China Sea, offering a critical signal of alliance solidarity. Shortly after the visit, the State Department pledged a $9 million investment to expand a Philippine coast guard facility in the western province of Palawan, a key staging area for maritime law enforcement operations in the region.

Washington is also publicly bolstering ties with Vietnam, another ASEAN member, ahead of the third anniversary of formalizing a comprehensive strategic partnership with Hanoi. The U.S. aircraft carrier USS George Washington docked in Da Nang on July 30, strengthening defense ties between the two countries as the United States and Vietnam continue to discuss pending sales of F-16 fighter aircraft.

The month also marks the first anniversary of a trade deal between the United States and Japan, with Tokyo having fulfilled 20 percent of its pledged investments in energy projects critical to artificial intelligence development, particularly natural gas and next-generation nuclear power.

However, the United States may struggle to fully consolidate its gains in the region as the ongoing conflict in Iran roils global energy markets and disrupts Southeast Asia’s reliance on Middle Eastern suppliers while driving up regional inflation.

On July 2, acting U.S. Attorney General Todd Blanche informed the International Criminal Court (ICC) that Washington will reject extradition requests involving Americans, citing the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002. On July 13, Secretary of State Marco Rubio unveiled a campaign to “dismantle” the ICC, employing sanctions and travel bans for ICC personnel, and called upon non-member states to join the effort. The United States is not a party to the ICC’s Rome Statute and does not recognize its jurisdiction over Americans.

ICC authority remained at the fore on July 18, when New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani told The New York Times he was consulting the city’s legal department about arresting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should he visit for the UN General Assembly in September, citing the court’s outstanding warrant against him. President Trump quickly defended Netanyahu, countering that he “will not be arrested in any way, shape, or form.” Days later, Mayor Mamdani said the city lacked the authority to enforce the warrant, though he urged the federal government to do so.

Finally, the UN General Assembly on July 24 reelected Volker Turk, UN high commissioner for human rights, to another four-year term, despite U.S. opposition. Nominated by outgoing Secretary-General António Guterres, Turk becomes the first commissioner to serve consecutive terms since the post’s 1993 creation. Jeff Bartos, U.S. representative for UN management and reform, criticized the lack of debate around nominating a new candidate and vowed that the Trump administration would “reassess engagement, participation, and funding” of the international body.

On July 8, President Trump declared the June 17 memorandum of understanding signed between Iran and the United States to be “over.” The United States had resumed airstrikes against the Islamic Republic on July 7 after Tehran attacked three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) then conducted strikes on Iran for 13 consecutive nights that “targeted Iranian military command centers, drone storage facilities, communication networks, coastal surveillance sites and maritime capabilities.” Subsequently, the Islamic Republic terminated a multiday quiet by launching a preemptive ballistic missile attack on U.S. forces in Jordan on July 28. CENTCOM responded by striking dozens of targets in Iran on July 29. CENTCOM also reinstated the blockade of Iranian ports.

Meanwhile, the Treasury Department sanctioned Ali Ansari, saying that he “oversees a sprawling global network of assets benefitting Iran’s leader—Mojtaba Khamenei—and other regime elites.” Washington also designated numerous exchange houses that move billions of dollars of illicit Iranian funds annually. Likewise, Treasury targeted elements of the Shamkani shipping empire, which was first designated in 2025 for exporting Iranian oil.

Additionally, Treasury sanctioned 13 targets in Babak Zanjani’s network, which has enabled Iranian sanctions evasion. Similarly, Treasury designated two components of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) weapons procurement network, the Persian Gulf Marine Insurance Company and HormuzSafe Marine Services Authority, both of which are key elements of the IRGC effort to toll the Strait of Hormuz. Finally, Washington sanctioned international sales agents for Mahan Air, a U.S.-designated IRGC airline.

The U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding predictably collapsed under the weight of Iranian violations, easing tensions in the U.S.-Israel relationship. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with President Donald Trump on July 28, their first in-person meeting since shortly before the launch of Operation Epic Fury in February.

On July 9, shortly after meeting with Syria’s jihadist-turned-president and suggesting that Syrian troops could handle Hezbollah, Trump reportedly told Netanyahu that Israel should redeploy out of Syria and Lebanon, a prospect Israel considers harmful to its security.

