Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: November

The fragile tariff truce between Washington and Beijing collapsed in October. China announced sweeping new export controls on rare earths and magnets — giving Beijing de facto control over supply chains containing even minimal Chinese content. President Trump responded by threatening tariffs of over 100 percent on Chinese imports and new export bans on U.S. software sales. Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping met in South Korea in an attempt to resolve some of these disputes; however, it is clear both sides are entering an era of mutually assured disruption — managing trade flows to avoid all-out economic warfare while preserving leverage and escalation options.

The Chinese Communist Party’s Fourth Plenum reaffirmed Beijing’s drive for technological self-reliance while sidelining market reform. The meeting underscored China’s willingness to absorb tariff pressure while doubling down on state-led industrial upgrading in sectors such as advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, and biotechnology. The Trump administration, by contrast, has moved in fits and starts — announcing mining incentives, supply-chain reviews, and new export controls — but still lacks a coherent long-term strategy to counter China’s industrial ambitions.

Meanwhile, Taipei announced plans to deepen its defense partnership with Washington and finalize a long-discussed bilateral trade deal. Yet the administration has shown little urgency, prioritizing a broader agreement with Beijing instead of advancing these initiatives. That hesitation leaves Taiwan in limbo and signals that its future may be negotiable. The administration should move quickly to reinforce deterrence — approve pending arms sales, expand joint exercises, and advance a trade pact — to demonstrate that Taiwan’s security is not a bargaining chip.

In October, Washington’s cybersecurity policy and operations included both laudable and lamentable developments.

In positive news, the White House is fully backing a “clean, 10-year” reauthorization of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, according to National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross. Unfortunately, Congress had allowed the critical information sharing, liability, and antitrust law protecting industry to lapse without reauthorization at the end of September. Director Cairncross additionally teased a forthcoming White House national cyber strategy.

The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security is taking on two Section 232 trade-focused, national security investigations — one into U.S. healthcare technology and another into robotics and industrial machinery. Both investigations are focusing on the threat from China’s preeminence within these supply chains.

U.S. adversaries continue to attack large U.S. companies. In October, suspected Chinese operatives hacked Seattle-based technology company F5, leading to the compromise of sensitive government files, systems, and information. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) ably and quickly issued an emergency directive to federal agencies, ordering them to assess and update F5 products by the end of the month.

Unfortunately, the Trump administration continues to reduce CISA’s personnel in ways that impair the federal government’s ability to cooperate with state and local governments on cybersecurity. October layoffs eliminated almost all personnel working in CISA’s Stakeholder Engagement Division, which facilitated improvements to state and local government, private business, and allied countries’ cybersecurity.

U.S. Central Command quickly opened a Civil-Military Coordination Center in Israel on October 17 to “help facilitate the flow of humanitarian, logistical, and security assistance from international counterparts into Gaza.” The center will support the International Stabilization Force envisioned in the 20-point peace plan the Trump administration brokered. The administration has insisted American troops will not serve in Gaza. Turkey and Qatar, both supporters of Hamas, are angling to play major roles in Gaza’s future. That would not bode well for Trump’s plans to dismantle the terrorist organization.

The administration continued to build up military forces in the Caribbean and has struck a growing number of vessels the administration says were smuggling drugs. On October 24, Secretary Hegseth directed the Ford Carrier Strike Group to leave the Mediterranean and sail to the Caribbean, adding considerable forces and firepower to the roughly 10,000 service members already reported there as of October 17. Trump has suggested the United States might conduct military strikes in Venezuela.

Following a phone call with Vladimir Putin, President Trump decided, at least for now, against providing Ukraine with Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missiles and reportedly repeated his demand that Ukraine cede territory to Russia. Trump should match the newly imposed economic pressure on Moscow with increased military support for Kyiv.

The Pentagon issued a new policy that will clamp down on communications with Congress. Lawful communications by service members with Congress are a legal right, and those interactions are vital to the ability of Congress to fulfill its constitutional duties.

