Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: April

The delay of the planned Trump-Xi summit, originally scheduled for March, now shapes the broader U.S.-China relationship. The Iran war drove the postponement, sparing Beijing from hosting Trump just as Washington pummels one of China’s principal diplomatic partners. At the same time, the delay preserves the fragile trade truce reached in Busan last fall. For now, both sides appear comfortable with a temporary holding pattern: Trump can focus on the war, while Beijing can continue hardening its supply chains and strengthening its industrial capacity.

Behind the scenes, U.S. and Chinese negotiators met in Paris to explore deliverables for a future summit. Discussions included expanded Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural and energy exports, as well as the creation of new “boards” on trade and investment to manage bilateral ties. Washington sees these mechanisms as a way to enforce purchase commitments and guide diversification away from China in strategic sectors. Beijing, however, views them as tools to lock in a softer U.S. approach and slow-walk concessions — consistent with its broader strategy of using dialogue formats to shape outcomes and dilute pressure.

The result is a familiar pattern: tactical stability masking strategic divergence. The administration continues to prioritize a narrow trade truce while pursuing longer-term efforts to reduce U.S. dependence on Chinese supply chains. Beijing, for its part, is pressing for a broader reset that would unwind export controls, ease investment restrictions, and restore pre-2018 trade conditions. With both sides pursuing incompatible end states, the current pause looks less like progress and more like posturing before rivalry between the two countries sharpens again.

March brought several positive developments for the Trump administration’s cyber efforts, but the proof remains in the successful implementation of these initiatives.

The White House released its long-awaited National Cyber Strategy, marking a significant step forward in reprioritizing the nation’s cyber foundation. The strategy includes important goals, such as building offensive cyber capabilities, simplifying cyber regulations, increasing public-private collaboration, and developing the U.S. cyber workforce.

Executive agencies took substantive action to combat America’s adversaries in cyberspace. On March 19, the Justice Department seized four websites connected to Iran’s intelligence apparatus. Utilized by pro-Iran hacking group Handala, the sites functioned in furtherance of Iranian psychological operations and transnational repression, including the March 11 attacks on U.S. medical product manufacturer Stryker.

Meanwhile, the Federal Communications Commission banned the import of foreign-made consumer routers. Citing the Chinese cyber threat groups Volt and Salt Typhoon, the ban marks the latest in a series of actions taken to combat Chinese control of the home technology market.

Unfortunately, continued understaffing at the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency remains a problem, with only a fraction of the needed workforce in place even before the additional layoffs caused by the DHS shutdown. Because of the shutdown, the agency also had to postpone town hall meetings intended to bring together public- and private-sector stakeholders to share information, concerns, and guidance on the cyberthreat landscape.

American and Israeli combat operations in March established air superiority over Iran and severely degraded Iran’s military capabilities. U.S. forces struck more than 10,000 Iranian military targets by March 25. American and Israel Defense Forces strikes resulted in a 90 percent reduction in Iranian missile and drone launch rates and damaged or destroyed more than two-thirds of Iran’s missile, drone, and naval production facilities and shipyards. U.S. strikes destroyed 92 percent of the Iranian navy’s largest vessels, according to U.S. Central Command.

Despite major operational progress, Iran continued attacks on U.S. military bases, Israel, and Arab states. Thirteen American servicemembers have been killed, and an additional 290 were reported wounded or injured by March 24. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s strategic and political objectives remain unclear and shifting.

Iran implemented a selective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, imposing significant economic and political costs. The United States cannot permit Tehran to close the strait indefinitely, but an American military effort to reopen it could consume significant time and resources.

The administration ordered two Amphibious Ready Groups and their embarked Marine Expeditionary Units to the region on March 13 and 17, respectively, as well as elements of the 82nd Airborne Division on March 24. Trump is reportedly considering options for ground operations, including a potential seizure of Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf to pressure Iran to reopen the strait. Ground operations, especially those that seek to hold ground, would entail considerable dangers and risk expanding and extending the conflict, incurring additional casualties.