Developments with Saudi Arabia and Turkey also undercut Israel’s security. On July 22, the Trump administration announced a deal that would potentially allow Riyadh to enrich uranium on Saudi soil. Such enrichment could trigger a regional nuclear arms race. Trump later said the nuclear deal was contingent on Riyadh normalizing relations with Jerusalem, but Saudi Arabia has reportedly not agreed to do so.

Following a favorable meeting with Turkish strongman Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the NATO summit in early July, Trump dismissed Israeli objections to plans to sell F-35 fighter jets to Turkey, a supporter of Hamas and an enemy of Israel.

With Gaza on the back burner, Israel gave initial approval in late July for 200 troops from friendly nations to enter the territory as part of the International Stabilization Force, a modest step compared to Trump’s grander 20-point peace plan.

July widened the strategic imbalance on the Korean Peninsula. Although Seoul strengthened its deterrence through exercises and shipbuilding cooperation, it is seeking renewed engagement with Pyongyang without insisting on denuclearization.

Seoul joined three exercises: a tabletop exercise with the UN Command and U.S. forces on countering cognitive warfare on July 9, a Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command interoperability exercise from July 13 to 16, and the annual U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific naval exercise. On July 17, Pyongyang branded Seoul a U.S. “puppet” over the naval exercise.

On July 23, Seoul and Washington launched the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center to advance the $150 billion “Make America’s Shipbuilding Great Again” initiative through workforce training and supply chain cooperation. U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick pledged to clear “roadblocks” for South Korean companies investing in the United States. That same day, Unification Minister Chung Dong Young announced a shift from “denuclearization first” to a “peace first” policy after Seoul halted anti-Pyongyang broadcasts and curbed propaganda leaflets.

Meanwhile, North Korea deepened ties with China and Russia. Kim Jong Un hosted Chinese official Wang Huning on July 16, while North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on July 19. Pyongyang reportedly plans to send Russia 30,000 more troops and ballistic missile launchers after deploying roughly 14,000 personnel since 2024. Ukrainian estimates put North Korea’s share of Russia’s artillery ammunition at 25 to 40 percent since at least 2023.

While Kim deepens partnerships driving this imbalance, the Trump administration has yet to impose costs or articulate a response.

July exposed a widening gap between the Trump administration’s Lebanon diplomacy and enforceable results. On July 21, President Trump hosted Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, reaffirmed the June 26 Framework Agreement, promised “very concrete plans” to support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and authorized U.S. airlines to serve Lebanon directly. Trump also increased pressure on Israel — reportedly urging Jerusalem to reduce its operations and presence in Lebanon while maintaining that Syria could “do a better job” against Hezbollah.

These inducements produced limited Lebanese action. As Aoun met Trump, Israel withdrew from Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh and the LAF entered, launching the framework’s first pilot zone. Yet the handover did not test the agreement’s central bargain: the verified disarmament of Hezbollah. The LAF cleared rubble and recovered bodies, while neither weapons seizures nor infrastructure dismantlement was announced. No third-party verification mechanism was established, Israeli forces remained nearby, and Israel later accused Hezbollah of striking an IDF vehicle with an explosive drone from the adjacent Ali Taher ridge.

Meanwhile, Aoun left Washington without disclosing his reported disarmament proposal, securing the Lebanese cabinet’s adoption of it, or setting a timetable. He continued to place Israeli withdrawal before Lebanese performance and insist that Hezbollah’s disarmament proceed through noncoercive “dialogue,” effectively preserving the group’s veto. The Pentagon still has not publicly produced the congressionally mandated standards for judging LAF performance.

Washington deserves credit for preserving a conditions-based framework and achieving one limited redeployment. But it is rewarding Beirut with validation, prospective military and reconstruction aid, and direct flights faster than Lebanon is implementing its obligations.

The resumption of military conflict between the United States and Iran appears to have terminated the joint memorandum of understanding reached on June 17. That highly flawed agreement would have granted Iran sanctions relief in exchange for only maintaining the “status quo” of its nuclear program and pledging further negotiations on long-term restraints. Satellite imagery showed Tehran already violating the status-quo provision in late June by advancing construction on a deeply buried nuclear facility at Pickaxe Mountain — a purported centrifuge-assembly site that Western intelligence suspects may be intended to house a new enrichment site impervious to U.S. bunker-buster bombs. Israel had reportedly tracked Iran moving centrifuges into Pickaxe Mountain for safekeeping last fall.

