Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: June

President Donald Trump’s May summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping produced the modest, marketable, and measured results the bilateral relationship can currently bear. The two leaders agreed to create new trade and investment boards and finalized Chinese purchases of U.S. aircraft, agriculture, and energy. Those meager deliverables may help stabilize markets and preserve the fragile trade truce reached last fall in Busan, South Korea. But they did not reset the relationship or resolve the deeper rivalry over technology or Beijing’s support for Tehran.

The summit’s clearest strategic cost came on Taiwan. Xi warned Trump that mishandling Taiwan could lead to “clashes and even conflicts.” Trump later said he and Xi “talked a lot about Taiwan,” including potentially delaying U.S. arms sales, and that he would soon decide on a pending $14 billion arms package for the self-governed island. Most damaging, Trump reportedly described Taiwan arms sales as a “very good negotiating chip” with Beijing.

That framing undermines deterrence. Taiwan arms sales should not be concessions bargained with Beijing; they are central to Taiwan’s ability to defend itself from Chinese coercion and to Washington’s credibility in Asia. Beijing quickly pressed the advantage. Chinese state media cast Taiwan as the “stumbling block” in U.S.-China ties, warned that “Taiwan independence” and cross-strait peace are “as irreconcilable as fire and water,” and said Washington has “much to lose” from playing the “Taiwan card.” The risk now is that Beijing will keep testing whether Trump’s desire for deals outweighs his willingness to deter Chinese coercion.

The Trump-Xi summit in May failed to address cyber concerns between the United States and China. While President Trump said the leaders discussed mutual “spying” activities, the summit neglected China’s efforts to compromise U.S. critical infrastructure.

At the eleventh hour, the White House postponed an executive order establishing a voluntary governmental review process for AI models, citing concerns that the order would slow U.S. innovation.

Despite these setbacks in cyber policy, federal agencies have continued important work on AI transparency and security. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released guidance alongside the G7 Cybersecurity Working Group on the minimum elements necessary to produce software bills of materials (SBOMs) for AI. SBOMs are ingredient lists that provide transparency about supply chains and components. AI bills of materials (AIBOMs), CISA explained, will provide a similar level of transparency about the data, models, and properties of AI systems and help reduce cybersecurity risk.

Meanwhile, after the Senate confirmed Arvind Raman as the new director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the agency announced it is developing flexible guidance on AIBOMs that will help developers detail the data, model, and lineage of their AI systems.

This work, however, is not slowing the erosion of international cyber cooperation. European organizations are migrating away from a longstanding, U.S.-led mechanism for categorizing and sharing cybersecurity vulnerabilities, creating their own parallel system. In May, four new participants signed up under European leadership, and seven switched away from the existing system, reflecting the real costs of America’s diminished leadership in cyberspace.

The Department of Defense announced on May 19 that it would reduce the total number of Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Europe from four to three. The United States had generally maintained at least four BCTs in Europe since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the move would bring America’s military force posture on the continent closer to pre-2022 levels. The decision further deteriorates American combat power on the continent and undermines deterrence against Russian aggression in Europe, which had already been weakened by a series of previous actions by the administration.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on May 3 that it would begin assisting commercial ships attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz on May 4 as part of Project Freedom. However, President Trump announced on May 5 that the effort would be “paused for a short period of time.” CENTCOM confirmed on May 26 that Project Freedom had not resumed and that U.S. forces were not conducting escort operations. Meanwhile, CENTCOM continued conducting a blockade of Iranian ports throughout the month, while defending against sporadic Iranian attacks and conducting self-defense strikes against targets in and around Iran.

ABC News reported on May 13 that the Army planned to make significant training cuts across the force amid a budget shortfall of between $4 billion and $6 billion tied, in part, to increased domestic missions and the Iran war. According to ABC, the cuts could impact key areas of training and readiness, including aviation, medical care, and specific combat arms courses.

Amid continued pressure on the global oil market, with the inability to move product out of the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum on May 15 announced a new effort to streamline permitting for oil and gas infrastructure in the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska. During his visit that week to the North Slope, Burgum toured the Pikka oil field, where first oil was reached on May 18. Pikka is expected to produce 80,000 barrels per day by the third quarter of 2026.

