Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: March

The Trump administration is doubling down on economic pressure against Beijing, wielding tariffs as a tool to counter China’s malign activities. In early February, President Trump announced an across-the-board 10 percent tariff on Chinese imports, citing China’s role in the illegal fentanyl trade. A few weeks later, he unveiled plans for an additional 10 percent tariff. This latest announcement comes as China prepares to convene its annual parliamentary meetings, known as the Two Sessions, where its leaders will grapple with mounting domestic challenges, including a slowing economy and failed stimulus efforts.

Meanwhile, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) proposed fees of up to $1.5 million on Chinese-built vessels entering U.S. ports. This follows a sweeping investigation into China’s state-backed dominance of the global shipbuilding and logistics industries, where its market share has risen from 5 percent in 1999 to over 50 percent today while crippling U.S. shipbuilding. USTR’s findings highlight how Chinese subsidies undermine global competition, revealing that U.S. shipyards, once producing 70 vessels annually in 1975, now build just five per year.

These measures align with the White House’s newly released America First Investment Policy, which reinforces the administration’s view that economic security is national security. The policy document outlines restrictions on Chinese investment in key U.S. sectors and signals a potential expansion of outbound-investment controls targeting China’s critical technology industries. Taken together, these actions reflect a broader effort to restructure global trade in ways that diminish Beijing’s leverage and reinforce America’s economic resilience.

The Trump administration took an important step forward by nominating Sean Cairncross as the next national cyber director. This positive news, however, was overshadowed by several problematic decisions.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reportedly ordered Cyber Command to pause offensive operations and planning against Russia despite Moscow’s persistent, ongoing malicious cyber operations against the U.S. homeland. The Pentagon has denied these reports. The administration has additionally signaled that it will no longer characterize Russia as a cyber threat, a decision that could prove devastating to U.S. cybersecurity and deterrence.

The administration shuttered efforts at the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) for combatting foreign malign influence. The administration also gutted CISA’s election security team and fired 130 of its employees, weakening Washington’s ability to work with state and local election officials and support private industry on national cybersecurity priorities. In addition, the administration signaled its intent to shrink the National Institute of Standards and Technology, including its programs on artificial intelligence and semiconductors, and to reduce the National Science Foundation’s funding.

The lack of robust cybersecurity practices at the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) poses major security risks. DOGE employees have connected unsecure devices to government networks, including at Treasury and USAID. These devices may introduce new vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit to pilfer sensitive government information. Elsewhere, pursuant to President Trump’s directive to reduce the federal workforce, the CIA sent the White House an email over an unclassified network, partially revealing the identities of soon-to-be undercover personnel, compromising operational security.

February featured a dramatic shift in policy toward Ukraine. Before formal negotiations began with Russia, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth offered preemptive concessions, weakening the administration’s negotiating position. The United States and Russia then conducted talks in Riyadh that did not include Ukraine or America’s NATO allies. The month culminated with an Oval Office meeting that devolved into a shouting match between Presidents Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky, after which Trump suspended U.S. military aid for Ukraine. These short-sighted decisions no doubt elicited a grin from the Russian dictator who started the unprovoked war of aggression.

Meanwhile, Hegseth directed the Defense Department to identify 8 percent of the Biden administration’s FY26 budget, totaling around $50 billion, to be cut and shifted to defense programs aligned with Trump’s priorities. Those include “border protection, fighting transnational criminal organizations, nuclear modernization, submarine programs, missile defense, drone technology, cybersecurity, core readiness and training and the defense industrial base,” as well as munitions production, among others. Indo-Pacific Command and Northern Command appear to be the winners, while Central Command and European Command may be among the losers.

On February 21, the Trump administration fired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General C.Q. Brown, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti, and Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife. Firing exceptionally capable warfighters and leaders is not “meritocracy.” This decision could leave many service members with the impression that some things are more important than competence and loyalty to the Constitution, potentially corroding U.S. military unity, professionalism, and readiness.

After President Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff met with Vladimir Putin and negotiated a prisoner swap, Trump and Putin spoke by phone on February 12, blindsiding Europe and Kyiv. At subsequent talks in Riyadh, which excluded Ukrainian and European officials, Washington and Moscow agreed to unwind their mutual diplomatic restrictions, appoint teams for Ukraine negotiations, and identify opportunities for post-war cooperation.

Washington warned that while it “remains committed” to NATO, allies must “take ownership” of European and Ukrainian security. The administration ruled out Ukrainian membership in NATO and the deployment of U.S. troops in Ukraine. Trump has not provided a firm answer to requests for U.S. military support for a potential European-led “reassurance force” in Ukraine.

