Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: May

April exposed the gap between the administration’s Iran pressure campaign and its willingness to confront China’s support for Tehran. President Donald Trump threatened 50 percent tariffs on any country supplying Iran with military aid. That warning should have put China in the crosshairs: Chinese-linked networks have supplied Iran with dual-use chemicals, including sodium perchlorate, which feeds into Iran’s ballistic missile program. Yet when asked about Beijing’s support for Iran, Trump said China was “maybe helping,” but “could help [Iran] a lot more.” That restraint likely reflects a larger priority: preserving the fragile U.S.-China trade truce ahead of Trump’s planned May summit with Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping.

Nevertheless, the administration did take meaningful action. The Treasury Department sanctioned a Chinese teapot refinery accused of buying billions of dollars in illegal Iranian oil, along with several shipping firms and vessels tied to Iran’s shadow fleet. The U.S. blockade has also disrupted Iran’s ability to move oil through the Strait of Hormuz to China, though reporting suggests some tankers continue to evade it. All told, Trump has not pressured Beijing enough to squeeze Tehran into serious negotiations, and he may need to do more if that is his goal.

Meanwhile, Beijing opened a second front. In April, China issued new supply-chain security rules that threaten foreign firms for shifting production out of China, cutting Chinese inputs, or complying with Western restrictions. These moves were met with silence from the White House. Left unchecked, those measures could chill reshoring, slow diversification, and give Beijing new leverage over America’s industrial comeback.

April cyber activity across the Trump administration presented a mixed bag. Unfortunately, negative developments overshadow progress.

Commendably, the Federal Communications Commission remains focused on continuing its cybersecurity efforts, selecting a new lead administrator of the Cyber Trust Mark Program.

The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) rightly issued a joint advisory on the widespread Iranian exploitation of internet devices within U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including municipal water and energy sites, which resulted in operational disruptions and financial costs. Likewise, the Department of Justice successfully prevented Russian military hackers from using U.S. routers to steal information and manipulate internet traffic from government agencies and critical infrastructure. However, the moves are insufficient given the extent of adversarial intrusion into U.S. networks.

Meanwhile, after much turmoil for America’s cyber agency, Sean Plankey withdrew his nomination to lead CISA. The Trump administration should move swiftly to nominate a new candidate.

Even more problematically, the administration’s budget request for CISA dramatically undercuts some essential functions. The budget effectively rids CISA of its election security efforts, cybersecurity training for critical infrastructure operators, chemical infrastructure safety, and its nationwide security advisor presence. Moreover, CISA’s threat-hunting and capacity-building team stands to lose more than $25 million, with regional operations being cut by more than $40 million. If passed, the Stakeholder Engagement Division, international capacity-building teams, and previously shuttered public-private advisory councils would be almost entirely eliminated.

The Trump administration requested an extraordinary 44 percent increase in defense spending in its roughly $1.5 trillion Fiscal Year (FY) 2027 defense budget proposal on April 21. The request is split between $1.1 trillion in the base defense discretionary budget request and an additional $350 billion that would require passage of a separate mandatory so-called “reconciliation” bill. That level of defense spending would represent a vital and belated step to begin to reverse a long-term failure of both parties to invest sufficient resources in America’s military. It will take time, however, for an increased investment to yield benefits for U.S. forces on the battlefield, yet new adversary aggression could come soon. That is why increasing production of key munitions and interceptors and reconstituting and expanding depleted inventories are particularly urgent.

President Trump announced a ceasefire between the United States and Iran on April 7. While American forces conducted an impressive campaign alongside their Israeli partners that seriously degraded Iranian military capabilities, the operation failed to achieve some of the Pentagon’s stated objectives. A troubling portion of the regime’s missile facilities, missiles, launchers, drones, small attack boats, and air defenses survived the war, according to the Pentagon’s own metrics.

Hopefully, the administration can translate positive military operational gains into sustainable policy outcomes that advance American interests. In an attempt to create leverage at the negotiating table and impose economic costs on the regime in Iran, the administration implemented a blockade against maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports on April 13.

