Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: April

The Trump administration kept the pressure on China with a flurry of actions involving technology, trade, and sanctions. While President Trump has signaled openness to meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Beijing has so far declined those overtures. The two leaders have not spoken since the inauguration.

The administration announced sweeping new export controls targeting dozens of Chinese firms, including subsidiaries of China’s largest server maker, Inspur Group, and companies linked to supercomputer manufacturer Sugon. The restrictions will require U.S. firms — such as Nvidia, AMD, and Intel — to seek government approval before selling to the listed entities. The Commerce Department said the move was designed to curb China’s access to high-performance computing used in military applications, particularly hypersonic weapons development. The decision underscores the administration’s intent to go further than its predecessor in restricting sensitive technology flows to Beijing, even amid industry pushback.

Separately, the Treasury Department sanctioned a Chinese refinery, Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., for purchasing more than $500 million in Iranian oil. Although the company is relatively small, it is part of a broader network that processes the vast majority of Iran’s illicit exports to China. Treasury’s designation signals a willingness to impose secondary sanctions on Chinese firms and sends a broader warning about Beijing’s commercial ties with U.S. adversaries.

On March 4, Trump doubled the tariff rate on all Chinese imports from 10 to 20 percent, citing Beijing’s role in the fentanyl crisis. On April 2, he raised the rate to 54 percent as part of his sweeping “reciprocal tariffs,” prompting Beijing to threaten “countermeasures.”

President Trump prudently nominated Sean Plankey to lead the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). He has the talent and experience to improve CISA’s efforts. Meanwhile, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) launched an investigation into whether Chinese telecommunications companies are still selling banned equipment or services in the United States.

Unfortunately, this good news was overshadowed by concerning federal cuts. The U.S Agency for International Development slashed funding for critical cybersecurity capacity-building assistance for U.S. partners, including Ukraine. The State Department moved to dismantle Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and Radio Free Europe. Millions under authoritarian rule could now be left uninformed against adversary information operations.

The Department of Homeland Security fired and then recalled some of CISA’s most experienced analysts and threat hunters. These analysts help the government identify vulnerabilities in networks before adversaries can exploit them. In addition, CISA eliminated substantial funding for the Center for Internet Security, a nonprofit housing state and local cyber information sharing centers, leaving local governments even more vulnerable to threats from foreign adversaries. CISA also shut down several advisory boards, including the Cyber Safety Review Board, which was investigating China’s Salt Typhoon hacks of U.S. telecommunications.

Finally, the Department of Homeland Security suspended the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC), which brings together government and industry to share threat information, assess cyber challenges, and practice response scenarios. The suspension of CIPAC strips critical infrastructure operators of a key connection to government and its resources, undermining preparedness against growing cyber threats.

The Trump administration launched a more aggressive military campaign against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, deploying additional naval power to the region and conducting strikes against Houthi leaders. The Houthis have waged the worst assault on freedom of navigation in decades, attacking American naval vessels and international commercial shipping for over a year. President Trump’s more forceful response is a welcome change. But the administration’s disclosure of sensitive operational details of impending airstrikes via an unsecured messaging app risked the safety of U.S. servicemembers.

The administration temporarily suspended military aid and intelligence sharing to Ukraine in March. While the administration later reversed that decision, invading Russian forces took advantage of the pause by attacking Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. Unsurprisingly, Vladimir Putin has responded to Trump’s peace proposals with more attacks against Ukrainian civilians.

The administration is reportedly considering reducing U.S. forces stationed abroad and relinquishing the role of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, a position traditionally held by an American military officer. The former decision would risk inviting preventable aggression, and the latter would undermine U.S. leadership, security, and influence.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth traveled to Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, and Japan. In Manila, alongside his Philippine counterpart, Hegseth announced a four-part plan to reestablish deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. The plan calls for the deployment of advanced U.S. military capabilities, bolstered bilateral training, industrial cooperation, and a bilateral cyber campaign.

