The Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement Will Only Succeed if Washington Enforces It

The Pentagon may have missed a significant deadline on Lebanon. Congress, in the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, gave the secretary of defense until June 30 to report on how to assess Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) efforts to disarm Hezbollah, including whether U.S. aid should be suspended if “it is determined that [LAF] are unwilling to act to disarm Hezbollah.”

The Department of Defense has not publicly delivered any such rubric. Meanwhile, on June 26, the United States concluded a framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon, aiming to advance Hezbollah’s disarmament and bilateral peace. But with neither measurable standards in place for the LAF’s performance nor leverage, this framework may end in failure like its numerous predecessors. 

U.S. Brokers a New Agreement for an Old Conflict

This latest U.S.-brokered arrangement between Israel and Lebanon, dubbed the “Trilateral Framework,” contains 14 points. The most significant clauses condition U.S. military assistance to the LAF and gradual Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon upon Lebanon’s incremental but “complete and verified disarmament” of Hezbollah.

To that end, the agreement calls for “pilot zones,” small parcels of Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory to be “gradually” transferred to the LAF’s “full and effective” control. Once the LAF is “confirm[ed]” to have “successful[ly] disarm[ed]” Hezbollah “and dismantle[d] their infrastructure in these zones,” additional pilot zones will be transferred to the LAF. Per the reported terms of a still officially undisclosed “Security Annex,” full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon will accordingly be “phased, conditions-based, [and] progressive,” conditioned upon Lebanon’s “successful completion of an agreed-upon and verifiable disarmament and dismantlement process” that will be verified “by a mutually agreed-upon third-party entity.”

Precedent Does Not Portend Success

On its face, the Framework Agreement is promising. But — like similarly promising UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, which, respectively, ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war and paused the current one — the June 26 framework may contain the seeds of its own failure if the third-party entity relies on the LAF’s reporting, as others have. 

After November 2024, Lebanon remained fearful of restraining Hezbollah, let alone coercively seizing its arsenal, lest that ignite a civil war. Beirut then sought to cover up this failure with a series of cosmetic measures, culminating in the LAF’s January 8, 2026, declaration that it had cleared Hezbollah from the Southern Litani Sector (SLS). Meanwhile, Hezbollah dismissed disarmament efforts, boasted its regeneration was outpacing even ongoing Israeli operations, and refused to confirm the LAF’s declaration.

The group was telling the truth. Hezbollah restarted the conflict with Israel in early March, tenaciously fighting the Israel Defense Forces from the SLS, where it retained a significant fighting force and military assets. In the months since, Beirut has not acted on its unprecedented March 2 ban on Hezbollah’s military activities, and the LAF is still effectively refusing to enforce it. Meanwhile, Lebanese officialdom, including President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, still insist on addressing Hezbollah’s arms through “domestic dialogue,” an approach that has repeatedly facilitated Hezbollah’s regeneration.

Washington Must Set Standards for Hezbollah Disarmament

The Framework Agreement’s “verifiable milestones” must therefore be tied to an enforceable, measurable rubric. Otherwise, Beirut and the LAF are likely to again avoid undertaking meaningful action against Hezbollah. Despite the June 30 deadline passing, the administration should nevertheless communicate precise and realistic metrics for Lebanon to fulfill. The U.S.-brokered June 3 Israel-Lebanon understanding, for example, required the “evacuation of all Hizbollah [sic] operatives from the South Litani Sector.” However, most of the group’s fighters are local residents and, therefore, monitored demobilization would have been more effective and appropriate.

Washington should also communicate concrete consequences if Lebanon repeats past failures. This includes withholding military and other promised assistance to Lebanon while supporting Israel’s resumption of proactive operations against Hezbollah.

In the May 2026 Central Command Posture Statement, Adm. Brad Cooper testified that “while the United States continues to support our Lebanese partners and real progress is underway, important work remains.” If that work is to have a chance, Washington must state exactly what it expects of Lebanon and be ready to hold Lebanon to account.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he focuses on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs, and Justin Leopold-Cohen is a senior research analyst with the Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP) at FDD. For more analysis from David, Justin, and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow David on X @DavidADaoud and Justin @jleopoldcohen. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.