The Trump administration on October 17 defeated an attempt by members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to impose a “carbon tax” on the global shipping industry as part of a 2023 IMO agreement for shippers to achieve “net zero” carbon emissions by 2050. President Trump took to his Truth Social account to lambast the proposal and call it a “Global Green New Scam,” while Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a warning as well. Earlier in the month, a joint statement by Rubio, Energy Secretary Chris Wright, and Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy suggested the administration would impose costs on countries that supported the proposal.

The IMO agreed to shelve the proposal for a year, proving the capacity of the White House and interagency — when principals engage and the president is willing to threaten consequences against UN member states, not just the United Nations itself — to fight back against anti-American energy policies emanating from across the UN system.

Meanwhile, alongside the administration’s decision to tighten oil sanctions against Russia, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum on October 23 reopened the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas drilling. Burgum also reinstated seven oil and gas leases the Biden administration had attempted to cancel and pushed the Ambler mining road project forward to unlock the development of critical minerals in Alaska. Speaking at the launch of FDD’s new program on energy and national security on October 24, Burgum noted Alaska’s centrality to American energy dominance and to reclaiming control of the periodic table from China.

October saw dramatic twists and turns in President Trump’s effort to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. Amid frustration with Russian intransigence, U.S. officials leaked that Washington had been supporting Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian energy infrastructure. Trump, meanwhile, signaled openness to Kyiv’s request for Tomahawk missiles, musing that he might use that threat to pressure Moscow to compromise. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced he would visit Washington in mid-October to discuss the Tomahawk and other issues, including Ukrainian air defense and energy security and U.S. sanctions on Russia.

On the eve of his meeting with Zelenskyy, however, Trump abruptly announced that he and Vladimir Putin had held a “productive” phone call and agreed to a summit in Budapest. Purportedly, Putin told Trump he would be willing to trade small parts of southern Ukraine for the rest of Ukraine’s Donbas region. The next day, Trump rebuffed Zelenskyy’s request for Tomahawks. Washington reportedly also pressed Kyiv to accept Putin’s proposal, though Trump ultimately endorsed Kyiv’s demand for a ceasefire along the current battle lines.

Moscow refused. Following an October 20 phone call between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Russian counterpart, Trump decided to shelve plans for the Budapest summit. The next day, Ukraine said it had used British missiles to attack a Russian military-industrial facility, apparently made possible by a recent U.S. policy change regarding the use of American targeting data. And on October 22, the administration sanctioned Russia’s top two oil companies. If aggressively enforced, these sanctions could deal a major blow to Moscow’s war economy.

The Trump administration is in talks with Riyadh to draft a defense agreement that would formally consider any armed attack on Saudi Arabia as a direct threat to the United States, according to media reports. The pact may be signed during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington in November. If President Trump grants the Saudis this arrangement without preconditioning it on Saudi normalization with Israel, he would effectively be lowering the bar compared to when former President Joe Biden tied any potential American defense pact with Saudi Arabia to normalization.

The Biden administration viewed a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia not merely as a bilateral affair but as regional integration that includes America and all its key allies in the Middle East and the Gulf region. However, when the Saudis began dragging their feet on advancing peace with Israel, the Biden administration held its ground, which ultimately prompted Riyadh to abandon its pursuit of the defense pact with America and instead sign a similar, yet far less effective, treaty with Pakistan.

In October, Trump predicted that Saudi Arabia will normalize relations with Israel by the end of this year. If true, negotiations for signing the Trump defense pact might be unfolding in tandem with possible behind-the-scenes talks and normalization efforts between Riyadh and Jerusalem, in which case the Trump administration would have successfully pulled off what the Biden team failed to achieve.

The United States is edging closer to coupling its strong commitment to revitalizing deterrence with an overarching trade strategy intended to reorient regional markets away from Beijing.

Following a collision between the Chinese Coast Guard and a Filipino ship on October 13, the State Department issued a statement reaffirming Article Four of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, which commits the United States to defend Filipino vessels against armed attacks.

Pairing words with action, U.S. forces, along with those of Australia, Japan, Canada, and a range of European allies, launched the latest iteration of the Sama Sama naval exercises shortly following the incident, the first to be held under Manila’s newly minted Western Naval Command.