Separately, the Trump administration on May 6 transferred 1.4 million acres of land to the state of Alaska to support the development of a 200-mile road, Ambler Road, which would provide future access to critical minerals and the construction of the Alaska LNG pipeline.

Meanwhile, the Army Corps of Engineers on May 21 issued a permit for a key section of the Dakota Access Pipeline — long held up by legal challenge — which should further insulate the pipeline from future political interference. Dakota Access creates a lower-cost and more efficient way to distribute oil from the Bakken, helping drive U.S. exports in addition to affordability at home.

In recent months, FDD has opted for a neutral rating to reflect current market disruptions, while acknowledging the mitigation steps the administration has taken and the role the military must ultimately play. Notably, while West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil benchmark reached $106 on May 4, ceasefire negotiations between the United States and Iran drove WTI down below $90 on May 27 — a positive development.

Confusion reigns over the future of U.S. force posture in Europe.

On May 1, Pentagon officials announced that Washington would remove some 5,000 troops from Germany, including by withdrawing a forward-stationed brigade combat team over the next six to 12 months and canceling the planned deployment of a long-range missile battalion. But in mid-May, news broke that most of those 5,000 troops would instead come from an armored brigade combat team scheduled to rotate into Poland and the Baltic states. Washington abruptly canceled that deployment even as it was already underway, blindsiding countries that the Pentagon itself has praised as “model allies.”

Following bipartisan backlash, however, President Trump announced he would send 5,000 additional troops to Poland. But he offered no details regarding the timeframe or where those forces would come from.

Separately, the Pentagon informed allies that it will scale back the U.S. forces earmarked to NATO. American contributions of assets such as strategic bombers, fighter jets, destroyers, submarines, and drones will decline to varying degrees, a U.S. defense official reportedly said, without specifying timelines.

The Trump administration deserves credit for pushing allies to improve burden sharing, which can enable Washington to focus more resources on China. But Europe will need time before it can assume “primary responsibility for its own conventional defense,” as the Pentagon insists. The key is a managed transition that prevents dangerous capability gaps, minimizes transatlantic friction, and avoids the perception of wholesale U.S. divestment from Europe.

Handling this the wrong way risks inviting Russian aggression.

In a determined push for regional peace, President Trump has called on Saudi Arabia and Qatar to join the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel once the standoff with Iran is resolved. Neither country commented on the president’s request, which he issued during a May 23 conference call with their leaders. Riyadh promptly leaked its inflexible stance to the media: It would only normalize ties with the Jewish state after Jerusalem offers an “irreversible pathway and timetable” for the creation of a Palestinian state. Qatar remained silent.

This marked the second time the president made the same request of Saudi Arabia. During his visit to Riyadh in May 2025, Trump publicly urged the Saudis to join the accords. The kingdom rejected him then and is unlikely to comply now.

In fact, between 2025 and the present, Saudi Arabia has grown far more vocal and aggressive in its animosity toward Israel. Even as Iran pummeled the kingdom’s energy facilities with explosive drones, Riyadh focused its efforts on diplomatic attacks against the Jewish state. This included rallying Arab and Muslim countries to sign statements condemning the mutual recognition between Israel and Somaliland and the opening of the latter’s embassy in Jerusalem.

Such misplaced priorities underscore growing concerns about the future of the Saudi-Israel relationship.

The United States maintained momentum on securing critical supply chains across the Indo-Pacific, though the strains of its domestic defense industrial base may complicate Washington’s efforts to supply its allies and partners with critical munitions to uphold deterrence.

In a May 26 meeting with foreign ministers from the Quad nations — India, Japan, and Australia — Secretary of State Marco Rubio signed two new pacts on critical mineral refining and energy security, along with committing to build a port in Fiji to enhance regional logistical infrastructure.

Washington also signaled that it was close to signing an agreement with Manila on establishing an “economic security zone” on Luzon Island, an arrangement that will allow U.S. and Filipino firms to invest in manufacturing hubs focused on artificial intelligence, defense production, critical minerals, and semiconductors.

