Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: December

China’s brazen cyber-espionage operation targeting U.S. telecommunications providers, attributed to a state-backed hacker group known as Salt Typhoon, exposed critical vulnerabilities in American infrastructure. The FBI and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency subsequently urged U.S. citizens to adopt encrypted messaging apps to protect their communications, underscoring the unprecedented scale of the breach. Chinese hackers reportedly still maintain access to U.S. telecommunications networks, including the ability to intercept calls and access call data. Despite the breach’s severity, the Biden administration has yet to impose costs on China. 

Meanwhile, as Chinese leader Xi Jinping grapples with an economic downturn fueled by years of mismanagement, Beijing is bracing for the return of President-elect Donald Trump. Trump’s threats to impose harsh tariffs, which could cut up to 2 percent of China’s GDP, pose a serious challenge to China’s export-driven recovery strategy. The country’s economic vulnerabilities leave Beijing with limited options to project strength without provoking outright retaliation. Beyond its recently announced ban on exports of rare earth minerals to the United States, China may escalate tensions in the South China Sea or other flashpoints during the lame-duck period, destabilizing regional security and global supply chains. 

Ultimately, the Biden administration’s China policy has failed to alter Beijing’s belligerent behavior. From the normalization of brute-force tactics in the Taiwan Strait to unchecked cyber aggression against the homeland, U.S.-China relations are increasingly defined by Chinese hostility and a lack of U.S. deterrence. As Beijing looks beyond Biden, Trump’s potential return may force Xi to confront vulnerabilities this administration failed to exploit. 

Recent reporting unearthed the “vast scope and severity” of the Chinese hack into U.S. telecommunications infrastructure. The Salt Typhoon operation infiltrated eight major U.S. telecommunications companies, accessing large quantities of Americans’ communications data, including that of senior government officials. The hackers have not yet been removed from U.S. networks. In response, the Federal Communications Commission proposed new cybersecurity requirements for telecom companies. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), alongside the FBI, released guidance for U.S. cellphone users based on the continued Salt Typhoon threat. 

Media coverage of the 2024 election lauded election infrastructure cybersecurity, with only “minor” disruptions, all of which officials were prepared to confront. Collaboration between federal, state, and local government officials thwarted foreign threats, ensuring election security. 

After months of discussion, the White House cautiously supported the final version of a controversial UN cybercrime treaty. The treaty’s opponents worry that authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia could use it to legitimize surveillance and repression of their citizens. 

CISA and the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) are working to clarify the alignment between CISA’s “secure by design” initiative and NIST’s Internet of Things guidelines. CISA is also working to better address cross-sector critical infrastructure risks and updated its guidelines for Trusted Internet Connections. 

The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) issued a proposed rule that would require pipeline, rail, and mass-transit operators to conduct annual cyber evaluations and develop cybersecurity operations and assessment plans. Stakeholders raised concerns about the sharing of sensitive information but are generally supportive of TSA’s efforts. TSA continues to excel under Dave Pekoske’s leadership. 

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin worked to build U.S. and allied military capability and deter Chinese aggression during trips to the Indo-Pacific in November and December, including what the Pentagon called a “historic” trilateral meeting with his Australian and Japanese counterparts. Areas of focus included strengthening trilateral interoperability through increased exercises and coordination in air defense, intelligence, and planning. Given China’s growing military capabilities, as detailed in a new Pentagon report, these efforts are vital. 

Eyeing battlefield developments in Ukraine and potential policy shifts in the next administration, the Biden administration surged additional aid to Ukraine in November and December, announcing five security assistance packages totaling nearly $3 billion. The administration also decided in November to allow Ukraine to use American-made long-range missiles to strike deeper inside Russia and provided anti-personnel mines. While the administration’s security assistance program to Ukraine has been laudable, providing over $61 billion in military assistance since February 2022, the administration has too often delayed important decisions and the provision of vital capabilities. 

After Syria’s Assad regime fell to a rebel offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, the United States conducted airstrikes against ISIS targets in parts of the country previously occupied by regime and Russian forces. Washington aims to prevent an ISIS resurgence amidst the instability. The United States also conducted several airstrikes in response to Iranian proxy attacks on U.S. forces in November. These timely and forceful responses may suggest a belated departure from the administration’s flawed restraint during previous waves of attacks on U.S. forces. 

