The Abraham Accords

Do the Abraham Accords represent an historic sea change in the Middle East’s strategic balance?

Pro — Varsha Koduvayur

The Abraham Accords represent a fundamental shift in the region’s strategic balance. Brought together by the signatories’ mutual antipathy to Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, the accords reflect the open and public embrace of Israel by countries that have historically been ideologically opposed to the Jewish state. And they reflect a dramatic shift in the Gulf states’ approach to the Palestinian issue.

The accords have effectively shattered the old pan-Arab consensus that normalization hinged on peace between Israel and Palestinians. The United Arab Emirates’ and Bahrain’s deals are a clear sign that the Gulf states are no longer willing to give the rejectionist, obstructionist Palestinian leadership veto power over regional diplomacy, security coordination and economic development. Through these deals, the UAE and Bahrain have positioned themselves to exert a moderating influence on Palestinian politics and society, marginalizing the actors that stoke Palestinian rejectionism. Indeed, it was this rejectionism that exacerbated the Gulf states’ frustration and Israel’s hesitation to offer concessions to the Palestinians.

The accords also establish a new paradigm for a warm peace with Arab states, built on people-to-people ties. This focus is the accords’ single most important point of distinction, setting them apart from Israel’s previous — and historic — deals with Egypt and Jordan, which fell far short of expectations. Both are best described as a cold peace, limited to transactional diplomacy, security cooperation and some economic cooperation.

By contrast, Emirati and Bahraini leaders have energetically stated their intent to foster a warmer peace and multisector cooperation — which in turn could have ripple effects throughout the region. As regional business hubs, the UAE and Bahrain host large populations of expatriate workers from the Arab and Islamic world whose home countries view Israel as an enemy. The deals have the potential to facilitate interpersonal interactions between Israeli visitors and these expat populations, creating a space for both sides to interact as humans in a supportive environment — thus planting the seeds for a societal and generational transformation.

If Israel’s deals with Jordan and Egypt — the “first act” of Israel’s regional recognition — represent a grudging tolerance of the Jewish state, the “second act” marked by the Abraham Accords represents a more open embrace of Israel. The accords reflect an understanding that Israel is an important and permanent regional actor, one that Arab leaders need for security, technology and diplomacy. With sustained momentum, this will have a transformational impact on the region’s strategic balance.

Con — Steven Cook

The Abraham Accords are an important step in widening the circle of peace in the Middle East. The agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Israel and Bahrain deserve the near-universal praise they have received. Yet despite the fanfare of a White House signing ceremony last September, the accords do not represent a fundamental change in the regional strategic balance. Instead, they are a public affirmation of the prevailing diplomatic, political and military order in the Middle East.

As important as the Abraham Accords may be, they do not compare to Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, both of which fundamentally altered the Middle East. With the famous three-way arm grasp on the White House lawn among President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1979, the era of regional Arab-Israeli wars came to an end. Without Egypt and its large army, there was no longer a coalition of Arab states that could threaten Israel’s security. This was a paradigm shift that contributed to regional stability. It also capped an American effort dating back to the October 1973 war to peel Egypt away from the Soviet Union — a significant setback for Moscow in the Middle East.

The impact of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel was different, but also represented a significant shift in the geostrategic environment. The agreement not only ended the state of war between the two countries, but also affirmed (albeit implicitly) that a resolution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians hinged on the establishment of a Palestinian state. With the treaty, ideas such as a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation and “Jordan is Palestine” — an idea the Israeli right championed — became politically untenable for all but the most diehard believers in annexation and ethnic cleansing of the West Bank. The two-state solution has never materialized, of course, but the Jordan-Israel peace treaty institutionalized this idea, which has guided American policymaking ever since.

In contrast, the Abraham Accords — as important as they are — reinforce an existing regional order. The agreements shine a light on developments that were widely known but never officially acknowledged: i.e., Israel and Gulf countries have shared strategic interests. They have merely layered onto this fact an openness to trade, tourism, technology and cultural exchange. This may make a broader peace — including Palestinians — possible in the long run, but the strategic environment in the Middle East has not changed.

Varsha Koduvayur is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow her on Twitter @varshakoduvayur. Steven A. Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and sits on FDD’s Turkey Program Board of Advisors. FDD is a nonpartisan think tank focused on foreign policy and national security issues.