This Is No Way To Treat Our European Allies

The Trump administration is fond of reminding allies that NATO is a two-way street. But at present, Washington seems to need that message most.

Earlier this month, amid a feud between President Donald Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Washington announced it will withdraw roughly 5,000 troops from Germany over the next six to 12 months. Although the outcome could have been far worse, this decision needlessly deepens the crisis in transatlantic relations and sends a dangerous message to the Kremlin.

The drawdown will reportedly impact one Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in Germany, likely the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR), which is forward-stationed in Vilseck and has been a mainstay of American combat power in Europe since the Cold War. Strategically located in eastern Germany, 2CR is America’s only forward-stationed Stryker BCT in Europe and regularly conducts missions across NATO’s eastern flank.

While significant U.S. forces will remain in Germany and throughout Europe, the withdrawal would return America’s military presence on the continent closer to pre-2022 levels. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States has generally maintained at least four BCTs in Europe: 2CR, the forward-stationed 173rd Airborne Brigade headquartered in Italy, and two rotational BCTs in Eastern Europe. However, last fall Washington decided to end one of those rotational BCT deployments. Withdrawing 2CR could leave just two BCTs on the continent: the forward-stationed infantry BCT in Italy and the rotational armored BCT in Poland.

Perhaps more concerningly, the Pentagon reportedly is also canceling the planned deployment of a newly activated long-range fires battalion (LRFB). The unit is part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force (2MDTF), elements of which are stationed in Germany and the United States. In a 2024 joint statement with Berlin, Washington committed to begin deploying the LRFB to Germany this year. It will include a HIMARS battery armed with GMLRS rockets and PrSM missiles, a Typhon Mid-Range Capability battery armed with Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles, and a Dark Eagle long-range hypersonic missile battery.

Though other U.S. artillery, air, and naval units can partially compensate, the LRFB’s absence would weaken 2MDTF’s long-range precision strike capabilities and, by extension, those of NATO. The alliance, which already needs more long-range strike capacity, depends overwhelming on the United States for these capabilities. European countries will require years to catch up, which is why Germany viewed the 2024 agreement as a “temporary bridge.”

Meanwhile, Russia has significantly expanded missile production since 2022 and is fielding new long-range strike capabilities. Moscow is also deepening its security cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea, as detailed in a forthcoming book by our FDD colleagues Bradley Bowman, Mark Montgomery, and Elaine Dezenski.

Trump suggested that this initial withdrawal could be part of a larger drawdown. “We’re cutting a lot further than 5,000,” he told reporters, pointing to Italy and Spain as other countries that could see reductions. Both nations have drawn the administration’s ire in recent months, including for restricting U.S. military activity related to Iran.

Those restrictions were unfortunate. But they were hardly unpredictable given that Washington failed to consult NATO allies prior to launching the war with Iran, which has hit European economies hard. The conflict came after allies had endured a year’s worth of insults, tariffs, meddling in European politics, threats to seize Greenland, and whiplash on U.S. policy toward Ukraine — even as those same allies have dutifully made historic commitments on defense spending. What’s more, the U.S. demands for European intervention against Iran came after Washington had repeatedly instructed those allies to focus on Europe and Europe alone.

And yet Germany has remained a critical U.S. military hub during Operation Epic Fury, even if the country’s leadership has vented its frustration with the war. Landstuhl Regional Medical Center continues to provide vital treatment for seriously wounded American servicemembers. Berlin has also indicated willingness to deploy minesweepers to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

This suggests that while administration officials paint the withdrawal as punishment for Germany’s perceived lack of cooperation on Iran, the real reason is a mix of personal animus and the administration’s preexisting desire to shift forces out of Europe. One can understand why the Pentagon would want to concentrate its finite long-range fires capabilities on China. But it is hard to see how a Stryker BCT designed for large-scale ground combat in Europe would have greater utility in the Pacific.

The administration consistently insists that NATO allies must take “primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense.” Most have taken that message on board and are racing to make the necessary investments. That transition, though, will take time, requiring continued American combat power in Europe to deter Russian aggression.

Furthermore, the administration should not be surprised if one of the consequences of this policy is a Europe that acts more independently from U.S. interests. Indeed, European leaders appear to have listened when Secretary of State Marco Rubio told them Washington doesn’t want Europe to be an American “vassal.”

The transatlantic relationship can still be salvaged. But if Washington does not correct course, it risks doing irreparable damage to NATO, one of America’s greatest strategic assets — and emboldening the Kremlin.

John Hardie is the deputy director of the Russia Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Cameron McMillan is a senior research analyst for FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP)