Washington Must Not Relax Nonproliferation Standards for Saudi Arabia

Will a forthcoming nuclear deal between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia ease Riyadh’s path to attaining a nuclear weapon? Current indications suggest that, worryingly, the answer is yes.

The United States will not insist on the strictest nonproliferation standards in a forthcoming bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. The administration may submit the agreement, known as a 123 accord, to Congress, in the coming days or weeks.

In particular, Washington will not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol — the agency’s strongest safeguards framework, enabling short-notice inspections of undeclared sites and comprehensive declarations to detect covert nuclear-weapons work. The United States may also facilitate Riyadh’s pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing — sensitive capabilities that could give the kingdom access to fuel and expertise it could repurpose for nuclear weapons — and permit U.S. participation in such activities on Saudi soil.

Once submitted, Congress has 90 days of continuous session to review the accord and could block it via a joint resolution of disapproval.

No Additional Protocol Required

A report submitted by the Trump administration to congressional committees in November 2025 — following a joint U.S.-Saudi declaration of nuclear cooperation on November 18 — confirmed that the administration has no intention of requiring Saudi Arabia to conclude an IAEA Additional Protocol. It argues that placing U.S. industry at the core of Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear program, along with bilateral or trilateral IAEA-involved safeguards, will provide sufficient verification, but only at “locations at which sensitive [U.S.-Saudi] cooperation would occur.”

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the administration must provide Congress with a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement alongside any proposed 123 agreement. A provision in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, however, first requires a separate report explaining how, if the Additional Protocol is omitted, the agreement advances U.S. security interests without contributing to proliferation.

U.S. Could Grant Riyadh Access to Sensitive Fuel-Cycle Technologies

The November 2025 report signals the United States will not object to Saudi enrichment or reprocessing. It notes that a bilateral agreement “with the involvement” of the IAEA will employ “additional safeguards and verification measures to the most proliferation sensitive areas of potential nuclear cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States (enrichment, conversion, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing).”

If Congress does not block the agreement during its 90-day review, the administration could grant consent for Saudi Arabia to pursue enrichment or reprocessing or for U.S. involvement in such facilities on Saudi soil. Indeed, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright indicated openness to enrichment in Saudi Arabia, stating in April 2025 that there appeared to be a “pathway” for such arrangements. The Biden administration had also explored concepts for a U.S.-operated enrichment facility in the kingdom. The Trump administration has shown willingness to relax longstanding U.S. restrictions on sensitive fuel-cycle technologies, as reflected by its recent acquiescence to South Korean uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing — reversing decades of opposition.

The Administration Should Reevaluate and Congress Must Oppose the Accord

The administration has also hinted that if the United States does not accommodate Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of sensitive fuel-cycle technologies, Riyadh may seek them from other suppliers, such as China. This stance persists despite Saudi Arabia’s designation as a major non-NATO ally and the billions in economic and defense support it receives.

Washington risks bending longstanding nonproliferation standards in response to Saudi warnings that it will produce nuclear fuel with only standard IAEA safeguards. This amounts to an implicit threat to edge closer to nuclear weapons.

The administration should reverse course, reassess the risks to core U.S. nonproliferation principles, and consider the precedent for other partners. It should require Riyadh to forgo enrichment and reprocessing under any 123 agreement.

Lawmakers concerned about proliferation risks should move to disapprove the accord. Allowing enrichment or reprocessing in Saudi Arabia — especially amid Riyadh’s statements about matching Iranian nuclear advances — would erode global nonproliferation norms and set a dangerous precedent in an already volatile region.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Andrea on X @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.