Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: February

China’s response to January’s geopolitical shocks underscored the gap between Beijing’s great-power rhetoric and its limited reach. China condemned the U.S. ouster of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro as a “clear violation of international law” and called for his immediate release. However, Beijing offered little more than diplomatic rebuke as Washington asserted control over Caracas and redirected China-bound oil shipments to the United States. Similarly, when Tehran cracked down on nationwide protests, China opposed external criticism of Iran’s internal affairs — even voting against a UN Human Rights Council resolution condemning the violence — yet remained a spectator to U.S. pressure on Tehran.

Against that backdrop, the administration’s newly released National Defense Strategy adopts reassuring language about “strategic stability” with China. It also advances a balance-of-power framework that avoids casting Beijing as the foremost threat, emphasizing deterrence through partnerships and a denial defense along the First Island Chain. But Beijing does not interpret balance as stability; it reads it as evidence that U.S. primacy is fading and that time is on its side. Without specific American commitments about what Washington will deny Beijing — where it will draw red lines and at what cost — China’s coast guard, maritime militia, and lawfare are likely to see opportunities to accumulate gains short of war without risking decisive U.S. pushback.

If the administration wants to deter China effectively, it must articulate what it will deny, where, and why parity is neither inevitable nor acceptable. Ambiguity in this context does not buy stability; it buys risk.

January brings cautious optimism for some administration-led cyber initiatives. Unfortunately, this potential is overshadowed by several troubling developments.

The Trump administration renominated Sean Plankey to lead the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a crucial step toward re-empowering an organization facing significant workforce shortages and embattled leadership. Also, after months of fractured public-private information sharing, DHS announced a potential replacement for previously shuttered critical infrastructure partnership initiatives. The success of the program will depend on whether it provides the private sector with necessary assurances to rebuild trust as well as the passage of a long-term extension of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.

Troublingly, the National Defense Strategy — similar to the president’s National Security Strategy — fails to mention the threat China poses in cyberspace and Beijing’s cyber campaigns to preposition destructive capabilities in U.S. critical infrastructure systems. As a whole, the strategy has little to say about cybersecurity and emerging technology. The administration’s National Cyber Strategy is still forthcoming and hopefully will address these shortfalls.

Finally, the newly updated TikTok deal does not fully address the national security concerns Congress identified in the 2024 law requiring divestiture. While American firms will own about 80 percent of the company and will “retrain” the algorithm with U.S. data, cooperation with Chinese company ByteDance will continue and remains an ongoing, significant risk. There is no indication that ByteDance will relinquish control of TikTok’s recommendation algorithm. Under the terms of the deal, Beijing may retain the ability to dictate what American users consume.

The Trump administration released its National Defense Strategy (NDS) on January 23, prioritizing the homeland and Western Hemisphere, burden-shifting to allies and partners, and strengthening the U.S. defense industrial base. Echoing the National Security Strategy, the NDS calls for shifting “conventional defense” of Europe to allies with “more limited U.S. support,” suggesting further reductions in U.S. force posture there. The strategy also calls for deterring China without “confrontation,” potentially weakening Beijing’s perceptions that America will defend its interests in the Pacific.

President Trump alarmed NATO allies with threats to acquire Greenland, even suggesting the use of force, which he later walked back. Still, the threats undermined perceptions of U.S. deterrence in Europe and damaged relationships within America’s largest military alliance. Trump’s dismissal of NATO sacrifices in Afghanistan exacerbated tensions.

Amid extraordinary protests in Iran, Trump threatened military action against the regime to discourage it from murdering its own citizens. Yet the regime massacred thousands without an immediate U.S. response. With reduced U.S. force posture in the region, the administration then directed a large military buildup, including the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group.

In a significant development that garnered little press, the Iraqi government announced on January 18 the withdrawal of U.S. forces from remaining major military facilities in Iraq, not including Kurdistan.

U.S. forces then began moving ISIS prisoners from Syria to Iraq amid clashes between the Syrian government and Syrian Democratic Forces — the U.S. security partner that has guarded ISIS prisons. The administration then reportedly began considering withdrawing from Syria.