The Trump administration took steps to stabilize markets amid Iran’s attacks and near-term price pressures. Those included a Strategic Petroleum Reserve release coordinated with G7 countries, a Jones Act waiver to facilitate deliveries to areas of the country that could otherwise face disruption, and a sanctions license to facilitate access to Iranian oil on the water. For the latter, while President Trump suggested it was unlikely Iran would receive money paid for the oil, the Department of the Treasury has not clarified whether it will require payments into escrow accounts. The president, through his own statements, created downward pressures on oil prices through conflict duration expectation management. FDD has opted for a neutral rating to reflect current market disruptions, while acknowledging the mitigation steps the administration has taken and the role the military must ultimately play.

Against this backdrop, the White House National Energy Dominance Council and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry co-hosted an Indo-Pacific Energy Security Ministerial and Business Forum in Tokyo from March 14 to 15. Interior Secretary Doug Burgum led the U.S. interagency delegation to the summit, which included 17 countries and featured announcements of $56 billion in deals tied to American energy resources. With Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) not moving and Doha reporting significant damage to its production capacity, the Trump administration’s decision to lift its predecessor’s LNG export ban takes on even greater significance. On March 23, Burgum said Asian allies were looking to the United States for secure oil and gas supplies.

With the Iran war consuming Washington’s attention, U.S.-brokered peace talks between Ukraine and Russia have lost what little momentum they had. The fourth round of trilateral negotiations, originally scheduled for early March, has been postponed indefinitely, though Russian and Ukrainian officials traveled separately to Florida to meet with U.S. envoys.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon reportedly may divert critical air defense munitions intended for Ukraine to the Middle East as the Iran war depletes U.S. stocks. With the U.S. focus elsewhere and Russia raking in extra cash thanks to inflated oil prices and loosened U.S. sanctions, Kyiv worries that the Kremlin will now be even less inclined to compromise.

Looking to bleed the United States and ensure the Islamic Republic’s survival, Moscow is providing Tehran with intelligence, advice on drone tactics, and additional one-way attack drones, according to Western officials. By contrast, Ukraine, drawing on its unmatched experience employing cost-effective defenses against these drones, has deployed personnel to the Middle East to help counter the Iranian threat.

Washington’s handling of the Iran war has further strained transatlantic relations. After declining even to inform allies of U.S. intentions to launch the war with Iran, President Trump demanded that they help open the Strait of Hormuz. When they predictably resisted, he labeled them “COWARDS,” threatening that it would “cost them dearly.”

In better news, the U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund announced its first investment, selecting a Ukrainian emerging technology company that supports the Ukrainian military. And during a visit to Washington, Ukraine’s energy minister announced agreements with American companies.

Since the outbreak of the Iran war on February 28, the Islamic Republic has fired thousands of missiles and drones at Gulf countries, destabilizing the region. Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, driving up energy prices.

Still, at least two other developments have shown constructive U.S. policy on the Gulf’s Arab countries. First, the Trump administration has made emergency arms sales to the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Jordan. Second, Washington has achieved diplomatic success in building a coalition to open the Strait of Hormuz, even as the coalition’s ultimate strategy remains unclear. At the same time, President Trump has condemned key European allies for failing to help.

The $23 billion emergency arms package for air defense radars, air-to-air missiles, and various other equipment was a pragmatic move. By fast-tracking some arms sales using emergency authorities, Washington is rapidly strengthening frontline allies. In a region where Iran has been attacking shipping and neighbors, empowering these states creates a stronger defensive perimeter.

Equally important is the diplomatic success in forming a coalition of 22 nations that publicly condemned the Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Securing the signatures of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, the two Arab neighbors of Iran that have dealt with some of the most intense volleys of Iranian ballistic missiles and drones, signals broad international legitimacy and isolates Tehran. The public condemnation demonstrates that U.S. diplomacy can still forge wide coalitions even in polarized times.

The war with Iran has placed significant strain on American regional allies and partners, many of which rely on seaborne energy imports that transit the Strait of Hormuz and host now departed U.S. defense assets intended to deter China.

Certain allies, such as Japan, offered to support efforts to reopen the strait during Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to Washington on March 19. They also made stronger commitments to rebuilding U.S. stockpiles of precision munitions. However, other allies have been forced to ration oil due to supply uncertainty.

