Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: Early May

The United States participated in a fourth round of multilateral talks in Vienna aimed at restoring the flawed Iran nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). U.S. officials suggest Iran still has not made a political decision to re-enter the deal, while Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated that Washington had agreed to lift many sanctions. Questions loom about what to do with hundreds of Iran’s advanced centrifuges, which the JCPOA does not permit. Tehran threatened to destroy International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) electronic records of Iran’s nuclear sites if it does not obtain sanctions relief by a deadline of May 22. Iran is also not cooperating with a separate IAEA probe over its suspicious nuclear activities. Meanwhile, the Biden administration completed its North Korea policy review, deciding to pursue a limited nuclear deal with Pyongyang rather than hold out for full denuclearization. Russian President Vladimir Putin moved to withdraw from the 1992 Open Skies Treaty, one month after the Biden administration indicated it would not reverse the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the treaty. Russia has long failed to comply with the treaty.

When it comes to China, many key issues remain “under review” by President Biden and his national security team. White House “Asia czar” Kurt Campbell acknowledged that the United States may not be able to rally allies to challenge Beijing to alter its malign behavior. So far, the administration’s multilateral push has resulted in coordinated sanctions with allies over Beijing’s persecution of Uighur Muslims and a G7 session dedicated entirely to the challenges posed by China. The next big test is whether the administration can secure Taiwan’s participation during the World Health Organization’s annual agenda-setting meeting, a move China vehemently opposes. Questions also continue to swirl around two other important issues: trade and supply chains. U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai announced plans to meet with her Chinese counterpart to assess the two-year old “Phase 1 trade deal.” Initial indications suggest the administration intends to maintain Trump-era policies, including U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports and limits on U.S. investment in certain Chinese companies. Still to be decided are concrete steps to address the global semiconductor chip shortage, as well as whether the administration will maintain export controls on Chinese technology companies. There is still no U.S. ambassador to China, although veteran diplomat Nicholas Burns appears to be the frontrunner.

While the Biden administration continues to prioritize cybersecurity, the urgency of the challenge is outpacing the administration’s response. The White House issued a new executive order to raise cybersecurity standards and breach-notification requirements for government contractors, improve government cybersecurity, and establish a Cyber Safety Review Board – all important steps. However, the latest ransomware attack against the Colonial Pipeline, which operates America’s largest refined products pipeline, underscores the need for greater efforts to enhance public-private partnerships to defend national critical infrastructure. The Colonial Pipeline hack also further reinforces the need to include cybersecurity funding for the most vulnerable critical infrastructures, such as water and wastewater systems, the Maritime Transportation System, and state and local municipality networks in the president’s proposed $2 trillion infrastructure bill. Crucially, the federal government needs a coherent ransomware policy. The FBI discourages payments, while Treasury advises that companies seek approval before paying ransom (lest victims inadvertently trigger sanctions violations by sending money to sanctioned entities). In one troubling bureaucratic development, the secretary of energy appeared to confirm that an acting principal deputy assistant secretary rather than an assistant secretary would lead the department’s cybersecurity office, potentially eroding the office’s authority in responding to attacks on critical U.S. energy infrastructure.

Building on a speech he delivered in Hawaii, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin published a Washington Post op-ed on May 5. He emphasized the changing character of war, as well as the need for new American military technologies, operational concepts, and combat capabilities. He also underscored the importance of American military power and deterrent capabilities in all warfighting domains – including air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace. The problem is that Austin would lack sufficient resources to advance these priorities under the Biden administration’s proposed defense budget for fiscal year 2022. The proposed budget would not even keep pace with projected inflation. The failure to provide the Department of Defense sufficient resources during the Obama administration played a major role in causing the military readiness crisis of 2017. Repeating that mistake would again force the Pentagon to choose between modernization, force structure, and readiness. This could not come at a worse time. Eyeing an increasingly daunting national security challenge from Beijing, the Pentagon is attempting to advance vital modernization efforts while grappling with persistent readiness challenges. Thankfully, our Constitution grants Congress the final say on the defense budget – providing hope that Congress may authorize what is necessary to defend our country.

