Power Outages Highlights Iran’s Growing Vulnerability

The Iranian government’s warning that Iranians should expect widespread blackouts this cold season suggests Iran may soon face a perfect storm. The scheduled electricity cuts come not only as Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government confronts the legacy of decades of corruption and infrastructure mismanagement but also as the Islamic Republic gears up to confront Israel militarily and contend with a renewed U.S. maximum pressure campaign.

Preparing for Blackouts

On October 10, 2024, Iran’s Ministry of Energy announced that it will schedule power outages across the country during the cold season as fuel runs short for power plants. Power outages have increased across Iran over the last few years, but this year’s announcement suggests electricity insecurity in Iran will only get worse.

Most Iranian power plants run on natural gas. On paper, Iran should not face any shortages, as it has the second-largest proven natural gas reserves after Russia. But in recent years, Iran has experienced summer outages as electricity consumption surpasses generation due to high temperatures and the use of air conditioning. In winter, household natural gas consumption for heating increases, leading to natural gas shortages. This, in turn, leads Iranian power plants to burn diesel or mazut, a low-quality fuel oil once used primarily in the Soviet Union.

Power Shortfalls: Spin vs. Reality

Burning mazut causes air pollution and health problems. As the use of mazut has increased, grassroots opposition has grown. Pezeshkian seeks to spin the blackouts by claiming they result from his decision to ban mazut. In reality, though, his ban affects only three plants out of 16 that can burn the substance. Nor does he explain why taking three plants offline would cause such shortages, as Iran has 140 other major power plants.

Iran simply no longer generates sufficient electricity to cover consumption. Some reports show consumption now peaks at 17,500 megawatts above production, a shortfall equivalent to more than eight Hoover Dams. Consumption growth exceeds increases in production.  

The prognosis remains poor for energy security. Some Iranian officials may blame resource shortfalls on the 8 million Afghans who now call Iran home, but blaming outsiders only goes so far. It does not explain decades of mismanagement hampering upgrades and new plant construction, nor does it explain why Iran cannot produce enough natural gas to power its plants in the fall and winter or, conversely, import the shortfall. Poor planning is endemic. While Pezeshkian may cite environmental stewardship, the reality is Iran has stored 43 percent less diesel and 23 percent less mazut than it had at this time last year.

Iran Cannot Cover Up Its Vulnerability

While Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard argue in Iranian state media that they are nearing victory against Israel, the United States, and other enemies, their failure to keep the lights on suggests otherwise to the Iranian public. That dissonance could be corrosive to Iranian stability as the Islamic Republic tries to project an image of strength. Since 2017, the regime has faced three waves of widespread protests, which it only managed to survive by killing, maiming, and arresting tens of thousands of people.

Combine Maximum Pressure With Maximum Support for the Iranian People

Four decades after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran’s real GDP per capita is not back to its pre-revolution level. Sanctions are responsible for only a small part of that shortcoming. The people know the real cause is the regime’s unending corruption, mismanagement, and foreign wars. Thus, the overwhelming majority blames Khamenei and his lieutenants, not Washington. The incoming Trump administration should focus its messaging to the people of Iran on the wide gap between what Iran could have been and the misery the Islamic Republic has delivered. At the same time, the United States should rapidly restore the maximum pressure policy from the first Trump administration, which Washington should complement with maximum support for the freedom of the Iranian people.

Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior advisor on Iran and financial economics at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s Iran Program and Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). For more analysis from Saeed and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Saeed on X @SGhasseminejad. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_Iran and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.