China-Russia Defense Cooperation Showcases Rising Axis of Aggressors

Despite its stated neutrality in the war in Ukraine, China continues to fuel Russia’s war machine. In late May, Oleh Ivashchenko, head of the Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service, shared new details regarding Chinese support for Russia’s military-industrial complex.

His interview, which follows revelations that China has funneled weapons components and targeting information to the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, highlights Beijing’s growing role within an axis of aggressors threatening U.S. national security.

China Is a Key Cog in Russia’s War Machine

According to Ivashchenko, Ukrainian intelligence has confirmed that at least 20 different Russian defense plants had received machine tools, gunpowder, chemical products, and components from Chinese suppliers. The true number is likely much higher. He noted that Russia’s aviation sector has obtained “equipment, spare parts, and documentation” from China, adding that four-fifths of the “critical electronics” used in Russian drones came from China as of early 2025.

These findings corroborate previous reporting on the crucial role China has played in supporting Russia’s defense-industrial base. Russian imports of key components such as microelectronics from and through China surged following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Last September, a Ukrainian official said that around 60 percent of the foreign components found in Russian weapons used in Ukraine came from China. Similarly, imports of nitrocellulose from China have helped Russia expand production of artillery shells and other munitions.

Russian firms have also increasingly relied on China as a source of precision machine tools, often routed through other jurisdictions, such as Belarus and Central Asia. Declassified U.S. intelligence has highlighted how the supply of CNC machines from China has facilitated growth in Russian ballistic missile production.

In addition to providing inputs to Russian industry, China has also provided Moscow with a key financial lifeline. China is the top importer of Russian fossil fuels, including crude oil, with Russia accounting for more than a fifth of Chinese crude consumption in 2024. Energy export revenue constitutes the backbone of the Kremlin’s budget.

Deepening Defense-Industrial Ties

Not only is Beijing backstopping the Russian economy and supplying Russian defense plants, but firms in both countries are reportedly also working on joint projects, including in drone development and production. Last year, Reuters reported that Chinese specialists were helping Russian industry develop an upgraded version of the Garpiya-1A long-range one-way attack drone — which also uses Chinese engines and other parts — as well as a new remotely piloted aircraft.

Russia apparently is returning the favor, accelerating China’s rapid military modernization. Last September, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said Moscow is transferring advanced military technology to Beijing that the Russians had previously been “reluctant” to provide. “That has to do with submarine operations, activities of aeronautical design, including stealth; that also involves capacities on missile capabilities,” he said. Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has similarly indicated that Russia may be providing China with submarine quieting technology.

U.S. and Europe Should Intensify Pressure on Russia and China

The United States and European Union have imposed sanctions on some Chinese firms for aiding Russia’s defense-industrial base. However, the Trump administration has yet to add to the sanctions in place when it took power in January. Washington, working with Western allies, should renew and expand this effort as part of a broader campaign to increase pressure on Russia’s economy and deprive its war machine of resources.

In addition, Washington should tighten restrictions on China’s defense-industrial complex, which is deeply intertwined with the country’s civilian science and technology sector. By tightening enforcement of current export controls, particularly on advanced semiconductors, and introducing outbound investment screening measures, the United States can impede China’s military modernization and inhibit collaboration between this axis of aggressors.

Jack Burnham is a research analyst in the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where John Hardie is deputy director of the Russia Program. For more analysis from the authors and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Jack on X @JackBurnham802. Follow John on X @JohnH105. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.