June 10, 2026 | Policy Brief
Showcasing Growing Ties, Xi Engages in Rare Visit to North Korea
June 10, 2026 | Policy Brief
Showcasing Growing Ties, Xi Engages in Rare Visit to North Korea
In a rare visit to the Hermit Kingdom, Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping sought to bring North Korea out of the cold.
Xi visited North Korea on June 8-9 for the first time in seven years, holding multiple events and discussions with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un while celebrating the 65th anniversary of both countries’ mutual defense agreement.
Xi’s presence highlighted Beijing’s desire to expand ties with the Kim regime while showcasing China’s growing acceptance of North Korea’s expanding nuclear program.
Visit Focuses on Expanded Cooperation, Omits Discussion of Denuclearization
The trip was Xi’s first foreign trip this year. In a Chinese state media readout, Xi committed to enhancing military and law enforcement exchanges with North Korea alongside expanding economic, scientific, and technological ties. In the same readout, Xi also called for fostering “close strategic communication” with Pyongyang while noting both countries’ shared history fighting against the United States during the Korean War.
However, neither China nor North Korea mentioned Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, reinforcing Beijing’s emerging reluctance to raise the issue publicly. While China has previously publicly committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula — Xi noted it in his 2019 visit — such language was notably absent both on this trip and from China’s official readout of Kim’s visit to Beijing in October 2025. This suggests that either Beijing is increasingly comfortable with tacitly accepting North Korea’s status as a nuclear state, or it has deprioritized denuclearization in favor of preserving strategic ties with Pyongyang.
North Korea Modernizes Its Military as Washington Considers Its Commitment to Seoul
China’s refusal to publicly discuss North Korea’s nuclear weapons program starkly contrasts with Pyongyang’s expansion of its arsenal amid a rapid military modernization effort.
On June 4, North Korean state media unveiled images of Kim touring a new uranium enrichment facility at the Yongbyon nuclear complex while pledging to expand the country’s arsenal “at an exponential rate.” Along with expanding its nuclear weapons stockpile to likely 60 warheads, Pyongyang has also modernized its conventional military capabilities, including its small-unit tactics, following the deployment of North Korean forces in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has also unveiled a new intercontinental ballistic missile likely capable of targeting the U.S. homeland and accelerated testing of cluster munitions and other missiles.
Meanwhile, Washington has continued to discuss its future posture on the peninsula. While the January 2026 National Defense Strategy suggested withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea and shifting primary responsibility for deterrence to Seoul, subsequent meetings between the two countries have yielded no public discussion of troop movements, creating uncertainty regarding the future of a U.S. military presence on the peninsula.
In a May 11 meeting with his South Korean counterpart, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth discussed transferring wartime operational control to the ROK military as well as Seoul’s plans to raise defense spending. Army Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, also acknowledged in April that munitions used by the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense battery stationed in South Korea had been moved from the peninsula due to the operational requirements of the Iran war.
Washington Should Strengthen Its Presence on the Peninsula
Xi’s visit to North Korea, combined with North Korea’s expanded enrichment facilities, highlights Pyongyang’s role within an emerging Axis of Aggressors that threatens U.S. national security.
In response to the visit, Washington should publicly reaffirm its commitment to defend South Korea, particularly under its extended deterrence posture, directly countering North Korea’s expanded nuclear arsenal. The United States should also coordinate with both Japan and South Korea to expand investments in missile defense, particularly in real-time monitoring and information-sharing of possible launches.
Both Seoul and Washington should strengthen their military industrial bases by accelerating shipbuilding initiatives. Greater cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea in shipbuilding would improve allied maritime readiness, expand industrial capacity, and help sustain a long-term regional force posture capable of deterring aggressors in the Indo-Pacific.
Jack Burnham is a senior research analyst in the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Jiwon Ma is a senior policy analyst at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at FDD. For more analysis from Jack, Jiwon, and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Jack on X @JackBurnham802. Follow Jiwon on X @jiwonma_92. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.