President Biden continued his last-ditch effort to surge assistance for Ukraine. With Kyiv’s forces struggling to hold their lines, the administration hopes to bolster Ukraine’s position as President-elect Trump looks to launch peace talks. 

Since November 1, the administration has pledged to donate nearly $2 billion worth of military aid from U.S. stocks via Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), plus almost $1 billion in materiel to be procured under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). U.S. officials said Kyiv will receive, inter alia, substantial numbers of artillery and air defense munitions. Washington also pledged $825 million in energy sector support and disbursed a $20 billion loan, part of a G7 initiative to exploit proceeds from frozen Russian assets. 

The administration expects to commit the rest of its USAI funding before leaving office but will likely be unable to allocate all its remaining PDA, with officials citing logistical constraints and stockpile concerns. To maintain leverage after the leftover PDA is exhausted, Trump will need to pass another assistance package. GOP lawmakers rejected Biden’s request to include this funding in the stopgap budget bill. 

In a long-overdue move, Biden granted Kyiv’s request to use U.S.-provided ATACMS missiles to strike inside Russia. He also finally okayed the provision of anti-personnel landmines and permitted American contractors to repair and maintain U.S.-donated equipment in Ukraine. In addition, the administration tightened sanctions on Russia’s financial sector and reportedly is considering tougher sanctions on Russian oil. While these policy reversals are welcome, their arrival at the 11th hour betrays a failure in strategy. 

After an offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) toppled Syria’s Assad regime, the Biden administration has yet to make clear whether it will embrace HTS, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization. This ambiguity resulted in a slew of clashing stances by America’s Gulf allies. While the United Arab Emirates questioned the HTS’s connection to radical Islamist groups, Qatar reopened its embassy in Damascus, signaling support, and Bahrain’s king called HTS chief Ahmad al-Sharaa to congratulate him. Saudi Arabia and Oman remained ambiguous, while Kuwait denounced Israeli military action in Syria but did not take a side on the change in power. The Gulf confusion was aggravated by Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s announcement on December 15 that Washington had established “direct contact” with HTS. American diplomats have long avoided talking to terrorists, since it would break U.S. law.  

There seems to be some ambivalence even in Qatar, which has long supported Islamist groups in Syria and elsewhere. An editorial in Qatari daily Al-Sharq suggested Doha disagrees with HTS on how to proceed in forming a new Syrian government. Qatar is committed to “achieving a Syrian-led political process in accordance with [UN Security Council] Resolution 2254,” the editorial read, “including the formation of an inclusive transitional governing body with Syrian consensus and beginning to implement the steps specified in the resolution to move from the transitional phase to a new political system.” HTS opposes Resolution 2254, arguing the resolution is obsolete as it calls for power sharing with the now-defunct Assad regime. 

President Biden’s farewell to the region during last month’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Lima underscored a key achievement of his administration: revitalizing America’s Indo-Pacific alliance network. The Biden team bolstered security partnerships with Japan and the Philippines, advanced the AUKUS submarine deal and other defense-industrial agreements, and strengthened the U.S. regional force posture with an upgraded command-and-control framework. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s 12 visits to the region highlight the administration’s sustained focus on countering Chinese aggression. In late November, the USS George Washington aircraft carrier returned to Japan after a nine-year hiatus. This deployment, along with historic trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, cements a legacy of enduring military and diplomatic progress. 

However, the administration’s missed opportunities on trade and economic security leave a critical gap. The collapse of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework raised doubts about America’s commitment to reducing regional reliance on China. The failure to finalize a trade pact with Taiwan, despite bipartisan support, highlights the Biden administration’s broader shortcomings in integrating economic tools into its Indo-Pacific strategy. These oversights have allowed Beijing to deepen its economic influence across the region. 

