February 4, 2026 | Policy Brief
Expiration of New START Offers Chance for U.S. To Revamp Nuclear Posture Towards Russia and China
February 4, 2026 | Policy Brief
Expiration of New START Offers Chance for U.S. To Revamp Nuclear Posture Towards Russia and China
The expiration of the last remaining U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control treaty offers the Trump administration an opportunity to reexamine and strengthen the U.S. nuclear posture to deter both Russia and China.
The pact, known as New START, is scheduled to expire on February 5. The 15-year-old accord imposes verifiable limits on deployed intercontinental-range nuclear warheads, delivery systems, and launchers.
Russia proposed an informal one-year extension of New START’s limits in September 2025 but the Trump administration was unpersuaded. “If it expires, it expires,” President Donald Trump told The New York Times. “We’ll just do a better agreement.” While Trump has long pushed for a trilateral accord with Russia and China, Beijing has rejected participation amid the expansion of its arsenal.
New START Limits
New START capped deployed strategic nuclear warheads at 1,550 per side. Including deployed stocks, the United States maintained a military stockpile of approximately 3,700 weapons as of 2025, with around 1,500 warheads slated for retirement and dismantlement. Russia held an estimated 4,309 nuclear weapons, including approximately 1,150 earmarked for dismantlement.
The treaty also permitted up to 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, along with 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
An Increasingly Obsolete Treaty
Given Russia’s non-compliance with New START, its large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons and development of novel delivery systems, and China’s nuclear expansion, the bilateral treaty is increasingly obsolete.
Russia informally suspended New START verification following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, halting on-site inspections and bilateral consultations. In 2023, Russia ceased data exchanges, leaving the United States “unable to make a determination” on Moscow’s compliance, according to the latest State Department New START implementation report. The report concluded that “Russia was probably close to the deployed warhead limit during much of the year and may have exceeded [it] by a small number during portions of 2024.”
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) undertaken by the Biden administration in 2022 noted U.S. concern over Russia’s active stockpile of “up to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear warheads,” which are not treaty limited. Moscow has also tested novel systems like the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater drone and Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, which fall outside New START’s caps on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The United States maintained just 200 non-strategic nuclear weapons in 2025.
According to the Department of Defense (DOD), China has expanded its nuclear arsenal from approximately 200 warheads to more than 600 operational ones as of 2024, while refining its delivery systems. The DOD has projected that China will amass over 1,000 warheads by 2030.
National Security Before New Arms Control
New START and its predecessors — such as SALT I, SALT II, the INF Treaty, START I, START II, and SORT — promoted strategic stability, transparency, and mitigation of the Cold War’s arms race excesses. Yet Russia and China’s aggression and their joint challenge to U.S. nuclear superiority necessitate recalibrating U.S. posture before new limits are agreed to.
A source with knowledge of the internal policy debate told FDD that the administration had reevaluated U.S. nuclear strategy as part of a classified portion of DOD’s National Defense Strategy, released on January 23. U.S. law requires the Secretary of Defense to brief congressional defense committees on DOD’s findings no later than March 15.
The Trump administration should also consider launching its own NPR to more fully assess U.S. nuclear strategy. This would determine whether current forces adequately deter Russia and China, provide allies with assurances on this key consideration, and support broader U.S. security goals.
Ahead of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, scheduled for April 27-May 22, the U.S. should reassure the international community, which will be concerned about a renewed arms race, that a new trilateral nuclear treaty is feasible based on its NPR findings — provided that both Russia and China participate.
Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Andrea on X @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.