Israel Missed Its Moment

Excerpt

The Great Arab Revolt—a better name for the “Arab Spring”—that began in Tunisia in 2010 accelerated a process that had started with the first Gulf War: the elimination of the radical Arab threat to Israel and the withering of the Palestinian cause. Granted, not much threat remained. The revolt scrambled the Middle East as the yearning for greater personal freedom, democracy, and prosperity gave way to sectarianism, civil strife, supercharged religious militancy, war, mass migration to Europe, and profound depression. Hating Israel and Western imperialism is now way down the list of regional grievances. The Arab intelligentsia, which sustained and drove anti-Zionism since the 1920s, effectively no longer exists. Anti-Zionism is probably a much more passionate subject on Western campuses than it is in Arab universities—outside of Gaza, the West Bank, and Jordan.

Anti-Zionism might rise again among Arabs. Lost causes, which is now what the quest for a Palestinian state most likely is, can have astonishing resonance. Israeli rule over the West Bank is probably permanent. Geography is destiny: Jerusalem simply can’t afford to allow militant Palestinians the capacity to launch drones and short-range missiles into Israel. Palestinian leadership has either egged on, co-opted, or been incapable of stopping radicals. A democratic West Bank, where neither Fatah nor Hamas enthrones itself and feeds on the commonweal, might eventually reconcile itself to the great disappointments that would come with a workable statehood; it might do the opposite. Israelis, who are skeptical of Muslims voting, clearly believe the latter is more likely. And Gaza, whether under Hamas or free from Islamist dictatorship, will remain a hot mess. The Western left will undoubtedly become more splenetic about Israelis, especially if they’re revanchist, religious right-wingers forcibly injecting themselves into Palestinian lives, and the Western media fuels global debates. The Abraham Accords could unravel if the ruling Arab elites determine they just don’t gain all that much from recognizing Israel (it may not be an economic bonanza) or if popular unrest reenergizes anti-Zionism (if the despised elites are for Israeli recognition, the people may go the other way).

An Arab state, however, is unlikely to become a serious threat for generations—with one possible exception. Egypt’s proximity to Israel and massive dysfunction could lead to revolution—a far more convulsive one than it saw in 2011—that empowers anti-Zionist forces. A bankrupt state could collapse, leading to a tsunami of emigration in all directions. (As Moses discovered, crossing the Sinai wouldn’t be easy.) But even in such scenarios, it’s hard to see the Egyptian military functioning again at a level that seriously threatens Israel.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former Iranian-targets officer in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, is a resident scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Follow him on X @ReuelMGerecht. FDD is a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.