During his trip, Hegseth likely saw firsthand the value of forward-deployed U.S. forces in deterring aggression. The same principle applies in Europe and the Middle East.

At March 11 talks in Jeddah, Kyiv accepted a U.S. proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, contingent on Russian compliance. In turn, Washington restored military assistance and intelligence sharing for Ukraine, which President Trump had paused following his confrontational Oval Office meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in late February.

Trump dispatched envoy Steve Witkoff to Moscow on March 13, then spoke with his Russian and Ukrainian counterparts on March 18 and 19, respectively. Vladimir Putin rejected a full ceasefire, which the Kremlin readout suggests he conditioned on a halt to Ukrainian mobilization and Western military aid. Putin likely also hopes to tie a ceasefire to acceptance of his maximalist demands for a final peace deal. Apparently believing time is on his side, he is dragging out talks while attempting to press his battlefield advantage.

Putin did accept a 30-day moratorium on strikes targeting energy infrastructure, though Kyiv and Moscow have repeatedly accused each other of violating it. Following expert-level talks in Riyadh on March 23-25, the White House indicated both Moscow and Kyiv had also agreed in principle to a Black Sea ceasefire. But Russia attached additional conditions, demanding sanctions relief that requires buy-in from the EU, which rejected the idea.

Moscow’s foot-dragging is starting to frustrate Trump. On March 30, he declared he was “pissed off” after Putin suggested Zelenskyy should be removed from power. Trump threatened to impose harsh “secondary tariffs” on Russian oil if he concludes Moscow is obstructing peace talks. Sanctions on Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” of oil tankers are reportedly also under consideration.

After President Trump hosted Emirati National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed in the Oval Office on March 19, the White House said Abu Dhabi had committed to a 10-year, $1.4 trillion, framework for investment in the United States. The sum eclipsed even Saudi Arabia’s recent commitment for $600 billion worth of investment and trade with the United States. The Emirati investments will focus on “artificial intelligence, advanced technology, infrastructure, energy, and healthcare,” the UAE official said.

Although the Oval Office meeting apparently focused on economic matters, Tahnoon reportedly also lobbied Washington to reject an Egyptian-drafted plan for Gaza endorsed by the Arab League and to cut U.S. military aid for Cairo. In February, Saudi Arabia hosted an Arab summit to endorse a Gaza plan that would have seen Hamas disarmed and a non-partisan Palestinian transitional government installed in its place. But Egypt, whose Gaza plan solicited $53 billion in Gulf funding, limited the transitional government’s tenure to six months. By the time Cairo hosted the Arab League’s “Emergency Summit on Palestine” on March 4, the Gaza plan had fallen below Emirati and Saudi expectations due to Egyptian revisions. The two Gulf capitals signaled their displeasure by downgrading their representation at the summit, sending their foreign ministers rather than heads of state. While neither Tahnoon nor Trump mentioned Gaza in their readouts of their March 19 meeting, Tahnoon may have pushed the U.S. president to embrace the original Emirati blueprint.

The Trump administration expanded its outreach to key U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, signaling its importance to the administration’s efforts to deter rising aggression from China.

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made his first tour of the Indo-Pacific since his appointment, meeting with senior political and military officials in the Philippines and Japan. In meetings with Philippine Defense Minister Gilbert Teodoro and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Hegseth promised to expand combined training exercises, enhance interoperability, and cooperate on defense production. During a joint press conference following the meetings, Hegseth emphasized America’s “ironclad” commitment to Manila under their mutual defense treaty.

During his visit to Japan, Hegseth promised to accelerate the process of standing up a joint force headquarters in the country, in line with a longstanding request by Tokyo that would upgrade the U.S. military presence in the region. The regional tour came as the U.S. Army reportedly prepares to deploy a second Typhon missile system to the Pacific region. The first Typhon, deployed to the Philippines in 2024, enhances U.S. capacity to strike targets across the region and within China.