The South China Sea remains the most likely flashpoint, with China escalating its provocations. Recent ramming incidents targeting Philippine military vessels have gone unpunished, emboldening Beijing’s aggressive behavior. Without cost imposition, China could further test U.S. resolve during the lame-duck period or early in the next administration, raising the risk of a regional crisis. Biden’s inability to deter these actions has set a challenging stage for his successor. 

The Biden administration vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have demanded an unconditional Israeli ceasefire in Gaza disconnected from the release of all Israeli hostages. The White House could still enable a hostile action toward Israel at the Security Council during the lame-duck period, like President Obama did in 2016. But this veto signals Biden may not repeat Obama’s mistake. Still, the UN General Assembly voted to condemn Israel’s presence in the Golan Heights just days before the fall of Syria’s Assad regime. Many of the votes in favor or abstentions came from U.S. allies or recipients of U.S. aid — a demonstration of the disconnect between the administration’s efforts at the United Nations and its bilateral diplomacy with individual countries. 

While President Biden condemned the International Criminal Court warrants for the arrest of Israeli leaders, his administration declined to pressure U.S. allies to reject the court’s jurisdiction and continues to oppose U.S. sanctions targeting ICC officials. Separately, the administration supported the adoption of the framework for the UN Cybercrime Convention. Critics fear that China and Russia could use the treaty to legitimize their repression of their citizens. 

Finally, the United Nations co-hosted a supposed human rights-related gathering in China, featuring remarks by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, with no mention of China’s human rights abuses. The event is the capstone to four years of failure by the Biden administration to reform the Human Rights Council or counter China’s co-optation of the UN system to whitewash its abuses.  

The Biden administration in early November renewed a sanctions waiver enabling Iran to access $10 billion worth of previously frozen Iraqi electricity payments. The waiver allows the funds to be converted from dinars to euros and transferred from Baghdad to Oman to help Tehran pay off debts.  

The administration continued its incremental implementation of the SHIP Act, which Congress passed this year to compel a crackdown on Iran’s oil exports. In early December, Treasury sanctioned 35 tankers and facilitators of Iran’s so-called “ghost fleet.” However, the administration has not designated ports accepting Iranian cargo — even though the Energy Information Administration identified such ports in October. Nor has it sanctioned high-level Iranian human rights violators pursuant to the MAHSA act. 

At a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors in November, Washington joined the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in censuring Iran over its failure to explain undeclared nuclear sites. Previously, the administration had held back the European allies. However, the censure resolution did not declare Iran to be in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, refer the file to the Security Council, or trigger the snapback of UN sanctions. Meanwhile, the IAEA reported in December that Iran was poised to dramatically increase its production of 60 percent highly enriched uranium. 

Finally, the Assad regime’s fall dealt a major blow to Tehran. Credit, however, goes to the Israeli military for degrading Iran’s proxy Hezbollah, one of Assad’s chief backers — not to the Biden administration, which quietly encouraged Arab countries to normalize relations with Assad. 

What began as full-throated American support after the October 7 massacre has given way to efforts to restrict Israel’s fight against Hamas. The Biden administration is spending its waning days trying to secure a Hamas-Israel ceasefire and the release of hostages held in Gaza to shore up its legacy on Israel.  

After Washington threatened to withhold weapons from Israel absent significant improvements to the humanitarian situation in Gaza, a State Department spokesman said on November 12 that Jerusalem had taken “a number of steps” to assuage American concerns. A U.S. official later confirmed Israel would receive a $680 million weapons package. 

On November 20, Washington vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that did not condition a Gaza ceasefire on Hamas’s release of the roughly 100 remaining hostages. The following day, Biden condemned the International Criminal Court’s “outrageous” decision to issue arrest warrants for Israeli leaders.” 

Meanwhile, Washington and Paris helped broker an Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, announced on November 26. Under the deal, Hezbollah fighters must stay away from the border, and Jerusalem can respond militarily to violations. Time will tell whether Hezbollah abides by the deal and the 70,000 Israelis displaced from the north can return home. 

In Gaza, the administration launched a last-ditch effort to free the hostages, with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveling to the region. Negotiations toward a ceasefire have reportedly made progress, with Hamas allegedly agreeing to release a comprehensive list of the hostages and consenting to Israeli forces remaining in Gaza temporarily. 