The administration seemingly lacks a unified vision for a long-term peace deal. Witkoff said a 2022 draft agreement favored by Russia would serve as a “guidepost,” but Keith Kellogg, Trump’s Ukraine envoy, later disagreed. Meanwhile, U.S. officials reportedly have suggested that Ukraine hold elections as part of a ceasefire ahead of long-term peace talks. This would abet a Kremlin scheme to remove President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and undermine Ukraine’s war effort.

Aiming to “recoup” U.S. aid, Trump pressured Zelenskyy to accept a draconian economic partnership agreement. Zelenskyy agreed after the terms were softened. But when he met with Trump to sign it, the meeting devolved into a war of words after Zelenskyy argued Putin cannot be trusted to respect a peace agreement. Trump ejected Zelenskyy from the White House and later suspended military aid — a short-sighted decision that undermines his own chances at a durable peace deal.

U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff said that “there are a lot of compelling features” in the Arab plan for post-war Gaza, describing it as a “good faith first step” that needed more discussion. The U.S. official thus walked back earlier American opposition, suggesting that President Trump’s recent proposal for Gaza was merely aimed at pushing Arab governments to come up with alternatives.

An earlier version of the Arab plan called for the creation of a transitional governing body in Gaza that would disarm Hamas and oversee Gulf-funded reconstruction. But the final draft, as endorsed by the Arab League at its “emergency summit” in Cairo on March 4, limited the term of the transitional government to six months and said that Hamas and other Palestinian groups would be disarmed only after the establishment of a Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution.

The change in plans led both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the biggest expected donors, to downgrade their representation at the summit from head of state to foreign minister, a diplomatic move that signaled disapproval.

Without Saudi and Emirati funds, the Arab plan for Gaza looked doomed — until Witkoff threw it a lifeline. If the governing body were to be given an open-ended mandate and the authority to disarm Hamas and rule independent of the Palestinian Authority, then the plan would be more viable.

President Trump held positive meetings with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, both key members of the Quad. Looking to strengthen Washington’s position in the region, the administration announced initial plans to increase energy exports, pursue greater bilateral trade, and bolster investment ties. The administration also announced billions of dollars in newly approved or potential weapons sales to both countries, helping ensure they can counter rising Chinese aggression in the region.

Meanwhile, China demonstrated both its capacity and willingness to project military and economic power across the region. The Chinese navy engaged in a series of live-fire exercises in the Gulf of Tonkin and the Tasman Sea within a single week, a major show of force designed to intimidate U.S. allies and partners. These drills came amid several close calls between Chinese and Australian and Philippine military aircraft operating in the South China Sea, prompting an outcry from Manila. The United States also resumed its joint air patrols with the Philippines, conducting drills over Scarborough Shoal for the first time since Trump returned to office.

China also enhanced its economic and political influence with the Pacific Island countries, announcing a series of agreements with the Cook Islands that allow Chinese firms greater access to undersea minerals and tie Avarua closer to Beijing. More troublingly, the agreements may also allow China’s navy to gain access to port facilities critical to cutting off sea lanes to Australia and New Zealand and threatening Hawaii.

President Trump signed an executive order on February 3 prohibiting U.S. contributions to the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), precluding association with the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), mandating a 90-day review of U.S. support for the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and starting a 180-day review of all other U.S. contributions to international organizations. The order is an opportunity for the administration to reset America’s approach to the United Nations.

Noting that terrorist groups had “infiltrated” UNRWA, Trump’s order ensured that U.S. funding for the agency would not resume once a congressional ban expires. Further steps available to the administration include de-recognizing most UNRWA aid recipients as refugees, as they have not fled any conflict, and reassigning oversight of UNRWA from the State Department’s refugee bureau to its international organizations bureau. The administration could also determine that UNRWA is independent of the UN and thus subject to terrorism sanctions for providing material support to terrorist groups.

The Biden administration rejoined UNESCO — despite the organization’s refusal to recognize Jewish connections to Jerusalem and other Israeli cities — on the promise that U.S. participation would counter Chinese malign activities. UNESCO has instead continued to support Beijing’s revisionist history. The Trump administration will have 90 days to test UNESCO’s willingness to fundamentally change direction.

As for the broader review, the administration may want to condition future support for the UN’s regular budget on the UN eliminating all Palestinian organizations, ending its funding of UNRWA, prohibiting leadership roles for designated state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran, and overhauling the UNHRC.