However, Washington has signaled to key regional allies, particularly Japan, that it may struggle to fulfill previously signed defense orders. The Financial Times reported on May 23 that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned his Japanese counterpart, Shinjiro Koizumi, that a planned 2028 delivery of 400 Tomahawk missiles could be delayed by two years. The shortfall may complicate Tokyo’s plans to raise defense spending due to rising Chinese coercion around Taiwan and the South China Sea.

The delay also risks compounding further reductions in U.S. combat power in the region. The Trump administration had previously acknowledged removing certain components of its Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery from South Korea over Seoul’s objections due to the conflict in Iran.

On May 7, the United States introduced a resolution at the UN Security Council aimed at opening the Strait of Hormuz, requiring Iran to cease the tolling, mining, and attacks along the international waterway. The cosponsors of the resolution included Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar. However, China and Russia vetoed the initiative. A French-led resolution is now in preparation while the U.S. text stalls.

On May 14, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz announced a new $1.8 billion humanitarian aid package in coordination with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The funding will support OCHA’s country-based pooled funds across 21 countries, notably Ukraine, Lebanon, and Syria. This package is the second iteration of the Trump administration’s “Humanitarian Reset” framework, part of Washington’s effort to streamline U.S. funding of international organizations.

Finally, a U.S. federal judge ruled on May 13 that sanctions against UN special rapporteur Francesca Albanese be temporarily lifted after Albanese’s husband and daughter sued the Trump administration following her designation in July 2025. In response, the Justice Department filed an emergency relief motion on May 21 requesting that the court set aside the ruling, thereby allowing the sanctions against Albanese to remain in place. On May 22, the Justice Department prevailed; the DC Circuit issued a short-term pause of the May 13 ruling, temporarily reinstating the sanctions on Albanese while the court considers the case.

President Trump emphasized on May 27 that he is in no rush to secure a deal with Iran, saying, “the primary urgency is that we can’t let Iran have a nuclear weapon.” This came days after reports of the two countries nearing agreement on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for a ceasefire extension to open the Strait of Hormuz. Washington and Tehran have publicly disputed the contours of the MOU, but it reportedly leaves other key issues — such as the nuclear file — for subsequent negotiation.

Since the April 8 ceasefire, maritime traffic has struggled to transit the strait. On May 6, President Trump reversed his May 3 announcement of Project Freedom, a U.S. mission to escort commercial ships through the strait.

The United States and Iran have continued tit-for-tat attacks. On May 27, Iran launched five drones at ships in the strait, which U.S. Central Command described as an “egregious ceasefire violation.” The American military responded by striking a ground control site used to launch drones. In retaliation, Iran fired a ballistic missile at Kuwait, which was intercepted. Earlier in the week, the United States undertook limited strikes on launch sites and mine-laying vessels.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Treasury Department targeted illicit Iranian finance networks, including Iranian exchange houses, foreign front companies, Iranian shadow fleet vessels, and individuals enabling oil smuggling schemes in Iraq. Treasury also sanctioned Iranian weapons procurement networks and the Persian Gulf Strait Authority for operating a toll system in the strait for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

May reaffirmed the durability of the U.S.-Israel relationship while also exposing a notable fault line regarding Washington’s negotiations with Tehran.

On May 1, the Trump administration approved more than $8.6 billion in military sales to allies in the Middle East, including Israel, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio citing an emergency circumstance requiring immediate sales. Just over a week later, in an interview that drew mixed reactions, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told 60 Minutes that he hopes to wean Israel off U.S. security assistance within a decade, stating that the country has “come of age.”

Later in the month, Trump and Netanyahu reportedly had a heated exchange over the phone after Washington announced it would postpone strikes to encourage Iran to move toward a deal. Despite dissent from Jerusalem, Trump continued to push the diplomatic train forward in hopes of reaching a deal with Tehran.

Just days later, Trump also opened additional diplomatic channels with Arab and Muslim nations regarding a possible expansion of the Abraham Accords contingent on reaching a deal to end the war with Iran.

