January 31, 2019 |

Midterm Assessment: Libya

January 31, 2019

Midterm Assessment: Libya

Current Policy

The Trump administration, like its predecessor, has largely disengaged from political reconciliation efforts aimed at unifying Libya’s rival governments in the east and west. Instead, it has relied on the United Nations and Europe to manage the country’s political divisions and persistent instability. The United States has played a more active role in military operations against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), but engagement has remained limited even on these fronts.

Seven years after the fall of the Muammar al-Qadhafi regime, Libya remains mired in armed clashes, political discord, and economic crisis. The Tripoli-based government of Fayez al-Sarraj, known as the Government of National Accord (GNA), continues to compete for influence with the eastern-based government backed by the House of Representatives (HoR), which has aligned itself with General Khalifa Haftar’s Libya National Army (LNA). The GNA, which Washington and the UN recognize as Libya’s only legitimate government, emerged in December 2015 as a product of the UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement, which tasked the GNA with building a democratic state rooted in national consensus.

The United Nations, France, and Italy have taken the lead in resolving the Libyan crisis. The UN Action Plan seeks to facilitate approval of a new constitution and hold an inclusive national conference in early 2019, followed by new elections in the spring. The Action Plan also addresses humanitarian assistance and the need for economic and security reforms. France and Italy, though, have sparred over the future of Libya’s leadership, undercutting the UN plan. Paris, which chiefly fears that Libya’s instability exacerbates the risk of terrorist attacks on European soil, backs the HoR and LNA, which prioritize the defeat of Islamist terror groups. Rome, which has prioritized stemming the flow of migrants and preserving its robust economic ties with Tripoli, supports the GNA yet has recently shown willingness to engage with Haftar.

President Trump indicated his relative disinterest in Libya when he said in April 2017, “I do not see a role in Libya” for America aside from “getting rid of ISIS.”1 U.S. military leaders, however, have expressed greater concern. “The instability in Libya and North Africa may be the most significant, near-term threat to U.S. and allies’ interests on the continent,” said AFRICOM Commander General Thomas D. Waldhauser in September 2017. Political divisions, he noted, “exacerbate the security situation, spilling into Tunisia and Egypt and the broader Maghreb, allowing the movement of foreign fighters, enabling the flow of migrants out of Libya to Europe and elsewhere.”2 In March 2018, Waldhauser articulated four U.S. goals in Libya: “degrade terrorist groups who threaten U.S. interests and threaten to destabilize Libya and the region; avert civil war; support the political reconciliation process towards a unified central government; and assist to curb the flow of illegal migrants into Europe via Libya.”3

Even so, the Trump administration has offered little in the way of diplomatic engagement aside from limited economic assistance aimed at bolstering the GNA and Libyan civil society. To date, the U.S. embassy remains closed and there is no U.S. ambassador; the Libya External Office at the U.S. embassy in Tunisia serves instead as the primary base for U.S. diplomats engaging with Libya.

Following an aggressive air campaign in 2016 that contributed to the collapse of the Islamic State stronghold of Sirte on the Libyan coast, U.S. military activity has sharply diminished. As part of counterterrorist operations, the U.S. military conducted eight airstrikes against the Islamic State in Libya in 2017 and six airstrikes in 2018, targeting both the Islamic State and AQIM.4 The pace of activity may increase in 2019 if the Islamic State and AQIM take advantage of the country’s continuing instability to recover their strength.

Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis hosts Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj during a visit at the Pentagon on November 30, 2017. (U.S. Army photo by Darrell Hudson)

Assessment

The Trump administration’s actions in Libya seem to rest on the assumption that the UN, France, and Italy can address the country’s instability while U.S. counterterrorism operations can address direct threats. Yet the UN and the Europeans have not moved Libya much closer to creating a unified government with a legitimate military and security force. The prospects for achieving that goal would significantly improve through robust U.S. engagement.

In the absence of U.S. engagement, other countries are filling the void. Russia, seeking to burnish its credentials as a regional power, has worked to serve as a power broker between east and west Libya. In particular, Moscow has thrown its weight behind General Haftar and the LNA to safeguard its economic engagement with Libya in energy and infrastructure. France, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have also backed Haftar, who casts himself as a bulwark against terrorists and Islamists.

