A Parliament Without Real Opposition in Syria

A year and a half after the overthrow of former dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria’s new parliament is finally taking shape.

On July 1, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa appointed 70 lawmakers, one-third of the chamber, following indirect “elections” held between October 2025 and May 2026 to fill the remaining two-thirds of the seats. Rather than allowing citizens to vote directly for their representatives, Syria’s constitutional declaration — effectively its interim constitution — created a layered selection process controlled from the top. The Higher Committee for Parliamentary Elections (HCPE), a body established by Sharaa, appointed election subcommittees, which then selected roughly 7,000 local electors. Those electors voted to fill two-thirds of parliament, while the final third was reserved for presidential appointees.

According to HCPE, the purpose of Sharaa’s 70 appointments was to create “a blend between those who sacrificed … and national competencies and expertise” while also strengthening women’s representation. Fifteen of the 70 appointees were women, bringing the total number of women in the assembly to 22. Damascus had also acknowledged shortcomings in the earlier selection process, particularly the limited representation of minority groups, and sought to address those gaps through presidential appointments.

Yet the appointees do not necessarily represent their communities. Many appear more closely aligned with the Syrian government, while others are figures close to the leadership’s inner circle. As a result, the new parliament risks becoming a largely performative institution, reluctant to meaningfully question the executive’s authority.

Sharaa’s Loyalist Base

When Sharaa took power in December 2024, he pledged to “form a comprehensive transitional government that expresses the diversity of Syria.” Since then, he has appointed loyalists and consolidated power in his own hands through expansive executive authorities. The new parliament follows the same pattern.

For example, several of the 70 members appointed by Sharaa, including Maher Alloush, Hassan Soufan, and Hassan al-Dugheim, held roles during the transitional period. Sharaa appointed both Alloush and al-Dugheim to the National Dialogue Committee, responsible for organizing the national dialogue conference in February 2025. Al-Dugheim is also a member of the Syrian Islamic Council, a Turkey-based religious body that seeks to strengthen the role of religious institutions in Syrian society. Alloush, meanwhile, is a writer and key ideologue of the Syrian Islamist movement. Sharaa also briefly appointed Hassan Soufan as governor of Latakia before Soufan served on the Supreme Committee for Civil Peace, tasked with bridging sectarian divides.

Minority Representation Favors Pro-Government Figures

Sharaa also appointed several minority figures to “fill the gap” left by the earlier selection process. Yet the priority appears to be appointing minorities who are more closely aligned with the government. In Suwayda, the Druze-majority province where violence last July reportedly killed around 1,700 people, Sharaa appointed Laith al-Balous. Damascus has promoted Balous as a representative of the Druze community. But Balous sided with the government during its campaign against Druze factions and has been widely denounced by segments of the Druze community as a “traitor.”

Another issue is Kurdish representation. Following the January integration agreement to bring the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian armed forces, political progress between Damascus and the SDF has remained limited. More alarmingly, the Kurdish figures selected for parliament appear to come exclusively from factions opposed to the SDF, such as the Kurdish National Council, effectively excluding the group from political decision-making.

Damascus Must Repay Washington’s Trust

The United States has shown significant trust in Damascus by lifting sanctions and giving the new Syrian government “a chance.” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has previously emphasized the need for an inclusive transition in Syria and called for broad representation of Syrian voices in shaping the country’s future.

Washington should continue to press Sharaa to avoid further centralization of power and control over all branches of government. Such a trajectory would only alienate other factions in Syria, including the SDF, and risk renewed civil strife and instability — outcomes that run directly counter to U.S. interests.

Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Ahmad and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Ahmad on X @AhmadA_Sharawi. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.