Finally, on the northern front, the U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel appears to be hanging by a thread as the IDF makes advances in southern Lebanon and strikes between the two sides intensify. According to Netanyahu, the IDF “eliminated … over 600 terrorists” in its military offensive against Hezbollah over the preceding several weeks.

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth met with South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back on May 11 and prioritized discussing wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer from Washington to Seoul. While the United States treats the OPCON transfer as a mechanism for burden sharing and freeing American assets for broader Indo-Pacific missions, Seoul seeks it as a path toward strategic autonomy over its defense. The January 2026 National Defense Strategy included language about updating “force posture on the Korean Peninsula,” but the May ministerial meeting did not address troop presence on the peninsula.

On trade, the U.S. Trade Representative concluded Section 301 hearings on May 8 targeting South Korea and 15 other economies for overproduction in strategic manufacturing sectors that could undercut U.S. producers. At her May 21 Senate confirmation hearing, President Trump’s nominee for ambassador to South Korea, Michelle Steel, vowed to press Seoul on its $350 billion commitment to invest in the U.S. market in return for favorable tariff conditions. Steel also reaffirmed her commitment to protect U.S. companies from discrimination in the South Korean market, citing the November 2025 U.S.-ROK joint fact sheet from President Lee Jae Myung’s visit to Washington.

North Korea tested short-range ballistic missiles into the Yellow Sea on May 26, its latest in a sustained 2026 testing cadence that has included cluster munition variants and KN-25 upgrades. Washington and Seoul did not issue a joint statement in response.

The combination of force posture signaling, unaddressed North Korean provocation, and active trade enforcement pressure constitutes a negative trajectory.

The United States continued shepherding direct Israel-Lebanon negotiations throughout May. Mid-month, the State Department hosted the third round of bilateral talks, during which the parties agreed to extend the April 16 ceasefire by 45 days while establishing parallel security and political tracks.

However, diplomatic progress produced little practical effect. Lebanon remains committed to extracting concessions from Israel during these negotiations — namely, consolidating the ceasefire, ending Israeli military operations and presence in Lebanon, and a return of Lebanese detainees in Israel — without committing to disarming Hezbollah. Lebanon, instead, said it was seeking “breathing space” and pressure on Israel to accede to Beirut’s positions.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah remains unbowed. Secretary-General Naim Qassem insisted no foreign country had a right to opine on the “resistance” and its weapons, which he said the group would not surrender. Meanwhile, Hezbollah politburo deputy chairman Mahmoud Qmati tacitly warned the group’s domestic opponents against exploiting the war with Israel to “stab the resistance in the back” — saying Hezbollah’s frontline fighters were only a portion of the force the group could muster.

Clashes between Israel and Hezbollah also continued. The past month saw Hezbollah lean heavily on first-person-view (FPV) drones to attack Israeli forces operating in Lebanon and Israeli targets beyond the Blue Line. Israel intensified its attacks while casting a wary eye toward Washington. While the Trump administration sanctioned several Hezbollah and allied officials, including from the Amal Movement, Washington nevertheless placed limits on Israel’s operations in Lebanon that are constraining its freedom of action against Hezbollah.

A month-long UN conference, convened roughly every five years to review implementation of the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), failed to reach consensus on a final document outlining mutual commitments and future steps to strengthen the treaty. By the end of the final week, the draft had been so heavily diluted that it omitted key issues such as Iran’s noncompliance, North Korea’s expanding arsenal, and Russia’s seizure and shelling of a Ukrainian nuclear power plant.

References to the February expiration of the last remaining U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control agreement, New START, were also removed. China’s unprecedented nuclear buildup — as well as possible arsenal increases by the other nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom) — received no specific mention amid concerns expressed by non-nuclear-weapon states. This marks the third conference since 2010 to end without a consensus outcome document.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration announced it is close to reaching a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Iran aimed at halting the conflict, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and neutralizing Iran’s nuclear threat. The MOU is expected to be followed by a ceasefire and at least 60 days of negotiations to add greater specificity to a potential agreement. President Trump has emphasized that he will not accept a weak nuclear deal with Iran, asserting that Tehran must surrender or destroy its enriched uranium stocks under international supervision and take concrete additional steps to constrain its future ability to build nuclear weapons.

