May 2, 2022 | FDD Tracker: April 2, 2022-May 2, 2022

Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: May

May 2, 2022 | FDD Tracker: April 2, 2022-May 2, 2022

Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: May

Trend Overview

Edited by David Adesnik and John Hardie

Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch. As Russian forces withdrew from the outskirts of Kyiv, they left behind evidence of torture, summary executions, and other crimes. In the town of Bucha, corpses littered the streets and hundreds of bodies filled mass graves, yet the Kremlin insisted the atrocities were an elaborate hoax. President Joe Biden called for Russian President Vladimir Putin to be put on trial for war crimes, yet that prospect seems remote. However, the United States has led an increasingly rapid and effective effort to arm Ukrainian forces, who continue to exact heavy costs on their adversary. Washington and its allies also continued to levy sanctions against Russia and are discussing measures to target its vital energy export revenue.

In Vienna, nuclear negotiations with Iran reached an impasse when the White House rejected Tehran’s demand to remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Under pressure from Congress as well as U.S. victims of IRGC attacks, the administration appeared to reverse its initial readiness to grant this concession to Tehran. Check back in a month to see if the White House continues to hold the line against unreasonable Iranian demands and if escalating support for Ukraine enables Kyiv to thwart Russia’s offensive in eastern Ukraine.

Trending Positive

Trending Neutral

Trending Negative

Trending Very Negative

Arms Control and Nonproliferation

By Anthony Ruggiero and Andrea Stricker

Previous Trend: Negative

Secretary of State Antony Blinken told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 26 that reviving the Iran nuclear deal remains “the best way to address the nuclear challenge posed by Iran.” The stalemate in talks continues because of Tehran’s insistence that Washington lift its designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization. While firm (so far) on this point, the Biden administration appears unwilling either to pressure Tehran to curtail its threatening nuclear advances or to hold Iran accountable for non-compliance with its nonproliferation obligations.

On April 20, Russia tested a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The test follows the Biden administration’s decision to cancel a test of an unarmed Minuteman III ICBM. Elsewhere, North Korea has conducted at least 12 missile tests this year, with more tests likely in the months ahead. Pyongyang is rebuilding tunnels at its Punggye-ri nuclear test site that were superficially damaged in 2017, raising concerns that North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un is planning another test of an atomic weapon.

In late April, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), along with a small nuclear safeguards and safety team, traveled to Ukraine for the second time since Russia’s invasion began. The delegation’s visit also marked the 36th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident. The team visited the plant to “deliver equipment, conduct radiological assessments and restore safeguards monitoring systems.” The IAEA is proactively responding to safeguards and safety concerns at Ukraine’s 15 operational nuclear reactors, which are located at four separate plants.


By Craig Singleton

Previous Trend: Neutral

Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping has entered the most fraught moment of his political tenure. Xi’s zero-COVID strategy has failed to contain outbreaks across China, leading to mass lockdowns and mandatory testing in both Shanghai and Beijing. Extended factory and port shutdowns will weigh heavily on China’s economic outlook in 2022. At the same time its stock market has plummeted, China has also experienced unprecedented capital flight following Xi’s decision to tacitly back Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. To maintain economic stability, Xi will likely abandon major elements of his ambitious economic agenda, instead seeking to rev up growth through new stimulus spending and export-driven manufacturing. At risk is Xi’s narrative that China’s one-party system is superior to Western liberal democracy, and that the United States is declining politically and economically. Beyond the potential damage to Xi’s legitimacy, the fallout from extended lockdowns could undermine social cohesion in ways not seen since the Tiananmen era, possibly resulting in unrest and other demonstrations.

For the United States, the likely effect of Chinese lockdowns is to exacerbate existing inflation and supply chain challenges. The upshot: Some American firms may accelerate efforts to relocate their supply chains from China to more stable Indo-Pacific nations. However, such diversification strategies will be impeded by continued uncertainty surrounding the administration’s still-nascent Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Worse, after more than 15 months in office, President Biden still has yet to deliver a speech on U.S.-China relations, although Secretary of State Antony Blinken pledged to speak on the subject in the weeks ahead.


By RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery and Annie Fixler

Previous Trend: Positive

In the final days of March, the White House released its budget request for fiscal year 2023, proposing significant funding increases for federal cybersecurity. The budget also makes investments in enhancing national cyber resilience, although some shortfalls remain.

As the war in Ukraine continued, the Biden administration emphasized the need to remain vigilant against Russian cyberattacks. Together with its Five-Eyes allies, the administration detailed Russian state-sponsored and criminal cyber threats to critical infrastructure. The Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and its partners also released technical details about a sophisticated threat to industrial control systems (ICS). Private security experts concluded Russia was likely responsible, although CISA did not say so explicitly. Relatedly, CISA added ICS experts to its Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative to improve defense planning. Critical-infrastructure representatives positively reviewed the administration’s information sharing efforts.

The Justice Department, meanwhile, announced that with help from a private cybersecurity firm, it disabled a vast Russian botnet “before it could do any harm,” according to FBI Director Chris Wray. Separately, Treasury worked with German police to dismantle the world’s largest darknet market and seize $25 million in bitcoin. Treasury also issued its first-ever sanctions against a Russian cryptocurrency mining company and designated a digital wallet in which North Korean hackers had stashed $620 million in cryptocurrency. The latter, however, may have limited effect, as the hackers quickly moved funds to other wallets.

Finally, the administration appears set to roll back authorities that have improved the Pentagon’s ability to disrupt malicious cyber threats, against the counsel of lawmakers and current and former defense officials.


By Bradley Bowman

Previous Trend: Neutral

The Biden administration in April expanded its security assistance to Ukraine designed to help the country fight Russia’s unprovoked and ongoing invasion. The Department of Defense announced on April 13 the seventh drawdown of equipment from U.S. military inventories for Ukraine, including 18 155mm towed howitzers, 40,000 artillery rounds, and 10 AN/TPQ-36 counter-artillery radars, for example. One week later, President Biden authorized an additional drawdown of security assistance, which included, inter alia, 72 additional howitzers and over 121 Phoenix Ghost loitering munitions developed specifically for Ukraine in just a few weeks. The howitzers and counter-artillery radars, in particular, will be vital assets in battles in eastern Ukraine, based on the topography there and Russia’s emphasis on artillery attacks.

Following Ukraine’s impressive defeat of Russia’s ground offensive targeting Kyiv and Moscow’s shift in focus to eastern and southern Ukraine, the Biden administration deserves credit for acknowledging the changing character of the conflict and responding accordingly and with a sense of urgency. Indeed, one week after Biden authorized the eighth drawdown of security assistance, 60 percent of the 90 howitzers had already been delivered.

As of April 25, the Biden administration had invested more than $4.3 billion in security assistance for Ukraine, the vast majority of which ($3.7 billion) unfortunately was not authorized until after Moscow’s February 24 invasion. Since then, however, the administration has undertaken an extraordinary and agile security assistance effort that reflects the best traditions of American transatlantic national security leadership and has helped prevent Russian President Vladimir Putin from accomplishing many of his objectives in Ukraine.


By John Hardie

Previous Trend: Positive

The Biden administration in April strove to meet Ukraine’s pleas for heavy weapons and other materiel needed as Russia’s war effort shifted focus from Kyiv to eastern Ukraine. In addition to authorizing $2.3 billion in military aid for Ukraine in April, the administration encouraged and facilitated assistance from allies, focusing on heavy weapons. For example, the U.S. middle-manned deliveries of tanks and aircraft parts. Slovakia donated an S-300 battery to Ukraine, backfilled by a U.S. Patriot deployment. Last week, representatives from over 40 countries joined Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, where they launched a mechanism for coordinating near- and long-term defense support for Ukraine. At the U.S.-organized meeting, several nations, including Germany, announced plans to send Ukraine heavy weapons.

