Why the United States Should Pay More Attention to the War in Mali

Excerpt

In Africa, an Al Qaeda militia has surrounded a capital city, killed a defense minister, and blockaded 3 million people, and it is just getting started.

On April 27, fighters from Al Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) helped overrun Russian forces in the northern Malian town of Kidal, seizing weapon caches. On the same day, JNIM killed Mali’s pro-Kremlin defense minister. Days later, JNIM stormed a Malian maximum-security prison dubbed “Africa’s Alcatraz” just 60 miles from the capital of Bamako in an attempt to free high-value JNIM prisoners. Now, the jihadi militia has the capital Bamako—and its 3 million inhabitants—under a partial blockade.

Some 2,000 miles to the southeast, Nigeria’s defense minister is warning that violence from Mali could spill into his country. And he is right to be worried. But these developments also give the United States an opportunity to re-engage in West Africa productively—before a terrorist caliphate can fully take root.

For the past three years, Mali’s military junta has taken a gamble by kicking out Western security partners and inviting in Russia. French forces were expelled in 2022. American forces drew down from the region at the request of neighboring governments in 2024. Russia’s Africa Corps, the rebranded Wagner Group, arrived with fanfare and delivered failure. With its attention and resources consumed by Ukraine, Moscow never had the capacity to fill the void it encouraged Mali to create. JNIM filled it instead.

Daniel Swift is a senior research analyst for economics, finance, and trade for the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Mariam Wahba is a research analyst at FDD, focusing on Egypt, the Horn of Africa, and minorities in the Middle East.