Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: September

President Trump extended his trade truce with China for another 90 days, issuing an executive order on August 11 postponing high U.S. tariffs until early November. Ostensibly, the extension buys time to finalize a trade deal ahead of a hoped-for fall summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. But this is less a breakthrough than a breathing spell. Beijing’s negotiating strategy remains unchanged: delay, de-escalate, and exploit Washington’s fixation on leader-level summitry to forestall tougher U.S. competitive actions. While China resumed limited rare-earth and magnet exports to the United States, Beijing has made no concessions on fundamental issues, such as its industrial subsidies or rampant intellectual property theft.

Though Trump has sought to project strength, he is treading carefully to avoid jeopardizing the summit. On August 25, the president threatened to impose 200 percent tariffs on Chinese imports and block U.S. exports critical to China’s aviation sector if Beijing curtailed rare-earth shipments. But moments later, he effectively walked back both threats, acknowledging they could “break” bilateral trade.

The next day, in another sharp reversal, Trump announced plans to welcome up to 600,000 Chinese students to U.S. universities — more than double current enrollment. The announcement contradicted his administration’s prior push to revoke visas for students linked to Chinese military-affiliated institutions or studying sensitive tech fields. The administration provided no timeline for this new directive, but the policy whiplash suggests tactical improvisation, not strategic planning.

All told, Trump’s approach to China appears incoherent. Beijing is betting it can outlast Trump’s pressure — and right now, that bet appears to be paying off.

The Trump administration’s new national cyber director, Sean Cairncross, officially assumed office after being confirmed by Congress on August 2. He is well-positioned to reestablish the office’s role in leading federal cyber policymaking.

In mid-August, the Treasury Department designated Russian cryptocurrency exchange Garantex Europe OU for the second time. Treasury had sanctioned the company three years ago for providing financial services to the Russian economy. Treasury imposed additional sanctions on Garantex, along with three executives and seven associated companies, for facilitating cyber-enabled money laundering schemes and ransomware attacks and for providing financial services to malign cyber actors.

Despite these positive developments, the administration made concerning cuts to the intelligence community’s cyber capabilities. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard announced “ODNI 2.0,” an effort to “eliminate redundant missions, functions, and personnel.” The plan slashes intelligence-processing and information-sharing mechanisms that enable cyber resilience measures for the public and private sectors. In particular, ODNI 2.0 eliminates the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, which synthesized and enriched cyber intelligence information and also ensured all intelligence bodies and civilian federal agencies had access to commercial threat intelligence.

In another worrying move, the Department of Homeland Security moved to restrict State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program recipients from using funds to purchase low-cost services from the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC). The department imposed this restriction despite the MS-ISAC’s record of providing critical threat intelligence and incident response support to tens of thousands of state and local governments, utilities, and schools.

Looking to end the war in Ukraine, President Trump hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin for a summit in Alaska on August 15. Before the meeting, Trump said, “I want to see a ceasefire rapidly,” and he warned of “severe consequences” if Moscow refused. Yet after meeting Putin, Trump backed off his demand and floated Ukrainian territorial concessions as part of a larger agreement.

A few days later, Trump hosted President Zelensky at the White House, where the meeting was a major improvement over the one in February. Trump then met with Zelensky alongside key European leaders, who presented a positive unified front. Putin then continued his attacks on Ukraine, and the administration did not impose consequences on the Kremlin, undermining the leverage needed to obtain a sustainable end to the war.

Meanwhile, the administration deployed the Washington, DC, National Guard to the streets of the nation’s capital on August 11. Other states subsequently deployed their own Guard troops, leaving over 2,000 Guard personnel, some armed, deployed to D.C. by August 24. Using the National Guard for U.S. domestic civilian law enforcement could put Guard troops in difficult positions for which they are not properly trained, diminish overall military readiness to combat foreign enemies, and damage civil-military relations at home.

On August 22, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth fired the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This comes two months after an inappropriate leak of a DIA assessment that contradicted Trump’s claims regarding the impact of the June U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear program.