China topped the agenda at the G7 in London as the administration continued efforts to rally European support to counter Beijing. While reassuring allies that America is not asking them to forgo ties with China, Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged them to defend the “rules-based order” and democratic values, including by scrutinizing Chinese investment and confronting Beijing over human rights issues such as Xinjiang. While the final communique included few concrete agreements, the meeting reflected a growing shift in European views on China and Europe’s role in the Indo-Pacific. Berlin and London joined Washington in organizing a subsequent UN event on Xinjiang despite what Germany’s UN ambassador called “massive Chinese threats.” The week prior, the European Commission paused efforts to promote December’s controversial EU-China investment deal and unveiled plans to reduce dependency on Chinese and other foreign suppliers and to impose restrictions on state-subsidized firms. After the G7, Blinken traveled to Ukraine. He reaffirmed U.S. support for Ukraine following Russia’s recent military build-up, saying the administration is “very actively” considering unspecified additional security cooperation. Equally important, the secretary pressed Kyiv for progress on anti-corruption – a renewed focus under Biden. Blinken echoed the State Department’s criticism of Kyiv’s decision to replace state-owned Naftogaz’s widely respected chief, part of a concerning trend of setbacks in Ukraine’s reform agenda.

Saudi Arabia recently launched a diplomatic charm offensive, seeking to improve relations with Syria, Qatar, Turkey, and even Iran. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu traveled to Riyadh in the first high-level Turkish visit since the 2018 murder of Saudi critic Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul. Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani also visited Riyadh for the first time since June 2017, when the blockade of Qatar began. Saudi Arabia’s intelligence chief met his Syrian counterpart in Damascus in the first official Saudi visit since 2012. Meanwhile, Saudi and Iranian officials have convened in Iraq to discuss de-escalating regional tensions. This diplomatic flurry may be a response to Washington’s lukewarm Saudi policy. With little or no security guarantees from its longstanding ally, Riyadh appears to be hedging its bets in the face of continued Iranian security threats. The U.S. Navy confiscated a Yemen-bound arms shipment in the Arabian Sea, likely of Iranian provenance, just days after the Houthis rebuffed a meeting with Martin Griffiths, the UN special envoy for Yemen. Saudi attempts at hedging will continue absent a strong U.S. line against the Houthis, which is unlikely to occur given President Biden’s emphasis on downgrading ties with Saudi Arabia, minimizing the U.S. role in the Yemen conflict, and returning to nuclear diplomacy with Iran.

Regional governments held their collective breath as pieces of Chinese rocket debris rained down on the Maldives, in what NASA chief Bill Nelson called yet another example of China’s “failing to meet responsible” international standards. But that will not stop Beijing. China has reportedly drawn up plans to upgrade an airstrip and bridge on a remote Kiribati island approximately 3,000 kilometers southwest of Hawaii. The move, long feared after Kiribati severed ties with Taiwan in favor of China in 2019, would provide Beijing a strategic foothold close to U.S. military forces and vital commercial sea lanes. In response, the Biden administration is ramping up its regional defense outreach. Newly appointed chief of Indo-Pacific Command Admiral John Aquilino will travel to Japan in late May to discuss China’s growing military pressure on Taiwan and Beijing’s aggressive behavior. Secretary Austin will also attend the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. These steps are occurring at the same time France, Germany, the Netherlands, and other European countries are stepping up their regional engagement to hedge against China. Left unclear is a U.S. strategy to better engage Five-Eyes partner New Zealand, which is caught balancing its close economic ties to Beijing with its stated concerns about China’s illiberal behavior.

Secretary Blinken issued a strong statement demanding the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO) invite Taiwan as an observer at the upcoming World Health Assembly (WHA). Blinken correctly asserted that Taiwan’s exclusion from the WHA would be “detrimental to our collective international efforts to get the pandemic under control and prevent future health crises,” noting that Taiwan “offers valuable contributions and lessons learned from its approach to these issues.” Separately, amidst growing violence in Jerusalem and sustained Hamas rocket attacks on Israel, the Biden administration reportedly blocked a UN Security Council statement put forward by Tunisia and Norway (and backed by China) that unjustly singled out Israel for the ongoing violence – minimizing the roles of Hamas and its patron Iran. In one particularly negative development, the Biden administration backed negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over waiving intellectual property rights for U.S.-manufactured COVID-19 vaccines – a potentially significant victory for China, which has long sought to weaken American intellectual property rights and patent restrictions at the WTO.

