Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: February

The Trump administration wasted little time in signaling a more assertive approach to China while keeping diplomatic channels open. In a flurry of executive orders and a memo issued within days of taking office, the administration announced a sweeping review of trade policy, to be completed by April. China was a central focus, with proposed steps including new tariffs, technology controls, sanctions for currency manipulation and fentanyl supplies to the United States, a rollback of de minimis exemptions, and a review of China’s compliance with the 2020 Phase I trade deal. The memo also directed the Commerce Department to address loopholes in export controls to protect America’s technological edge.

Days before his inauguration, however, President Trump held what he said was a “very good” call with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, emphasizing the need to “solve many problems together, and starting immediately.” China’s Foreign Ministry noted that both leaders “attach great importance to mutual interactions,” suggesting that leader-to-leader communication may become more frequent than it was under the Biden administration. Such regular engagement is vital to advancing U.S. interests while ensuring clarity in competition.

While Trump’s call with Xi reflects openness to dialogue, his administration’s initial moves suggest it will take a tougher approach in the months ahead, especially on trade. With China’s economy faltering, the prospect of swift tariffs and other punitive measures will force Xi to weigh the benefits of cooperation against the mounting costs of U.S. pressure. This early mix of engagement and assertiveness sets the stage for a high-stakes recalibration of U.S.-China relations.

The early days of the Trump administration featured strong rhetoric but limited action in signaling the future of U.S. cyber policy and resilience.

Senior officials affirmed the need to act more aggressively to deter Chinese cyber activities. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz asserted, “We need to start going on offense and start imposing … higher costs and consequences” on criminal and state-backed hackers. CIA Director John Ratcliffe promised to ensure America has “all the tools necessary to go on offense.”

The administration also emphasized the importance of U.S. leadership in emerging technology. President Trump announced a $500 billion private-sector investment to develop artificial intelligence infrastructure. The administration will need to work with those companies to safeguard national security, data security, and intellectual property given some participants’ joint cyber and AI ventures with the People’s Republic of China.

Meanwhile, the White House has yet to nominate a slew of senior cyber officials, namely the national cyber director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency director, and ambassador-at-large for cyberspace and digital policy. Nor has it announced a cyber-related senior position on the National Security Council.

Concerningly, the 90-day suspension of foreign aid halted much of the work of the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy. A key recommendation of the congressionally mandated Cyberspace Solarium Commission, the bureau provides cyber assistance to allies and partners and is essential for U.S. global leadership. Meanwhile, programs aimed at securing U.S. cyber, election, and telecoms systems were caught in the crossfire of the temporary federal spending freeze.

President Trump issued an executive order on January 27 on “The Irone Dome for America,” jumpstarting an effort to deploy and maintain a “next-generation” missile shield to better defend the U.S. homeland. While the “Iron Dome” name is unfortunate, creating unrealistic expectations and easy opportunities for critics, Trump’s order represents a necessary and long-overdue shift in thinking and policy related to homeland missile defense. The effort will be expensive, difficult, and time consuming, but it is necessary to begin better protecting the U.S. homeland from growing missile threats that endanger Americans at home and undermine deterrence abroad.

The Trump administration lifted Biden’s hold on 2,000-pound bombs for Israel. The administration then notified Congress of plans to sell the Jewish state more than $7 billion in weapons.

The Department of Defense (DoD) deployed roughly 1,500 servicemembers to the U.S. southern border, representing a 60 percent increase in active-duty forces in the region. DoD also began assisting in the deportation of illegal immigrants with military aircraft, including to Guantanamo Bay, where the department is establishing holding centers for deported migrants.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on January 29 canceled retired Gen. Mark Milley’s security detail following Trump’s decision to revoke protection for his former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, National Security Adviser John Bolton, and Iran envoy Brian Hook. That the Trump administration is doing so despite continued, specific threats against their lives from the Islamic Republic of Iran is dangerous and short-sighted — and should be reversed without delay.