President Trump initially demanded that Moscow accept a ceasefire by August 8 or face economic punishment. On August 6, he announced higher tariffs on India, citing its Russian oil imports. Yet after dispatching envoy Steve Witkoff to Moscow, Trump abruptly agreed to meet with Putin, putting his economic pressure on ice.

Prior to the August 15 Alaska summit, Washington coordinated with Kyiv and European capitals. Trump declared he would push for an immediate ceasefire and a follow-up trilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, threatening “very severe consequences” if Putin refused.

But in Anchorage, Trump reversed his position on a ceasefire, embracing Putin’s view that the parties should first negotiate a comprehensive peace framework. Moscow wants Kyiv to accept its maximalist demands before Russian troops stop shooting. Trump then put the ball in Kyiv’s court to “make a deal.” He suggested Ukraine should accept Russia’s territorial demands, though he has promised to defer to Kyiv on that matter.

After the summit, Trump hosted Zelenskyy and European leaders at the White House, pledging U.S. involvement in non-NATO security guarantees for Ukraine. Exactly what that will look like remains unclear. Trump has ruled out putting American boots on the ground but appears open to supporting a European force in Ukraine.

During the White House meeting, Trump spoke with Putin and later indicated the Russian autocrat had agreed to meet with Zelenskyy. But Moscow quickly threw cold water on that idea as well as genuine security guarantees for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia’s assault has continued with no U.S. consequences.

On July 29, a Saudi- and French-led coalition of 17 countries, along with the European Union and the Arab League, endorsed the New York Declaration, a 17-page document detailing “tangible, time-bound, and irreversible steps” toward a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The declaration is consistent with the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative adopted at the Beirut Summit.

Washington responded. On July 31, the State Department sanctioned Palestinian officials for undermining the peace process, including by pursuing illegitimate cases against Israel at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ), inciting violence — notably in school textbooks — and providing payments to terrorists and their families. And on August 29, the State Department announced it had revoked and denied visas for Palestinian Authority (PA) and Palestine Liberational Organization (PLO) officials scheduled to participate in the upcoming UN General Assembly. Until they firmly repudiate terrorism and abandon their attempts to end-run the peace process, the PLO and PLA cannot “be considered partners for peace,” Washington declared.

Despite their differing views on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia remain strong. On August 6, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth held a phone call with Saudi Minister of Defense Khalid bin Salman. They discussed “shared efforts to deepen bilateral defense ties,” a Pentagon readout said, including “opportunities to advance Saudi capabilities, in line with the $142 billion Foreign Military Sales Memoranda of Intent signed during President Trump’s May 2025 visit to Riyadh.” The leaders also addressed regional security concerns, including developments regarding Syria and Iran.

The United States continued to work at cross purposes in the Indo-Pacific. Even as Washington signaled its willingness to deploy military assets to deter rising Chinese aggression, economic disputes are straining ties with key regional allies and partners.

Following an August 11 collision between two Chinese vessels chasing a Philippine ship, the United States briefly deployed a littoral combat ship and a guided missile destroyer to patrol the disputed waters. This signaled Washington’s commitment to Manila in the face of ongoing Chinese efforts to erode the Philippines’ sovereignty. Later in August, U.S. Marines joined Australian and Philippine forces in conducting the largest-ever iteration of Canberra’s Exercise Alon, simulating maneuvers in and around Luzon and Palawan. The Marine Corps also proposed opening two new sites to pre-position equipment in Australia and Palau, enhancing Washington’s forward posture while complementing its current rotational deployment in the Philippines.

On the economic front, however, Washington continued to spar with two key regional trading partners, Japan and India. Despite having previously announced a preliminary trade deal, Japan’s top trade negotiator postponed a long-planned trip to Washington after disputes emerged over the structure of Japanese investment in the United States, among other issues. President Trump also doubled his tariffs on India to 50 percent, citing Indian purchases of Russian oil. Those tariffs, which entered into force on August 27, hinder key supply chains and undermine years-long U.S. efforts to strengthen ties with New Delhi as a counter to Beijing and to pull American manufacturing out of China.

