Don’t Decimate U.S. Military Posture in Europe

As NATO leaders gather in Ankara next week, there is much to celebrate. Ukraine is gaining the upper hand on the battlefield against Russia. European defense spending is way up. Many European allies are stepping forward to carry more of the security burden on the continent. These are major, positive developments.

Despite this good news, transatlantic ties have been strained in the past year. That could explain the calls for unity in pre-summit statements from many leaders, reflecting in part the need for more of it. Indeed, many European allies are understandably upset about the policy President Donald Trump pursued regarding Greenland and nervous that America may dangerously reduce its commitment to the alliance and its defense.

Understanding the stakes, one decision that policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic will be watching is where Washington will come down on U.S. troop posture in Europe. The Trump administration has already taken troubling steps, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced on June 18 a “review” of America’s military force posture in Europe, which could lead to further reductions of American combat power on the continent.

Excessive or premature American military withdrawals from the continent will send a dangerous message to Putin regarding America’s political will and reduce the American combat power necessary to deter costly additional Russian aggression.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the United States had generally maintained at least four Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Europe: the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR) Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) in Germany, the 173rd Airborne Brigade headquartered in Italy, a rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in Poland, and a rotational Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) in Romania and surrounding countries. But the cumulative impact of the administration’s successive drawdowns has brought America’s military force posture on the continent closer to pre-2022 levels.

Last fall, the administration decided to end the rotational IBCT deployment to Romania, bringing the number of BCTs on the continent to three. Then, in early May, the administration announced that it would withdraw roughly 5,000 troops from Germany, with reports suggesting it would likely impact 2CR. It seems clear these reductions in Germany were little more than White House-directed political retribution for Berlin rather than thoughtful reductions based on a serious and objective strategic assessment of American security interests and the strategic situation on the continent.

Two weeks later, in what appeared to be a self-inflicted wound to U.S. national security interests, the administration reportedly halted the deployment of an ABCT to Poland, which many feared marked the end of the rotational ABCT along NATO’s eastern flank.

While the administration announced in late May that it would maintain three BCTs in Europe, the fate of 2CR and the Poland ABCT remains in flux. If 2CR is withdrawn from Europe or the rotational ABCT deployments to Poland are ended, America would lose its large armored or mechanized combat formations on the continent. That would be a serious mistake — a cause for celebration in Moscow and serious concern for Americans and Europeans.

The administration’s 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) called for NATO allies to “take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense, with critical but more limited U.S. support.” That is an understandable goal given the possibility of simultaneous great power wars and the need to increase deterrence in the Pacific. This is a concern emphasized in a new book on the Axis of Aggressors. But how we get from here to there — and the pace of the transition — matters greatly and should not be done at the expense of vital American interests in Europe.

Still, it is difficult to justify many of the administration’s previous and prospective cuts to U.S. Army Europe with that logic. Formations designed for large-scale ground combat, such as ABCTs and SBCTs, are more valuable deterring Russia in Europe than countering China in the maritime-dominated Pacific.

Likewise, while the administration’s NDS makes clear that Europe must bear most of the burden of conventional defense of the continent, it commits to maintaining what it describes as “critical support.” That presumably means units or enablers that require a relatively small American footprint but offer capabilities that Europe would have difficulty fully replicating in the near to medium term, such as certain long-range fires and critical air and naval assets.

But that is exactly what some of the administration’s cuts target. Take the long-range fires battalion (LRFB) of the 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force (2MDTF), for instance. The Pentagon reportedly canceled the planned deployment of the 2MDTF’s newly activated LRFB in May as well.

Elements of 2MDTF are already stationed in Germany and, in a 2024 joint statement with Berlin, Washington committed to begin deploying the LRFB to Germany this year. It includes critical capabilities, such as a HIMARS battery armed with GMLRS rockets and PrSM missiles, a Typhon Mid-Range Capability battery armed with Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles, and a Dark Eagle long-range hypersonic missile battery.

Though other U.S. artillery, air, and naval units can partially compensate, the LRFB’s absence would weaken 2MDTF’s long-range precision strike capabilities and, by extension, those of NATO. The alliance, which already needs more long-range strike capacity, depends overwhelmingly on the United States for these capabilities. European countries will require years to catch up, which is why Germany viewed the 2024 agreement as a “temporary bridge.”

More recently, the administration reportedly informed NATO allies of its intention to significantly reduce the number of aircraft and naval assets made available to the alliance. The cuts will reportedly include a reduction of maritime reconnaissance aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, and roughly a third of America’s F-15s and F-16s for Europe.

Cumulatively, these cuts would do serious damage to “critical” American support for the alliance, violating the principle in the administration’s own National Defense Strategy.

The essence of strategy is the coordination of ends and means. Sometimes that is easier said than done because ends can be extensive and means finite and insufficient. The United States has vital interests in both Europe and the Pacific, and America lacks sufficient combat formations and its munitions are depleted. There is an urgent need to increase deterrence in the Pacific, but excessive or premature reductions in U.S. combat forces in Europe risk inviting additional Russian aggression that would be a disaster for American interests in Europe and a boon for the Chinese Communist Party.

The Trump administration should encourage the expeditious implementation of ongoing European measures to step up their own defenses while avoiding excessive or premature U.S. military withdrawals. If the administration fails to get this balance right, Congress will need to ensure the United States works with allies and partners to establish and maintain sufficient deterrence in both Europe and the Pacific.

Cameron McMillan is a senior research at the Center on Military and Pollical Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Bradley Bowman is senior director.