That meeting came a day after Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv. In addition to direct military and economic aid, the administration announced it would provide almost $400 million in Foreign Military Financing to help European allies backfill weapons donated to Ukraine. Blinken also announced that U.S. diplomats would return to Ukraine, but at first only for day trips to Lviv. Several allies have already reopened their embassies in Kyiv. President Biden subsequently nominated Ambassador Bridget Brink as envoy to Ukraine. Her confirmation will end a confounding three-year vacancy in that post.

Meanwhile, Washington and its European allies are discussing potential sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector. The administration is encouraging allies to target Russia’s vital export revenues while minimizing supply disruptions and price increases.


By Hussain Abdul-Hussain

Previous Trend: Negative

The White House announced on March 22 its nomination of Michael Ratney as ambassador to Saudi Arabia. If confirmed, Ratney would fill a position that has been vacant for 15 months, and would become the first career diplomat in three decades to serve as U.S. ambassador to Riyadh.

Ratney is currently the chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Israel and previously served as the U.S. consul general in Jerusalem. By breaking with the tradition of dispatching political appointees to Riyadh, President Biden may be signaling that his administration’s relations with Saudi Arabia are a lower priority.

Biden has pointedly avoided any personal interaction with the de facto Saudi ruler, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS). Instead, the president has attempted to circumvent MBS by dealing with his father, King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz. In a February phone call, Biden asked Salman to pump more oil to offset the price spike resulting from Russia’s war in Ukraine. Riyadh did not oblige. In mid-April, MBS agreed with Russian President Vladimir Putin to keep production by the OPEC+ oil cartel at its current level, thus acting against U.S. interests.

Trying to isolate MBS by working with his 86-year-old father has failed. Channeling America’s relations with one of the world’s leading oil producers through a career diplomat is unlikely to improve things. The only way to restore good ties with Riyadh is to talk to MBS, albeit while raising with him issues of human rights as Washington does with other countries.


By Craig Singleton

Previous Trend: Negative

The Biden administration was caught flat-footed after China and the Solomon Islands signed a new security pact this month, which could pave the way for Beijing to establish a military base in the South Pacific. That would be China’s second overseas base — Beijing established the first in Djibouti in 2016. China’s interest in a potential base in the Solomons has been known for years, but the Biden administration failed to mount an effective response. It seriously erred in outsourcing the matter to Australia, which has fraught relationships with most Pacific Island countries. A Chinese military presence in the South Pacific will have major implications on America’s force posture, including its ability to respond to a potential invasion of Taiwan. A base in the Solomons could also provide Beijing with a platform to disrupt global trade routes during a crisis.

The White House’s Indo-Pacific woes will likely be compounded by disparaging remarks President Biden made during a recent closed-door fundraiser during which he referred to the Philippines, a longstanding democratic treaty ally, as “essentially” a dictatorship akin to China and Russia. Notably, Biden has not held a single bilateral phone call with any leader from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since assuming office. However, the administration has an opportunity to reset its Indo-Pacific policy during an upcoming summit with ASEAN leaders. Key to the summit’s success will be a stated commitment from the Biden administration to provide ASEAN countries with improved access to the U.S. market.

International Organizations

By Richard Goldberg

Previous Trend: Negative

The Biden administration helped pass an April 7 UN General Assembly resolution suspending Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. While undoubtedly a positive move, Russia’s removal from the council did not deliver any broader reform to that deeply flawed organization, which still boasts China, Cuba, and Venezuela as elected members. Earlier in April, the council wrapped up its spring session — its first since the United States rejoined the body in January — having passed only one resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, alongside four anti-Israel resolutions, including a call for a partial arms embargo on the Jewish state. The Biden administration also failed to terminate the council’s antisemitic Commission of Inquiry that seeks to falsely label Israel an apartheid state. Demonstrating just how broken the council remains, the administration had to push back against the body’s so-called expert advisors who claimed the U.S. decision to prevent Afghanistan’s reserves from falling into the hands of the UN-blacklisted Taliban was contributing to a humanitarian crisis.