Though the United States signed a series of regional energy deals collectively worth $57 billion to supply American-produced liquefied natural gas on March 15, these agreements will not ease current shortages of crude and gasoline, with the Philippines declaring a national emergency on March 24 due to predicted shortfalls. Concurrently, the United States has reportedly entertained allowing Manila to purchase U.S.-sanctioned oil, undercutting the Trump administration’s regional economic security agenda.

Washington has also struggled to advance this agenda amid new trade investigations, with India reportedly holding off on signing an interim trade agreement due to the possibility of further tariffs on key export sectors.

Meanwhile, the conflict has forced the United States to withdraw key defense assets from the region, upsetting some allies. While America reportedly redeployed the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit from Japan to the Gulf, the withdrawal of critical Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) components and potentially other missile defense systems from South Korea drew condemnation from Seoul.

On March 11, the Trump administration collaborated with fellow International Energy Agency member nations to authorize the release of a record 400 million barrels of oil from emergency reserves. The move aims to stabilize markets amid ongoing disruptions to global energy supply as a result of the war in Iran. The United States will release 172 million barrels as part of this agreement.

The same day, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz issued a strong statement of support for the Bahraini-led UN Security Council Resolution 2817, which condemned Iran’s attacks on neighboring Arab states. He also commended the 135 cosponsoring nations that have “spoken as one voice.”

On March 12, the United States filed to intervene in the International Court of Justice genocide case between Israel and South Africa, arguing that a ruling against the Jewish state could undermine international law. U.S. State Department legal advisor Reed Rubenstein, in the filing, argued, “Civilian casualties, even widespread civilian casualties, are not necessarily probative of genocidal intent, particularly when they occur in the context of an armed conflict involving urban combat.”

Finally, the United States voted on March 16, in unanimity with the rest of the UN Security Council, to extend the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) for an additional three months until the full mandate renewal comes under consideration in June. UNAMA coordinates more than two dozen UN agencies and international organizations working in Afghanistan to provide a wide range of humanitarian aid and services to the people of Afghanistan.

The commander of U.S. Central Command, Admiral Brad Cooper, described Operation Epic Fury as “on plan or ahead of plan in achieving very clear military objectives for eliminating Iran’s ability to project power,” saying the United States had struck more than 10,000 targets as of March 25. U.S. and Israeli forces have destroyed 92 percent of large Iranian naval vessels and “two-thirds of Iran’s missile, drone, and naval production facilities and shipyards,” said Cooper, resulting in a more than 90 percent decrease in drone and missile launches during the conflict. The operation has also killed most of Iran’s key leaders.

Simultaneously, the Trump administration is exploring a deal with Iran, but the president said he is not “desperate” for one. The United States presented Iran with a 15-point plan to end the war through the Pakistani government. Steve Witkoff, U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, reported “strong and positive messaging and talks.” However, the Iranian foreign minister has denied negotiations with the United States.

President Trump extended a pause on attacking Iran’s power plants until April 6 after initially issuing a 48-hour deadline on March 21 for the country to allow unimpeded transit of the Strait of Hormuz or face the destruction of their power plants.

Meanwhile, the Treasury Department issued a general license permitting the sale of an estimated 140 million barrels of Iranian oil already at sea. The license does not include mechanisms related to payment or reporting that would prevent the Islamic Republic from profiting.

The United States and Israel have dealt the Islamic Republic of Iran punishing strikes, eliminating much of its leadership, nuclear infrastructure, air defenses, navy, ballistic missile capabilities, and repression apparatus, but have yet to deliver the knockout blow.

While coordination between the United States and Israel has been unprecedented, some fissures have emerged. After Israel struck Iran’s South Pars gas field, Iran responded by attacking energy infrastructure in Qatar and across the Middle East. President Donald Trump claimed that Jerusalem failed to warn Washington prior to the attack, a charge Israel denies. “NO MORE ATTACKS WILL BE MADE BY ISRAEL” on the field, he declared on social media, unless Iran again attacks uninvolved parties. Potentially divergent aims — destroying the regime or only its military capabilities — could strain coordination.