The Trump administration on April 24 extended a Jones Act waiver for 90 days, enabling faster deliveries of oil, fuel, and fertilizer to parts of the country that could see supply constraints and increased prices due to the halt of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, the Energy Information Administration revealed that the United States exported oil at a record 6.438 million barrels per day amid the global scramble for supply while exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) continued at record highs as well.

Energy Secretary Chris Wright on April 28 unveiled a “Peace Pipelines” framework at the Three Seas Initiative Summit in Croatia. The memorandum of understanding between the United States and central and eastern European states — backed by billions of dollars in private sector commitments — envisions a massive expansion of gas infrastructure to import more U.S. LNG. America and Croatia separately signed a joint statement on deepening civil nuclear cooperation, particularly in small modular reactors.

Also on April 28, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced it would leave OPEC at the end of the month, a significant blow to the cartel and a sign of shifting geopolitical and energy alliances that favor the United States. The departure frees the UAE from OPEC quotas, allowing for increased production and broader energy coordination with the United States.

Like last month, FDD has opted for a neutral rating to reflect current market disruptions, while acknowledging the mitigation steps the administration has taken and the role the military must ultimately play.

As President Trump trades barbs with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and other European leaders over the Iran war, Washington announced that it will remove some 5,000 troops from Germany — even though it has been a critical hub for the U.S. operation against Iran. The Pentagon will withdraw an Army brigade combat team and cancel the planned deployment of important long-range precision-strike capabilities. The Kremlin is surely pleased.

Meanwhile, Moscow continues to reap financial rewards from the Middle East crisis. After initially promising not to extend a waiver temporarily easing sanctions on Russian oil exports, the Treasury Department reversed course two days later, renewing the waiver for another month in a bid to keep prices down. Treasury is now again insisting no further waivers are planned.

Russian President Vladimir Putin called Trump on April 29, their 12th telephone conversation since February 2025. The Russian autocrat offered assistance on U.S. negotiations with Iran, which Trump again rebuffed. He did, however, endorse Putin’s call for a brief ceasefire to safeguard the Kremlin’s annual May 9 Victory Day parade from Ukrainian drones. At the same time, Putin reiterated his vow to continue fighting until Ukraine bends to his demands, including territorial concessions that the White House has pressed Kyiv to accommodate.

Trilateral peace talks between American, Ukrainian, and Russian officials remain indefinitely paused amid the Iran conflict, though some contacts have continued behind the scenes. Separately, following congressional pressure, the Pentagon said it had “released” the modest amount of Ukraine military aid funding passed by Congress in February.

The strategic harmony between Washington and Abu Dhabi has proven to be an effective instrument in America’s pressure campaign against Tehran. The goal is clear: force the Islamic Republic to completely abandon its nuclear weapons program, surrender its ballistic missiles, and sever all ties with its destabilizing terrorist proxies throughout the region.

America’s naval blockade now threatens irreversible losses to Iran’s vital oil production unless Tehran submits to Washington’s demands. In retaliation, the Islamic Republic harassed shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and temporarily closed this critical chokepoint. However, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) responded with steps that significantly mitigated the Iranian threat to global energy markets.

First, Abu Dhabi ended its 60-year membership in the OPEC oil cartel, which long sought to prop up energy prices by restricting output. Second, the UAE redirected its substantial oil exports to its Indian Ocean port of Fujairah, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. The Emirati step increased supply and might have helped slow down the surge in prices.

President Trump commended the UAE for leaving OPEC, noting that the move would help lower global energy prices. He further offered financial backing, expressing readiness to provide dollar support through currency swaps if the wealthy oil power encounters any liquidity challenges.

Since the April 8 ceasefire with Iran, this policy alignment between America and the UAE has proven how powerful close alliances can be in shaping effective global strategy.

The United States has strengthened its deterrence posture across the Indo-Pacific while seeking to enhance its regional defense industrial base, placing both Washington and its allies and partners on a more stable footing to counter Chinese coercion.

On April 20, the United States and the Philippines, along with Japan, Australia, and several other allies and partners, launched an expanded version of Exercise Balikatan to enhance interoperability and practice battle maneuvers in the South China Sea and the waters around Taiwan. The drills coincided with Manila joining Pax Silica, an initiative to build secure supply chains for emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, and announcing plans to build a new semiconductor manufacturing hub.