The Trump administration has begun reaching out to Ukraine and Russia in hopes of brokering a speedy peace deal. President Trump has yet to articulate a firm plan, though administration officials have pitched various ideas. Officials reportedly are considering pushing for a ceasefire along current lines then for Ukrainian elections ahead of a permanent deal. If done prematurely, lifting martial law and holding elections could destabilize Ukraine, gut its military, and facilitate Russian influence.

For its part, Kyiv is willing to accept it will not liberate its territory militarily but insists on Western security guarantees, ultimately including NATO accession. Trump opposes NATO membership and demands that Europe carry the load on aid and security guarantees. He has expressed interest in a post-war European peacekeeping force, though it would likely require significant U.S. involvement to be feasible.

Trump has threatened Russia with economic punishment if Moscow remains obstinate, while administration officials have suggested targeting Russian oil revenue. Though some economic measures might be best held in reserve, tightening sanctions now could force Moscow to end the war sooner.

To what extent Trump will continue arming Ukraine remains unclear. He has rightly observed that the “only way” to get a good peace deal “is not to abandon” Ukraine. But when recently asked whether military aid would continue, Keith Kellogg, Trump’s Russia-Ukraine envoy, remained ambiguous. Trump has suggested assistance might be tied to a deal for access to Ukrainian natural resources. At least for now, the administration reportedly has resumed delivering Biden-promised materiel after briefly pausing shipments amid ongoing internal debate.

The Trump administration has signaled its intention to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia and that Saudi-Israeli normalization will be one of its top priorities. U.S.-Saudi relations, often tense under President Biden, have quickly and drastically improved. During a January 23 phone call with President Trump, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS) promised that Riyadh would “broaden its investments and trade with the United States over the next four years, in the amount of $600 billion, and potentially beyond that.” Trump has said he may travel to Saudi Arabia for the first foreign trip of his term, as he did in 2017.

Trump also asked the Saudis, as leaders of the oil cartel OPEC, to lower oil prices. This could boost U.S. and global economic growth and pinch Russian revenues, providing Washington with greater leverage to broker a peace deal between Moscow and Kyiv. It remains unclear whether Riyadh will grant Trump the favor. In early February, OPEC+ agreed to stick to plans to gradually increase output from April.

Meanwhile, in its first week in office, the administration deployed Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff to Saudi Arabia and Israel. In Riyadh, Witkoff met with MBS and Palestinian Authority (PA) second-in-command Hussein al-Sheikh. In Jerusalem, Witkoff met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. President Trump had spoken with PA President Mahmud Abbas after his electoral victory in November. Witkoff’s visit is part of the Trump administration’s efforts to broker an end to the Israel-Hamas war and secure a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal that offers a path toward a Palestinian state.

In a positive development, the Trump administration signaled initial plans to maintain its predecessor’s focus on the Indo-Pacific region. On his first day in office, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with the foreign ministers of the “Quad” nations (India, Japan, and Australia), underscoring Washington’s intent to deepen regional partnerships.

Following their discussion, Rubio and the foreign ministers released a joint statement emphasizing a shared commitment to maintaining “security in all domains,” a pointed acknowledgment of China’s unprecedented military build-up and assertive actions in the region. Rubio reinforced that same message during a subsequent call with Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo. The secretary sharply criticized China’s “dangerous and destabilizing actions in the South China Sea,” citing recent clashes between Philippine civilian vessels and the Chinese Coast Guard. Shortly thereafter, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command confirmed the deployment of Typhon missile launchers — which can fire Tomahawk missiles capable of hitting targets in China and Russia — to strategic locations closer to Manila.

However, just days later, Philippine  President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. pledged to remove the missile system if China halts its coercive actions within the region. This incident highlights how Beijing employs pressure and gray-zone tactics to shape strategic decision making by regional governments. To counter this, the Trump administration must remain actively engaged, bolstering military interoperability and providing diplomatic support to help regional allies resist Chinese coercion.