Meanwhile, U.S. Army Pacific Command launched the first stage of Salaknib, an annual combined exercises with the Philippine Army. The drills, which have been held since 2016, will focus on territorial defense of the Philippines, live-fire exercises, and large-scale maneuvers, ultimately aiming to enhance interoperability and trust.

President Trump announced on March 27 that he was pulling Rep. Elise Stefanik’s nomination to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Trump said he made this decision — announced six days before Stefanik’s scheduled April 2 Senate confirmation vote — to safeguard the slim GOP majority in the House. Stefanik was expected to pursue dramatic reforms at Turtle Bay. During her confirmation hearing in January, she promised to defund the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and take decisive action to counter U.S. adversaries within the UN system.

Earlier in March, the Trump administration sent a questionnaire to the United Nations and other U.S.-funded aid agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development and the International Committee of the Red Cross, to assess the impact of U.S. spending. The survey asked recipients to disclose if they have worked with entities that harbor “communist, socialist … or anti-American beliefs.” Virtually all non-governmental organizations in Gaza have cooperated with Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.

Information provided by the survey will guide the administration’s 180-day review of the UN system and inform policies that ensure U.S. funding is aligned with U.S. strategic objectives. The next U.S. ambassador to the United Nations should refocus funding and political capital on much-needed reform, leveraging the 180-day review to determine which organizations are deserving of continued U.S. contributions. Key reforms should include swiftly withdrawing from the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization as well as defunding and dismantling UNRWA and other organizations in Gaza that have colluded with Hamas.

The Trump administration took a significant step to expand its “Maximum Pressure” against the Islamic Republic by targeting the largest importer of Iranian oil, China. Specifically, the administration for the first time sanctioned a Chinese “teapot refinery” processing Iranian crude. Time will tell if the administration continues to impose greater costs against China for keeping Iran’s threat network afloat through illicit oil purchases. In addition, the Treasury Department designated vessels from the regime’s “shadow fleet” used to ferry Iranian oil. Treasury also imposed sanctions targeting Tehran’s growing use of transnational criminal networks, as well as elements of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence.

On the nuclear front, President Trump revealed that he sent a letter to Iranian officials inviting them to negotiate directly with Washington over their nuclear program. Tehran initially stalled but has reportedly sent an official reply rejecting the U.S. offer for direct negotiations, instead suggesting indirect talks mediated by Oman. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz declared that Iranian nuclear “dismantlement” is the desired end-state for talks with Tehran. But conflicting statements by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard muddied the waters over the aims of the administration’s Iran policy.

On March 19, Trump issued a congratulatory statement on Norooz, the Iranian New Year. While the message praised the Iranian people’s “vibrant culture and exceptional talents in fields such as math, science, law, technology, and the arts,” it did not express political support for the increasingly defiant Iranian population. This omission stood in a sharp contrast to previous Norooz messages from the president.

President Trump defended his administration’s unprecedented direct talks with Hamas in early March, which were held without fully informing the Israelis. While the direct negotiations indicate the lengths to which the White House will go to secure the release of the remaining hostages held in Gaza, particularly the Americans, they could strengthen Hamas’s position, undermine Israel, and create a gap between the two allies.

Hamas and Israel failed to agree on terms for the second phase of the ceasefire, which was supposed to commence following the expiration of the first phase on March 1. Hamas also rejected Israel’s proposal to extend the first phase of the ceasefire, during which time Hamas would exchange Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners. For over two weeks, the Iran-backed terrorist group enjoyed the benefits from the break in hostilities while maintaining its hold on Gaza and refusing to release Israeli hostages.

On March 18, however, Israel resumed combat operations in Gaza. The Trump administration joined Israel in blaming Hamas for the collapse of the ceasefire. U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff said, “This is on Hamas.” Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said that Trump “fully supports Israel and the IDF.” The White House has shown this support by allowing Israel to prosecute its war against Hamas without interference. The Trump administration has expedited the sale of billions of dollars of weapons to Israel without criticizing the Jewish state over humanitarian issues.