On August 20, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on four additional International Criminal Court (ICC) officials. Secretary of State Marco Rubio accused the ICC of conducting “lawfare” against the United States and Israel, criticizing the court’s “politicization, abuse of power, disregard for our national sovereignty, and illegitimate judicial overreach.” According to Rubio, the designated individuals have engaged in ICC efforts to “investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute nationals of the United States or Israel, without the consent of either nation.”

Meanwhile, at Washington’s urging, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to require the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to withdraw from the country beginning on December 31, 2026. For decades, UNFIL has failed to fulfill its mandate to keep southern Lebanon clear of Hezbollah forces — a task Washington is now pressing Beirut to accomplish. With Israel having weakened Hezbollah, the Lebanese state can “assume greater responsibility,” said Ambassador Dorothy Shea, acting U.S. representative to the United Nations, lauding the historic vote. She affirmed that Washington would continue supporting the Lebanese military “to expand its capabilities as Lebanon carries out its critical work in disarming Hizballah.”

Finally, Rubio met with the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Rafael Mariano Grossi, on August 27 to discuss the agency’s work in Iran and Ukraine. The meeting came as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, collectively known as the “E3,” initiated the process to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran after Tehran refused to commit to E3 demands for checks on its nuclear program.

On August 28, following weeks of fruitless talks over Iran’s nuclear program, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, or “E3,” triggered the snapback mechanism under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal to reimpose UN sanctions on the Islamic Republic. The restrictions will come into force after 30 days. Washington welcomed the move, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio pledging to work with the E3 and UN Security Council “to successfully complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran.” The United States and its partners must now thwart Iranian attempts to forestall sanctions during the 30-day window.

The Treasury Department sanctioned elements of Iran’s sanctions-evasion network both inside and outside of Iran. The State and Treasury departments also sanctioned enablers of Iran’s illicit oil trade, including elements of its so-called “shadow fleet.” The targets of these sanctions packages included two Chinese businesses that imported sanctioned Iranian oil. Action against Chinese purchases of Iranian oil is essential to achieve maximum pressure on Tehran, as China buys 91 percent of Iran’s oil exports. Treasury also targeted Iranian oil smuggling operations in Iraq, where Tehran and its partners run a billion-dollar illicit business.

Ali Larijani, the newly appointed secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, visited Lebanon and Iraq to shore up relations with Tehran’s partners in those countries, where Washington is pushing for the disarmament of Iran-backed militias. In response, the State Department criticized Tehran’s efforts to “turn Iraq into an Iranian satellite state.”

As the Israeli military prepares to widen its operations in Gaza, the Trump administration has continued to back Jerusalem despite escalating international criticism over humanitarian conditions in the enclave.

In late July, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly butted heads over claims of starvation in Gaza. But on August 11, Trump said he had a “good call” with Netanyahu the previous day, emphasizing that people should “remember October 7” and that Hamas cannot be allowed to remain in Gaza.

Meanwhile, the administration continued to support Israel in the international arena. On August 20, the United States announced additional sanctions on International Criminal Court officials for their efforts to arrest and prosecute U.S. and Israeli officials. Later in August, Washington was the only UN Security Council member not to sign a letter asserting that there is famine in Gaza. The U.S. representative criticized the neutrality of a report that undergirded the famine claim, citing the demonstrated bias of one of its authors. At the end of the month, the State Department announced that Washington will deny and revoke visas for Palestinian officials seeking to attend the UN General Assembly in September, due to their support for terrorism.

On August 27, Trump convened a high-profile meeting to discuss Gaza’s post-war future. A prospectus reportedly circulating within the Trump administration would see Gaza completely rebuilt into a self-sustaining territory. Critics have noted that the plan would pay Gazans to relocate voluntarily — either temporarily or permanently.

