Political Exclusion of Syrian Kurds Threatens SDF-Damascus Deal

A dispute over Kurdish political representation and cultural rights is emerging as the primary fault line in the Syrian government’s process of integration with the Kurdish-run semi-autonomous region in the country’s northeast. While military integration with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has advanced, Kurdish leaders have argued that Syria’s transitional political system offers little meaningful representation.

On May 24, authorities completed  the process of selecting members of parliament from the Kurdish-majority areas of Hasakah province and the district of Kobani (Ayn al-Arab), filling 11 seats that had remained vacant since October. Five of the seats went to Kurdish candidates, yet Kurdish officials criticized the indirect process as “nothing more than an appointment process” that failed to reflect the “free Kurdish will,” reigniting concerns over inadequate political representation.

Instead of allowing citizens to vote for their representatives, Syria’s constitutional declaration — in practice, its interim constitution — relies on electors chosen by a set of committees. Specifically, the Higher Committee for Parliamentary Elections, a body created by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, appointed election subcommittees, which in turn appointed local election boards, numbered at around 7,000. Those boards then voted in October to fill two-thirds of the seats in parliament, with the final third reserved for presidential appointees.

At the time, Damascus did not allow the selection of parliamentarians in the SDF-held provinces of Hasakah and Raqqa, nor in Suwayda, the Druze heartland.

Military Integration Contrasts With Persistent Tensions Over Language and Cultural Rights

In January, a U.S.-mediated agreement established a mechanism to integrate both the SDF and the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), the governing body overseeing civil institutions in northeastern Syria, into the Syrian state. Since the deal’s signing, Damascus has integrated four SDF brigades into the Syrian army. The Syrian Ministry of Defense appointed senior SDF commander Siphan Hamo as deputy defense minister for the Eastern Region, while naming an SDF-linked member as deputy commander of the army’s 60th Division.

Yet progress on political and cultural issues has been more limited. Despite Sharaa describing Kurdish as a “national language” in a January 18 decree that granted Kurds rights — including citizenship, recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights, and Kurdish-language instruction in public schools in areas with a significant Kurdish presence — disputes over language rights have persisted. Earlier this month, protesters in Hasakah tore down a government billboard at the Justice Palace after Syrian authorities replaced the Kurdish-Arabic text with English and Arabic.

Sharaa’s Centralization of Power Heightens Kurdish Fears

Tensions between the SDF and Damascus are magnified by the fact that Syria’s parliament has yet to convene, leaving political authority during the past 18 months concentrated in Sharaa’s hands.

The prolonged absence of a legislature has enabled Sharaa to govern by presidential decree. Article 30 of Syria’s constitutional declaration assigns parliament the responsibility of “proposing and passing laws” and “granting a general amnesty.” With no parliament in place, Sharaa has exercised these authorities unilaterally. The constitutional declaration does not explicitly authorize the president to exercise these legislative powers in parliament’s absence.

These concerns have deepened the existing distrust between Damascus and the SDF, particularly after Kurdish actors were excluded from the constitutional drafting process in March 2025. At that time, Kurdish organizations rejected the declaration and condemned it for being drafted “without ensuring inclusive participation.”

U.S. Must Press Damascus To Respect Kurdish Rights, Curb Presidential Power

Washington has demonstrated significant trust in Damascus by lifting sanctions and mediating the integration agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF. The United States should pressure Damascus to adhere to Sharaa’s decree recognizing Kurdish rights, and ensure that Sharaa enshrines those protections in Syria’s constitution. The White House should also condition deeper engagement on curbing Sharaa’s concentration of power.

At the same time, Washington should be prepared to use its existing authorities, including Executive Order 13894, against any individual or entity that obstructs the implementation of the integration agreement under provisions targeting those who “threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Syria.”

Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Ahmad and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Ahmad on X @AhmadA_Sharawi. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.