China May Have Accessed U.S. Supercomputing Resources To Fuel Its Military Modernization Efforts

The United States may have inadvertently paid for China’s nuclear weapons research.

On January 15, Rep. John Moolenaar (R-MI), chairman of the China Select Committee, sent a letter to the National Science Foundation (NSF) alleging that Chinese universities involved with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) appear to have credentials for the NSF’s supercomputing systems. Though maintained by a civilian agency, the Advanced Cyberinfrastructure Coordination Ecosystem: Services & Support (ACCESS) is the primary computing hub for academics working in national security-related fields, including nuclear science and artificial intelligence.

NSF has not yet responded to the chairman’s record request to confirm or refute the committee’s findings. If confirmed, China’s access to these systems directly undercuts U.S. export controls and supports PLA modernization, particularly its efforts to modernize its nuclear weapons infrastructure.

Program Allows Domestic and Foreign Universities To Access High-End Computing

Under NSF guidelines, researchers must be based in the United States to use the ACCESS program, though they can add co-authors and other colleagues based abroad to facilitate shared investigations. The congressional probe, however, revealed that numerous Chinese universities, including the “Seven Sons of National Defense,” have standing access to the program. NextGov/FCW verified these findings, noting that the National University of Defense and Technology is among the dozens of academic institutions that appear to have access. The National University of Defense and Technology is subject to U.S. export controls for collaborating on chip designs with the Chinese military.

The loophole also appears to undercut longstanding U.S. export controls on supercomputing resources — a key technology in the design, production, and testing of nuclear weapons and used to power frontier AI systems. The Biden administration had previously moved to block the export of supercomputers to China, introducing a new export control policy in October 2022 specifically designed to prevent related components from flowing to firms and laboratories connected to the Chinese military.

China Has Previously Exploited Federal Research Programs

The investigation follows previous reports of Chinese military universities exploiting federally funded research programs to gain access to sensitive information related to military modernization. Another study, released in December by the China Select Committee and the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, found that the Department of Energy had financed thousands of academic papers on nuclear technology by Chinese academics affiliated with Beijing’s military and defense industries.

The findings also highlight China’s growing focus on nuclear weapons-related research, particularly as Beijing has rapidly expanded and diversified its arsenal. Over the past year, China has simultaneously displayed all three legs of its nuclear triad for the first time, built out its stockpile of siloed intercontinental ballistic missiles, and invested in developing low-yield weapons likely intended for battlefield use. These moves also coincide with China’s surging civilian nuclear program. Satellite photos from September appear to show the construction of a fusion research facility in Sichuan.

Washington Must Improve Accountability for Federal Research Funding

While the extent of Chinese universities’ access to American supercomputing resources remains unclear, the NSF should immediately audit the ACCESS program with the goal of expelling from its systems all academics affiliated with an adversarial military or any institution under trade sanctions.

Moreover, the NSF and other federal grant-making agencies should adopt more stringent research security measures. Building on the Department of Defense’s recent move to prohibit companies listed as Chinese military companies from receiving federal research funding, federal science agencies should prohibit grant funding from supporting joint research with Chinese military-linked institutions. These efforts should be paired with more aggressive enforcement mechanisms, with the Department of Justice prioritizing academic espionage investigations to prevent Chinese firms from stealing American research.

Jack Burnham is a senior research analyst in the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Jack and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Jack on X @JackBurnham802. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.