Separately, the Biden administration co-sponsored a UN resolution, which passed by consensus, to require a General Assembly discussion of vetoes by permanent members of the Security Council. While aimed at Russia, which regularly wields its veto power to block U.S. and Western interests, the move does nothing to limit the veto but could undermine future U.S. administrations that exercise a U.S. veto to block anti-American or anti-Israel resolutions.

In positive news, American and Taiwanese officials held talks on expanding Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, including the possibility of Taiwan attending the World Health Assembly in May.


By Behnam Ben Taleblu and Richard Goldberg

Previous Trend: Very Negative

Russian-brokered indirect nuclear talks between Washington and Tehran reportedly hit a snag over Iran’s request that the United States remove Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list. Following last month’s reports that Biden administration had offered to remove the IRGC from the FTO list in exchange for certain unenforceable political commitments from Tehran, the White House in April faced strong opposition from Congress, independent experts, former U.S. military leaders, and more than 900 Gold Star family members. The State Department now frames any decision to lift the IRGC’s FTO designation as beyond the 2015 nuclear deal, but reports suggest the administration may be offering to replace the IRGC’s FTO designation with a narrow designation of the IRGC-Quds Force.

On April 26, Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified that Tehran is actively plotting to harm current and former U.S. officials, raising a more fundamental question as to why the administration is offering Iran any sanctions relief whatsoever — particularly from terrorism sanctions imposed on key Iranian institutions for financing IRGC terrorism. Russia and Iran, meanwhile, signed an agreement to expand joint trade shows — the latest indication that a renewed nuclear deal could position Iran as a sanctions-evasion hub for Russia as it faces increasing pressure over its invasion of Ukraine. Finally, on April 18, Tehran unveiled new weapons systems, including drones and surface-to-surface missiles, raising additional concerns about the Biden administration’s plan to lift sanctions against Iranian entities and sectors tied to missile development and proliferation.


By David May

Previous Trend: Neutral

The Biden administration finally held the line against Iran’s excessive demands at the Vienna nuclear talks and firmly denounced Palestinian terrorism, yet hesitated to pin full responsibility for the violence on Palestinian leaders.

Meanwhile, Israel rejected a U.S. offer to host a meeting between Israeli and Palestinian national security advisers at the White House.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other high-ranking administration officials, including the vice president, strongly condemned the current wave of Palestinian terrorism against Israeli civilians. However, on April 15, as Palestinians hurled rocks and fireworks from the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the State Department issued a “call on all sides to exercise restraint.” On April 19, Blinken reinforced this message to his Israeli counterpart, Yair Lapid.

That same day, speaking with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Blinken issued a similar call to “end the cycle of violence” and declared Washington’s commitment to improving Palestinian lives and supporting “a negotiated two-state solution.” Senior State Department officials traveled to the region that week to reduce tensions.

President Biden spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett on April 24, primarily regarding Israeli-Palestinian tensions and Iran. Biden accepted an offer to visit Israel in the coming months.

The next day, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and his Israeli counterpart, Eyal Hulata, discussed their potential options to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons if the stalled nuclear talks ultimately collapse. The Iranian demand to remove terrorism sanctions against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a move Israel opposes, has reportedly been a major cause of the impasse.


By David Maxwell

Previous Trend: Negative

On the night of April 25, North Korea conducted its first military parade of the year and showed off its Hwasong-17 ICBM, among other weapons. North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un gave a speech at the parade making it clear he will not give up his nuclear weapons and will maintain them for deterrence and offensive operations. Kim’s political warfare and blackmail diplomacy continue apace despite the Biden administration’s continued offer to negotiate anywhere, anytime, without preconditions.

