Israel Likely Eliminated Key Iranian Weaponization Site

Israel likely destroyed an Iranian site that played a key role in the Islamic Republic’s past nuclear weapons program, known as the Amad Plan. The potential elimination of the facility sends a strong message to Tehran that Jerusalem may target additional nuclear sites should Iran continue attacking the Jewish state.

Following Israel’s counterstrike against Iran on October 25, a building within the Parchin military complex, known as Taleghan 2, appeared demolished. Although neither Israel nor Iran has officially confirmed the site’s destruction, initial analysis of satellite imagery provided to Reuters by Institute for Science and International Security President David Albright, as well as imagery acquired by the Associated Press, appeared to show its elimination. Israel also eliminated several missile-related buildings that lie directly northwest of Taleghan 2 within the Parchin complex.

What Was Taleghan 2?

An earlier Institute analysis of Iranian activities at Taleghan 2 and other Parchin sites is based on Iranian nuclear files, plans, and photographs that the Israeli Mossad seized from a Tehran warehouse in 2018 and shared with the Institute. According to this Institute report, Taleghan 2 was roughly 40 meters long and built into a hillside. Prior to mid-2003, when Iran allegedly halted the Amad Plan, the Institute assessed that Tehran used a small test chamber inside Taleghan 2 to test high explosives. These activities constituted part of Iran’s development of a so-called multi-point initiation system, which creates a shock wave that helps set off a nuclear weapon explosion. Iran’s early nuclear weapon design used an MPI.

The Institute’s analysis of Iran’s nuclear archive also indicated that in addition to a test chamber, Taleghan 2 contained flash X-ray equipment powered by a Marx generator, which could “deliver fast pulses of energy” and “enable a rapid succession of images to be taken” of “high explosives compressing a core of natural uranium, simulating the initiation of a nuclear explosive.” This equipment could enable Tehran to test weapons components using natural uranium in lieu of weapons-grade uranium.

In 2012, as negotiations progressed on a nuclear deal between Iran and world powers, the clerical regime apparently began modifying and sanitizing Taleghan 2 as well as the nearby Taleghan 1 building, possibly in anticipation of international inspections. The nuclear archive indicated that Taleghan 1 previously contained a larger high-explosive test chamber than the one used at Taleghan 2. According to the nuclear archive materials, Tehran used the chamber at Taleghan 1 to test the functionality of the center of its nuclear weapon design, called a neutron initiator. Iranian experiments at either Taleghan 1 or 2 using uranium would have left traces for international nuclear inspectors, which could “explain why Iran sought to also sanitize [Taleghan 2] in the same manner used to sanitize Taleghan 1,” the Institute assessed.

Ultimately, the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), required Iran to submit environmental sampling to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that would enable the detection of potentially illicit nuclear activities — but, for reasons that remain unclear, only at Taleghan 1. During a 2015 visit to Taleghan 1, the IAEA did not observe the larger high explosive chamber previously located inside, since Iran likely relocated or dismantled it. However, the IAEA — using sampling physically carried out by Iran under the agency’s oversight — still detected particles of natural uranium that Tehran failed to declare as required by its IAEA nonproliferation safeguards agreement.

The other parties to the JCPOA, including the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, did not require Iran to explain the presence of uranium. In 2016, they began implementing the accord’s associated sanctions relief provisions. The IAEA’s inspection of Taleghan 1 appeared to be a mere box-checking exercise aimed at placating critics who lamented the Obama administration’s failure to reach a deal with Iran that permitted nuclear inspections at regime military sites.

The IAEA never visited Taleghan 2. However, Albright told Reuters after this weekend’s Israeli strike that even if Iran had removed key equipment prior to the Jewish state’s attack, the site retained “intrinsic value” to a weaponization program.

More Strikes May Be Ahead

Following Israel’s seizure of Iran’s archive of nuclear files in 2018, the IAEA — which received a copy — should have requested access to all of Iran’s former weaponization sites to ascertain whether Tehran continues nuclear weapons work in violation of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. The IAEA has never visited numerous other sites associated with Iran’s Amad Plan. Notably, the Parchin site also contains at least two other former Iran weaponization facilities, Shahid Boroujerdi and Golab Dareh. In September, the Institute assessed that the latter appears presently active.

Moreover, the IAEA has been unable for several years to assert that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful, and the regime remains a serial violator of its IAEA safeguards agreements. Perhaps most urgently, earlier this year, the U.S. and Israeli intelligence communities began to suspect that Iran had restarted nuclear weaponization work that could potentially further activities carried out at the Parchin sites.

From its strikes on Iran in both April and October, Israel has shown it can eliminate key Iranian radar, air defenses, missile facilities, and military sites — and has also likely destroyed one of Tehran’s former nuclear weaponization facilities. If the regime continues to refuse to open its program to stronger IAEA inspections and monitoring, as well as halt its attacks on Israel, additional strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities may be ahead.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Andrea on X @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.