The Trump administration has stepped up military operations against jihadists in Nigeria, but the jihadists remain entrenched and the trajectory of the conflict is uncertain. The U.S. military partnered with the Armed Forces of Nigeria and killed Abu Bilal al Minuki, a senior leader in the Islamic State, and several unnamed commanders during a raid on May 16. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) described Minuki as the “director of global operations” and the “ISIS number two,” or second in command. Additionally, AFRICOM said Minuki “provided strategic guidance to the ISIS global network on media and financial operations as well as the development and manufacturing of weapons, explosives, and drones.”

The Islamic State has not commented on reports of Minuki’s death. Immediately following Minuki’s demise, AFRICOM announced additional strikes against the Islamic State in Nigeria on May 17 and May 18. However, the targets of those strikes have not been identified. At the end of 2025, the Trump administration began pressuring the Nigerian government to take action against the Islamic State for the group’s targeting of Christian communities in the country. AFRICOM launched its first strike against the Islamic State in Nigeria on December 25, 2025.

Meanwhile, the spokesman for al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in Somalia and East Africa, congratulated the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s branch in West Africa, for its recent victories in Mali. JNIM took control of multiple cities and towns in Mali in late April and has laid siege to the capital of Bamako. However, the Malian government has stemmed JNIM’s advance with the help of Russia’s Africa Corps.

Despite Washington’s unconditional removal of sanctions on Syria in June 2025 and the revocation of the Caesar Act in December 2025, America continues to maintain Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), imposed in 1979 over the former Assad regime’s support for Palestinian militant groups. For now, the Trump administration should maintain the SST designation as conditional leverage rather than remove it outright. Washington should instead use the prospect of lifting it to press Damascus on unresolved security concerns.

According to Syria’s Ministry of Finance, the designation has deterred foreign investment and limited economic engagement by foreign companies and governments. Al-Monitor reported that the State Department completed the required six-month review last year to determine whether Syria had continued to support international terrorism, and a decision on removing the designation is awaiting final approval from Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Still, the State Department has yet to publicly explain why the designation remains in place despite the Trump administration’s broader push to normalize relations with Damascus. One likely explanation is that Washington rightly seeks to utilize it as a bargaining chip over the Syrian government as the Trump administration evaluates key U.S. policy objectives. These include monitoring implementation of the U.S.-mediated agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which aims to integrate northeastern Syria into the Syrian state. Although military integration has shown progress, disputes over Kurdish political representation and minority rights persist, including criticism voiced by Kurdish groups during parliamentary voting on May 24.

Another potential factor is the continued presence of foreign fighters inside Syria, including members of U.S.-designated terrorist organizations like Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, particularly amid tensions between Damascus and some of these groups that escalated into clashes on May 5.

President Trump’s latest outreach to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reflects a troubling willingness to treat Ankara as a stabilizing partner despite Turkey’s accelerating democratic backsliding.

On May 25, Trump called on Turkey and several Muslim-majority states to join the Abraham Accords as part of a broader Iran deal. The proposal overlooks Erdogan’s long deterioration of ties with Israel, especially since October 7, 2023, and his positioning of Turkey as a patron of Hamas and critic of Israel’s campaign against Iranian-backed terror networks. Linking Turkey’s normalization posture to an agreement with Iran rewards Erdogan diplomatically without requiring meaningful changes in Ankara’s regional behavior.

Trump’s approach also mistakes transactional access for achieving strategic goals. While the Trump administration may perceive Erdogan as a supporter of a potential peace deal with Iran, Ankara’s main goal is to preserve leverage, weaken Israel diplomatically, and insert itself into negotiations to gain concessions from Washington.

More concerningly, Trump praised Erdogan just days after a Turkish court removed the elected leadership of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Turkey’s main opposition. On May 23, Trump publicly thanked Erdogan and recently described him as a “strong man” and “very good ally.”

The timing was striking. The Turkish court’s unprecedented intervention against CHP leader Ozgur Ozel is aimed at weakening the opposition before the next presidential election. Praising Erdogan amid judicial interference against political opponents signals indifference to democratic backsliding and emboldens further authoritarianism in Turkey.