The United States is also poised to benefit from Japan’s recent decision to relax restrictions on the export of both lethal and non-lethal defense technologies, including potentially allowing exports into active combat zones. Tokyo’s move to place its defense industrial sector on a more stable commercial footing will benefit Washington in easing supply constraints and accelerating planned joint production efforts for precision weapons.

Likewise, Washington is looking to the region to bolster its own maritime forces. While South Korea has already announced investments in American shipyards, the Pentagon directed the Navy in its latest budget submission to Congress to consider South Korean and Japanese shipyards for new designs for destroyers and frigates, allowing Washington to benefit from both countries’ advanced production capabilities.

The United States was the only nation to oppose the April 8 nomination of Iran to the UN’s Committee on Program and Coordination, which sets policy on women’s rights, disarmament, and counterterror. The Islamic Republic was nominated by its Asia Pacific country group and — while member states were not given an opportunity to vote on the nomination — America was the only nation to voice disapproval, rightly citing Tehran’s history of brutally repressing its citizens.

On April 15, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz expressed legitimate concern regarding the potential election of Michele Bachalet, a candidate for UN secretary-general. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Waltz said that he is “prepared to ensure that the next secretary-general is aligned with American values and interests.” Waltz also stated that “there is discussion now, finally, of the UN labeling the IRGC as a terrorist organization.”

The Board of Peace’s recent progress in Gaza has been mixed, with representatives reportedly meeting with Emirati firm DP World on plans for the reconstruction of the coastal enclave — a central tenet of President Trump’s 20-point peace plan — though Hamas’s continued rejection of a U.S.-proposed disarmament plan will likely stall implementation.

Finally, the 11th review conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons began on April 27, where Iran’s selection to the body was rightly described as an “affront” by Christopher Yeaw, assistant secretary for the U.S. Bureau of Arms Control and Proliferation. The conference runs through May 22.

President Trump said on April 29 that the U.S. blockade of Iran will remain, rejecting an Iranian deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which the Islamic Republic closed in March, and to end the war without addressing the nuclear issue. On April 21, President Trump announced an indefinite extension to the ceasefire between the United States, Israel, and Iran, which began on April 8.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces began a maritime blockade of Iran on April 13, and have since redirected more than 40 ships attempting to enter or exit Iranian ports. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy claimed that it seized two ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz on April 22, and has attacked numerous vessels.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration is executing Operation Economic Fury, an economic pressure campaign against the regime. The Treasury Department has issued multiple rounds of sanctions targeting Iran’s oil smuggling networks, weapons procurement, shadow fleet, and shadow banking system. Treasury also sanctioned Iran-backed Iraqi militias that were active participants in the recent conflict.

Similarly, Treasury issued two major Iran-related warnings: an April 14 letter to China, Hong Kong, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman over financial institutions in their jurisdiction enabling illicit Iranian activity, and an April 28 alert to financial institutions over engaging with Chinese “teapot” refineries that import and refine illicit Iranian oil.

UN Human Rights Chief Volker Turk said that the regime executed at least 21 people and arrested more than 4,000 since the war began on February 28.

Ceasefires in Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza have left United States’s ally, Israel, in a holding pattern. While Israelis are not running to bomb shelters nearly as often, life has not returned to normal, and Israel’s enemies are rearming.

President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire with Iran that took effect on April 8. Negotiations in Pakistan failed to yield an agreement. Nevertheless, Trump announced a two-week extension to the ceasefire on April 21, citing the Tehran regime’s disunity, but rightly canceled planned negotiations, expressing frustration at evident Iranian intransigence.

Meanwhile, the blockade and counter-blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have eroded support for U.S. war efforts. The respective economic pain tolerances of the United States and Iran will determine the war’s conclusion.

Lebanon was excluded from the Iranian ceasefire. Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted direct talks between the Lebanese and Israeli ambassadors in Washington on April 14. Trump announced a 10-day ceasefire on April 16 and a three-week extension to that ceasefire on April 23, declaring that Israel would be “prohibited” from “bombing Lebanon.”

Direct talks are a promising sign for normalization and the possibility that Lebanon would stop affording the Iranian proxy Hezbollah a launching pad against Israel. However, Beirut has so far failed to act decisively on the opening created by Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah.