The United States faces the need to add 100 GW of power supply by 2030 to meet the accelerating demand of artificial intelligence (AI) data centers while operating within the outdated and inflexible constraints of existing power markets. Accordingly, the Trump administration on January 16 joined with an unprecedented bipartisan group of Mid-Atlantic governors to press PJM — the country’s largest grid operator — to rapidly develop new power plants. The proposal urges PJM to establish a first-ever 15-year price locked capacity payment — the cost of which would ultimately be borne by the largest tech companies driving demand.

The inability to secure long-term power contracts for data centers remains a significant challenge impeding project financing and land-use approvals. The United States faces an existential national security crisis: It cannot secure enough power to develop cutting edge Large Language Models while keeping the existing grid stable and resilient. The PJM proposal seeks to address this problem.

Separately, the Trump administration continued to use energy as a key tool for national security policy. President Trump ordered the removal of Nicolas Maduro from power in Caracas following a weeks-long “quarantine” of oil exports coming out of Venezuela. The administration’s strategy going forward relies heavily on seizing and selling Venezuela crude and using the proceeds as an inducement for transition toward democratic rule alongside long-term U.S. dominance in the country’s energy sector. The White House hosted a summit on January 9 with energy companies to discuss how they might play a role in rebuilding Venezuela’s economy.

President Trump met with his Ukrainian counterpart in Davos on January 22 before dispatching envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff to Moscow for another sit-down with Vladimir Putin, followed by trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi on January 23-24. A Russian envoy then met solo with American officials on January 31 ahead of further trilateral talks planned for February 4-5. Washington continues to pressure Kyiv to cede territory, encouraging Kremlin intransigence. Meanwhile, on January 29, Trump announced a week-long moratorium on Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, intended as a confidence-building measure. That arrangement apparently ended or fell apart four days later on February 1, leading to fresh strikes.

The Pentagon plans to cut the small number of U.S. personnel assigned to NATO commands and advisory bodies, according to press reports on January 20. This came after Pentagon officials reportedly threatened to withdraw from NATO defense coordination mechanisms unless Europe assumes primary responsibility for its conventional defense by 2027, an unrealistic timeline. Meanwhile, the administration’s National Defense Strategy warned that, while America will “continue to play a vital role in NATO,” Europe will receive “more limited U.S. support.” The Pentagon is right to prioritize China and to ask allies to step up. But Washington must ensure a coordinated transition that minimizes intra-alliance friction and avoids gaps in capability or resolve that invite aggression.

Instead, Trump needlessly antagonized European allies by attempting to coerce them into ceding Greenland. He eventually backed off, agreeing to negotiate a deal addressing U.S. security concerns — which Copenhagen was already willing to resolve — while preserving Danish sovereignty. Still, the crisis did lasting damage to transatlantic trust.

On January 29, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman visited Washington and met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff. A Saudi readout said the meetings reviewed “strategic relations between [the two] countries, prospects for enhancing cooperation … and efforts to advance regional and global peace and stability.”

But the following day, state-sanctioned sermons in Saudi Arabia highlighted domestic rhetoric that could hardly help advance regional peace. In Mecca, Bandar Baleela led Friday prayers and called on God to stand with our “downtrodden brothers in Palestine,” and “reverse their weakness into strength.” In Medina, Abdul-Bari al-Thubaiti invoked the divine to give “our brothers in Palestine victory against your enemy and their enemy the Zionist aggressors.” Both imams are government employees who deliver content approved by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs.

The surge in anti-Israel and occasionally antisemitic rhetoric — evident in editorials, columns, and state-aligned media — marks a shift in Saudi policy. Despite private ownership of dailies, content often coordinates with government priorities. Riyadh’s messaging echoes tactics of Qatar and Turkey, which are influenced by Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

This contradictory rhetoric — affirming high-level U.S. alignment while permitting incitement against Washington’s key ally — raises concerns about Saudi reliability amid regional realignments, including rifts with the United Arab Emirates and warmer ties to Islamist actors.

As noted in the newly released National Defense Strategy, the United States remains focused on projecting military deterrence within the First Island Chain while building up allies and partners’ capacity to ensure their own defense — a throughline that Washington has upheld in its recent engagements with the region.