With President Trump visiting the region for the first time since retaking the White House, the United States has also pushed to expand America’s economic presence while curtailing Chinese access to neighboring markets. Following Trump’s visit to Malaysia, the United States announced trade deals with Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Vietnam — including rare earth mineral access agreements with Malaysia and Cambodia. The deals will also provide the United States with preferential market access while ensuring cooperation on export controls and sanctions enforcement against Chinese transshipment and smuggling.

The trip also contributed momentum to ongoing trade talks with Japan and South Korea, both of which have previously struggled to finalize agreements with Washington. President Trump signed deals with new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi while announcing new investments with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung.

While visiting Israel on October 24, Secretary of State Marco Rubio commendably said that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) would not play any role in the rebuilding of Gaza, and that the UN body had become a “subsidiary of Hamas.”

Two days earlier, the United Nations’ International Court of Justice issued a ruling criticizing Israel for its management of aid to Gaza and calling on the Jewish state to cooperate with UNRWA. In October 2024, Israel’s Knesset passed legislation that cut ties with UNRWA after Jerusalem produced extensive evidence that UNRWA had deep ties to Hamas.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz met with UN Secretary-General António Guterres and representatives from major donor countries on October 7 to discuss reducing the budget and personnel for UN peacekeeping missions by 15 percent and 25 percent, respectively. This initiative is part of Washington’s effort to reform funding of key UN programs, including peacekeeping missions, which the Trump administration previously pointed to as ineffective and wasteful.

On October 1, a federal judge ruled that UNRWA was immune from lawsuits. Victims of Hamas’s October 7 attacks sued the agency for financing the Islamist group’s terror operations. Unfortunately, the judge rejected the Trump administration’s assertion that UNRWA must “answer these allegations in American courts.”

Also on October 1, Washington announced additional U.S. sanctions on 44 individuals and entities involved in Iran’s nuclear program and weapons procurement networks. The new sanctions will augment the snapback of the UN sanctions regime designed to deter Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

Following the snapback of UN sanctions against Iran in September, the Trump administration continued to use U.S. sanctions to name, shame, and punish persons and entities supporting Iran’s missile and military programs. Despite a tighter web of international penalties, Tehran is working overtime to enlist great-power and near-peer competitors like China and Russia to fight against snapback diplomatically and avoid the costs associated with reimposition.

To that end, China and Russia have sent a letter to the UN Security Council declaring that UN sanctions are illegal and are working to gut monitoring of Iran’s nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is currently unclear how the Trump administration will work with its European partners to combat these efforts.

Elsewhere, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a report on about $9 billion of potential Iranian shadow banking activity in 2024. The finding highlighted the role jurisdictions like the United Arab Emirates, which is a major U.S. security partner, play in helping Iran illicitly maintain access to the international financial system and move money.

The Treasury Department also sanctioned more than 50 targets that “collectively enabled the export of billions of dollars’ worth of petroleum and petroleum products.” Treasury targeted Iraqi companies and individuals supporting illicit financing and intelligence collection for Iran. These actors are connected to Iran-backed militias in Iraq.

Lastly, President Trump credited American strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities as creating the necessary conditions for a ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Israeli hostages, claiming, “We took the bully out of play.”

President Trump helped secure a ceasefire in Gaza. On October 13, Hamas released all 20 living hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, but — violating the deal — Hamas has dragged out the release of the bodies of slain hostages, freeing only 17 out of 28. As part of the deal, under U.S. pressure, Israel also apologized for striking Hamas leaders in Qatar, and Trump signed a problematic executive order pledging to defend the Gulf nation in the event of an attack.

As difficult as it was to secure the ceasefire, it has been even more challenging to chart a path from the first phase of the 20-point plan to the point where Hamas would disarm, an international stabilizing force would enter, and reconstruction could begin. The United States has sent 200 troops to Israel to help plan next steps.

The White House has also dispatched a flurry of officials to help advance and maintain the ceasefire, including special envoy Steve Witkoff, Vice President J.D. Vance, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. While critics have claimed the attention is a form of babysitting, Rubio said the administration has supported Israel’s actions against any “imminent threat” to Israel. Meanwhile, President Trump threatened to attack Hamas if it did not stop using the pause to execute rival Palestinians.