Libya has also suffered from destructive interventions by Turkey and Qatar, which seek a more Islamist order. In recent years, Turkey has repeatedly shipped arms to Libyan Islamist groups.5 Likewise, Qatar has shuttled Islamist militants to Libya.6 By contrast, Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia have supported the UN Action Plan and rejected all foreign interference, although Cairo’s support for Haftar is not consistent with this position despite its roots in legitimate security concerns. Chad, Niger, and Sudan also signed an agreement with Libya’s internationally recognized government to enhance cross border security by targeting human trafficking and arms and narcotics smuggling.7 The deal, however, lacks formal international recognition.

In the areas where the United States has exerted greater effort, it has enjoyed some tactical success. In September 2017, U.S. forces captured Mustafa al-Imam, a member of the Islamist terrorist group Ansar al-Sharia, who helped plot the 2012 attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, killing Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three others.8 Likewise, U.S. airstrikes on the Islamic State and AQIM have degraded the abilities of both terrorist groups, according to AFRICOM.9

Nonetheless, the Islamic State is still capable of carrying out attacks against state, military, and economic targets. The group has claimed responsibility for several major operations, including a December suicide attack on Libya’s foreign ministry in Tripoli, a September shooting at the Tripoli headquarters of National Oil Corporation, and a May attack on High National Election Commission. The Islamic State also has acknowledged that it perpetrated surprise attacks on the central town of al-Fuqaha and the southern town of Tazirbu in October and November, respectively.

The United States has also employed sanctions to target those responsible for disrupting oil exports, a major source of income for the GNA. In February 2018, the Treasury Department sanctioned six individuals, 24 entities, and seven vessels for destabilizing Libya by engaging in illegal oil transactions. Washington and the UN jointly sanctioned Libyan militia leader Ibrahim Jadran for carrying out attacks on oil facilities. They also jointly designated Libyan militia leader Salah Badi for undermining security by directing attacks on groups aligned with the GNA. While it is difficult to show a direct causal relationship between these actions and rising oil production, the country’s output recently jumped to  almost 1.3 million barrels per day, the highest since 2013, according to the state-run National Oil Corporation.10 In December, however, militia forces, tribesmen, and state guards seized the country’s largest oilfield, El Sharara, disrupting its production of 315,000 barrels per day.

A Libyan rebel on March 9, 2011 near Ras Lanuf, Libya. (Photo by John Moore/Getty Images)

Recommendations

The Trump administration should recognize that it cannot achieve its strategic objectives in Libya by relying on others to resolve the country’s political divisions. Moving forward, U.S. policy should adopt a holistic approach that engages all relevant stakeholders to achieve a unified, democratic Libya. As then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said in a January 2018 Security Council meeting on Libya, “The only legitimate path to power is through free and fair elections.”11

  1. Directly engage with Libyan stakeholders to advance implementation of the UN Action Plan. The Trump administration should urge Libya’s rival governments to work together to prepare for free, credible, and secure elections in order to bring an end to interim governments and reunify state institutions. It should expand America’s good governance programs and electoral support initiatives, and back comprehensive economic reforms based on the conclusions of Italy’s Palermo conference.12
  2. Nominate a U.S. ambassador to Libya and, when security permits, reopen the U.S. embassy in Tripoli. Washington needs a senior representative appointed by the president to engage effectively with Libyan and European leaders.
  3. Avoid taking sides in the Italian-French rivalry over Libya. Instead, the administration should work to create a unified international stance by recognizing the legitimate concerns of both countries and of the European Union.
  4. Carefully monitor Russian, Turkish, and Qatari intervention in Libya. The United States should be wary of Russian efforts to establish a permanent military presence in Libya. It should hold Turkey and Qatar accountable, potentially via sanctions, if they continue to provide arms and manpower to Islamist militias. Likewise, it should continue to monitor and sanction, in coordination with the UN, individuals or entities responsible for undermining the UN-led political process, endangering the lives of innocent civilians, squandering the country’s resources, and engaging in migrant smuggling and human trafficking.
  5. Continue the U.S. military counterterrorist campaign in coordination with the GNA, and provide training and advisory support to Libya to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State and AQIM. In the absence of an effective central authority, terrorists have ample opportunity to rebuild their strength.
  6. Recognize the border agreement signed between Libya, Chad, Sudan, and Niger, as recommended by UN special envoy Ghassan Salamé.13 This step would help prevent foreign-armed groups from exploiting Libyan territory.