On his first day in office, President Trump issued an executive order withdrawing the United States from the World Health Organization (WHO). The order noted the agency’s mishandling of COVID-19, unwillingness to adopt reforms, and lack of independence from Beijing. For years, FDD scholars have advised policymakers to withhold funding for the WHO until it adopts key reforms. These should include conducting a true and independent investigation into COVID-19’s origins, electing a new director-general who is not beholden to China, giving more influence to larger voluntary donors, allowing Taiwan to become a WHO observer, and ending the agency’s standing agenda item castigating Israel.

Separately, in congressional testimony, Elise Stefanik, Trump’s pick to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, spoke about the need to counter China’s influence inside the UN system. She said the administration intends to do so by running American and allied candidates for leadership positions in key agencies, focusing on standards-making organizations, pressing for maximal Taiwanese participation, and removing Chinese Communist Party language in UN documents. These are all recommendations made by FDD scholars over the last four years.

In her testimony, Stefanik also suggested establishing an Abraham Accords Caucus at the UN and affirmed her commitment to defunding UNRWA, the Palestinian aid agency, and replacing it with the work of other existing organizations. In addition, she said the UN Human Rights Council needs to jettison its standing agenda item castigating Israel. Stefanik also spoke about the need to use the U.S. role in the United Nations to contribute to a renewed maximum pressure campaign on Iran.

On February 4, President Trump signed a national security directive to re-impose “maximum pressure” on the Islamic Republic of Iran, aiming to prevent the regime from developing nuclear weapons and to deny it resources for terrorism and other malign activities. It is “in the national interest,” the memorandum declared, “to impose maximum pressure on the Iranian regime to end its nuclear threat, curtail its ballistic missile program, and stop its support for terrorist groups.” The memorandum emphasized that Iran cannot be allowed to threaten the United States with a “nuclear extortion racket.”

Specifically, the president directed his administration to “drive Iran’s oil exports to zero” and restrict Tehran’s access to resources, complete the snapback of multilateral sanctions at the United Nations under the 2015 nuclear deal, and run an “export control enforcement campaign” to constrain Tehran’s access to military-related goods and technologies. Trump also directed the attorney general to crack down on Iranian activities inside the United States, impound Iranian oil cargoes, and seize Iranian assets for victims of terrorism. In addition, the order directed Treasury to keep pressure on Iran at the Financial Action Task Force and encourage companies around the world to adopt an enhanced due-diligence standard of “Know Your Customer’s Customer” for Iran.

Missing, however, was any broad support for the Iranian people, save for one line standing in solidarity with oppressed Iranian women. The president also indicated he was torn about signing the order, stressing his desire to negotiate what he called a “Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement.”

President Trump set the tone for his second term’s Israel policy in early December, vowing there would be “hell to pay” if the Israeli hostages held by Hamas were not returned by the time he took office. Under pressure from the incoming and outgoing administrations, Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire that took effect on January 19, one day before Trump’s inauguration. Although the deal saw Hamas release the hostages, Jerusalem had to exchange them for Palestinians with Israeli blood on their hands. Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, reportedly pressured Netanyahu into accepting the deal.

Trump has quickly overturned some of President Biden’s policies that caused friction with Israel. On January 20, the Trump administration canceled Biden-imposed sanctions on Israelis in the West Bank. On January 25, the White House instructed the U.S. military to release 1,800 2,000-pound bombs that Israel had “ordered and paid for.” Biden withheld these weapons in May 2024, concerned about civilian casualties in Gaza. On January 29, Trump signed an executive order to combat antisemitism, particularly on college campuses. Trump has also urged Egypt and Jordan to admit Palestinians while Gaza is rebuilt.

In early February, Netanyahu became the first foreign leader to meet with Trump during the latter’s second term. They discussed the fragile ceasefire in Gaza, expanding the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia, and confronting the Iran threat. Trump turned heads by suggesting Washington would take ownership of Gaza long-term and develop the strip, ensuring terrorists there could never again threaten Israel.