The Biden administration’s march to rejoin the flawed and expiring 2015 Iran nuclear deal continues. U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley, who last month claimed that terrorism sanctions imposed on Iran during the Trump administration were somehow illegitimate, reversed course earlier this month – accepting the factual bases for terrorism sanctions imposed on Iranian banks and companies. He is now arguing that such sanctions were “inconsistent” with the nuclear deal. Malley’s latest assertion contradicts statements by former President Barack Obama, then-Vice President Biden, then-Secretary of State John Kerry, and others that the United States retained the right to impose sanctions for terrorism at any time under the deal. If Malley’s statement is now U.S. policy, it would mean the Biden administration is giving a green light for any bank or company working with Iran to finance terrorism or engage in other non-nuclear illicit activity without repercussions. Meanwhile, as Malley prepares to inject Iran’s economy with billions of dollars in sanctions relief, the International Atomic Energy Agency made no progress in its investigation of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy is also stepping up its harassment of U.S. military vessels in the Persian Gulf, so far with a feeble US response.

After initially expressing concern about Israel’s judicial ruling in a property dispute in eastern Jerusalem, the administration’s tone shifted on May 10, when State Department spokesman Ned Price called Hamas rocket attacks against Israel an “unacceptable escalation.” On May 12, President Biden phoned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and expressed his support for Israel’s “legitimate right” to defend itself. Secretary Blinken emphasized Israel’s “extra burden” to avoid civilian casualties, but also stressed the “very clear and absolute distinction between a terrorist organization, Hamas, that is indiscriminately raining down rockets… targeting civilians, and Israel’s response defending itself.” Last week, the United States prevented the UN Security Council from releasing a joint statement against Israel. The State Department also dismissed Human Rights Watch’s allegations that Israel is guilty of apartheid. On May 3, the State Department announced it will eschew “any events” commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Durban Conference on racism, which was marred by rampant antisemitism and helped launch the anti-Israel boycott campaign. Concerns in Israel linger, however, about America’s imminent return to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. That return will inevitably involve sanctions relief and other financial benefits for Iran. These funds will then flow to anti-Israel terrorist groups. And Jerusalem remains skeptical that the nuclear deal will halt the Islamic Republic’s nuclear aspirations.

The first summit between President Biden and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, set for May 21, will likely cover the administration’s new Korea policy, which has yet to be unveiled. They will also discuss COVID-19 response, possible South Korean participation in the Quad, and Moon’s call for swift negotiation with the North. One key point of contention is South Korea’s controversial anti-leaflet law, which resulted in a recent police raid targeting a defector for launching a leaflet balloon into North Korea. Another area of potential disagreement is Moon’s public reaffirmation of his peace agenda, which may conflict with the new U.S. policy. During the 19th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue, both militaries reaffirmed the bilateral alliance’s importance for deterring North Korean aggression, as well as the need for robust U.S.-South Korea-Japan security cooperation. Seoul and Washington are planning another trilateral military meeting with Tokyo at the upcoming Shangri-La Dialogue. In addition, the U.S. director of national intelligence met with her Japanese and South Korean counterparts on May 12. While these high-level meetings underscore positive momentum in U.S. efforts to bolster alliances, these efforts will likely face challenges from ongoing South Korea-Japan strife over Fukushima water disposal and historical disputes. The administration’s nominee for commander of U.S. Forces Korea will have his confirmation hearing on May 18. But the administration has not announced appointments for the special representative to North Korea, special envoy for North Korean human rights, or U.S. ambassador to South Korea. These vacancies leave the administration vulnerable to criticism for insufficiently prioritizing Korea policy.

The State Department’s responses to civil unrest, tragic disasters, and upcoming elections in Latin America have been underwhelming – unsurprising given the lack of senior officials appointed to focus on the region. Though the administration has rightly prioritized addressing root causes of migration, revitalizing alliances, holding corrupt officials accountable, and combatting China, these goals remain aspirational. The Biden administration has yet to back up its rhetoric about “revitalizing” relationships with allies. A virtual meeting with Mexico’s president made no headway in addressing the unprecedented border crisis or restoring U.S.-Mexico law enforcement relationships, whose breakdown has caused record drug smuggling. The president’s principled approach on climate issues with Brazil has achieved little other than alienating a critical ally struggling with COVID-19. Biden has yet to call his Colombian counterpart and has sent mixed messages on resuming aerial eradication of coca crops, despite State Department support. The administration has been largely silent on the situation in Venezuela, failing to condemn dictator Nicolás Maduro’s latest efforts to rig elections. Recent efforts such as designating a corrupt Paraguayan assemblyman are positive but must be part of a broader U.S. campaign to fight corruption. The same is true for Honduras, where it remains unclear whether the Biden administration will pursue action against President Juan Orlando Hernandez after he was alleged to have accepted bribes related to drug trafficking. In one particularly positive step, Treasury on May 12 issued sanctions targeting a Mexican drug cartel.

