Israel Risks Another “Managed” Conflict in Lebanon

Arecent flurry of diplomatic activity suggests Israel is restricted to a managed conflict, echoing previous inconclusive rounds of fighting. A new or partial ceasefire could give Hezbollah a morale boost as it seeks to regroup. Limiting Israeli military operations could lead to a campaign that does not achieve a clear goal, which would benefit neither Israel nor Lebanon.

On June 1, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Israel was calling back a strike on Beirut’s southern suburbs, adding that Israel and Hezbollah would halt their fire against each other. The announcement came after mounting warnings from Israel that it would expand its bombing to the greater Beirut area in retaliation to escalating Hezbollah attacks. Shortly after a phone call with Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would continue its campaign in southern Lebanon. If Hezbollah continued its cross-border attacks, he said, Israel would strike Beirut’s southern suburbs. 

The prospect of escalated Israeli military actions apparently raised concerns that it would complicate negotiations with Iran, which wants Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon preserved as part of any potential regional settlement. Trump’s comments appear to be another signpost in Israel’s campaign in Lebanon, where it has pursued an incremental strategy combining slow ground advances with precision airstrikes. Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah has already faced several pauses and ceasefires since the militia opened a front in support of Hamas on October 8, 2023.

U.S. pressure on Israel to not strike the greater Beirut area has been building in recent days. On May 31, Netanyahu said that he had “instructed the IDF to strike terrorist targets in Beirut. There will not be a situation in which Hezbollah attacks our cities and our citizens, and its terrorist headquarters in Beirut, in Dahiyeh, remains out of bounds.”

The statement hints at a managed conflict in Lebanon where Beirut’s southern suburbs, commonly known as Dahiyeh, have been “out of bounds.” Such a managed conflict was in force after the November 27, 2024 ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. At the time, Israel was supposed to give the Lebanese government maneuvering room to disarm Hezbollah. Israel continued to carry out near-daily precision airstrikes in Lebanon. These strikes, however, did not defeat Hezbollah. On March 2, 2026, the militia once again opened a front against Israel. Residents in northern Israel found themselves under heavy rocket and drone attacks.

When another cessation of hostilities between Beirut and Jerusalem took effect on April 17, 2026, in the wake of the U.S.-Iran ceasefire, it was unclear what would happen in Lebanon. Israel undertook a policy of establishing a buffer zone along the border, razing Lebanese villages. Hezbollah, for its part, began using fiber optic-guided drones against Israel, inflicting casualties as the IDF scrambled to counter the new threat. When Israel escalated its bombardment in Lebanon on May 26, renewed talk emerged in Jerusalem of “crushing Hezbollah.”

However, the offensive has been largely contained to southern Lebanon. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has been targeting northern towns and cities, including Kiryat Shmona, Karmiel, Nahariyeh, and Safed. This has led to another cycle where Israel and Hezbollah’s tit-for-tat attacks follow an equation. After the 2006 war, a similar equation took hold, with both sides refraining from actions that could provoke the other. There were flareups, including Hezbollah’s establishment of a tent in the disputed Mount Dov area, while Israel stepped up targeted assassinations of Hezbollah operatives in Syria.

Hezbollah likely perceives that every previous round of fighting has benefited it. The current conflict appears no different, with Hezbollah remaining in force in parts of Lebanon while Israel conducts precision airstrikes. Under this equation, Hezbollah moves from place to place, shifting its centers of planning from the Bekaa to Dahiyeh or other areas, confident it will survive the conflict. Hezbollah believes Israel will remain restricted to south of the Litani, where it will recreate the security zone in the 1980s and 1990s when Hezbollah rose to prominence. 

While Hezbollah may appear weakened in Lebanon, Iran now seeks to tie Beirut to a potential U.S.-Iran deal. This creates a precedent where Tehran is basically knitting the region together into one large fabric of conflict. Iran has done so in the past, but it matters more for Hezbollah now because Tehran might help preserve its proxy in Lebanon.

Israel’s decision to wage a relatively slow conflict in Lebanon, fighting Hezbollah near the border with ground forces, has led to Hezbollah being able to wait things out. For instance, Israel took the Beaufort Crusader-era fortress in a day of fighting in June of 1982. This time, it took roughly 1000 days of fighting for Israeli forces to decide to take the same symbolic site, several kilometers north of the Israeli border town of Metula. Israel’s current doctrine favors this slow method, which still leads to daily casualties. Hezbollah may also prefer this Israeli strategy.

Israel has sought to “manage” conflicts in the past, such as with Hamas. It has also sought to “shrink” conflicts, and conduct what it called a “campaign between the wars.” All of this has resulted in the same outcome. The enemy is slightly weakened, but remains standing. The only fundamental shift along one of Israel’s managed-conflict frontlines came in Syria, where the Assad regime fell in December 2024. Israel’s weakening of Hezbollah enabled the Syrian rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to overrun Assad’s forces. Without Hezbollah’s support, the Syrian army’s front lines rapidly collapsed. Hezbollah and Iranian-backed militias were subsequently expelled from the country.

In Lebanon, the risks of the current doctrine is that Hezbollah begins to perceive it is protected in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. This has historical precedent. In the Vietnam war, the U.S. Air Force was restricted in its combat operations over North Vietnam, with its rules of engagement changing often. 

These shifting restrictions “defined conditions under which certain forces, acts, aircraft, and vessels would be declared hostile and become eligible for air attacks. The rules further identified what enemy forces could be attacked by US aircraft and under what conditions. Finally, the rules described the degree of force American pilots could use in pursuing hostile enemy forces and in providing for their own self defense,” Ricky Drake wrote in a 1992 study of the conflict.

These complex rules allowed North Vietnamese troops to evade U.S. airpower because they knew certain areas, such as the capital Hanoi, were off limits. These lessons are relevant for current discussions about Dahiyeh.

Waging a geographically-limited war against Hezbollah would allow the group to shift resources to areas it believes are protected. The way the conflict is publicly debated, with potential target areas often discussed in advance, enables Hezbollah to prepare accordingly. 

While Hezbollah might accept U.S. pressure to halt its attacks on Israel and choose to only engage the IDF in southern Lebanon, the reality is that it would likely seek to replicate its growth the last time Israel attempted to enforce a security zone.

Seth J. Frantzman is Senior Middle East Correspondent for The Jerusalem Post and a contributor to FDD’s Long War Journal and Breaking Defense, focusing on regional security, Israel, and conflict dynamics.