Syria Need Not Enter Lebanon to Help Curb Hezbollah

In recent days, U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly suggested that Syria could take on Hezbollah in Lebanon, even suggesting that Damascus would be more effective than Israel in confronting the Iranian-backed militia. But Syria is in no position to intervene militarily in Lebanon. Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa made that clear last week, saying Damascus would rather help end the conflict in Lebanon than be drawn into it.

“I suggested to Israel to let Syria take care of Hezbollah as, to be honest with you, I think they would do a better job,” Trump said on June 16 on the sidelines of the G7 summit in France. What explains the U.S. president’s interest in drawing Damascus into Lebanon?

Since April, Washington has been brokering talks between Lebanon and Israel, with the clear aim of encouraging cooperation between Beirut and Jerusalem while sidelining Hezbollah. While the White House continues to back Israel’s right to defend itself against Hezbollah, it has grown frustrated by Israeli threats to strike Beirut. 

This is partly due to the new deal between the U.S. and Iran, with Tehran seeking to draw a red line against Israeli strikes on Hezbollah in Beirut’s southern suburbs. However, it appears that Trump is also not pleased with destructive Israeli bombardment in Lebanon, including against high-rise buildings in the capital. 

“You don’t have to knock down a building every time somebody walks into it that’s from Hezbollah,” Trump said on June 17, arguing for a more proportionate Israeli military campaign. In his recent comments, the U.S. leader seems to think that Syria might take a lighter or more precise approach in dealing with Hezbollah.

Trump is aware that the Syrian rebels who overthrew the Assad regime had spent years fighting Hezbollah during Syria’s civil war. This is a key issue. The government in Damascus opposes Hezbollah and has sought to interdict arms smuggling to the group. However, Damascus also knows its limitations. It is still working to consolidate control over various regions of the country and integrate the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in eastern Syria.

Syria’s new armed forces lack armored vehicles, an air force, and a navy. If it entered Lebanon, the military would have to slog through Hezbollah-controlled areas in the Bekaa Valley. Damascus knows this could inflame sectarianism and extremism, sow chaos in Lebanon, and prompt Iran or its militias to attack Syria. 

Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah, have close ties to Lebanese Hezbollah and previously operated in Syria. These groups oppose the new Syrian authorities and are looking for an excuse to launch attacks.

Syrians also know the cost of intervention in Lebanon. In 1976, the Hafez al-Assad regime intervened in the Lebanese Civil War by deploying troops into Lebanon, where Syrian forces remained until their withdrawal in 2005. Damascus ultimately had to withdraw because of mass protests against the Syrian occupation following Hezbollah’s assassination of former premier Rafik Hariri. 

This was a unique period, when Hezbollah was far weaker than the force it would later become. In fact, Hezbollah’s vulnerability following the Syrian military withdrawal appears to have contributed to its launching of a war with Israel in 2006. Hezbollah used the war to claim it was “defending” Lebanon. Two years later, Hezbollah would topple the Lebanese government and begin consuming the Lebanese state, as it held the country’s politics hostage.

Lebanon is now at a crossroads. Hezbollah has been weakened by Israeli military strikes, its arsenal depleted. It lost its strategic depth in the Assad regime in December 2024. Hezbollah had been so badly beaten by Israel a month earlier that it could no longer provide the support that might have helped Damascus stop the offensive led by the Syrian insurgent group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Sharaa’s government owes part of its victory to Israel’s pounding of Hezbollah. 

That being said, Syria is not going to undertake a military campaign against Hezbollah that Israel itself has been unable to carry out. It is not going to send its troops into the Bekaa Valley or Beirut’s southern suburbs. Hezbollah is not going to be removed easily, either by Israel or Syria. Instead, the Lebanese leadership, with U.S. backing, will need to lead efforts to disarm Hezbollah.

There are many routes ahead, including U.S.-backed plans to support a program in Lebanon under which Hezbollah would be disarmed in specific pilot zones, allowing residents to return as infrastructure is restored. Other proposals call for vetted units of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to tackle disarmament.

Trump makes a worthwhile point that Israel’s strikes on high-rise buildings in Beirut tend to harm civilians, while Hezbollah appears to move from place to place. To remove the militia, less harm should be done to civilian areas. Syria, which has a large community in Lebanon, can provide valuable insights on this. 

For instance, it could help isolate Hezbollah by cutting off smuggling routes and providing intelligence to the U.S. and others. Syria can provide further information gleaned from years of fighting Hezbollah during its civil war. Syria’s government could also work with other regional states that are engaging Damascus to explore ways to weaken Hezbollah.

Trump is right that Syria can play a role. However, this would not come through military action in Lebanon, but through regional and international cooperation aimed at reducing Hezbollah’s role. Syria could help pave the way for an understanding with Jerusalem while facilitating a broader Lebanon-Israel agreement.

Seth J. Frantzman is Senior Middle East Correspondent for The Jerusalem Post and a contributor to FDD’s Long War Journal and Breaking Defense, focusing on regional security, Israel, and conflict dynamics.