How Russia Is Eclipsing the U.S. in Africa

The Kremlin is preparing to showcase its steadily growing influence in Africa, which has often come at Washington’s expense. On October 28-29, Moscow will host more than 30 African delegations for the third Russia-Africa Summit. More than four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it is clear that U.S. sanctions and diplomacy have not isolated Russia in Africa. Instead, Moscow has expanded its political, economic, and military relationships across the continent, weakening the fight against terrorism, undermining U.S. efforts to end the war in Ukraine, and locking up critical minerals Washington needs.

This change for the worse was not inevitable. Washington’s lackluster and incomplete efforts are partly to blame. To reverse the trend, the United States needs to step up and compete with Russia in Africa by imposing sanctions on the infrastructure Russia has built on the continent to facilitate sanctions evasion; extending the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the cornerstone of U.S.-Africa trade, which expires on December 31; making plain to African governments that hosting Russian forces on the Red Sea or in the Indian Ocean — which would bring Russia closer to key shipping lanes and critical undersea cables — will cost them Western assistance and investment; and filling vacant ambassadorships. Together, these initiatives would give African states a credible alternative to Russia for the global partnerships they are seeking.

What Diplomatic Isolation?

Russia exploited Africa’s ambivalence about the war in Ukraine to expand its foothold on the continent. When the UN General Assembly marked the invasion’s first anniversary in 2023 by demanding Russia’s withdrawal, 15 African states abstained, six did not vote, and Eritrea and Mali voted no. Of the 54 UN member states in Africa, roughly 40 percent declined to condemn Russia’s invasion. Many African governments see the war in Ukraine as a European conflict between great powers, still embrace nonalignment, and remember Soviet support for their liberation movements. Their neutrality also serves practical interests: it protects grain, fertilizer, and fuel supplies, keeps Russian arms and regime-protection forces flowing, and lets them court Moscow, Beijing, and Washington at the same time.

Since then, Russia reopened its embassy in Burkina Faso in December 2023 after more than 30 years, then opened embassies in Niger, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan in 2025. Russia now operates 45 embassies on the continent, has missions planned for Comoros, The Gambia, Liberia, and Togo, and has created a new foreign ministry department dedicated to Africa.

Closer Economic Links

Although a central aim of U.S. sanctions has been to shrink Russia’s economic reach, in Africa it is growing. According to Russian figures, Russia-Africa trade reached $27.7 billion in 2025, up about 13 percent from 2024. In the first half of 2026, Russian agricultural exports reached $2.9 billion, a 35 percent increase compared with a year earlier. During the same period, Russian wheat deliveries to Kenya rose about ninefold and to Sudan more than doubled.

A key element of Russia’s economic strategy in Africa is nuclear energy. State-owned Rosatom is building Egypt’s roughly $30 billion El Dabaa nuclear plant. Since 2022, Rosatom has signed cooperation agreements with Burkina Faso and Mali and a nuclear deal with Niger, and the corporation is in talks with Nigeria to build two nuclear plants worth a reported $20 billion.

An Expanding Military Footprint

Russia’s military presence has expanded fastest of all. In 2023, Russian forces operated in four African countries: the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, and Sudan. Today, Russian military personnel are present in at least nine, including Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Niger, the Republic of the Congo, and Togo — although there are conflicting reports on Russia’s presence in Sudan. Notably, though, a larger Russian military presence does not necessarily correlate with Russian policy success. For example, the Russian Defense Ministry’s Africa Corps has been unable to stop jihadists from gaining ground in Mali this year against the Russian-allied junta.

Last December, Russia delivered weapons and kamikaze drones to Madagascar’s junta, and Russian instructors began training its 1st Airborne Battalion. The head of Russia’s Africa Corps arrived on the island with about 40 of its members, and a Russian delegation toured a disused naval base in April 2026.

In August 2026, U.S. government imagery analysis identified Russian-linked construction at six Libyan air bases, including Maaten al-Sarra, near the borders with Chad and Sudan. Russia has also pressed Sudan’s army for a Red Sea naval logistics facility at Port Sudan; in October 2025, Khartoum reportedly offered a 25-year deal in exchange for air-defense systems after years of drawn-out negotiations.

Why Russia’s Gains Are America’s Losses

Russia’s advances in Africa are weakening the fight against terrorism. Russia’s arrival in the Sahel came with the expulsion of Western partners: Niger’s junta ordered U.S. troops out in 2024, forcing Washington to abandon a $110 million drone base in Agadez that surveilled Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates. The Africa Corps has not filled the gap. The Sahel now accounts for nearly half of all terrorism deaths worldwide. In 2025, Niger rose from fifth to third on the Global Terrorism Index, which ranks countries by the severity of terrorists’ impact — four of the five most affected countries are in the Sahel. Moscow’s presence sometimes makes matters worse because Russian abuses of civilians feed recruitment for the very groups the United States seeks to contain.

Moscow’s links to African states are also helping Russia continue its war in Ukraine. Russia is building sanctions-evasion architecture on the continent. A7, a payments firm that helps Russia support Iran and is co-owned by sanctioned Promsvyazbank and fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, opened offices in Nigeria and Zimbabwe in September 2025 with a Russian deputy finance minister on hand. Moreover, African recruits are filling Russian ranks on the front line. In May 2026, Kenya’s foreign minister said 19 Kenyans had been killed fighting for Russia in Ukraine, and recruiters have drawn young Africans to drone factories in Tatarstan.

Nuclear power deals also bind African host governments to Rosatom for fuel, maintenance, and financing for decades. Russian access to Nigerien uranium, Malian and Sudanese gold, and Guinean bauxite comes as Washington works to secure its critical minerals supply chains.

Washington Should Compete, Not Concede

First, the Treasury Department should close loopholes that Russia exploits. It should designate A7’s African affiliates and local partners; target the gold and mining revenues that fund the Africa Corps by sanctioning the companies holding mining rights and the logistics networks that move the money; and warn banks in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere that processing sanctioned Russian transactions carries secondary-sanctions risk.

Second, Washington must offer a better economic deal. AGOA expires on December 31 after only a one-year extension, despite its 25 years of success. Congress should pass a multiyear reauthorization, and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank should back U.S. and allied nuclear, grid, and critical minerals projects in countries Rosatom is courting.

Third, Washington should deny Moscow the bases it wants by making clear to Sudan’s army and Madagascar’s junta that hosting Russian forces on the Red Sea or in the Indian Ocean will cost them Western assistance and investment.

Fourth, the United States must show up. Russia is opening embassies and hosting African leaders in Moscow. As of late September, only seven of Africa’s 54 countries have a confirmed U.S. ambassador: Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Tunisia, according to the American Foreign Service Association. Filling vacant U.S. ambassadorships and sending cabinet-level officials to the continent would signal that Washington intends to compete. Doing so would challenge Russia’s ability to use its links on the continent to offset the costs of its war on Ukraine and build leverage against the West, while strengthening U.S. efforts to fight terrorism and end the war in Ukraine.

Michele Kernitsky is an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) with 26 years of service in the CIA, the State Department, and the White House. For more analysis from Michele and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.