However, tensions arose during the visits, as Israel’s Knesset advanced two bills to annex the West Bank. Trump vowed, “Israel would lose all of its support from the United States if that happened.” Vance called it “a very stupid political stunt.”

In the final days of October, President Trump traveled to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea. The trips provide an opportunity to address issues complicating bilateral relations.

Securing a trade deal has been front of mind for the South Korean leadership. After meeting with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick on October 22, Seoul’s presidential policy chief Kim Yong-beom noted that the two sides had made some progress. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung similarly told reporters that he expects the two allies to reach a “rational” trade agreement. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent noted that the “framework is done,” but the details remain outstanding.

Aboard Air Force One en route to Japan, President Trump said that he opposed an immigration raid at a Hyundai facility in Georgia that has been a point of tension in the U.S.-South Korea relationship. The two leaders are expected to meet on the sidelines of the APEC summit, where they will have additional opportunities to discuss the economic pillar of the alliance.

These talks are taking place amid North Korea’s efforts to escalate tensions on the peninsula. In mid-October, Pyongyang tested multiple ballistic missiles, which U.S. Forces Korea called “unlawful” and “destabilizing.” Despite these provocations, President Trump indicated he would be willing to extend his Asia trip to meet with Kim Jong Un. A meeting is unlikely — and inadvisable — at this time given the lack of productive conversations to date.

Lebanon has done little to counteract Hezbollah’s growth since “welcoming” the Lebanese Armed Forces’ disarmament plan in early September. To the contrary, Hezbollah has defied Beirut’s restrictions on its activities, while the Lebanese government has been satisfied with symbolic responses. Even as Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has stressed his goal to see Hezbollah transform into a purely political party, he also declined to answer in an October 23 interview with pro-Hezbollah Al-Mayadeen whether he would order the group’s forcible disarmament if it continues to reject demilitarization.

Meanwhile, Western intelligence sources are claiming that Hezbollah has recently accelerated the pace of its reconstruction efforts and is “rebuilding faster than the Lebanese army is dismantling,” including by rearming, recruiting new fighters, and restoring sites and bases. Based on Israeli statements, these restoration efforts are occurring both north and south of the Litani River. These claims dovetail with post-operation statements from the Israel Defense Forces and Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem.

U.S. officials responsible for the Lebanon file have taken note. In a lengthy post on X, and in conversations with France’s foreign minister reported by Annahar, Ambassador Tom Barrack stressed that Lebanon has yet to engage in any meaningful action against Hezbollah — reiterating his position from an interview in late September. Meanwhile, and presumably with Washington’s approval, Israeli operations in Lebanon — targeting Hezbollah assets and operatives involved in the group’s regeneration efforts — have noticeably escalated over the past month, after temporarily decreasing in quantity and intensity in August and the earlier parts of September.

China has leaped ahead of the United States in nuclear power development, according to media reports in October, constructing 13 electricity-producing nuclear reactors since 2013 — compared with two in America in the same timeframe. Washington is working closely with the private sector, has ambitious plans to expand nuclear power by reducing U.S. regulatory hurdles, and is improving the global competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear sector. The Trump administration will support the construction of 10 reactors in the United States by 2030. Yet U.S. companies have not yet broken ground on new units compared to China actively building 33 new units. America still leads at 94 operating reactors compared to Beijing’s 58 reactors.

The Trump administration also aims to meet the massive energy needs of domestic AI data centers through the construction of novel small modular reactors. However, a plethora of commercially untested reactor designs, nuclear fuel supply models, and newcomer industry providers, as well as costs, could delay timely execution.

Russia announced it had flight-tested the 9M730 Burevestnik, a nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable cruise missile that may be able to evade U.S. missile defenses. Yet the missile is large, expensive, and carries the risk of creating radiation in an impact zone.

Meanwhile, due to the ongoing U.S. government shutdown, the National Nuclear Security Administration placed 1,400 employees on furlough and maintains only 400 essential personnel. While the practical consequences of the move are unclear, it may create an impression among U.S. adversaries that America has reduced nuclear readiness, which could invite conflict.

