November 1, 2022 | FDD Tracker: October 3, 2022-November 1, 2022

Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: November

November 1, 2022 | FDD Tracker: October 3, 2022-November 1, 2022

Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: November

Trend Overview

Edited by David Adesnik

Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch.

Xi Jinping secured his third term as head of the Chinese Communist Party on October 23, with all signs pointing toward the further suppression of political pluralism and market forces at home as well as greater confrontation with the United States abroad. The Biden administration released its National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy in October, both of which affirm that China under CCP rule poses the foremost threat to the United States. Yet neither strategy explains clearly how the White House plans to address either shortfalls in U.S. military capability or the lack of sufficient military presence in the Indo-Pacific theater. Meanwhile, North Korea tested its 24th ballistic missile this year, the most since 2017. The White House has taken steps to improve the readiness of U.S. and allied troops on the Korean Peninsula but otherwise exerted little pressure on Pyongyang to disarm. In Iran, anti-regime protests continued to rage, passing the 40-day mark. The administration has expressed sympathy for the protesters and imposed sanctions on several Iranian targets, yet the White House remains wedded to its policy of offering hundreds of billions of dollars of sanctions relief in exchange for concessions on the nuclear front.

Please check back next month to see whether and how the president adjusts his foreign policy after mid-term elections that may cost his party control of one or both houses of Congress.

Trending Positive

Trending Neutral

Trending Negative

Trending Very Negative


By Craig Singleton

Previous Trend: Neutral

After years of foreshadowing, Xi Jinping secured a once unthinkable third term atop the Chinese Communist Party at the conclusion of last month’s 20th Party Congress. A triumphant Xi used the congress to confidently boast about China’s rising power and prospects, although he also issued stark warnings about the many threats the country faces. The formal extension of Xi’s tenure and his deft elimination of intra-party rivals cements China’s current policy orientation — one that is unambiguously hostile to political pluralism and free market forces.

Overall, Xi’s intensifying focus on economic statism and his refusal to relax his zero-COVID strategy bode ill for China’s already bleak economic outlook. Indeed, Chinese stocks plunged on word that Xi intends to deepen the party’s organizational integration throughout China’s commercial sector. These and other mounting risks, such as rising Chinese debt levels and decreasing demand for Chinese exports, will pose serious challenges for U.S. multinational companies operating in China. Moreover, Xi’s preference for appointing advisors seen as politically loyal versus technocratically competent suggests China’s aggressive ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy will remain a mainstay of Chinese foreign policy. The result: U.S.-China relations will deteriorate further.

For its part, the Biden administration’s newly released National Security Strategy correctly classifies China as America’s chief strategic competitor. The White House backed up its rhetoric by announcing sweeping restrictions on the sale of semiconductors and chip-making equipment to China, with the goal of curbing Beijing’s access to critical technologies. Still unclear, however, is whether the administration intends to bolster America’s military presence in the Indo-Pacific in light of China’s increasing belligerence.


By RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery and Jiwon Ma

Previous Trend: Positive

The Biden administration announced a number of measures to strengthen U.S. resilience amid increasingly frequent cyberattacks.

First, the administration announced it would prioritize the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, specifically in the water and wastewater systems, healthcare and public health, and transportation sectors. The announcement aligns with the recently issued National Security Strategy, which highlighted the need to secure critical infrastructure from foreign adversaries.

Second, the White House announced a new labeling program for Internet of Things (IoT) devices, which is expected to roll out in spring 2023. The program aims to create more transparent security and privacy standards in IoT devices for consumers. If implemented, the program would ensure the labeling of these devices aligns with international standards and informs consumers of security and privacy risks.

The Biden administration also continues to work with industry partners. After first announcing plans to develop a cyber workforce development strategy in July, the Office of National Cyber Director is now soliciting feedback and comments on the strategy. Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas called for increased U.S. government engagement with multinational companies to harmonize cyber incident reporting with international partners. In addition, the Transportation Security Administration’s new railroad security directive reflects significant industry input, providing further guidance and regulations for railroad operators.

While the National Cyber Strategy was originally expected this month, it is apparently still working its way through the laborious interagency review process.