In May, Washington and Jerusalem are expected to begin talks that could wind down U.S. military aid to Israel in favor of a partnership model, possibly endangering Israel as it faces multiple threats.

Tensions between Washington and Seoul continued in April, even as North Korea stepped up its missile testing.

The United States reportedly limited South Korean access to military intelligence about Pyongyang’s nuclear program after Seoul’s Unification Minister Chung Dong-young disclosed information about possible uranium enrichment facilities in North Korea’s Kusong region. The Unification Ministry disputes reporting that Chung’s remarks were based on classified information. Undercutting intelligence sharing on North Korean nuclear facilities risks a critical component in this U.S.-ROK alliance: military cooperation.

Although Seoul’s military leadership has said that Washington’s cutoff of intelligence does not damage South Korea’s posture towards North Korea, it comes at a particularly bad time: In April alone, North Korea conducted four ballistic missile launches — the largest number of consecutive missile tests Pyongyang has carried out since 2024.

Meanwhile, North Korean malicious cyber activity continued unabated. In mid-April, North Korean hackers stole nearly $300 million in cryptocurrency from crypto platform Kelp. This comes on the heals of a similarly sized North Korean heist from Drift, another financial platform, at the beginning of April.

Finally, the Department of Justice notched a win against North Korea’s IT worker scheme as a federal court sentenced two Americans to prison for running laptop farms to facilitate the scam. Pyongyang’s operatives steal identities and pose as Americans to secure IT jobs in American and international companies. Despite the conviction of these two accomplices, the activity is ongoing.

On April 8, the United States agreed to a cessation of hostilities with Iran to facilitate the negotiation of a ceasefire agreement between the two countries. Initially, this was decoupled from Lebanon, allowing the Israelis to redirect resources from the Iranian front to strike harder at Hezbollah. The next day, in fact, Israel launched its heaviest bombardments in Lebanon to date. Despite some potential Israeli excesses, the United States voiced little objection — until Iran, seeking to rescue Hezbollah, insisted that the continuation of quiet between Tehran and Washington depended on the guns concurrently falling silent in Lebanon.

After initially hesitating, the United States pressed the Israelis into a 10-day ceasefire in Lebanon beginning on April 17 — which has since been extended for an additional three weeks. But countering Iran’s play, Washington sought to transform this quiet into the first step of Hezbollah’s demise rather than its salvation. To that end, the Trump administration has sponsored direct “peace negotiations” between Beirut and Jerusalem.

Lebanon, however, has come to the table not seeking peace but a return to the pre-war status quo. Beirut also claims it is seeking a permanent truce with Israel but has neither mentioned nor moved toward disarming Hezbollah. If the group remains armed, it will doubtlessly reignite a conflict with the Israelis at some point in the future. Despite this demonstrable Lebanese inaction, the April 16 ceasefire agreement placed significant constraints on Israeli freedom of action against Hezbollah in Lebanon — and the Trump administration has repeatedly emphasized these limitations. The result, despite Washington’s intentions, has given Hezbollah enough breathing room to regroup, try to seize the initiative in the fight with the Israelis, and set the redlines of their conflict.

Over 39 days of U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran, culminating in a ceasefire on April 8, the two countries struck at least 10 nuclear facilities, along with eight scientists and university centers involved in nuclear research. These operations further degraded Tehran’s nuclear weapons pathway beyond the damage done during the 12-Day War in June 2025. One strike, disclosed on April 8 by the Institute for Science and International Security, targeted a former Iranian nuclear weaponization site called Shahid Boroujerdi at some point between March 24 and April 1. However, the current purpose of the facility — located in a tunnel complex originally designed in the early 2000s to make weapons-grade uranium metal cores using enriched uranium from the Fordow enrichment plant — remains unclear.

On April 27, the 11th Review Conference on the implementation of the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began. Over the next month, treaty members will assess progress on prior commitments and seek to adopt a final consensus document outlining future steps to strengthen the treaty. Consensus is unlikely, since the conference faces numerous thorny issues: China’s rapid nuclear buildup and covert nuclear testing; the expiration of the last remaining U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control treaty; planned arsenal modernization and expansion by all five nuclear-weapon states; U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear program; European and Asian concerns about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella; and Moscow’s ongoing war in Ukraine accompanied by nuclear threats.