In a visit to the United States on January 16, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi met with his counterpart, Pete Hegseth, to discuss spending, joint military deployments, and both countries’ respective defense industrial bases. Following the summit, Hegseth pledged to increase joint training across Japan’s southwest outlying islands, accelerate joint missile production, and improve repair capabilities for ships and aircraft — all of which will enhance Washington and Tokyo’s capacity to respond to a Taiwan crisis.

The United States also stepped up its efforts to supply the Philippines with crucial military equipment to deter rising Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and around Taiwan. Washington announced plans to sell Manila several new surveillance aircraft and expand maintenance contracts to enhance the Philippines Armed Forces’ maritime domain awareness, upholding its previous commitments to the bilateral Philippines-Security Sector Assistance Roadmap.

In addition, the United States installed its newest ambassador to India, Sergio Gor, at the beginning of the month. While trade talks between Washington and New Delhi stalled over the past year due to concerns over Indian purchases of Russian oil, Gor has promised that India will join Pax Silica, a U.S. initiative to build secure supply chains for AI and other advanced technologies.

On January 15, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz addressed the UN Security Council on the Islamic Republic’s violent suppression of the most recent wave of protests in Iran. According to Waltz, President Trump “has made it clear that all options are on the table to stop the slaughter.” The United States also invited two Iranian dissidents, Masih Alinejad and Ahmad Batebi, to address the Security Council. During her fiery speech, Alinejad turned to face the council’s Iranian representative. “You have tried to kill me three times” for speaking out against the regime, she told him.

On the diplomatic front, President Trump formally ratified the Charter of the Board of Peace while attending the World Economic Forum in Davos. According to the White House, the board is aimed at transforming Gaza “from a region plagued by conflict and despair into one defined by opportunity, hope, and vitality.” Several Arab nations have accepted Trump’s invitation to join the board, including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. Notably, the board also includes Qatar and Turkey despite opposition from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Lastly, on January 26 at the UN Security Council, U.S. Ambassador Tammy Bruce delivered remarks emphasizing the Trump administration’s commitment to advancing peace and security throughout the world. In particular, Bruce highlighted U.S. efforts to reinstate the Security Council’s sanctions on Iran and warned against China’s “expansive and unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea.”

President Trump issued what may be a final warning to Iran amid an American force build up in the Middle East. “As I told Iran once before, MAKE A DEAL! They didn’t, and there was ‘Operation Midnight Hammer,’ a major destruction of Iran,” he wrote on Truth Social. “The next attack will be far worse!” U.S. Central Command confirmed on January 26 that the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group had arrived in the Middle East. How Washington acts now that the regime has killed its people and U.S. forces are in position will be a defining moment in the second Trump administration’s Middle East policy.

The massing of U.S. forces comes after President Trump promised support to Iranian protesters if the regime killed demonstrators. Estimates suggest that the Islamic Republic has killed more than 30,000 protesters.

The Treasury Department issued two rounds of sanctions in response to the Islamic Republic’s brutality. The majority of the individuals and entities targeted are part of Iran’s shadow fleet and illicit financing networks. However, Treasury also targeted five individuals for human rights violations over the violent crackdown on protests, the first such designation in this administration. This included Ali Larijani, a close ally of the supreme leader, whom Treasury identified as being “responsible for coordinating the response to the protests.”

On January 13, President Trump also announced a 25 percent tariff on countries doing business with the Islamic Republic.

Israeli forces recovered and identified the body of Ran Gvili, the last remaining hostage in Gaza, on January 26, thanks to Israeli intelligence operations and intense recovery efforts. Without providing evidence, President Donald Trump credited Hamas with assisting. Trump might be projecting Hamas’s compliance with the peace plan’s stipulation that it return all the hostages, hoping to usher in the deal’s second phase.

On January 16, the White House announced the establishment of a National Committee for the Administration of Gaza and a Board of Peace for the territory. Trump’s Gaza Executive Board, which will help rebuild Gaza, includes representatives from Hamas patrons Turkey and Qatar. However, this panel will reportedly serve in an advisory role.

