Why Is Saudi Arabia Circumventing the Lebanese State?

Aflurry of statements and reports reveals that Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar helped Hezbollah establish an indirect channel to U.S. President Donald Trump, offering a ceasefire in Lebanon on Hezbollah’s terms. Their proposal calls for Israel to halt military actions against the militia, relinquish control over Lebanese territory it wrested from it, and allow the Iranian proxy to reconstitute for future attacks against Israel.

For days, Hezbollah touted that it was forcing through a ceasefire, one which the Lebanese state had been unable to secure through diplomacy with Israel. Trump, for his part, repeatedly told the press that his administration had “talked to Hezbollah,” a Foreign Terrorist Organization per the U.S. Department of State, and that “all shooting must stop.” 

Since then, fighting in Lebanon has worsened, with the situation now on the verge of further escalation. Hezbollah and Iran rejected a U.S.-mediated ceasefire between Beirut and Jerusalem announced on June 3. The trilateral agreement was conditional on Hezbollah ending its fire on Israel and the Lebanese state asserting its authority over the militia. 

Everyone wants a ceasefire in Lebanon, but all proposed plans come with their own conditions. Both Israel and Lebanon seek a “ceasefire to end all ceasefires,” one tied to Hezbollah’s disarmament and the transfer of territory from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

Hezbollah, for its part, wants an unconditional ceasefire and Israeli military withdrawal. After the 2006 and 2024 wars, Hezbollah agreed to ceasefires that included Lebanon’s commitment to disarm the militia once hostilities ceased. Lebanon, however, never lived up to its promises. Instead, it pocketed Israel’s concessions to stop its campaigns and withdraw while allowing Hezbollah to reorganize and rearm. In effect, ceasefires amounted to little more than pauses in preparation for the next war.

Long targeted by Hezbollah and the Houthis, Saudi Arabia had spent decades defending itself against Iran’s proxy network. After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Saudi Arabia countered efforts by Iranian-backed militias to take over Iraq. This contributed to the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, a key figure in Riyadh’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah and restore Lebanese sovereignty.

Since then, Saudi Arabia has tried every trick in the book to disarm Hezbollah. In 2009, it patched up relations with the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria in hopes of luring Damascus away from Iran and Hezbollah. In 2016, it severed ties with Tehran and went as far as waging war on Iran’s proxy, the Houthis, in Yemen.

Until 2025, Riyadh had led the campaign against Iran’s bullying and belligerence across the Middle East. Then something changed. The kingdom started playing nice with Iran and took its foot off the pedal in efforts to counter Tehran’s network of regional militias. The reasons behind this shift in Saudi strategy remain unclear.

In the lead-up to the June 2025 war, Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman traveled to Tehran, where he met the late Ali Khamenei to warn him of an impending Israeli offensive. Ahead of the 2026 war, Saudi Arabia said that it would not allow the U.S. to use Saudi airspace or bases for any military operation against Iran.

Iran still attacked Saudi energy installations, inflicting tens of billions of dollars in damages, after the U.S. and Israel launched their military campaign against the Islamic Republic. Saudi Arabia responded tamely, summoning the Iranian ambassador for a reprimand but stopping short of expelling him. This showed Tehran that Riyadh was taking the strikes lying down. 

As the war continued, Iran scaled back its attacks on Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Following the April 8 ceasefire, it stopped targeting Saudi Arabia and Qatar altogether, while continuing intermittent attacks against the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Bahrain.

Despite being the world’s eighth-largest military spender, Saudi Arabia did not respond militarily to Iran’s attacks on its territory. Saudi officials justified their surrender by saying they sought to spare Saudi lives and sensitive economic infrastructure, including desalination plants. But Iran too has desalination plants to worry about had it escalated to such a level of brutality.

Riyadh’s choice to appease Iran while escalating its rhetoric against Israel is its own business. But its decision to actively undermine diplomacy between Lebanon and Israel, a pathway to peace and disarming Hezbollah, should not be tolerated by the Lebanese. 

Perhaps Saudi Arabia thinks itself big and important, and that it can boss Lebanon around. Such tactics might work with some Lebanese, but will infuriate many others. If the kingdom wants to play footsie with Iran and Hezbollah, it should be prepared to face the same venom directed at Iran and Hezbollah by Lebanese sovereignty advocates for decades.

Saudi Arabia and Lebanese opponents of Hezbollah have spent the last two decades together in the trenches against Iran. If the Saudis now want out, they must be prepared to be treated like Iran. However, if they mind their own business or once again support the disarmament of Hezbollah and peace with Israel, these disagreements will become water under the bridge.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a columnist focusing on Lebanon and broader Arab affairs.