Meanwhile, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a nuclear cooperation agreement on July 22 that opens a door to future uranium enrichment on Saudi soil without the International Atomic Energy Agency’s strongest inspection arrangement, known as the Additional Protocol. If a joint two-year study finds a facility to be economical, the United States would build and operate the plant — whether Saudi officials would have access remains unclear. The accord must be submitted to Congress for a required 90-day review.

Yet both President Trump and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Michael Waltz ruled out enrichment in Saudi Arabia after the signing, with Trump conditioning approval on Riyadh joining the Abraham Accords. Still, the deal marks a further reversal of decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy opposing the spread of enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Both technologies can produce fuel for nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons.

The Trump administration is considering initiating counterterrorism airstrikes in Mali against Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s branch in sub-Saharan Africa. JNIM went on the offensive earlier this year and seized control of several cities and towns throughout the country, while the capital of Bamako is under pressure. JNIM has advanced throughout Mali after France was ejected from the country in August 2021 following a coup. JNIM has also gained significant ground in neighboring Niger and Burkina Faso.

Meanwhile, the United States is withdrawing support from the UN mission in Somalia, which is the logistical backbone of the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Somalia is under pressure from Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in East Africa. The Trump administration is reportedly frustrated with infighting in the Somali government. Without U.S. support, AUSSOM is likely in jeopardy, as the Somali government and military are propped up by U.S. and African Union forces. The U.S. military has stepped up attacks against Shabaab, while the Somali military claimed it killed a senior Shabaab leader.

President Donald Trump followed through on his promise to remove the last major U.S. sanctions regime on Syria. After meeting Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Turkey during the July 8 NATO summit, Trump delivered a letter stating, “I promised to remove all barriers preventing you from rebuilding your country.”

The letter initiated the process of removing Syria from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, a designation first imposed in 1979 because the former Assad regime supported Palestinian terrorist organizations. The delisting has not yet been finalized. For Syria to be delisted, the administration must submit a report to Congress certifying either that Syria’s leadership and policies have fundamentally changed or that the Syrian government has not supported international terrorism during the preceding six months.

Although Syria has undergone a change in leadership, removing the designation without conditions carries major risks. The new government has integrated several U.S.- and UN-designated terrorist organizations into its armed forces. These include Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, an Uzbek faction, and the Turkistan Islamic Party, a Uyghur organization designated by the United Nations.

Foreign fighters serving in Syria’s new security forces have already been implicated in conduct that undermines U.S. counterterrorism objectives. In January 2026, after the Syrian government assumed responsibility for camps in northeastern Syria holding the families of Islamic State fighters, foreign fighters within the Syrian army reportedly facilitated the release of detainees from al-Hol camp.

President Trump traveled to Ankara on July 7-8 for the NATO summit at Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s personal invitation, drawing on a rapport dating to Trump’s first term. But President Trump drew congressional ire after he announced his intention to sell GE F-110’s to Turkey while in the country.

The State Department had reportedly notified Congress on June 24 of a $700 million sale of GE F-110 engines for Turkey’s KAAN fighter, which had been stalled since sanctions pursuant to the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) took effect in 2020. The announcement elicited objections from Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY), the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the administration had bypassed congressional review.

Rep. Dina Titus’s (D-NV) subsequent disapproval resolution cited Turkey’s occupation of Cyprus, support for Azerbaijan against Armenia, and Erdogan’s regime making “repeated threats of military action against NATO allies.” Still, the measure, which required a two-thirds Senate majority to override a veto, drew only Democratic support.

Turkey’s ongoing desire to acquire the F-35 depends only on a promise from Washington for now: Trump said on July 7 that he would lift the CAATSA sanctions but has yet to implement the sale. However, a separate 2020 law still bars any F-35 transfer absent certification that Turkey no longer has the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system. Still, Erdogan claimed Ankara had secured a commitment on five jets. Trump apparently seeks to reward an increasingly authoritarian ally with a concrete deliverable, not just words.