The decision by South Korea’s embattled President Yoon Suk Yeol to impose martial law in early December shocked Washington and triggered an immediate domestic backlash, leading to his impeachment and possible criminal charges. The Biden administration expressed concern over Yoon’s move but did not publicly condemn him, later welcoming his decision to rescind martial law the following day. During and after the crisis, Washington reaffirmed that the U.S.-ROK alliance, which the administration has taken positive steps to strengthen, would remain “ironclad.” However, Yoon’s short-lived maneuver could jeopardize years of painstaking work to bolster U.S.-ROK-Japanese trilateral cooperation. The leftwing leader favored to win South Korea’s presidency could also reverse Yoon’s tough policy on North Korea, complicating U.S.-ROK coordination as power changes hands in Washington.  

North Korea, meanwhile, continues to augment its nuclear capabilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed last month that North Korea is likely using a second enrichment facility called Kangson to increase output of enriched uranium and expand its nuclear weapons stockpile. Pyongyang is also seeking Russian assistance in enhancing its nuclear delivery capabilities. According to Washington, North Korea hopes to receive ballistic missile, re-entry vehicle, and submarine technologies from Russia, and Moscow has agreed to send Pyongyang fighter jets. Since taking office, the Biden administration has failed to rigorously enforce sanctions targeting key revenue streams for Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs. The incoming administration may face a North Korea that is not only less willing to negotiate but also feels increasingly emboldened to use nuclear threats to pursue its policy goals — including its aim of dominating the Korean Peninsula.  

In late November, Washington brokered a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hezbollah. At the time, Israel had decimated Hezbollah’s military capabilities but was far from destroying them entirely. U.S. diplomat Amos Hochstein, the deal’s drafter, promised the agreement would end the Israel-Hezbollah conflict “once and for all.” 

The agreement, however, repeated the fatal error of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, requiring Hezbollah to withdraw from southern Lebanon and disarm. To enforce those obligations, Resolution 1701 relied primarily on the Lebanese state, which has proven itself unwilling and unable to restrain Hezbollah. Hochstein’s agreement requires Resolution 1701’s “full implementation” but again leaves enforcement to the Lebanese state. Though the deal seemingly offsets Lebanese inaction by appearing to permit Israel to respond militarily to Hezbollah violations, it places significant hurdles on Israeli military action. 

Beirut has already begun to prevaricate. It has yet to take action to disarm or restrain Hezbollah in areas that have come under Lebanese Armed Forces control. The country’s caretaker prime minister has returned to Lebanon’s old position that the fate of Hezbollah’s arsenal must be resolved through internal “dialogue and consensus.” Hezbollah is unlikely to consent to its disarmament. 

Washington appears to hope that Lebanon’s upcoming presidential election — which will fill a position that has remained vacant for almost two years — will lead to Hezbollah’s disarmament. But Beirut’s failure to rein in Hezbollah results from a lack of will, not a stalled political process. And Lebanon’s political dysfunction, coupled with Hezbollah’s retention of overwhelming Shiite support, may enable the group to outmaneuver potential moves against it. 

The surprise collapse of Syria’s Assad regime raises the question of how to deal with its undeclared stockpile of chemical weapons. Israel immediately began striking key Syrian chemical weapons facilities, including a facility devoted to chemical weapons research, with the aim of preventing these assets from falling into the hands of terrorists. During an emergency session of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council on December 12, the OPCW director-general reminded Syria’s new leaders that Damascus remains a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. He offered to continue OPCW investigations toward the verified elimination of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons assets and pledged support in identifying the perpetrators of the regime’s past chemical weapons attacks. For its part, Washington says it is working with regional partners to secure and destroy the chemical weapons and has stressed that Syria’s new leadership must cooperate in this effort. 

Iran took further steps to position its nuclear program for a dash to nuclear weapons, augmenting its ability to produce highly enriched uranium at the underground Fordow facility. Prior to this move, Tehran already possessed enough enriched uranium to produce weapons-grade material for 16 nuclear weapons. The regime could seek to use these actions to bolster its negotiating leverage with the incoming administration. Tehran could also exploit the lame-duck period to dash to nuclear weapons, testing President Biden’s willingness to intervene militarily. Having heavily degraded both Iran’s air defenses and Hezbollah’s retaliatory capability, Jerusalem is better positioned to carry out military strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites — an action the second-term Trump administration is reportedly more inclined to support or even join. 

