The Israeli Perspective

LAPID: Eventually we will attack Iran’s nuclear facility, because there’s no other choice.

HULATA: Israel is committed to defend ourselves by ourselves and we’ll do whatever it takes with whatever we have, so that Iran does not become a nuclear power.

DUBOWITZ: “Death to Israel, the Little Satan.” It’s all too familiar, this rallying cry of the Islamic Republic regime officials and their sympathizers. They’ve been chanting this for almost 50 years now. But make no mistake, they mean what they say. With its terrorist proxies across the region, the Iran threat has been knocking on Israel’s door for decades. But on October 7th, 2023, they knocked down the door. Following this horrific attack, the worst against the Jewish people since the Holocaust, carried out by Iran-backed Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Gaza, what was previously considered a war between wars came out of the shadows and into plain sight.

Tehran activated its regional terror proxies, like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi terrorists in Yemen, to pile on with direct rocket attacks in an attempt to overwhelm Israel’s already taxed security apparatus. And in an unprecedented move, not once, but twice last year, a missile attack on Israel was launched directly from Tehran with hundreds of cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drones. As a new Trump administration grapples with how to face the threat from Iran, understanding the Israeli perspective is vital. To help us do that, I’m speaking with Israel’s former Prime Minister, Yair Lapid, as well as with former National Security Advisor, Eyal Hulata, now a senior fellow here at FDD.

I’m Mark Dubowitz. This is The Iran Breakdown. So let’s break it down.

Yair Lapid, wonderful to have you on the podcast. This is the Iran Breakdown. And I want to talk to you about the time that you served in office, about Iran. I think one of the most significant moments of your time in office was the Jerusalem Declaration that was signed between you and President Biden. And it really expressed, I think for the first time in writing, the U.S. president’s commitment to using all instruments of national power to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Tell us a little bit about how that came about and your sense from the President of whether this really was a firm commitment for the United States to use military force to stop an Iranian nuclear breakout.

LAPID: First of all, yes, but there was something there that goes a little deeper. We were discussing this with the Americans saying, “Listen, this is not an Israeli problem. Nuclear Iran is not something that Israel needs to solve. And looking for the best friend to help her with.” A nuclear Iran will throw the entire Middle East into an arms race, a nuclear arms race, because no way on earth the Iranians are going to have a nuclear bomb without the Turks developing, immediately, a nuclear program of themselves, the Egyptians as well.

DUBOWITZ: The Saudis.

LAPID: The Saudis would either build an industry or buy a bomb from Pakistan. And here you have a new Cold War on your hands. And then it also shakes the questionable stability between India and Pakistan and so on and so forth. So we were talking with the Americans about this, with the American administration about this, and said, “We need to work on this together as allies and partners. And we want this to cross one administration or another. It needs to be a long lasting joint effort, because they’re not going to stop.” The Iranians are very good at waiting. They’re very good at playing the cards according to what else is happening. They are unfortunately, a patient player, and therefore it has to be declarative. And this is why we have signed this, not only as an American commitment to Israel, but an American-Israeli commitment to the world, that we are not going to tolerate nuclear Iran.

DUBOWITZ: I want to talk a little bit about Israel’s ability to stop Iran militarily. I recall that when you and Naftali Bennett came into government, and you opened the hood to see what had been worked on. Perhaps there was nothing there, or I wouldn’t say nothing there, but in terms of the level of Israeli military preparedness, perhaps you were surprised to discover that things were not as advanced as Prime Minister Netanyahu at the time was rhetorically suggesting they were.

LAPID: There was a gap between the talk and the walk. I mean, of course I cannot comment on the details, but there was quite a significant gap. But fortunately, we caught it on time in order to make sure that we are closing this gap. And I think – it’s more than I think, I know a lot of things that even in this government… I mean, one of the last things I did as prime minister, I called Netanyahu one day, it was after the election already, and I said, “Listen, there’s a thing that we want to have. I’m going to put the money now, only if you are promising that you’re going to put the money when your time comes, because otherwise it’s just money down the drain.”

And so this is one of the very few things we did together in a positive way. Usually when we meet, it’s not that nice. So yes, Israel, I mean, we were taken by surprise in ways, but fortunately this gap was not that wide, so there was an ability to close it down. It took a lot of hard work on our account, both Naftali [Bennett] and me, we were very committed to it. We allocated not only the money, but the efforts of the Israeli security system. And we can do a lot, not everything, but a lot, Israel can do a lot to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear.

DUBOWITZ: So because of the investment that you and Naftali made in Israel’s military preparedness, we actually saw that on full display in April of last year, but particularly in October of last year, with some pretty remarkable capabilities. Particularly from the Israeli Air Force in destroying Iran’s strategic air defenses, going after their ballistic missile production capability, hitting Parchin, where in Iran, according to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] worked on weaponization activities in the past. But I recall that you were critical of Prime Minister Netanyahu for not doing enough, for not going after either assets. Can you talk a little bit more about what you would’ve done? And where you think the Israeli military and the Israeli government should have gone on that fateful day?