By Bradley Bowman

Previous Trend: Neutral

The Department of Defense released the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy (NDS), Nuclear Posture Review, and Missile Defense Review on October 27. The NDS identifies four fairly standard “top-level defense priorities” designed to “strengthen deterrence,” an urgent task given the growing threats from Beijing. The priorities include defending the homeland; deterring strategic attacks against the U.S., its allies, and its partners; deterring aggression and being prepared to prevail in conflict; and ensuring future military advantage by building a resilient force and defense ecosystem. The Pentagon lists three important but vague ways it will achieve these objectives: “integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantage.”

As is often the case with strategies published in Washington, the NDS lacks sufficient specificity regarding the resources necessary to accomplish the desired ends. That’s a problem given the daunting array of threats the NDS describes, serious U.S. military capacity shortfalls, and the growing gap between Washington’s words and actions related to Taiwan.

In the NDS’s formulation, Beijing is the U.S. military’s “pacing challenge” (i.e., most comprehensive and serious threat) and Russia remains an “acute” threat, even as North Korea expands its nuclear and missile capability. For its part, Tehran continues to “improve its ability to produce a nuclear weapon,” while building and exporting to its terror proxies “extensive missile forces, uncrewed aircraft systems, and advanced maritime capabilities.”

When it comes to terrorism, the NDS says al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates “have had their capabilities degraded.” Notably, the 80-page document only mentions “Afghanistan” once.


By John Hardie

Previous Trend: Positive

President Biden and his G7 counterparts met virtually with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on October 11. In a joint statement, the G7 leaders welcomed “Zelenskyy’s readiness for a just peace,” which “should include” respect for Ukraine’s “territorial integrity and sovereignty,” protecting Ukraine’s capability for future self-defense, “exploring” the use of Russian funds for Ukrainian reconstruction, and “pursuing accountability” for Russian war crimes. This constitutes Biden’s first public articulation of his desired end-state in Ukraine since his May 31 op-ed, in which he said he seeks “a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine with the means to deter and defend itself against further aggression.” The statement also tacitly endorses Zelenskyy’s opposition to talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who would never accept the conditions the G7 laid out.

The next day, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin led a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, where efforts to bolster Ukraine’s air defenses topped the agenda. The administration says it is working to expedite delivery of the first two NASAMS air defense systems promised to Ukraine, set for November. Austin later met separately with his counterparts from NATO and nine eastern-flank countries.

On the energy front, the U.S. plan to cap the price of seaborne Russian oil exports hit choppy waters. Longer-than-expected internal and international negotiations have reportedly forced the administration to postpone announcement of the cap price until after the midterm elections. The administration also reportedly plans to settle for a higher and more loosely policed cap, in which top customers India and China will not participate.


By Hussain Abdul-Hussain

Previous Trend: Negative

After threatening Saudi Arabia with consequences for leading OPEC+ to cut oil production by 2 million barrels a day, the Biden administration welcomed Saudi “moves” on Ukraine that included voting against Russian annexation at the UN and offering Kiev humanitarian assistance. The administration’s praise signaled that Washington was cooling its attacks, which started after the Saudi-led OPEC+ announced its intention to cut daily oil production by two million barrels.

Biden had privately asked the Saudis to delay their cut by a month, but Riyadh seemed unwilling to grant favors that could help out the Democrats in the midterm election scheduled for November 8.

The OPEC+ move prompted some Democrats to attack Saudi Arabia and call for a U.S. troop withdrawal, arguing that Riyadh should be punished for siding with Russia by keeping energy prices high. The Saudis responded that their decision was “purely economic” and independent of the war in Ukraine. Saudi Arabia voted against Russia at the United Nations and donated a token $4 million in humanitarian aid to Kyiv.

To mitigate the oil cartel’s decision, Washington announced the sale of 15 million barrels of oil from its strategic reserves, which makes up for half of lost Saudi production in October. Behind the scenes, however, reports indicated that the Saudis were maintaining their high sales levels, despite production cuts, mainly by tapping into their reserves. This suggests that either the Saudis changed their mind after the announced cut, seeing the negative American reaction, or that the Biden administration reacted prematurely.