The Trump administration generally has not yet announced new North Korea policies but has not diverted from the containment and pressure strategy followed by successive U.S. administrations. Pyongyang, for its part, grabbed headlines after unveiling what it called a new “nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine.” North Korea may intend to carry nuclear-capable weapons aboard the vessel, and its development raises concerns about Russian assistance in return for Pyongyang’s aid in prosecuting the Ukraine war. In response, the U.S. National Security Council spokesman reiterated that Washington “is committed to the complete denuclearization of North Korea.”

Meanwhile, the South Korean government is reportedly concerned after an internal Pentagon memo by U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth called China the “sole pacing threat” for the United States. The memo said Washington would “assume risk in other theaters” and press allies to take on primary responsibility for deterring Russia, North Korea, and Iran. This raised concerns that Washington may reduce its military presence in South Korea.

The U.S. Department of Energy opted to add South Korea to a list of “sensitive” states with regard to proliferation concern, entailing additional scrutiny for U.S. nuclear exports. The move comes after officials in Seoul have become more vocal about potentially developing a South Korean nuclear deterrent to counter North Korea. Separately, Seoul is preparing to support South Korean businesses impacted by the Trump administration’s new tariffs.

Israel has continued to conduct airstrikes against Hezbollah targets both north and south of the Litani River in southern Lebanon. These strikes are a testament to Beirut’s failure to implement the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement, in which the Lebanese state was supposed to disarm Hezbollah and dismantle the terror group’s military infrastructure south of the Litani.

While the Trump administration hoped the ceasefire would hold, Washington has blessed the Israeli strikes, noting that they came after rockets were launched at Israel from southern Lebanon. The administration has also insisted that Beirut follow through on disarming Hezbollah. Morgan Ortagus, deputy U.S. envoy for the Middle East, praised the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) for “acting more than they have in previous years.” Nevertheless, she took the LAF to task for “not doing enough” to enforce the ceasefire.

The United States also continued to pressure Hezbollah through sanctions. On March 28, the administration targeted a “Lebanon-based sanctions evasion network” that helps Hezbollah’s finance team generate revenue for the terror group.

Still, Washington’s tougher stance remains largely rhetorical. Although the administration acknowledges the LAF’s shortcomings, U.S. aid to the LAF continues to flow. The United States, at least publicly, has not threatened any consequences if Lebanon remains unwilling to implement the ceasefire deal.

Meanwhile, the administration is attempting to broker Israeli-Lebanese negotiations to resolve their longstanding border dispute. The Israelis released five Lebanese detainees as a goodwill gesture, but Beirut insists that Israel must withdraw its forces from Lebanon and release additional detainees before border talks begin.

The Trump administration issued an ultimatum to Iran’s supreme leader: negotiate limits on Tehran’s nuclear program within two months or face military action. Tehran has committed only to indirect talks, while threatening to build nuclear weapons or strike U.S. troops in the region if attacked. In Vienna, however, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors declined to censure Iran’s non-compliance with its nonproliferation obligations. The question of whether to censure Tehran and refer the case to the UN Security Council for the re-imposition of UN sanctions will be on the table at the board’s June meeting. Those sanctions will expire the following October.

Meanwhile, Russia rebuffed a U.S. proposal for America to take over control of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Kyiv has welcomed potential U.S. assistance in restoring the plant but is uninterested in relinquishing ownership of it. Moscow seized the plant near the start of its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and Russian military action and other unsafe practices at the facility have on numerous occasions threatened to cause a radiological disaster.

America’s European allies continued to express unease over the reliability of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. Poland’s foreign minister even voiced a desire to “reach for opportunities related to nuclear weapons” to safeguard the Eastern European country. France has initiated discussions over extending its nuclear deterrent to the continent, hoping to assuage concerns that the United States would not defend Europe in the event of Russian aggression.

