February 3, 2025 | The National Interest

Cracks in the Core? The Meaning Behind Iran’s Assassinations

As Iran’s economic, regional, and domestic standing deteriorates, senior and junior officials alike will begin to realize that the regime cannot ensure their safety.
February 3, 2025 | The National Interest

Cracks in the Core? The Meaning Behind Iran’s Assassinations

As Iran’s economic, regional, and domestic standing deteriorates, senior and junior officials alike will begin to realize that the regime cannot ensure their safety.

On January 18, 2025, an Iranian judicial employee assassinated Supreme Court Justices Ali Razini and Mohammad Moghisseh. Their deaths may be the tip of the iceberg in terms of a broader dynamic that is undermining the stability of the Islamic Republic.

The official story is that the assailant was a janitor in his thirties and the son of a martyr who died fighting in the Iran-Iraq War. The assassin killed the two judges and injured a security guard. After security forces cornered him before he could kill other judges, he reportedly committed suicide.

Not everything from the official account adds up, though. The assailant’s precision with firearms suggests he might have been a security guard or a trained agent rather than a custodian. Revenge might also have been a factor: Razini and Moghisseh both cultivated reputations as hanging judges, especially against dissidents. In recent years, assassins have killed several regime officials. In 2023, in the Caspian province of Mazandaran, a security guard killed Ayatollah Abbasali Soleimani, a member of the Assembly of Experts. This clerical body selects the new supreme leader. The following year, an Iran-Iraq war veteran shot the Friday prayer leader of Kazeroun before committing suicide. Earlier in January, an angry citizen set the mayor of Kargan, a town in the southern Hormuzgan province, on fire.

Such violence targeting officials signals that the regime is losing the support of segments of society upon which the regime traditionally relies. At least some in sensitive administrative, military, and security positions now turn on their rulers.

This growing discontent can manifest in three ways: the disillusioned can become lone wolves, align with opposition forces, or assist foreign agencies. Such intelligence-sharing previously facilitated targeted killings of figures such as top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Hamas leader Ismael Haniyeh, and senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders.

There are many reasons behind such dissatisfaction. Living standards are collapsing after decades of double-digit inflation, leading many to fall below the poverty line. Real gross domestic product per capita remains lower than before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Since 2017, the regime has faced three waves of protests—in 2017, 2019, and 2022—that spread to more than 150 towns and cities across the country. Each time, the regime relied on brute violence to survive, injuring, killing, and arresting tens of thousands. Sexual violence that security forces directed toward female detainees has alienated even fence-sitters.

In the age of social media, such stories spread rapidly. For example, the regime’s abuses in 2019 led Mahdi Nassiri, an influential figure in the regime’s radical hardline faction whom Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei once appointed to senior positions, to flip to the opposition. In another case, Hossein Ghadiani, an influential journalist among the radical Hezbollah groups, published audio files cursing Khamenei over the violence the regime uses to impose hijab on women.

The regime’s faltering regional strategy compounds domestic discontent. Regime impotence around the collapse of proxy groups like Hezbollah and the Assad regime, coupled with Israel’s bold operations inside Iran, have led even staunch supporters to question regime strategy.

There is also a growing belief among traditional religious groups that the Islamic Republic’s misgovernance and corruption have tarnished Islam’s reputation and credibility. Figures such as Fatemeh Sepehri, an imprisoned dissident and hijab-wearing wife of a martyr of the Iran-Iraq war, highlighted these issues, among other things, to explain her belief Iran should revert to a constitutional monarchy.

Of course, the recent assassinations could be more of a blip rather than a sign of imminent revolution, but the regime should still worry. Discontent among loyalists who have access to weapons and officials—is a combustible material. This dissatisfaction could erupt violently at any time, within any rank or organization. As a result, regime officials may become increasingly unable to trust those around them. This pervasive fear represents a critical pressure point on the regime, accelerating defections and pushing the regime toward collapse.

As the regime’s economic, regional, and domestic standing deteriorates, senior and junior officials alike will begin to realize that the system cannot ensure their safety. This recognition may prompt them to join the opposition or adopt a neutral stance to escape an unsustainable deadlock.

The Islamic Republic finds itself at a precarious juncture. Pressure will widen the cracks already evident within security and intelligence forces. The foundation is cracking, perhaps beyond repair. For the United States, this is the time to increase the pressure, not to de-escalate.

Dr. Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior advisor for Iran and financial economics at FDD, specializing in Iran’s economy and financial markets, sanctions, and illicit finance. Follow him on LinkedIn and X @SGhasseminejad

Issues:

Issues:

Hezbollah Iran Iran Global Threat Network Iran Politics and Economy

Topics:

Topics:

Iran Israel Hamas Iraq Hezbollah Islam Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Bashar al-Assad Islamic republic Ali Khamenei Saeed Ghasseminejad Iranian Revolution Ismail Haniyeh Supreme Court of the United States Iran–Iraq War Assembly of Experts for Leadership Mohsen Fakhrizadeh LinkedIn