On August 25, President Trump held a bilateral summit with South Korea’s new president, Lee Jae Myung. Both presidents gave warm remarks, and Lee visited a shipyard in Philadelphia as a testament to Seoul’s pledge to invest in revitalizing U.S. shipbuilding. However, Lee’s comments to reporters on his way to the summit indicated there are significant points of tension between the two allies. Lee said the Trump administration is pushing for U.S. Forces Korea to have greater strategic flexibility to counter China. This issue ultimately remains unresolved. Lee said that while Seoul also wants discussions on the future of the forces, it cannot agree to Washington’s vision.

During the bilateral meeting, President Trump announced his intent to resume diplomacy with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, which Lee wholeheartedly endorsed. Lee is an advocate of greater engagement with Pyongyang to address security concerns on the peninsula. However, Washington and Seoul must be careful to prevent Pyongyang from exploiting diplomatic engagement to divide the allies or reduce economic sanctions. During the first Trump administration, Kim used bilateral summits to string Washington along while rejecting efforts to address the North Korean nuclear threat.

In more positive news, as part of U.S. efforts to counter Pyongyang’s malign activity, the Treasury Department issued sanctions on August 27 against a Russian national and a Chinese front company facilitating North Korean fraud and illicit cyber activity. Treasury noted that North Korea uses these schemes to “generate revenue for its illicit weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.”

Prodded by Israeli military operations and American diplomatic pressure, Beirut finally adopted two decisions on disarming Hezbollah, which Lebanon promised to do under its November 2024 ceasefire agreement with Israel. First, Lebanon’s government tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with drafting a plan — to be tabled for a cabinet vote by September 5 — to disarm militias, including Hezbollah, by the end of 2025. The government then discussed and adopted the objectives outlined in a proposal from U.S. envoy Tom Barrack, including “phas[ing] out the armed presence of all non-state actors, including Hizballah, across all of Lebanon.” The government stressed that it would decide on practical steps to achieve those goals after the LAF submits its disarmament plan.

Some U.S. officials are now speaking of signing a defense pact with Beirut. But Washington should not be overconfident. While Lebanon’s promises are certainly positive, whether Beirut will follow through remains to be seen. The LAF has yet to submit its plan, which must then be approved and operationalized. LAF’s ability to forcibly disarm Hezbollah is also in doubt.

That said, the Trump administration — and Barrack in particular — deserves credit for pushing Beirut to this point. Washington has emphasized that the Lebanese themselves must deal with Hezbollah and that Beirut must even eventually engage with Jerusalem. Rather than pushing Israel to make preemptive concessions in exchange for empty Lebanese promises, the administration has apparently shifted to insisting on a quid pro quo in which Israel would reduce its military presence and operations in Lebanon after Beirut makes good on its commitments.

On August 28, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, or “E3” — the remaining Western parties to the defunct 2015 Iran nuclear deal — triggered the “snapback” of suspended or lapsed UN sanctions on Iran’s nuclear, missile, arms, and proliferation activities. Those sanctions will officially come back into force on September 27 absent a UN Security Council resolution extending Iran’s sanctions relief. Washington has signaled it will veto any such resolution. London and Paris would likely do the same given that Iran has not met any of the conditions the E3 set for extension. The European powers insist that Tehran restore International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring of nuclear sites, suspended by Iran during its 12-day war with Israel in June. The E3 also demands that Tehran account for missing highly enriched uranium and negotiate future nuclear restrictions with the United States.

In other news, President Trump reiterated his desire to engage Russia and China in nuclear arms control talks, with the last remaining nuclear treaty with Russia set to expire in February 2026. However, Beijing, which is engaging in a massive expansion of its nuclear arsenal, rejected the notion.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) took steps to bolster the U.S. nuclear industry to meet goals Trump set in executive orders in May. Part of that effort involves accelerating the construction of small, advanced reactors requiring specialized nuclear fuel called HALEU. DOE announced it is creating a consortium of U.S. companies with a view toward spurring production of HALEU under the Defense Production Act.