In light of great-power competition and regional realities, the roughly 120-nation Non-Aligned Movement is unlikely to offer new nonproliferation commitments, such as constraints on acquiring sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle technologies like uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

The Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin or JNIM), Al Qaeda’s branch in Mali, and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), an alliance comprised of Tuareg and Arab rebel groups, launched an offensive against the Malian state and its Russian allies in the Wagner Group/Africa Corps. JNIM and FLA captured several cities and towns, and have partially seized others during the nationwide coordinated offensive. JNIM launched attacks in Bamako, Mali’s capital, and the city has been blockaded. Malian Minister of Defense Sadio Camara was killed in a suicide attack in a suburb of Bamako.

Moscow, which has backed the Malian junta since it took control during a coup in 2020 and ejected the French from the country in 2022, has stated that it will remain in Mali to support the government and battle JNIM and the FLA. Russia’s Africa Corps has launched strikes against JNIM outside of Bamako, but have withdrawn from the northern town of Kidal. The status of the Malian government is unclear. “There is a massive power vacuum here,” an anonymous Malian official told The Washington Post. “No one knows what is going on … it’s not clear what government we still have here.” The Trump administration has yet to weigh in on the situation in Mali. U.S. policy in the Sahel countries of Mali and Niger has lacked purpose and direction since the American military was ejected from two bases in Niger during the summer of 2024.

The United States completed its military withdrawal from Syria on April 16, ending a deployment that began in 2014 as part of the anti-Islamic State coalition. “U.S. forces have completed turning over all of our major bases in Syria, as part of a deliberate and conditions-based transition,” said U.S. Central Command spokesperson Capt. Tim Hawkins. Damascus framed the withdrawal as a political victory, with Syria’s Foreign Ministry stating that the move reflected the state’s “restoration of sovereignty over areas that were outside its control.”

The withdrawal, however, is resting on an assumption that Damascus can contain ISIS, but the group is already resurging by launching new attacks and exploiting some of the security gaps left behind. Washington is essentially handing off responsibility to a government that has shown limited capacity to confront ISIS.

On a more positive front, the U.S. mediated integration agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is being gradually implemented, but with some challenges. On April 16, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa met with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi in Damascus to discuss next steps in the integration process. According to Al-Monitor, Sharaa offered Abdi the position of vice president.

However, the SDF commander declined the proposal to avoid legitimizing Damascus’s inclusivity without securing substantive guarantees. Meanwhile, Kurdish leaders continue to press for meaningful political concessions, including greater representation in state institutions and a new democratic constitution that safeguards the rights of women and minorities.

At the April 2026 Antalya Diplomacy Forum, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack outlined an overly optimistic vision for U.S.-Turkey relations, drawing the ire of both Turkish and American critics.

Barrack emphasized that longstanding disputes — most notably Ankara’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system — could be resolved “soon,” and suggested Washington is open to restoring Turkey’s participation in the F-35 program. His remarks hinted towards a broader strategic recalibration: prioritizing pragmatic cooperation with Ankara over punitive measures tied to defense procurement disputes.

He further framed Turkey as an indispensable regional actor, dismissing tensions with Israel as “rhetoric” that would fade and underscoring continued economic and strategic interdependence. In parallel, Barrack highlighted Turkey’s centrality to emerging energy and trade corridors, reinforcing the notion that Washington views Ankara as a cornerstone of regional stability and connectivity.

However, Barrack’s comments quickly drew criticism from multiple quarters. Lawmakers and analysts warned that his tone reflected an overly accommodating posture toward Ankara, particularly given Turkey’s strained ties with Israel and its regional ambitions. His remarks equating Israel and Hezbollah as “equally untrustworthy” further fueled backlash in Washington, prompting sharp rebukes from senior U.S. officials.

Criticism also emerged domestically in Turkey. Opposition figures condemned Barrack for appearing to praise strongman governance models over democratic systems — comments that one prominent leader labeled “brazen impertinence.”

The job of the American ambassador to Turkey is not to make Ankara feel validated; it is to defend U.S. interests, uphold alliances, and confront a partner whose policies have repeatedly empowered America’s adversaries.