By Craig Singleton

Previous Trend: Neutral

The Biden administration’s long-awaited National Defense Strategy (NDS) puts into sharp focus the threat posed by China’s expanding presence throughout the Indo-Pacific. Specifically, the strategy asserts that China is the “most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security” given its “coercive and increasingly aggressive” attempts to “refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences.” Thus, the NDS states the Pentagon intends to build up its network of bases and better coordinate with the State Department to expand U.S. access throughout the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, the document is devoid of much specificity about how the Pentagon will shift weapons and personnel to the region to support an era of heightened superpower competition.

The NDS’s rollout overlapped with Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman’s travel to Japan, where she stressed that the United States’ commitment to defending both Japan and South Korea was “ironclad,” and that Washington is focused on preserving “an open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.” However Sherman’s trip also coincided with reports that the U.S. intends to replace its entire fleet of F-15 fighter jets based in Okinawa, Japan, with a “rotational” force, a shift that American and Japanese officials privately conceded weaken deterrence of China. Such mixed messaging runs the risk of undermining American credibility at a time when Indo-Pacific countries are increasingly concerned about rising tensions between Washington and Beijing.

International Organizations

By Richard Goldberg

Previous Trend: Neutral

The 51st session of the UN Human Rights Council concluded on October 7 without the United States putting forward a resolution to terminate the council’s open-ended commission of inquiry into Israel, which seeks to build a false narrative that Israel is an apartheid state. Later in the month, the commission released its second report condemning Israel without making a single reference to terrorist organizations that launch attacks against Israeli civilians. The administration’s failure to shut down the commission and fix the council’s systemic bias against Israel — despite promising to do so — comes on the heels of a failure to persuade the council to debate the human rights situation in Xinjiang where China is committing genocide. The Biden administration’s inability to achieve reforms through a strategy of engagement became clear this month at the World Health Organization as well, when the Associated Press reported that the head of the agency’s Syria office allegedly mismanaged millions of dollars and provided favors to senior Assad regime officials. This misconduct occurred throughout WHO Director Tedros’ first term when FDD repeatedly raised concerns about the agency’s relationship with the Syrian government. The Biden administration opted not to field a candidate to run against Tedros for re-election this year and then backed Tedros’ new budget financing scheme that dilutes the influence of large donors like the United States. Separately, the Biden administration successfully whipped a UN General Assembly vote on a resolution condemning Russia’s continued war against Ukraine.


By Behnam Ben Taleblu and Richard Goldberg

Previous Trend: Very Negative

Nation-wide protests against the Islamic Republic continued across Iran, with demonstrations passing the 40-day mark in late October. Iranian intelligence organizations continue to deflect blame for provoking the protests, in part by falsely impugning foreign intelligence organizations and non-governmental think-tanks.

On at least three occasions last month, the Biden administration’s Treasury Department issued sanctions against persons and entities in Iran, twice in response to protester repression and internet censorship, and once to designate the Iranian foundation which offered a bounty for the killing of Indian-born British-American writer Salman Rushdie who survived a stabbing attack this August. These human rights penalties, while significant, would have a greater impact if imposed on national leaders like Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi. What’s more, the administration continues to seek a nuclear deal with Tehran that would deliver $275 billion of sanctions relief in its first year alone. October also marked the first month since April that the U.S. did not announce new sanctions against Iranian energy smuggling networks.

Meanwhile, Tehran’s footprint in Russia’s war against Ukraine is deepening, particularly after the reported deaths of 10 Iranians in a strike in Russian-occupied Ukraine. Iran is now set to provide not just more loitering munitions like the Shahed-136, but for the first time ever, solid-propellant short-range ballistic missiles like the Fateh-110 and Zulfiqar, which Iranian forces previously used in operations in the Middle East.


