Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Potential Leaps Ahead of IAEA Meeting

Iran’s major strides in its march towards a nuclear weapon hang ominously over the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors in Vienna on March 3-7. The nuclear monitoring agency reports that Tehran surged production of 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU), increasing this stock by 50 percent since the IAEA’s last reporting in November. Using this roughly 275-kilogram stock of HEU, Tehran can fuel nearly seven nuclear weapons. Overall, Iran is currently assessed to possess enough material for at least 17 weapons, if further enriched to weapons grade.

The IAEA also reported that Iran once again failed to answer the agency’s questions about nuclear weapons work at two sites. Tehran continues to build new nuclear facilities without notifying the IAEA, a violation of Iran’s legal safeguards obligations.

Galloping Breakout Capability, Secret Weaponization Work

In addition to Iran’s advancing capability to produce fuel for multiple nuclear weapons, The New York Times reported in February that the Islamic Republic has a secret team dedicated to shortening the country’s route to constructing nuclear weapons. Axios reporting in 2024 suggested that Iran had restarted weaponization activities such as computer modeling, metallurgy, and tests to trigger an implosion that compresses a nuclear device, which leads to its detonation. A July 2024 intelligence assessment by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence omitted a previous finding that Iran was not carrying out nuclear weaponization activities. In October 2024, Israel destroyed a small Iranian facility called Taleghan 2, where U.S. and Israeli officials said the regime was allegedly conducting experiments related to explosives that can trigger a nuclear explosion. Meanwhile, David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security, estimates that Iran could construct crude nuclear weapons within six months.

IAEA Meeting Comes Ahead of Critical Decision Points on Iran

The IAEA Board of Governors meeting comes ahead of several critical decision points on the Iran nuclear file. First, the IAEA is set to issue a comprehensive report on the agency’s outstanding safeguards concerns in Iran as mandated by a November 2024 IAEA board resolution.

Second, the United States, along with France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, or “E3,” must decide whether to reimpose UN sanctions against Tehran that remain lifted under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal’s associated UN resolution. The mechanism to “snap back” UN Iran sanctions in UN Security Council Resolution 2231 will expire in October 2025.

In addition, Israel has a window to militarily strike Iran’s nuclear facilities following Jerusalem’s decimation of Tehran’s air defenses and missile production capabilities during an October 2024 counterstrike on Iran. However, the Trump administration may not yet support such a move. While President Trump reimposed maximum U.S. economic pressure and sanctions on Iran this month, Trump has indicated a preference for a negotiated settlement to the Iran nuclear issue.

Review and Enhance IAEA Safeguards, Execute a Strategy

The IAEA should assess whether it can detect Iran relocating enriched uranium to produce nuclear weapons before Tehran is able to move the material out of IAEA-safeguarded facilities. Once Tehran moves such material to a secret underground site, it may be difficult for Western powers to detect its location and disrupt subsequent weaponization.

The Trump administration must prepare a strategy for addressing the Iran nuclear crisis in 2025 and quickly appoint an ambassador to the IAEA and international organizations in Vienna to help execute the strategy. If the administration seeks diplomacy with Iran, it should avoid negotiating a new nuclear deal that leaves Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure intact. The regime will simply use these assets to resume threatening the United States and its allies once Trump leaves office.    

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Andrea on X @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.