The administration has not yet devoted major focus to the Korean Peninsula, but North Korean leader Kim Jung Un appears committed to changing that. The North Korean regime carried out missile tests both on U.S. Election Day in November and in early January. In the weeks following the election, Pyongyang vowed to enact “the toughest anti-American policies,” and on February 5, it slammed Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s characterization of North Korea as a rogue state.

Trump has repeatedly signaled willingness to engage in diplomacy for a negotiated agreement regarding Pyongyang’s nuclear program, noting last month that he planned to “reach out” to Kim. During his first term, Trump visited the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, stepping briefly onto North Korean soil, and attempted to negotiate an arms control agreement with the hermit kingdom, to no avail. Trump and the Biden administration then allowed the sanctions regime against North Korea to atrophy. There has been little meaningful action since 2018 to enforce existing U.S. sanctions or enact new measures targeting key revenue streams that fund North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs, such as Chinese banks. Yet engaging Kim may be more difficult this time given his closer ties with Russia and China.

South Korea will also require close attention as President Yoon Suk Yeol remains impeached and imprisoned for enacting martial law. As Seoul potentially holds an upcoming special election, it will be critical for Washington to signal that its support for Seoul and commitment to South Korea’s defense remain ironclad.

The newly minted Trump administration has yet to formulate its own policies and approaches toward Lebanon. So far, the administration has continued to apply its predecessor’s policies, including the November 27 ceasefire deal between Israel and Lebanon.

The agreement required Beirut to deploy the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) throughout southern Lebanon in tandem with the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the area over the course of 60 days. The deal also requires Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah and dismantle its infrastructure south of the Litani River while securing all borders against the entry of unauthorized arms and personnel to prevent the group’s regeneration.

However, save for a cosmetic deployment of LAF troops to parts of southern Lebanon, Beirut has not implemented any of the agreement’s other terms — and appears to have no intention of doing so. Lebanon’s new president and prime minister-designate instead appear to be making political deals with Hezbollah. Beirut’s continued unwillingness to restrain Hezbollah all but guarantees its regeneration.

Nevertheless, reports indicate that the Trump team, even before assuming office, pressured the Israelis to preserve calm with Lebanon. At the same time, when the 60-day withdrawal date expired without demonstrable action by Beirut against Hezbollah, the Trump administration pressed Lebanon to accept an extension until February 18. This could suggest that Washington is now demanding actual performance and not mere platitudes from Lebanon. Whether that is the case will soon become clearer.

The new administration has yet to roll out formal policies concerning nonproliferation. However, President Trump has indicated possible policy directions. In an address in Davos, he indicated a desire for arms control talks with Russia and China to reduce the size of all three countries’ nuclear arsenals, which he views as expensive to maintain. Yet Moscow and Beijing have not indicated serious will to engage in nuclear restraint as great-power competition — including via nuclear weapons — heats up. Russia has suspended its participation in the New START treaty, which is set to lapse in February 2026, and the Biden administration’s arms control talks with China collapsed last summer. Moreover, before engaging in arms control, the Trump administration needs a strategy to simultaneously deter two near-peer nuclear competitors and ensure a reliable extended deterrent for key allies.

In other news, International Atomic Energy Agency head Rafael Grossi reported that Iran had boosted its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent — a stone’s throw from atomic weapons-grade. Trump has signaled a willingness to negotiate for nuclear restrictions on Tehran, a sentiment echoed by key Iranian officials. However, Tehran is likely attempting to dissuade Trump from reimposing the “maximum pressure” sanctions from his first term, and it remains doubtful that the regime would agree to a deal that permanently removes its nuclear threat.

Newly confirmed CIA Director John Ratcliffe declassified the agency’s finding that COVID-19 likely originated via a lab leak in China. The administration has not indicated how it will hold Beijing accountable for the possible cover-up.

