October 21, 2025 | Policy Brief

Amid Rising Chinese Aggression, Manila Announces Plans To Procure New South Korean Anti-Ship Missiles

October 21, 2025 | Policy Brief

Amid Rising Chinese Aggression, Manila Announces Plans To Procure New South Korean Anti-Ship Missiles

In exploring new arms deals with South Korea, the Philippines is targeting both missiles and messaging. On October 16, Asia Times reported that Manila began discussions with Seoul to acquire new anti-ship ballistic missiles. While development of the new weapons system remains underway, the planned delivery is expected to begin in late 2028, pending final contract approval by both parties.  

The deal highlights the contributions of South Korea’s expanding defense-industrial base in equipping the Philippines, another key regional U.S. ally, to strengthen its deterrence against China. 

New Missiles Will Enhance Manila’s Capabilities Against Beijing

The proposed sale features Hanwha Aerospace’s Chunmoo Tactical Missile Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (CTM-ASBM) — a weapon that would allow Filipino forces to strike Chinese naval vessels off the coast of Luzon’s outlying islands. In adding this system, Manila may also exploit a significant tactical advantage over Chinese forces, with dispersed Filipino coastal batteries now being capable of holding Chinese ships at greater risk when they transit regional waters.  

The deal puts Hanwha at odds with Chinese authorities on a second front. On October 14, CNBC reported that China sanctioned five U.S.-based subsidiaries of Hanwha Ocean, another of Hanwha Group’s subsidiaries and a major global shipbuilder, which had recently purchased a major shipyard in Philadelphia and signed agreements to service U.S. naval vessels.  

South Korea Has Emerged as a Key Player in Global Arms Market

South Korea is among the most recent countries in the region to offer support to Manila against rising Chinese aggression. In March, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth traveled to Manila to sign new co-production agreements, enhancing coordination between each country’s respective defense industrial bases. These programs, along with expanded joint military exercises featuring Australia, Canada, and the United States, provide critical training to ensure interoperability while spurring Manila’s military modernization drive. 

South Korea’s rise as a global arms exporter has become a key part of Seoul’s regional defense strategy. While South Korea previously avoided large-scale defense exports out of fears of provoking regional tensions, Seoul recalibrated its approach following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and U.S. efforts to expand secure supply chains. Backed by decades of investment in heavy industry, South Korean firms such as Hanwha Aerospace, KAI, and LIG Nex1 supply K2 Black Panther tanks and K9 Thunder howitzers to Poland and FA-50 light fighters to Malaysia — demonstrating Seoul’s emergence as a reliable supplier of high-end weapon systems. Moreover, South Korea has also become a key supplier of more common munitions, having indirectly supplied Ukraine with critical 115mm artillery rounds via the United States.

Washington Should Work To Cement Ties Between Seoul and Manila

Washington should secure South Korea’s role within allied defense production as a key aspect of bolstering the region’s deterrence posture against China. The Trump administration should use ongoing trade discussions with Seoul to codify licensing arrangements that pave the way for Korean firms like Hanwha to expand operations in the United States, including allowing skilled workers to easily transit to the United States.  The administration can pair these efforts with insurance mechanisms and export-credit guarantees that protect Korean manufacturers from facing outright failure should the missile project collapse.

The United States should also push to ensure that Korean-Filipino joint training and trilateral operations become a permanent fixture of regional military cooperation. Adding South Korean missile systems to joint U.S.-Philippine exercises, logistical planning, and command structures will improve interoperability and enhance high-level cooperation in disputed waters.

 Jack Burnhamis a research analyst in the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Duncan Lazarow is an intern. For more analysis from Jack and FDD, please subscribeHERE. Follow Jack on X@JackBurnham802. Follow FDD on X@FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.