After restoring its “maximum pressure” policy against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Trump administration levied four rounds of sanctions against the clerical regime. Some of the sanctions targeted Tehran’s network of illicit oil shippers and traders and its crude oil sales to China, which generate revenue for Iran’s military. Another package aimed to disrupt Tehran’s drone technology procurement fronts in Asia, while the fourth exposed the Iran-based leader of an online darknet narcotics marketplace. Despite these sanctions, February data shows a rise in Iranian oil output (not to be confused with exports), as the new U.S. policy will require time and continual enforcement to take effect. The administration also relisted Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

On the nuclear file, the U.S. delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency slammed Iran for its growing stockpile of highly enriched uranium and diminished international monitoring, but also reiterated Washington’s desire for a deal. To that end, the administration has reportedly expressed interested in Russian assistance for diplomatic mediation with Iran, though a White House official claimed Moscow offered its assistance without being asked by Washington. Regardless, Russia is unlikely to deliver meaningful Iranian nuclear concessions. Russia was part of the international negotiations that produced the fatally flawed 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Russo-Iranian ties have only deepened since then, to include a strategic partnership agreement. In fact, a newly published Reuters investigation found that Russian missile specialists traveled to Iran between its April and October 2024 ballistic missile barrages against Israel.

President Trump held a joint press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after their White House meeting on February 4. Trump proposed that the United States take over Gaza, develop it, and resettle its Palestinian population in neighboring countries. Trump said the resettlement would be permanent but did not say whether it would be voluntary, while administration officials and Jerusalem have said it would be temporary and voluntary.

Whether Trump truly believes the proposal is feasible or merely wants to use it to pressure other countries to offer alternatives is unclear. Regardless, after 16 months of inaction, Jordan offered to admit 2,000 sick Palestinian children. And in early March, Arab leaders endorsed an Egyptian-sponsored counterproposal. During Bibi’s visit, Trump also signed executive orders withdrawing America from and withholding funding for certain anti-Israel UN bodies and imposing sanctions against the International Criminal Court.

While the Biden administration frequently sought to constrain Israeli options vis-à-vis Hamas, Trump has done the opposite. He threatened that if all Israeli hostages were not released by mid-February, the ceasefire deal should be canceled, though he ultimately deferred to Netanyahu to “do whatever you want.” Whereas the previous administration withheld congressionally approved arms shipments to Israel, the Trump administration in early March invoked “emergency authorities” to bypass Congress for a $4 billion arms sale. The White House also backed Israel’s decision to block aid to Gaza, much of which Hamas had seized, amid the terrorist group’s refusal to agree to the ceasefire deal’s second phase.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with South Korea’s and Japan’s foreign ministers in Munich on February 15. They issued a joint statement reaffirming “the unshakable trilateral partnership between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea” and pledged to bolster regional defense and deterrence. They also reaffirmed their commitment to the “complete denuclearization” of North Korea and expressed concerns about Pyongyang’s “nuclear and missile programs, malicious cyber activities including cryptocurrency thefts, and increasing military cooperation with Russia,” as well as its sanctions evasion and human rights violations.

Yet the Trump administration has not named a nominee to be ambassador to South Korea. Meanwhile, South Korea continues to face political tumult as its president, Yoon Suk-Yeol, stands trial for impeachment over his decision to impose martial law last December. In late February, South Korea’s Constitutional Court heard final arguments in the trial. The court has up to several months to return a judgment, and if Yoon is impeached, South Korea must hold an election within 60 days.

The Trump administration signaled its intent to continue cracking down on North Korea’s transnational sanctions evasion. Washington held a meeting with 10 other allies committed to the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), formed by the Biden administration in October 2024. The MSMT replaces a UN panel that focused on North Korea sanctions but was disbanded after Russia vetoed an extension of its mandate in March 2024.

The Trump administration seemingly intends to maintain its predecessor’s Lebanon policy. Washington has not publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the November 2024 ceasefire deal between Israel and Lebanon or with Beirut’s failure to implement it. To the contrary, U.S. officials expressed confidence in the newly minted government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and reportedly promised increased aid for the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Beirut continues to fail to disarm Hezbollah, as required by the agreement. Demonstrating its continued influence, the terror group brought out an estimated 700,000 to 900,000 people to the February 23 funeral for its late secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah. Recognizing Beirut’s inability to rein in the group, Israel has continued striking Hezbollah assets throughout Lebanon and plans to keep Israeli forces indefinitely at five strategic points in southern Lebanon despite the ceasefire agreement’s February 18 withdrawal deadline.

To the administration’s credit, Israel is acting with at least tacit U.S. approval. When Israel highlighted Iran’s continued use of Beirut International Airport to smuggle funds to Hezbollah, American pressure led Lebanon to bar Iranian airliners indefinitely — though not flights passing through Tehran or from other countries, such as Iraq or Turkey, which serve as funding conduits for Hezbollah. In a first, Lebanon also seized $2.5 million at the airport from a man arriving from Turkey.

Time will tell whether these steps portend a genuine change in Lebanese policy or are isolated moves meant to create the impression of Lebanese action against Hezbollah and advance Salam’s stated goal of recruiting Arab and international support “to force the [Israeli] enemy to withdraw.”