By David May

Previous Trend: Neutral

Secretary of State Antony Blinken congratulated Israel and Lebanon “for finalizing their agreement, facilitated by the United States, to establish a permanent maritime boundary” on October 27. President Joe Biden said the deal “sets the stage for a more stable and prosperous region,” ensuring the extraction of offshore energy deposits. While Prime Minister Yair Lapid defended the deal his government made, other Israelis criticized the agreement as a capitulation to Lebanon and Hezbollah — the latter pressed Israel to accept Lebanese terms by threatening to attack Israel’s Karish offshore gas rig. The deal came just days before the November 1 election, Israel’s fifth since April 2019.

Prior to the signing, Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Washington on October 25–26, met with the president and other top U.S. officials, and discussed both developments in Iran and the need to de-escalate tensions in the West Bank. The dimming of prospects of Biden’s effort to revive the 2015 nuclear deal have alleviated some friction in the U.S.-Israel relationship.

On the day of Herzog’s arrival, several top U.S. and Israeli officials convened the 48th U.S.-Israel Joint Political-Military Group to discuss mutual concerns and opportunities.

On the Palestinian front, Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary-general of the Palestine Liberation Organization and an inside candidate to be the next Palestinian president, visited Washington on October 4 and met with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. This was the first Washington visit by a Palestinian official since 2017. Abbas’ comments a week later praising Moscow and expressing distrust towards Washington “deeply disappointed” the U.S.


By David Maxwell

Previous Trend: Neutral

October culminated with additional North Korean ballistic and cruise missile tests — setting a record for the number of launches in a single year — along with continued rocket and artillery firings. North Korean forces also undertook operations in the DMZ and West Sea. The tests entailed launching a variety of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles as well an intermediate-range missile that overflew Japan for a record distance. Analysts assess the 2018 North-South Comprehensive Military Agreement has, in effect, failed. This appears to put the final nail in the coffin of the diplomatic initiatives of 2018–2019 undertaken by former presidents Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in.

The ROK/U.S. alliance has responded with increased readiness exercises on land, at sea, and in the air to include the deployment of the USS Ronald Reagan carrier battle group and strategic assets to Guam to demonstrate strength and resolve.

Despite calls to recognize the North as a nuclear state and conduct arms control negotiations, the Biden administration has correctly resisted. If the alliance gives in to North Korea’s blackmail diplomacy, Kim will assess his strategy a success and likely double down.

With the completion of the Chinese Party Congress, speculation continues that there will be a seventh nuclear test. Senior diplomats from the ROK, Japan, and the U.S. have warned of an unparalleled (but unspecified) response to a test.

Despite a regime crackdown, Koreans in the north continue to watch South Korean media. This indicates that a robust information and influence campaign would be well received by the Korean people in the North.

Latin America

By Carrie Filipetti and Emanuele Ottolenghi

Previous Trend: Negative

On October 30, former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva won a run-off election against incumbent Jair Bolsonaro. While Lula’s victory was expected, his likely yielding to China, celebration of BRICS, and history of corruption foretell a complicated relationship with the United States.

Secretary Blinken visited Colombia, Peru, and Chile last month to cement relations with three traditional U.S. allies who recently elected left-leaning leaders. In addition, the State Department’s special coordinator on global anti-corruption made a trip to Paraguay in late October to push the administration’s anti-corruption agenda.

On October 24, the Biden administration established a new executive order authorizing Treasury to target individuals who operate in the Nicaraguan gold sector, proceeds from which are used to pay off regime officials.

Venezuela policy remains mixed. The administration negotiated the release of seven American hostages in Venezuela at the cost of granting clemency to two nephews of Nicholas Maduro’s wife Cilia Flores, who have been in prison in the U.S. for drug trafficking. Meanwhile, the United States is considering authorizing Chevron to begin capital investments in Venezuela’s oil sector. This would weaken U.S. leverage against a regime accused of crimes against humanity.

Finally, as cholera spreads and political violence continues in Haiti, the Biden administration has responded by sending security equipment to aid the Haitian National Police “in their fight against criminal actors who are fomenting violence and disrupting the flow of critically-needed humanitarian assistance.” The administration’s reluctance to directly dispatch troops to the troubled island, due to fears of stoking anti-American sentiment, is hampering aid efforts.