President Trump said on October 26 that he would end the current conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. “I heard that Pakistan and Afghanistan have started up, but I’ll get that solved very quickly,” Trump said. The recent fighting between Pakistan and Afghanistan broke out as the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan (TTP), which is supported by the Afghan Taliban and seeks to create an Islamic Emirate of Pakistan, has intensified its insurgency in northwestern Pakistan over the past year. The Afghan Taliban backs the TTP even though Pakistan supported the Afghan Taliban’s efforts to expel the United States from the country.

Pakistan responded in mid-October by targeting Noor Wali Mehsud, the emir of the TTP, in a series of airstrikes in Kabul. After Pakistan’s assaults, the Pakistani military and the Afghan Taliban launched attacks across the shared border and claimed to have killed scores of each other’s soldiers. The two sides subsequently agreed to a ceasefire.

The current dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan stems from the U.S. policy of disengagement from Afghanistan, which began under the Obama administration, continued through the first Trump administration, and culminated with the Biden administration’s withdrawal from the country in 2021. Since the U.S. departure, al-Qaeda has established training camps in 12 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces as well as other terror infrastructure, and the TTP is operating camps in four provinces. In the past, the TTP has threatened Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Yet U.S. policy toward the Taliban remains unchanged during Trump’s second term.

U.S. envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack and U.S. Central Command chief Admiral Brad Cooper met with Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), on October 6 to discuss implementing the March Agreement, which seeks to integrate SDF-governed areas and military units into Syria’s national institutions.

On the same day, clashes between Syrian government forces and the SDF intensified in the Kurdish areas of Sheikh Maqsud and Ashrafiyeh in Aleppo. A ceasefire followed later that evening. On October 7, Barrack, Abdi, and Cooper met with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani to discuss “mechanisms for implementing the March Agreement.”

Since the U.S.-brokered intervention, negotiations between Damascus and the SDF have intensified to finalize the accord’s implementation before the year-end deadline established in the March Agreement. The United States is playing a pivotal role in averting a conflict that would further fracture Syria and would create a security vacuum.

On October 9, the U.S. Senate voted in support of the Department of Defense budget for 2026, which included a provision repealing the 2019 Caesar Act, the sanctions regime targeting entities tied to Bashar al-Assad. Commendably, the repeal requires the U.S. government to monitor Syria’s compliance with a series of six conditions.

The conditions include continued cooperation with the United States; protection of minorities; abstaining from military action against neighboring states, including Israel; ending support for terrorist organizations; removing foreign fighters from government positions; and holding accountable those responsible for human rights abuses. Adding conditions on the Syrian government is essential to ensure that the new administration can maintain stability in Syria.

Turkey played a significant role in forging the Gaza ceasefire and peace framework. Ankara leveraged its longstanding ties to Hamas — nudging the group toward accepting the U.S.-led agreement under President Trump’s 20-point plan. Turkish pressure on Hamas proved “unequivocal” as Ankara “helped persuade Hamas to accept Trump’s Gaza deal,” Reuters reported. Turkey was among the signatories at the October 13 Gaza peace summit in Sharm el-Sheikh alongside the United States, Egypt, and Qatar.

Troublingly, however, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Turkish authorities now frame Turkey as a guarantor of both implementation and reconstruction in Gaza. Ankara has made clear it wants to participate in the proposed multinational stabilization force, contribute to humanitarian relief, build temporary housing, and shape the post-conflict governance architecture of the Strip.

The Trump administration’s position on Turkey’s role in Gaza is unclear. Vice President Vance stressed that Ankara could play a “constructive role” in the future peace process, reinforcing the White House’s view that Turkey “will continue to contribute to the process with a view to establishing a just and lasting peace acceptable to all parties.” Nevertheless, the administration is constrained by Israeli objections — Israel insists it must approve any forces entering Gaza and has voiced concern at Turkish participation. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that any international force deployed in Gaza would be composed only of soldiers that Israel accepts.

Washington must explicitly resist Erdogan’s attempts to insert Turkish military personnel into the multinational stabilization force, as Ankara may use the deployment as an opportunity to aid Hamas.