Iran’s strategy has centered around creating pressure to end the war prematurely, as demonstrated by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, causing energy prices to soar in the first two weeks of fighting. Trump threatened drastic action should Iran continue to hold international shipping hostage but backed down amid vague claims that progress had been made toward Iran granting concessions. However, Tehran later rejected a U.S. plan to end the war — delivered via Pakistan — and responded with unserious demands, including reparations payments to Iran.

Though the Iran war has overshadowed Gaza, the Board of Peace presented to the UN Security Council its plan to disarm Hamas. Earlier in March, the Trump administration announced terrorism sanctions against four charities funding Hamas.

The Trump administration’s transactional posture toward the U.S.-ROK alliance intensified in March, with the ongoing U.S. military campaign against Iran introducing a new variable that continues to compound South Korea’s uncertainty about Washington’s long-term commitments. Early in the month, the United States reportedly began moving components of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), a land-based missile defense system, from South Korea to the Middle East to address rising demand tied to the Iran conflict.

During a cabinet meeting on March 10, President Lee Jae Myung acknowledged the move and admitted that Seoul could not compel Washington to halt the decision despite its opposition. The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy’s framing of South Korea as “capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea” has effectively provided Washington with the strategic rationale for this shift. South Korea has no domestic replacement for THAAD, and the redeployment of THAAD components coincided with North Korea’s third ballistic missile test of 2026 on March 14.

Meanwhile, South Korea’s National Assembly passed the $350 billion U.S. investment bill just hours after Washington launched Section 301 investigations into Seoul and 15 other trading partners for industrial overcapacity. Seoul’s defense industrial base and the latest investment commitment make it one of Washington’s most consequential partners as the United States faces simultaneous military and economic strain from its Middle East campaign. Seoul is making significant economic concessions to preserve the relationship while Washington simultaneously escalates trade pressure.

On March 2, after a 15-month lull, Hezbollah reignited the war with Israel that the group began on October 8, 2023. Israel’s initial response was predictably ferocious and overwhelming, with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) setting Hezbollah’s disarmament as the goal of the revived campaign in Lebanon. But as the war in Iran continues to preoccupy IDF planning and resources, the Lebanon front has, for now, settled into a predictable, albeit mid-level, intensity and tempo.

Hezbollah’s provocation, and Israel’s exacting response, prompted the Lebanese government to adopt several unprecedented decisions. On March 2, Beirut decided to proscribe the group’s military activities and ordered the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to continue its disarmament efforts. Lebanon then ordered the detention and deportation of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel operating on Lebanese soil. This culminated on March 24 with Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi declaring Iran’s ambassador-designate, Mohammad Reza Shibani, persona non grata — a dramatic decision on its face but one with no impact on the Iranian Embassy in Beirut’s operations or function as a hub for IRGC activity.

In fact, unfortunately, all of Lebanon’s seemingly promising decisions this past month remain symbolic. Hezbollah has defiantly continued fighting and intends to focus its post-ceasefire efforts on making Beirut reverse its March 2 decision, while the LAF is openly refusing to confront or forcibly disarm the group. The Lebanese government has nevertheless sought to leverage the excitement produced by its dramatic decisions to renegotiate a ceasefire with Israel — but one that, implicitly, will restore matters to the status quo ante that allowed Hezbollah to regenerate over the past 15 months. Washington, however, has been uninterested in accommodating Lebanon, with Ambassador Tom Barrack rebuffing Beirut by saying, “Stop with the bullsh*t on disarming Hezbollah, or there’s nothing to discuss.”

During U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran, nuclear facilities have come under assault on multiple occasions. Israel confirmed hits on weaponization-linked sites, including Taleghan 2, where Tehran was restoring a high-explosives vessel suitable for experiments to assist nuclear-device development; Minzadehei, a previously undisclosed site where Israeli intelligence had tracked scientists reconstituting work on a nuclear weapon component; a building at Malek Ashtar University associated with nuclear weapons research, and a laboratory building at Mojdeh, the former headquarters of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Israel may also be targeting additional scientists and university centers linked to the regime’s research on nuclear weapons.

Israel has added new obstacles to Iran’s uranium production pathway, striking the Ardakan uranium processing plant, which turned uranium ore into yellowcake for later enrichment. In addition, the entrances were collapsed and access points were struck at the already damaged underground Natanz enrichment site. In June 2025, Washington bombed the facility with two massive ordnance penetrators. Additional strikes may be intended to prevent Iran from recovering any surviving assets.