The new administration’s policy with respect to Syria remains unclear. Less than two weeks after taking office, President Trump said he would “make a determination” on whether to withdrawal the small number of U.S. troops currently in the country. Meanwhile, U.S. Central Command announced that it had killed Muhammad Salah al-Za’bir, whom it described as “a senior operative in the terrorist organization Hurras al-Din,” al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria. Hurras al-Din maintains relations with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the al-Qaeda-linked terror group that established the new Syrian government after overthrowing the Assad regime. A U.S. withdrawal from Syria would make targeting Islamic State, Hurras al-Din, and HTS operatives more difficult. The Biden administration launched a series of airstrikes against the Islamic State immediately in the wake of the collapse of the Assad regime.

The Trump administration’s policy toward Afghanistan also remains unclear. Following the Biden administration’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has established significant infrastructure in the country, including training camps, safe houses, religious schools, and weapons storage depots. After learning that the Taliban is holding more Americans hostage than previously thought, Secretary of State Marco Rubio threatened to sanction Taliban leaders. An executive order issued by Trump has canceled exemptions for Afghan refugees fleeing the country. The International Criminal Court has “filed applications for arrest warrants” for Taliban emir Haibatullah Akhundzada and chief justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani “for crimes against humanity.”

In Somalia, U.S. Africa Command launched a series of airstrikes against “multiple ISIS-Somalia operatives,” an undisclosed number which were killed. The Trump administration withdrew U.S. forces from Somalia in 2020 during its first term.

So far, there are only hints of what policy President Trump will pursue regarding Syria. Asked about reports that he planned to withdraw all U.S. troops from the country, Trump responded that no decision had yet been made, adding: “We’re not involved in Syria. Syria’s its own mess. They’ve got enough messes over there, they don’t need us involved.” The comment suggests that Trump’s instincts vis-à-vis Syria remain exactly what they were during his first term, when he twice ordered a withdrawal of U.S. troops but reversed himself both times. At his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio contended, “It is in the national interest of the United States, if possible, to have a Syria that’s no longer a playground for ISIS, that respects religious minorities … that protects the Kurds,” and is not a vehicle for Iran-backed terrorism.

On January 30, U.S. Central Command announced it had launched an airstrike in northwest Syria that killed a senior operative in the local al-Qaeda affiliate, Hurras al-Din. In December, Central Command took advantage of the turmoil in the last days before the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime to strike more than 75 ISIS targets in Syria, including leaders. Thousands of ISIS fighters and tens of thousands of their family members remain in detention facilities in northeast Syria in areas where American troops operate in concert with local partners. The Trump administration’s decision to pause foreign aid reportedly led to the disruption of programs to maintain security at the camps inhabited by ISIS family members.

During the presidential transition period, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan urged the incoming administration to withdraw the roughly 2,000 U.S. troops currently deployed in northeastern Syria. Meanwhile, following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, Turkey has pushed for the disarmament and dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a key U.S. partner responsible for defeating and preventing the resurgence of the Islamic State (ISIS). Turkey has long opposed Washington’s partnership with the SDF, which Ankara views as a terrorist organization due to its ties to groups that have waged a violent secessionist campaign inside Turkey.

Nevertheless, during his Senate confirmation hearing, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued that Washington should continue to support the SDF and maintain the U.S. presence in Syria. This support is crucial to ensuring that the SDF can continue overseeing prisons holding more than 40,000 ISIS-linked detainees. Trump advisor Gabriel Soma echoed this stance, stating, “The Kurds are allies of the United States and key partners in the fight against ISIS.” However, it remains to be seen which course President Trump will take. He has indicated he remains inclined to withdraw.

Meanwhile, Turkish-backed jihadist militias operating under the banner of the “Syrian National Army” have clashed with the SDF inside Syria. At the same time, Erdogan is pressuring Syria’s interim government, led by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, to cooperate with Turkey in dismantling the SDF.