The Biden administration continued to execute its policy of “stern deterrence” toward North Korea, deploying multiple strategic assets to the region over the last three months in response to Pyongyang’s provocations. Additionally, the U.S. and ROK militaries conducted the semi-annual Combined Command Post Training Exercise. The Biden administration also issued limited sanctions designations and enforcement actions. These are insufficient to achieve significant effects, yet the refusal to lift sanctions is in keeping with multiple UN Security Council resolutions that call for the full denuclearization of North Korea. Despite Kim’s efforts to coerce the administration into making concessions, there is no indication it will provide any kind of sanctions relief absent negotiations. The United States remains committed to the complete, peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The incoming administration of Yoon Seok-yeol is aligning itself with the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, particularly the critical task of improving trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the United States. The Yoon administration will likely also seek closer relations with the Quad as well as regional and global cooperation with the United States. The Biden team will likely ask Yoon for increased support for Ukraine, which he will likely provide, in contravention of the outgoing Moon administration’s wishes.

Latin America

By Carrie Filipetti and Emanuele Ottolenghi

Previous Trend: Negative

The Biden administration scored an important victory in April when the Organization of American States voted to suspend Russia’s observer status. Regardless, the abstentions of Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, the region’s three largest economies and most populous nations, highlight a continuing failure of U.S. leadership.

In June, the administration will host the Summit of the Americas, which the State Department describes as the “most important forum” for addressing the Western Hemisphere’s shared challenges and opportunities. Priorities for the summit should include supply chain challenges; democratic backsliding in Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela; and countering China’s rise in the region. However, there remains significant uncertainty surrounding the summit’s invitees and expected outcomes.

The administration also faces challenges with energy supplies. After a botched attempt to negotiate sanctions relief in exchange for Venezuelan oil, the administration should work with allies, including Brazil, Ecuador, and Guyana, to boost production.

Although migration flows at America’s southern border have soared to record highs, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention plans to end Title 42, the Trump-era policy that suspended undocumented migrant entry into the United States due to COVID-related public health concerns. While a federal judge has delayed cancellation of the measure, there is bipartisan concern that its termination could cause a surge in undocumented immigration.

Last month, for the first time, Cuban migrants outnumbered Central Americans at the southern border, with U.S. authorities reporting over 30,000 encounters, an increase of 460 percent over the same period last year. Accordingly, the administration has restarted migration talks with the Cuban regime, resulting in the highest-level negotiations since the Obama administration, despite Havana’s growing human rights abuses.


By Tony Badran

Previous Trend: Very Negative

With Lebanon’s parliamentary elections set for May 15, it seems that the Biden administration’s major initiatives in that country are on hold for a while.

Lebanese foreign minister Abdullah Bou Habib said a written U.S. proposal for resolving Lebanon and Israel’s maritime border dispute, while more favorable to the Lebanese than previous offers, was “not enough yet.” While this characterization suggests the Lebanese will reject the U.S. proposal, it remains unclear when they will hand over an official response. “Hopefully,” Bou Habib said, it “would be soon and it would be one response.”

Meanwhile, energy minister Walid Fayad declared that the fate of the U.S.-backed plan to supply Lebanon with Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity via Syria was in the hands of the World Bank. The primary remaining hurdle, Fayad said, was World Bank financing. What would need to follow that, Fayad continued, is a “written, total and concrete American commitment” that the deal would not be subject to sanctions.

Reports in the Lebanese press have since claimed that the World Bank has refused to finance the deal for the time being, pending satisfactory reforms, and not just in Lebanon’s energy sector. This means everything is now on ice until the elections and probably until the formation of a new government, which would then need to undertake the required reforms — a process potentially lasting several months.

The Biden administration had wanted to get the energy deal done before the May elections but seems to have oversold its ability to circumvent sanctions on Syria imposed by the Caesar Act.


By John Hardie

Previous Trend: Positive

U.S. support for Ukraine continues to pay dividends on the battlefield. American intelligence, for example, has helped Ukrainian aircraft and air defense systems avoid Russian strikes. This has helped deny Russia air superiority, as have U.S.-facilitated deliveries of spare parts that reportedly allowed Ukraine to restore over 20 fixed-wing aircraft. The administration also loosened rules for sharing intelligence to help Ukraine target Russian forces in the Donbas region.