Despite its reservations, on January 21, Israel agreed to join the Board of Peace, which is currently comprised of representatives from 27 nations. Without naming them, the White House said 20 more countries also agreed to join the board.

Commendably, the 2026 National Defense Strategy, released on January 23, calls Israel a “model ally” for its ability to handle its challenges without burdening the United States. Relatedly, the Israel Defense Forces chief of staff met in Washington with top U.S. defense officials as the two countries closely coordinate possible military action against Iran.

However, on January 29, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu implied that U.S. restrictions on weapons to Israel during President Joe Biden’s term led to soldiers’ deaths, another indication that Israel might reduce its reliance on American weaponry.

Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby’s trip to Seoul in January offered a reaffirmation of the importance of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. However, continued challenges in trade negotiations and the administration’s emphasis on shifting defense burdens to U.S. allies portend further strain in the relationship.

Colby met with South Korea’s Defense Minister Ahn Gyu Back to reassure Seoul that Washington supports its ally’s efforts to bolster its defense and deterrence capabilities. The parties will cooperate on South Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear-powered submarine, and Colby praised Seoul as a “model ally” for taking responsibility for its own defense. The trip, however, coincided with statements from the South Korean government that it may send a special envoy to North Korea to reopen dialogue — even though Pyongyang just a week prior had ramped up its provocations by conducting tests of a large-scale multiple rocket launcher system.

Meanwhile, the alliance is likely to experience another setback after President Trump announced he will raise tariffs on South Korea because Seoul is not adhering to an earlier trade agreement from July.

The administration’s new National Defense Strategy also signaled potential problems ahead. The strategy suggests Washington might limit its military support to Seoul and reduce its military presence in the region, placing the onus of deterring North Korean threats solely on South Korea. The strategy also notably omitted the objective of North Korea’s denuclearization.

Israeli strikes on Hezbollah assets and personnel involved in the group’s regeneration efforts have continued in the South Litani Area, even though Lebanon claims the Lebanese Armed Forces has completed applying its control over that sector. The Israelis claimed much of Hezbollah’s activity in the area depended on liaison officers originating from the villages where they operated and capitalizing on their local ties to advance Hezbollah’s regeneration.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah overall remains unbowed. Addressing the possibility of American or Israeli strikes in Iran, amid ongoing nationwide anti-regime protests by Iranians, Secretary-General Naim Qassem promised Hezbollah would not remain neutral if the Islamic Republic were threatened — suggesting the group would intervene militarily to ensure the regime’s survival. Inside Lebanon, some reports claimed Hezbollah operatives had temporarily detained Lebanese security personnel who had sought to inspect suspicious trucks reportedly carrying weapons from the group’s arsenal in Syria.

Meanwhile, Qatar was reportedly preparing to provide Beirut with unconditioned aid to assist with the reconstruction of three villages in south Lebanon damaged during the 2023-2024 Israel-Hezbollah war — one of Hezbollah’s central demands since the conflict came to a close. According to Lebanon’s An-Nahar newspaper, this was the result of U.S. Ambassador Michel Issa, recently appointed to represent the United States in Lebanon, “openly coordinating with” his Qatari counterpart.

The likelihood of a new U.S. strike on Iran appeared to rise following the deployment of major U.S. military assets to the Middle East and President Donald Trump’s January 28 post on Truth Social, which threatened Tehran with an attack “far worse” than the U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025. “Time is running out,” Trump warned, urging Iran to quickly “‘Come to the table’ and negotiate a fair and equitable deal — NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS.” He had previously conditioned U.S. restraint on the regime’s restraint in hanging protesters.

U.S. and European officials told The New York Times that additional American demands include “a permanent end to all enrichment of uranium and disposal of its current stockpiles, limits on the range and number of their ballistic missiles, and an end to all support for proxy groups in the Middle East, including Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis operating in Yemen” — echoing demands before the June 2025 strike.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi dismissed the threats the same day on X: “Our brave Armed Forces are prepared — with their fingers on the trigger — to immediately and powerfully respond to ANY aggression against our beloved land, air, and sea.” The Pentagon’s latest National Defense Strategy, released on January 23, warned that “Iran’s leaders have [left] open the possibility that they will try again to obtain a nuclear weapon.”

