Mr. Aoun Came To Washington. Lebanon Now Owes Results.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s July 21 meeting with President Donald Trump clarified the terms of the U.S.-Lebanese relationship but did not resolve Lebanon’s central problem: Hezbollah’s weapons and the absence of a state monopoly on force. Aoun thanked Trump for brokering the June 26 Framework Agreement with Israel — which conditions new U.S. assistance and a phased Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon on verifiable Lebanese action against Hezbollah — and sought U.S. pressure for further withdrawals, support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and reconstruction aid. Trump reaffirmed the framework and promised further Israeli redeployment and “very concrete plans” for supporting the LAF. Aoun walks away from the summit strengthened domestically as Washington’s principal Lebanese interlocutor, but without making any measurable commitments. That political benefit must now yield tangible results: Lebanese Cabinet approval and enforcement of a verifiable pilot zone plan, a nationwide disarmament timetable, and safeguards against Hezbollah’s interference in implementation and aid.

Aoun and Lebanon deserve some credit: the government proscribed Hezbollah’s military activities on March 2; Aoun backed direct negotiations with Israel and the framework despite Hezbollah’s objections; and the LAF reinforced its presence around the proposed southern Lebanon pilot zones — parcels of Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory to be transferred to LAF control. There, the LAF would clear nonstate weapons and infrastructure, third-party inspectors would verify its work, and qualified units would prevent Hezbollah’s return before further Israeli withdrawals. On the summit day, the LAF entered Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh as Israeli forces withdrew but remained nearby. The limited handover showed that LAF control can produce phased Israeli redeployment — but not Hezbollah’s disarmament, and therefore cannot substitute for nationwide policy. Trump’s endorsement strengthens Aoun’s authority to expand the process and Trump’s standing to condition further U.S. support on verified performance.

Yet Aoun has already taken positions that hollow out the framework. He publicly placed Israeli withdrawal before Lebanese performance and insisted that Hezbollah’s disarmament cannot be achieved by force, effectively giving the group a veto. In the Oval Office, he again emphasized U.S. pressure on Israel without offering a comparable Lebanese timetable. He has not held LAF commander Rodolphe Haykal accountable for resisting the Cabinet’s March 2 decision and refusing to proceed with disarmament. Although Aoun insists that no foreign power may negotiate for Lebanon, welcoming assistance from any country, including Iran, risks inviting Tehran into implementation, diluting U.S. leadership, and restoring Iranian leverage over Lebanese decisionmaking.

Aoun left the White House with political credit but the same implementation deficit. He had reportedly intended to present Trump with a written proposal to disarm Hezbollah in tandem with Israeli withdrawal; neither side later confirmed its delivery, disclosed its contents, or announced Cabinet approval. The opacity on the proposal’s fate recalls past instances of Lebanon equivocating on its promises. In September 2025, the Cabinet merely “welcomed” an LAF disarmament proposal without a timetable to avoid confronting Hezbollah. The LAF later declared “effective control” south of the Litani River on January 8, 2026, yet Hezbollah’s renewed conflict with Israel two months later exposed its substantial fighting force and military infrastructure there.

Because of Lebanon’s record, Beirut’s future commitments must be formal, binding, and unambiguous — and here, Aoun is no bystander. Executive authority and ultimate control of the LAF rest with the Cabinet, but the president may chair Cabinet meetings, introduce urgent matters, and, with the prime minister, call extraordinary sessions. He should use those powers to secure formal decisions, defend them publicly, and press the LAF to execute them.

Aoun should use his enhanced political standing to secure a dated, LAF-prepared pilot zone plan formally adopted by the Cabinet. It should designate the units responsible for each zone and vet them for Hezbollah links or sympathies; identify the weapons, tunnels, caches, and command facilities to be cleared; specify lawful measures against armed personnel who resist implementation; guarantee third-party inspectors real-time access; and pair verified LAF milestones with phased Israeli withdrawals. Trump’s “very concrete plans” should provide the necessary equipment and assistance, but only if Lebanon meets equally concrete benchmarks.

If Aoun brought the reported written proposal to Washington, he should announce it publicly, secure Cabinet adoption, and establish an enforceable nationwide timetable. Beyond the pilot zones and southern Lebanon, the plan should cover the seizure or destruction of Hezbollah’s weapons and tunnels, closure of its smuggling routes, dismantlement of its command structure, and demobilization of its armed personnel throughout the country. Lebanon’s political commitment must be explicit: dialogue may determine how Hezbollah complies, but neither Hezbollah nor Iran may determine whether Lebanon complies.

Aoun should also press the Cabinet and responsible authorities to insulate state institutions — including the security, reconstruction, and financial apparatuses — from Hezbollah’s influence. Officials with operational or financial ties to the group should be removed or recused from reconstruction, procurement, and donor-fund oversight, with U.S. audits ensuring that assistance does not reach Hezbollah or its affiliates. Lebanon should vet and discipline LAF, intelligence, and security personnel who cooperate with Hezbollah or obstruct disarmament. If Haykal continues to delay or resist Cabinet directives, Aoun should press the Cabinet to impose lawful consequences. Lebanon should cooperate with targeted U.S. sanctions against officials obstructing disarmament and work with Washington to dismantle Hezbollah’s financial institutions and Iranian funding channels.

Aoun’s fear that seizing Hezbollah’s entire arsenal at once could provoke civil conflict makes immediate, comprehensive disarmament unlikely. Trump should not demand sweeping promises Aoun cannot deliver. But Lebanon’s very real constraints cannot again justify American acquiescence to indefinite Lebanese inaction. Publicly, the summit demonstrated mutual amity but produced no enforceable bargain. Its ultimate success should therefore depend on whether Aoun return to Beirut prepared to treat Hezbollah’s disarmament, in principle, as an enforceable state obligation rather than an aspiration dependent on the group’s consent — and accepting concrete commitments that make continued progress enforceable: Cabinet-approved plans, timetables, verification, and defined consequences for obstruction. Trump should enforce that bargain: only verified Lebanese action will produce American support; delay, prevarication, or attempts to rewrite Lebanon’s obligations, whatever the reason, will bring suspended assistance and targeted punitive measures.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he focuses on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs. Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at FDD. For more analysis from the authors and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow David on X @DavidADaoud and Ahmad @AhmadA_Sharawi. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on foreign policy and national security.