The administration authorized $2.3 billion in military aid for Ukraine in April alone, focusing on heavy weapons needed to defeat Russia in eastern and southern Ukraine, including 10 AN/TPQ-36 counter-artillery radars, 90 155mm howitzers, and a large amount of ammunition both for those howitzers and for Ukraine’s Soviet-made artillery. On Thursday, President Biden asked Congress for another $33 billion for supporting Ukraine and related expenses, including over $20 billion for further military and security assistance to Ukraine and for other U.S. efforts to strengthen European security.

Following revelations of Russian war crimes in Ukraine, the administration prohibited Russia from making debt payments with funds held in U.S. banks, pushing Moscow closer to default. The administration subsequently banned new investment in Russia and imposed full blocking sanctions against state-owned Alrosa, the world’s largest diamond mining company, as well as Sberbank, Russia’s biggest bank, and Alpha-Bank, its largest private bank.

However, the initial shock from tougher-than-expected Western sanctions has ebbed. Russia has so far averted the direst economic forecasts, in part thanks to plentiful petrodollars. The challenge ahead for Washington and its allies is to craft sanctions targeting Russian oil export revenue.

Sunni Jihadism

By Bill Roggio

Previous Trend: Negative

General Richard Clarke, the head of U.S. Special Operations Command, told Congress in early April that the United States has not conducted a single airstrike against terrorists based in Afghanistan since the U.S. withdrawal from the country in August 2021. Clarke said the U.S. military has the capacity to conduct such strikes but has limited visibility on terrorist activities in Afghanistan. Clarke’s testimony undercut the Biden administration’s claim that the U.S. military can effectively target terrorist using “over the horizon” strikes. After the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the country remains a safe haven for a host of terror groups allied with the Taliban, including al-Qaeda, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, the Turkistan Islamic Party, Ansarullah, and a host of Pakistani terror groups.

Meanwhile, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in East Africa, has launched a series of complex suicide attacks that have targeted Somali politicians and security officials as the country holds elections. The United States, however, is still “marching in place at best” in efforts to support the Somali government and target al-Shabaab, as General Steven Townsend, the head of U.S. Africa Command, told Congress in March. “We may be backsliding,” Townsend conceded, after U.S. troops withdrew from the country in January 2021.


By David Adesnik

Previous Trend: Negative

The Biden administration published an unclassified report on the net worth and known sources of income of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and his family. The report is brief and draws on easily available public sources, although there is a classified annex. Congress mandated the report in hopes of spurring the administration to enforce the Caesar Act, a bipartisan sanctions law intended to hold the Assad regime accountable for its atrocities. Despite early promises to enforce the Caesar Act diligently, the administration has issued only two sets of sanctions designations, neither of which included any economically significant targets.

The administration is also bending the law by advocating for the Assad regime’s inclusion in a pair of regional energy deals that would direct substantial income to Damascus. In February, the ranking Republicans on the House and Senate foreign relations committees warned that the administration was creating a “blueprint for circumventing Caesar sanctions.” This tension in Washington may have contributed to the World Bank’s reported hesitation to finance the two energy deals. On April 21, Lebanese energy minister Walid Fayyad said the bank was delaying its approval in order to assess the “political feasibility” of the agreements.

Four U.S. troops suffered minor injuries during an April 7 attack on their base in northeastern Syria. The military initially reported rocket fire as the cause of the injuries, yet a week later said an unidentified individual had deliberately placed “explosive charges” inside the base. The incident remains under investigation.


The analyses above do not necessarily represent the institutional views of FDD.


Arab Politics China Cyber Gulf States Indo-Pacific International Organizations Iran Iran Global Threat Network Iran in Latin America Israel Jihadism Lebanon Military and Political Power Nonproliferation North Korea Russia Syria The Long War Turkey U.S. Defense Policy and Strategy