Meanwhile, China has accused a top general of leaking nuclear weapons data to the United States. If true, the leak would mark a major intelligence victory for United States after decades of Beijing’s spying on America’s nuclear program.

After insisting that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria was responsible for the December 13, 2025, attack in Palmyra, Syria, which killed two American soldiers and a civilian contractor, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) killed Bilal Hasan al Jasim, an Al Qaeda leader who was behind the assault. CENTCOM launched two waves of strikes against Islamic State targets in Syria, including one on January 10, 2026. The Islamic State, which is quick to claim attacks that kill or wound Americans, has not claimed credit for the murder of the three Americans six weeks ago.

The Islamic State and Al Qaeda are enemies, and it is highly unlikely they would cooperate in such an attack. The attacker was a member of the Syrian security forces, which is dominated by foreign and domestic jihadists who are loyal to, or allied with, Al Qaeda. However, the Trump administration has unfortunately sided with the Syrian regime, whose leader was the head of Al Qaeda’s branch in Syria and whose government and military are riddled with Al Qaeda members and allies.

Following the Syrian regime’s advance into areas formerly held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the United States has begun to transfer more than 7,000 Islamic State prisoners from SDF prisons to Iraq. The U.S. military has also withdrawn from the Ain Al Assad Air Base in western Iraq and moved assets to Kurdish semi-autonomous areas in northern Iraq. The loss of the Ain Al Assad Air Base will further impact America’s ability to monitor and strike the Islamic State in western Iraq and eastern Syria.

The United States has sought to prevent an escalation of fighting between the Syrian government and the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). After a government offensive recaptured territory previously held by the SDF in northeastern Syria, Washington endorsed a more balanced ceasefire and integration agreement on January 30 between the Syrian government and the SDF.

The deal is a revised version of the January 18 framework, which had largely favored Damascus. Under the new agreement, military and administrative structures in northeastern Syria will be gradually integrated into the Syrian state. The arrangement permits Syrian government forces to enter the cities of al-Hasakah and Qamishli, while allowing the SDF to retain four military brigades tasked with operating in Kurdish-majority areas. By contrast, the earlier January 18 agreement, after receiving international endorsement, quickly unraveled, with clashes erupting that contributed to the escape of several ISIS detainees.

U.S. Central Command announced on January 21 that it had transferred “150 fighters held at a detention facility in Hasakah, Syria, to a secure location in Iraq,” adding that “up to 7,000 ISIS detainees could be relocated.” This move signaled Washington’s lack of confidence that the ceasefire would hold. During the ensuing chaos, 120 ISIS fighters escaped from the Shaddadi prison in Hasakah. There are concerns over the Syrian government’s ability to securely manage these prisons due to sympathies toward radical jihadist groups within elements of Syria’s security services. For example, in December, a member of Syria’s general security forces killed two U.S. servicemen and a civilian interpreter.

In January, Presidents Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdogan held two telephone calls centered on Turkey’s proposed role in the Gaza Peace Board and the fragile ceasefire unfolding in northern Syria.

During their January 20 conversation, the leaders discussed efforts to preserve a tenuous ceasefire in northeastern Syria between Syrian government forces and the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Ankara has long demanded the dismantling of the SDF and its forced integration into the Syrian military, viewing the group as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Turkey designates as a terrorist organization. When the SDF resisted integration, Syrian forces — backed by Turkish pressure — moved to violently compel compliance, raising the risk of further instability.

The United States, which partnered with the SDF for years in the fight against the Islamic State, now faces a difficult balancing act as Ankara presses for a settlement that would effectively eliminate the SDF’s independent status. Trump characterized the call as “very good,” but offered few details. He also formally invited Turkey to participate in the Gaza Peace Board.

A second call on January 27 reaffirmed both leaders’ support for implementing the Syria ceasefire and integration framework. Erdogan also outlined Turkey’s vision for contributing to the Gaza Peace Board, despite Israeli opposition over Ankara’s continued political and material ties to Hamas. Also on January 27, Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, hosted Hamas’s senior leadership in Ankara. Senior Hamas official Khalil al-Hai thanked Fidan for Turkey’s efforts in Gaza.