A five-inch lightweight gun fires Mark 91 illumination rounds aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Carney, illuminating the shoreline of Sirte, Libya. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Weston Jones/Released)

  1. Glenn Thrush, “No U.S. Military Role in Libya, Trump Says, Rejecting Italy’s Pleas,” The New York Times, April 20, 2017. (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/us/politics/trump-italy-prime-minister-paolo-gentiloni.html)
  2. United States Africa Command, “2017 Posture Statement,” Statement for the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 9, 2017. (https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Waldhauser_03-09-17.pdf)
  3. U.S. Marine Corps General Thomas D. Waldhauser, Statement for the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 13, 2017. (https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Waldhauser_03-13-18.pdf)
  4. Bill Roggio, “US strikes target al Qaeda in Libya, Somalia,” FDD’s Long War Journal, December 4, 2018. (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/12/us-strikes-target-al-qaeda-in-libya-somalia.php); Eric Schmitt, “Under Trump, U.S. Launched 8 Airstrikes Against ISIS in Libya. It Disclosed 4,” The New York Times, March 8, 2018. (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/world/africa/us-airstrikes-isis-libya.html)
  5. Romany Shaker, “Illicit Turkish Arms Still Flow Into Libya Despite UN Embargo,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, December 21, 2018. (https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/12/21/illicit-turkish-arms-still-flow-into-libya-despite-un-embargo)
  6. Jonathan Schanzer, “Qatar’s support of the worst of the worst in Libya must end,” Newsweek, August 6, 2017. (https://www.newsweek.com/qatar-support-worst-worst-libya-must-end-646280); Edward Yeranian, “Gulf Coalition, Media Accuse Qatar of Shuttling IS Militants to Libya,” Voice of America, October 28, 2018. (https://www.voanews.com/a/gulf-coalition-media-accuse-shuttling-is-militants-libya/4089162.html)
  7. Mustafa Fetouri, “Will Libya’s newly signed border security agreement change anything?” Al-Monitor, June 8, 2018. (https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/libya-chad-niger-sudan-border-security-human-trafficking.html)
  8. The White House, “Statement by President Donald J. Trump on the Apprehension of Mustafa al-Imam for His Alleged Role in the September 11, 2012 Attacks in Benghazi, Libya Resulting in the Deaths of Four Americans,” October 30, 2017. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-apprehension-mustafa-al-imam-alleged-role-september-11-2012-attacks-benghazi-libya-resulting-deaths-four-americans)
  9. United States Africa Command, “2018 Posture Statement,” Statement for the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. (https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180306/106953/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-WaldhauserT-20180306.pdf)
  10. Salma El Wardany, “Libya Says Its Oil Output at Most Since 2013 Can Go Even Higher,” Bloomberg, September 23, 2018. (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-23/libya-says-its-oil-output-at-most-since-2013-can-go-even-higher); Ahmed Elumami, Ayman al-Warfalli, “Libya’s NOC declares force majeure on El Sharara oil exports,” Reuters, December 10, 2018. (https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-oil-sharara/libyas-noc-declares-force-majeure-on-el-sharara-oil-exports-idUKKBN1O90VH)
  11. Ambassador Nikki Haley, “Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Libya,” U.S. Mission to the United Nations, January 17, 2018. (https://usun.state.gov/remarks/8254)
  12. For the list of conclusions, see: Palermo Conference for and with Libya, “Conclusions,” November 12-13, 2018. (http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/conference_for_libia_conclusions_0.pdf)
  13. “UN urges implementation of border agreement among Sudan, Libya and Chad,” Sudan Tribune (France), September 8, 2018. (http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article66200)

Issues:

Arab Politics Libya