The U.S. military killed Abdallah Makki Muslih al-Rifai, one of the top leaders of the Islamic State, in mid-March. U.S. Central Command claimed that Rifai was the terror group’s second-in-command, serving as “Chief of Global Operations for ISIS and the Delegated Committee Emir.” However, it is possible that he actually served as the caliph of the global terror group.

The U.S. State Department’s Rewards for Justice program has revoked its offer for a $10 million reward for information leading to the arrest of Sirajuddin Haqqani. The department also withdrew bounties for Haqqani Network leaders Abdul Aziz Haqqani and Yahya Haqqani. In exchange, the Taliban released American hostages Faye Hall and George Glezmann. Sirajuddin is the Taliban’s interior minister and deputy emir and has close ties to al-Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organizations. He remains on Washington’s list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, and the Haqqani Network is still designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The removal of the three Haqqanis from the Rewards for Justice program signals that the Trump administration is prepared to negotiate deals with the Taliban.

The Trump administration has increased the rate of U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State and al-Shabaab in Somalia. In just the first three months since President Trump took office, the United States has launched at least 16 manned aircraft or drone strikes against the two terrorist groups. For comparison, the Biden administration launched 10 strikes in Somalia in 2024. Nevertheless, al-Shabaab has made territorial gains in the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions outside of Mogadishu.

On the sidelines of a Brussels conference for donors of humanitarian aid to Syria, a State Department official presented Syria’s foreign minister with a list of conditions for additional relief from U.S. sanctions. Washington has not revealed the specific criteria, but the list emphasizes cooperation on terrorism-related issues, including the exclusion of foreign jihadis from key positions in the Syrian defense and intelligence establishment. Yet President Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former al-Qaeda commander who remains on the U.S. terrorism blacklist, has already appointed foreign fighters to senior posts. These include a Jordanian national serving as commander of the Republican Guard and a Turkish national commanding the Syrian army’s Damascus division. Washington also expects Damascus to cooperate in dismantling the previous regime’s arsenal of chemical weapons. In a sign of readiness to cooperate, Syria granted access to sensitive sites for inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Separately, U.S. military officers helped broker an integration agreement between Damascus and the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who control northeast Syria. In principle, the agreement paves the way for full integration of “all civil and military institutions” in northeast Syria into the national state. Yet the terms are vague and leave major sticking points unresolved, so the agreement’s practical impact will likely be minimal. Nevertheless, the accord postpones a showdown between Damascus and the SDF. It is also a symbol of reconciliation, contrasting sharply with the ethnic bloodletting that claimed hundreds of lives in early March.

President Trump held a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on March 16. During the conversation, Erdogan emphasized the importance of lifting U.S. sanctions on Turkey, completing the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Ankara, and readmitting Turkey into the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.

Back in 2019, the first Trump administration ejected Turkey from the F-35 program over Ankara’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missile system. Turkey’s removal from the program upended an essential part of its military modernization strategy. The following year, Washington imposed sanctions against Turkey’s main defense procurement agency. In January 2024, Congress approved the sale of new F-16 jets to Turkey following Erdogan’s agreement to support Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO membership bids, which Ankara delayed for 18 months. But the Biden administration refused to consider Turkey’s reentry into the F-35 program, due to its continued possession of the S-400.

Now, Erdogan hopes the Trump administration may reverse this policy and allow Turkey to rejoin the F-35 program. The Turkish president is seeking a White House meeting with Trump before the end of April to negotiate a potential deal. To this end, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in late March to convey Erdogan’s interest in a meeting and reiterate Turkey’s goal of rejoining the F-35 program. As an incentive, Erdogan has expressed willingness to deploy Turkish peacekeeping forces to Ukraine if a ceasefire or peace agreement is reached.