In early February, President Trump ordered his administration to reimpose “maximum pressure” on Iran, aiming to “deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and end the regime’s nuclear extortion racket.” Trump nevertheless signaled his desire to engage in diplomacy over Tehran’s nuclear program. In response, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed disapproval of talks, while Iran’s foreign minister said the regime will not negotiate with Washington under pressure. The Trump administration had an opportunity to seek new penalties for Iran’s nuclear advances and non-compliance with its nonproliferation obligations when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors met in early March. But the administration seems intent on delaying penalties to the June board meeting.

The New York Times reported that Iran has a secret team working to shorten the regime’s pathway to a nuclear weapon. Shortly after that story broke, current and former U.S. officials leaked a U.S. intelligence assessment that Israel may strike Iran’s nuclear facilities in the coming months but would not succeed in setting Tehran’s nuclear program back by more than a few weeks or months. The new revelations about Tehran’s secret nuclear work may have motivated the officials to muster public support against such a strike.

The Trump administration has yet to address new IAEA concerns over military actions affecting Ukraine’s nuclear facilities. A drone struck the shuttered Chernobyl nuclear plant’s radiation containment structure, causing fires. At the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which Russia has occupied since early 2022, military clashes caused the plant to operate on a sole off-site power line, creating an “extremely fragile nuclear safety situation.” The IAEA has also been unable to rotate in new staff to monitor operations at ZNPP.

Al-Qaeda and its allies in Afghanistan continue to expand their network of terror infrastructure. The Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan and Jamaat Ansarullah have established training camps in a handful of provinces with support from al-Qaeda and the Taliban, a UN monitoring team reported. Al-Qaeda and its jihadist allies are now running facilities in 14 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. The UN monitoring team also reported that the Turkistan Islamic Party’s leadership, which is based in Afghanistan, is directing the group’s operations in Syria. Meanwhile, the Taliban has declared that the Doha Agreement, which it signed with the United States in 2020 and was intended to ensure al-Qaeda would not operate in Afghanistan, is invalid.

The Trump administration has yet to articulate a policy to deal with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the al-Qaeda-linked group in Syria that ousted Bashir al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. However, Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that “Syria replacing one destabilizing force for another is not a positive development.” The U.S. military has targeted Hurras al-Din (HaD), al-Qaeda’s official branch in Syria, four times since President Trump took office. Among those killed in the strikes were HaD’s overall military commander, a “senior leadership facilitator,” and a “senior finance and logistics official,” according to U.S. Central Command.

Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s Branch in Somalia, has gone on the offensive in central and southern Somalia and has retaken some ground that it lost to Somali security forces over the past two years. The U.S. military has responded by launching airstrikes to support beleaguered Somali forces.

At a hearing on the future of Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Sen. James Risch (R-ID), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, informed the audience that the National Security Council staff is working on the formulation of the Trump administration’s Syria policy. Risch weighed in with his own view of U.S. interests in Syria, emphasizing that Washington needs “evidence that the interim government will not allow Syria to be a launching pad for terror attacks against the United States or our partners.” Risch also expressed concern at the absence of a roadmap for Syria’s transition to a duly constituted government, a point also made by the committee’s ranking member, Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH). While calling for targeted sanctions relief, Shaheen said Washington needs “clear, measurable benchmarks for an inclusive government that respects the rule of law and protects the Syrian people.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio also signaled that U.S. policy toward Syria is a work in progress. “Syria replacing one destabilizing force for another is not a positive development,” he noted, referring to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the group that led the overthrow of Assad. “And that is something that we will watch very carefully as we seek to craft our own strategy with regards to how to approach the events in Syria.”

Meanwhile, on February 15, the U.S. military announced it had killed a senior member of Hurras al-Din (HaD), an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Subsequent strikes on February 21 and 23 killed two more senior HaD figures.

On February 2, The Wall Street Journal reported that the previous administration thwarted Russian attempts to bypass international sanctions, directing the American bank J.P. Morgan to freeze $2 billion in Russian funds destined for Turkey. This revelation shed new light on Turkey’s role, despite being a NATO member, in aiding Russia’s efforts to circumvent sanctions imposed over Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s Gazprombank has reportedly funneled over $5 billion through American banks to Turkey since the war in Ukraine began, ostensibly to finance the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant in Turkey’s southern Mersin province. However, a U.S. Justice Department investigation found that some of these funds were being diverted to establish an offshore dollar reserve to support Russian state interests. The Trump administration has yet to decide what to do with the frozen funds.

On February 27, Turkey hosted U.S.-Russia talks focused on unwinding the tit-for-tat restrictions the two countries have imposed on each other’s diplomatic missions since 2017. Ankara seeks to position itself as a key mediator in brokering a peace deal between Ukraine, the United States, and Russia — part of Turkey’s longstanding policy of playing both sides. While maintaining close economic ties with Moscow, Ankara has also criticized Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, calling Kyiv’s resistance a “just cause under international law.” In late February, Bloomberg reported that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had expressed openness to deploying troops in Ukraine as part of a post-war European peacekeeping force.