By Tony Badran

Previous Trend: Very Negative

The Biden administration succeeded in pushing the caretaker government of Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid to sign a maritime boundary demarcation deal with Lebanon just days before Israel’s general election. The administration got the Lapid government to forfeit its claims to the entire disputed area that Hezbollah demanded through its cutouts in the Lebanese government.

Nevertheless, the administration described the deal as “not a win-lose agreement,” as each side got “different things,” with Israel supposedly getting “security” gains. However, with this deal, the administration tied Israel’s security to Lebanon’s, declaring that the deal provides “the kind of security both countries need,” and that the “best security guarantee for both countries” is a “prosperous Lebanon.” Underscoring that Lebanon’s security, stability and prosperity were inseparable from its “commitment to [Israel’s] security,” the administration was thus putting checks on Israeli action against Hezbollah in Lebanon while inserting the U.S. in the middle as a guarantor and arbiter.

Shortly after the deal was announced, the U.S. energy envoy, Amos Hochstein, reiterated the administration’s commitment to see through its second major Lebanon initiative: importing gas from Egypt to Lebanon via Syria. The deal would generate tens of millions of dollars for the Syrian regime and violate U.S. sanctions on Damascus despite Hochstein’s assertion that the deal is consistent with U.S. law. Meanwhile, World Bank Vice President for Middle East and North Africa Farid Belhaj stated that, in order to consider funding the project, Lebanon must first undertake electricity sector reforms, which remain “distant.”

Lastly, as the administration looks to push ahead with its third major Lebanon initiative — paying the salaries of the army and internal security forces (ISF) — the ISF has been busy rounding up alleged Israeli spy networks on behalf of Hezbollah.

Nonproliferation and Biodefense

By Anthony Ruggiero and Andrea Stricker

Previous Trend: Negative

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned that Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) — Europe’s largest — remains “vulnerable” to power outages. Russia seized the plant in March and continues to jeopardize its safety and security. IAEA efforts have focused on ensuring that the plant has a steady, reliable source of external power “for reactor cooling and other essential safety and security functions” as well as establishing a “safety and security protection zone” free of military activity.

Russia also made baseless accusations that Ukraine is planning to use a “dirty bomb,” which uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. UN Secretary-General Guterres, President Biden, and other Western leaders denounced Moscow’s dangerous rhetoric. The IAEA director general agreed to a request from Kyiv for the agency to inspect two nuclear sites in Ukraine to confirm that no party had diverted radioactive materials. Russia also accused Washington and Kyiv of producing biological weapons in Ukraine. Western governments pushed back against both efforts at a UN Security Council meeting.

North Korea has reportedly completed preparations for a nuclear test — its seventh since 2006. Pyongyang may test miniaturized, “tactical” nuclear weapons, which are small and fit atop short-range missiles to facilitate use on the battlefield. North Korea may also test larger, two-stage devices, known as boosted fission weapons, which the Pyongyang regime previously tested in 2017. The United States assured South Korea that Seoul is backed by the “full range” of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear weapons.


By John Hardie

Previous Trend: Positive

The Biden administration committed $1.625 billion in additional military aid to Ukraine, drawing directly from U.S. stocks to hasten delivery. The new packages included four additional HIMARS rocket artillery systems and more GMLRS rockets, which will help Ukraine continue to degrade Russian logistics and command and control. They also included 200 MaxxPro Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles and 325 up-armored Humvees, providing much-needed armored transport for Ukrainian troops looking to retake additional territory.

On October 21, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin called Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to stress the need for open communication channels to help “manage escalation and prevent potential miscalculation,” per the Pentagon. Austin reportedly also hoped to clarify Moscow’s potential triggers for nuclear use in Ukraine. It was their first call since May. During an October 23 follow-up call that Shoigu requested, he accused Kyiv of planning to detonate a so-called “dirty bomb” and pin it on Russia. Shoigu repeated the allegation to his Turkish, French, British, Indian, and Chinese counterparts, as did the chief of Russia’s General Staff in calls with his British and American counterparts. A U.S.-UK-French joint statement rejected “Russia’s transparently false allegations” and affirmed “their shared determination to continue supporting Ukraine.” Some U.S. officials reportedly worry Moscow may be seeking to set the stage for its own false-flag attack, perhaps to justify subsequent nuclear use. The administration says it has seen no indication Russia is preparing to use either weapon. Administration officials reportedly continue to game out potential U.S. responses.