The U.S. government has made “direct contact” with Syria’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced on December 15, a week after the Assad regime fell to a rebel offensive led by HTS. Washington designated HTS as a foreign terrorist organization in 2018, but the Biden administration reportedly is considering removing the group from that list. HTS was designated for its ties to al-Qaeda, and HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) who has said that “Jerusalem awaits us.” Several terror groups linked to or allied with al-Qaeda operate under the aegis of HTS and participated in Assad’s ouster. One of these groups, the Turkistan Islamic Party, used their victory in Syria to recruit for the jihad in China. 

On December 8, the day Assad fled, U.S. Central Command announced it had launched “dozens” of airstrikes against the Islamic State’s “leaders, operatives, and camps” in Syria. The strikes took place as the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army launched attacks against the Syrian Democratic Forces, the U.S.-backed group that controls territory in northern and eastern Syria where the Islamic State operates.  

In other news, a U.S. court sentenced Afghan national Haji Abdul Satar Abdul Manaf to 30 years in prison for “heroin importation, narco-terrorism benefiting the Taliban, narco-terrorism benefiting the Haqqani Network, and witness tampering.” Manaf is an SDGT. Separately, the Islamic State killed Khalil al–Rahman Haqqani, the Taliban’s minister of refugees and a terrorist wanted by the United States, in a suicide attack in Kabul.  

President Biden sought to take credit for the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, yet his administration continually sought to cut a deal with Assad that would lift U.S. sanctions in exchange for Syria breaking with Iran. After Assad’s flight to Moscow on December 8, U.S. policy pivoted to the question of how to engage new authorities who, in Biden’s words, “have their own grim record of terrorism and human rights abuses.” On December 14, Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed that the administration was in direct contact with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the U.S.-designated terrorist organization whose commander, Ahmad al-Sharaa (aka Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) is now Syria’s de facto leader. 

Blinken has laid out what he describes as “basic principles” that are “essential to any credible, transparent transition process” in Syria. These include the new Syrian authorities’ rejection of terrorism and readiness to cooperate in the elimination of Assad’s chemical weapons arsenal. Less clear is what Washington expects in terms of how the new authorities govern their people. Blinken said the government “should uphold and protect the rights of all Syrians, including minorities and women.” In a joint statement with several allies, the administration also called for “representative government” in Syria, hinting at its opposition to the return of authoritarianism. But Washington has not clearly called for elections or any other mechanism of representation. Both Sharaa and the UN envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, have called for lifting sanctions, while a State Department spokesperson said the administration is waiting to see whether the new government’s conduct merits any changes. 

On December 13, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara to discuss regional challenges following the December 8 downfall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. The Assad regime’s collapse resulted from a military offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Syrian terrorist group reportedly supported by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as confirmed by Fidan in a televised interview.  

During a joint press conference, Blinken emphasized Washington’s commitment to Syria’s future, highlighting the opportunity for Syrians to transition from Assad’s authoritarian rule to self-determined governance. However, HTS’s former ties to al-Qaeda, for which the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and Turkey all designated HTS a terrorist group, cast doubt on its commitment to democracy and non-sectarian rule. 

Turkey now holds significant influence over Syria’s political future and stability, complicating U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Ankara has used Syrian opposition factions known as the Syrian National Army (SNA) to fight the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are led by a Kurdish group that Turkey views as a terrorist organization. The SDF is allied with the United States in combating ISIS, which will likely seek to exploit instability resulting from Assad’s fall. In recent weeks, the SNA has attacked SDF-held territory. On Tuesday, a State Department spokesman said Turkey and the SDF had extended a U.S.-brokered ceasefire until the end of the week, though the SDF has accused the SNA and Turkey of violating it. U.S. officials say Turkish and SNA forces are massing along the border, raising fears of an imminent offensive.