The U.S. military continues to target the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria even as Washington prepares to withdraw additional forces from the two countries. On August 21, U.S. Central Command announced it had conducted a raid in northwest Syria’s Idlib province, killing a “key financier who planned attacks in Syria and Iraq.” Idlib is the stronghold of the al-Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), which now controls the Syrian government. Numerous Islamic State leaders, including several caliphs, have been killed in the province. Syria’s HTS-led, U.S.-supported government has been involved in two massacres against the Alawites in Latakia and the Druze in Suwayda since taking power in December 2024.

Meanwhile, U.S. forces began withdrawing from the Ain al-Asad airbase in Iraq’s Anbar province, a key hub in the fight against the Islamic State. A reduced number of U.S. troops will be based in Kurdish areas in northern Iraq and in Syria. The reduction in U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria will hamper efforts to contain the terror group.

In Somalia, the U.S. military in August launched at least five airstrikes against al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in East Africa, but has provided minimal details on the operations. The U.S. military also concluded a two-week-long operation alongside Puntland forces that targeted the leadership of the Islamic State’s Somalia branch. The operation “consisted of targeted strikes against ISIS leadership safe havens in the Golis Mountains,” a stronghold of the terror group, U.S. Africa Command said. It did not report having killed any senior Islamic State leaders during the operation.

The United States pushed for an end to violence that has killed more than 1,000 people in Syria’s Suwayda province, mostly from the Druze community. Washington organized a meeting in Amman on August 12 between the Syrian and Jordanian foreign ministers and U.S. envoy Tom Barrack. According to Barrack, the Syrians pledged to “utilize all resources to hold perpetrators of the Suwayda atrocities accountable.”

Washington also sought to broker peace between Israel and Syria, arranging an August 20 meeting in Paris between Syrian and Israeli ministers. The meeting marked the first publicly acknowledged direct talks between Jerusalem and Damascus in a quarter-century. They discussed restoring a 1974 agreement that established a buffer zone between Syria and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. Syria’s new president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, declared that the chances of reaching a deal are high.

At the same time, U.S. efforts to advance the March agreement between Sharaa and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in which the SDF pledged to integrate into the new Syrian state, have stalled. Fears over ethnic violence and Sharaa’s centralization of power have fueled the impasse. In August, skirmishes between Syrian forces and the SDF caused multiple fatalities.

On August 25, the U.S. Treasury Department officially removed its Syrian Sanctions Regulations from the Code of Federal Regulations pursuant to President Trump’s earlier decision to lift sanctions on Syria. U.S. sanctions relief has prompted a wave of regional investment, with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates moving to fund Syria’s reconstruction.

On August 7, a bipartisan group of 40 members of Congress sent a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio opposing Ankara’s efforts to gain re-admission to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. Washington had ejected Turkey from that program in 2019 over Ankara’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missile system, warning that Turkey’s operation of both the F-35 and S-400 could allow Moscow to glean intelligence on the fifth-generation fighter jet. The following year, the United States also sanctioned Ankara’s main defense procurement entity under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). In their letter, the lawmakers urged the administration to “uphold U.S. law, maintain CAATSA sanctions, and protect American defense and intelligence assets.” The letter was led by the co-chairs and vice co-chairs of the Congressional Hellenic Caucus, Reps. Chris Pappas (D-NH), Gus Bilirakis (R-FL), Dina Titus (D-NV), and Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY).

On August 20, the State Department responded by reaffirming the Washington’s commitment “to protecting U.S. defense and intelligence assets and complying with U.S. law, including CAATSA.” While noting that Turkey is an important NATO ally, the State Department’s letter emphasized that Washington “has not changed” its position on Ankara’s “acquisition and continued position of the Russian S-400 system.” The letter pointed to a U.S. law passed in 2019 that bars the Pentagon from transferring the F-35 to Turkey unless the secretaries of defense and state certify, inter alia, that Ankara “no longer possesses the S-400.”