Sunni Jihadism

By Bill Roggio

Previous Trend: Neutral

The Biden administration approved a new policy that requires the president himself to approve additions to the list of terrorists whom the U.S. military can target with lethal strikes outside of active war zones. Biden’s decision reverses Donald Trump’s policy of letting commanders in the field have greater latitude. Additionally, the Biden administration “intends to launch fewer drone strikes and commando raids away from recognized war zones than it has in the recent past,” according to The New York Times. During the month of October, the U.S. military killed three Islamic State leaders in two targeted strikes in Syria, as well as Abdullahi Yare, a wanted Shabaab leader, in a strike in Somalia. The U.S. government listed 14 Shabaab leaders, including a key leader in the group’s intelligence serves, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Meanwhile, the Islamic State is regrouping and becoming resurgent in Iraq.

The Biden administration is deciding if it should accept a plea deal that would avert a death penalty trial for five terrorists, including Khalid Shiekh Mohammad, an architect of 9/11, who are currently being held at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility. In Afghanistan, the Taliban named Mohammad Nabi Omari, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee who is also a senior leader in the Haqqani Network and maintains close ties to Al Qaeda, to serve as its “first deputy” to Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Minister of the Interior.


By David Adesnik

Previous Trend: Neutral

The World Health Organization (WHO) is investigating its top official in Syria, Ajkemal Magtymova, who faces allegations from her staff that she bribed Syrian regime officials with cars, computers, and gold coins while committing numerous other abuses. WHO staff also alleged that Magtymova met surreptitiously with Russian military figures in Syria, a potential breach of UN neutrality. WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus did not respond to an employee complaint that Magtymova gave jobs to unqualified relatives of Syrian regime officials.

This past January, the chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate committees on foreign relations asked President Biden to develop a strategy for preventing the theft of humanitarian aid in Syria to ensure it “ends up in the hands of those who need it most.” While the administration made a concerted effort to prevent Russia from blocking the delivery of aid to desperate Syrians, no senior official, let alone the president, has acknowledged that the Assad regime expropriates vast sums for its own benefit, while the UN remains paralyzed or even complicit. The Magtymova investigation provides an opportunity for the administration to reverse its course and take an active approach to this challenge.

On October 24, the State Department imposed minor sanctions on three Syrian military officials responsible for the use of chemical weapons against civilians in 2013. The three officials and their families will now be ineligible for U.S. visas. The decision is consistent with the administration’s avoidance of any sanctions on Syria that would exert meaningful economic pressure.


By Sinan Ciddi

Previous Trend: Positive

The Biden administration continues to keep a close eye on Turkey’s financial dealings with Russia. In late October, Elizabeth Rosenberg, the Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, visited Ankara to meet with her counterparts. The visit had two goals: to inform Turkey of Washington’s awareness that illicit Russian financial assets continue to enter Turkey, and, secondly, to encourage the Turkish government to enforce “sanctions and export controls imposed on Russia by a broad coalition of over 30 countries, energy security, anti-money laundering policy, and countering the financing of terrorism.”

Although Ankara insists it is interested in addressing U.S. concerns, $28 billion of currency from “unclear origins” found its way into Turkish banks in the first eight months of 2022. The Turkish finance minister has unconvincingly tried to explain this away as “net errors and omissions”, leading U.S. officials to suspect that Turkey welcomes illicit Russian financial assets. Washington’s response to Ankara’s apparent deception has tepid, however, with the State Department declaring Turkey should not “be a safe haven for Russia.”


The analyses above do not necessarily represent the institutional views of FDD.


Arab Politics Biodefense China Cyber Gulf States Indo-Pacific International Organizations Iran Iran Global Threat Network Israel Jihadism Lebanon Military and Political Power Nonproliferation North Korea Palestinian Politics Russia Syria Turkey U.S. Defense Policy and Strategy Ukraine