Furthermore, a vehicle at the Pickaxe Mountain facility near Natanz was targeted, possibly to prevent Iranian access to this heavily fortified underground site, which could potentially serve as a new enrichment plant. Several buildings at the Esfahan nuclear complex were also targeted, in addition to a plant previously associated with centrifuge production called 7th of Tir.

In addition, Israel targeted the regime’s route to plutonium-based nuclear weapons, eliminating the Arak heavy water production plant, where it said Iran was reconstituting a moderator for plutonium-producing nuclear reactors.

Pakistan and Afghanistan resumed fighting after a brief ceasefire during the Eid al-Fitr holiday. Pakistan reinitiated attacks in Afghanistan in late February, and the two countries have exchanged fire since then. Pakistan objects to the Afghan Taliban’s support for the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, which is waging a deadly insurgency inside Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban denied sheltering and supporting the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. The United States has not taken a position on or intervened in the fighting between the two countries.

Immediately following the onset of the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran, the Islamic State has been linked to two attacks inside America. On March 7, Emir Balat and Ibrahim Nikk Kayumi attempted to detonate bombs in an attack targeting protesters outside of the mayor’s home in New York City. The two attackers were charged with “acting in support of ISIS” and are said to have sought an attack larger than the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. On March 12, Mohamed Bailor Jalloh entered an ROTC classroom at Old Dominion University in Virginia, shouted “Allahu akbar,” and killed the teacher. The students subdued and killed Jalloh. The assailant had previously been convicted of attempting to support an Islamic State attack in the United States and traveled to Nigeria to meet with an Islamic State leader.

Syria has remained one of the quieter fronts in the Middle East during Operation Epic Fury. But Hezbollah’s entry into the war and its continued attacks against Israel have drawn attention to the Syrian theater. A report by Reuters alleged that the United States had greenlit “the idea of Syrian cross-border operations against Hezbollah,” including the possibility of a ground incursion into eastern Lebanon. U.S. officials later denied the reports, with Ambassador Tom Barrack among those rejecting the claim.

That rejection is a welcome development. Syrian intervention against Hezbollah would carry significant risks. Introducing a force that has at times proven undisciplined could lead to civilian harm, while the sectarian optics of such an intervention could play directly into Hezbollah’s narrative, which could reinforce its justification for maintaining its weapons.

More encouragingly, the U.S.-mediated integration agreement between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) appears to be holding, with tensions between the two sides notably easing. Under the integration deal, reached after a round of clashes that saw Damascus pushing into SDF-held areas in northeast Syria, the Syrian government has taken steps consistent with implementation. These include appointing an SDF-affiliated figure as governor of Hasakah province, naming an SDF military leader as deputy minister of defense for the eastern region, and designating a deputy commander for the Syrian army’s 60th Division, which is expected to absorb four SDF brigades into its ranks.

Turkey has positioned itself as an intermediary in efforts to broker a ceasefire in the ongoing Iran war. Ankara opposes the conflict, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has condemned efforts to weaken the Islamic Republic, directly blaming Israel for manipulating Washington into starting the war. Since hostilities began, Ankara has consistently called for de-escalation while offering itself as a conduit for indirect diplomacy between Washington and Tehran.

Ankara has worked to shape U.S. decision-making, targeting key figures such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has held direct calls with Rubio to discuss the trajectory of the war and facilitate security coordination — particularly after NATO assets intercepted several Iranian missiles targeting Turkey.

Turkish officials have actively conveyed messages between the United States and Iran, with senior figures such as Fidan engaging counterparts on both sides to explore terms for a ceasefire. Earlier in the crisis, Ankara hosted or proposed talks and encouraged concessions — particularly on Iran’s nuclear program — to avert further escalation.

The Trump administration should demand more from Turkey in the war. Instead of calling for a ceasefire, Turkey should stand by and assist the United States. Turkey maintains a sizable navy to include mine-clearing capabilities — key assets that are necessary to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to navigation, permitting oil-laden tankers to navigate safely and continue to supply energy to world markets.