The Biden administration restarted U.S.-mediated talks between Israel and Lebanon on the demarcation of their maritime border, but the talks collapsed once again due to Lebanese maximalism. The administration remains undeterred, however. One official affirmed that the United States “remains engaged.” The administration also continued to request that Congress provide more funds for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The failure of this blank-check policy was on full display on May 14, when the LAF failed to prevent an organized mob from breaching the border fence with Israel. On a more positive note, the Treasury Department picked up the thread from the Trump administration’s 2019 designation of Jammal Trust Bank (JTB) to slap sanctions on Hezbollah officials and employees of its al-Qard al-Hasan (AQAH) financial institution who maintained accounts at JTB and other banks. However, the designation refrained from assigning these banks or Lebanon’s central bank any responsibility, instead giving the impression that they were victims. Moreover, all of this comes against the backdrop of the Biden administration’s rush to lift sanctions on Iran. This includes sanctions against Iran’s banking sector and airlines, which have been involved in supporting Hezbollah and have accounts with AQAH.

At the G7 ministerial, Secretary Blinken joined his colleagues in criticizing Moscow over issues ranging from Ukraine to human rights. They agreed to bolster a G7 counter-disinformation mechanism established in 2018. At the same time, Blinken reiterated the administration’s readiness for cooperation on areas of mutual interest and desire for more “stable and predictable” relations with Russia. During a subsequent call, Blinken and his Russian counterpart discussed North Korea, the upcoming Arctic Council Ministerial, and potential cooperation during Moscow’s subsequent council chairmanship. Blinken also “reiterated President Biden’s resolve to protect U.S. citizens and act firmly” against Russian threats to America or its allies, urging Moscow to release American prisoners Trevor Reed and Paul Whelan. That resolve may be tested soon amid mounting concerns over suspected directed-energy attacks against U.S. personnel, possibly conducted by Russian military intelligence. Following the Colonial Pipeline attack, Biden said Moscow was not involved but that he would push Moscow to rein in Russian cybercriminals. Meanwhile, negotiations continue over a Biden-Putin summit, which Biden said he is “confident” will happen during his June trip to Europe. Whether the summit will achieve Biden’s goal of making U.S.-Russia relations more “stable and predictable” remains to be seen. The likely demise of the largely symbolic Open Skies Treaty indicates progress on more fundamental issues will be difficult.

To maintain sanctions on Syria, President Biden issued the annual letter of renewal required by the National Emergencies Act. As Biden wrote, “The Syrian regime’s actions and policies, including pursuing and using chemical weapons and supporting terrorist organizations, pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” Nonetheless, the administration has remained silent on the most pressing aspect of sanctions enforcement: whether it will vigorously enforce the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. These sanctions are mandatory after being passed by Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support. The previous administration designated new targets each month after the act went into effect last June. If the president is committed to “putting human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy,” then he should direct the departments of State and Treasury to swiftly leverage the Caesar Act and related authorities. The previous administration assembled a team at State to identify sanctions targets. Biden has done no such thing. Through their outreach to Assad, the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf have already begun to test Biden’s commitment to isolating Assad. A clear message is necessary if the goal is to deter their efforts to rehabilitate the Syrian dictator.

President Biden, who gave Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan the “cold shoulder” by not calling him until April 23, has agreed to meet his Turkish counterpart on June 14 on the sidelines of the NATO Leaders’ Summit in Brussels. Secretary Blinken’s warning that significant transactions with Russian defense entities could trigger CAATSA sanctions “separate from and in addition to the sanctions that have already been imposed” sends a clear message that the dispute over Ankara’s acquisition of Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system is far from resolved. The Biden administration has also taken steps to deny Ankara impunity for its evasion of U.S. sanctions against Iran through the Turkish public lender Halkbank. On May 5, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security announced its decision to deny export privileges to Halkbank’s former deputy general manager Mehmet Hakan Atilla for a period of 10 years. (In 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced Atilla to 32 months in prison for violating U.S. sanctions on Iran.) Meanwhile, through legal maneuvers at an appeals court, Ankara has succeeded in stalling Halkbank’s jury trial, previously set to start in May at a Manhattan federal court. Biden should be prepared for renewed Turkish attempts to meddle in the federal case, which has significant ramifications for Erdogan and his inner circle. The Biden administration’s handling of this case will be an important indicator of whether this administration is truly prepared to hold Erdogan to account.