LAPID: Well, my thinking was and still is, that if you want to go after Iran, and we must, I mean the word is not “should”, but “must”, so you have two ways to go about it: go directly to the nuclear facilities of Iran, or ask yourself, “what are the origins of Iranian power that is making this industry or these facilities possible?” And the answer is the Iranian economy. This is a regime that is using way more than it can afford of its resources for two bad reasons. One, is the nuclear program, and the other one is the Iranian proxies around the Middle East that are supporting terror everywhere. So my thinking is that we should go for the Iranian economy. And going after the Iranian economy is actually quite simple, because this is an economy based totally on the oil industry. The oil industry is basically in an island, all the refinement and everything, the size you gave me when we discussed this, the analogy of another island, how small is that?

DUBOWITZ: I don’t know. It may be even smaller than Prince Edward Island in Canada.

LAPID: Okay.

DUBOWITZ: Yeah.

LAPID: You got a lot of islands in Canada, right? So it’s a small island and we can destroy the oil fields and the oil industry of Iran, which means destroying the Iranian economy, enforcing the government of Iran in answering the people of Iran, “Why is it that in a country that is already in economic chaos, you are making our lives so miserable, just in order to have nuclear capabilities that are not helpful to our lives, in no way?” This will create… I mean…

DUBOWITZ: So, you mean going after refineries, going after pipelines, going after ports. But I want to ask you…

LAPID: It’ll by the way, hurt the Chinese economy quite a bit.

DUBOWITZ: Correct.

LAPID: … which I think at least in the current American administration eyes, is not necessarily a bad thing.

DUBOWITZ: But the same president, President Biden, who you signed the direct Jerusalem Declaration with who said that the United States is committing to use all instruments of national power to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, that same president, I think forced the prime minister to limit the number of strategic assets that Israel went after. He said, “No economic assets, no nuclear assets.” So he effectively took those off the table. Should an Israeli prime minister always listen to an American president who’s telling that prime minister to take assets off the table, targets off the table? In that case, in October, should Prime Minister Netanyahu have gone further hit economic assets, perhaps even hit key nuclear assets in defiance of President Biden?

LAPID: Well, first of all, I’m not sure if defiance is the right word, considering the fact that we are after all, an independent country with our own needs, strategic plans, means, problems. I mean, there’s nothing more important for Israeli security than the alliance with the United States. There’s no greater goal than maintaining, by the way, the bipartisan support for Israel in the American system, and the ability to work as smoothly as possible with any administration. Having said that, sometimes you say no. I said no. One of the things that were quoted quite a bit is the time I said, “You know what? Unlike Netanyahu…” I said more times no to the administration than Netanyahu, but I did it behind closed doors, which is the right way to do it. Don’t publicize, don’t advertise.

You sometimes says, “Listen, this is…” Either you call them afterwards and you say, “I didn’t want to call you, because I didn’t want to corner you into the point that you have to say no, and I have to say I’m doing it anyway.” Sometimes you have the discussion, sometimes you change some of the things you want to do. It’s like any relationship. It’s detailed, delicate, and you have to be smart going about with it. And you can’t do it too often, considering the fact that you’re using American weapons, or at least partly using American weapons, while doing it. So there’s no textbook answer to the question you’ve asked. But if you ask me, if there is a scenario in which Israel is saying, “Well, we’re sorry, we’re going to do what we’re going to do,” especially after Israeli citizens were attacked and killed, and after October 7th also massacred. And we have to remember that Hamas was supported by Iran in so many ways. So sometimes you do say no.

DUBOWITZ: It’s interesting, I mean, when you talk about red lights, green lights, and orange lights with respect to the U.S.- Israel relationship. So we now have a new president who’s committed to maximum pressure, has issued a presidential memorandum. You saw designations just yesterday from the U.S. Treasury Department.

LAPID: Yes.

DUBOWITZ: They’re clearly committed to economic sanctions. President Trump was very tough on Iran in his first term. But he’s certainly sent out messages publicly, and I assume privately, that he wants to try negotiations with Iran. And I have to say, Mr. Lapid, I’m personally concerned about negotiations with Iran. I’m concerned the Iranians are going to try to rope-a-dope this administration into negotiations, pull them in, extend those negotiations, get beyond the October period when the snapback expires. And these are the U.N. resolutions that one party to the deal can snap back unilaterally and Iran gets hundreds of billions of dollars of sanctions relief.

President Trump does a deal, calls it, “the greatest deal ever negotiated”, submits it to the Senate for ratification. The entire Republican party lines up behind it, and even the half the Democratic caucus would rather have a deal than war. And you end up with a nuclear treaty, the Trump-Iran Treaty, which unleashes economic sanctions. And for the Iranians, they just wait President Trump out, and then they get an isolationist Republican or a Democrat not prepared to use force or support Israel, or provide that green light to Israel, and we end up in an even worse situation than I think we were in 2015. First, do you support negotiations with the Iranians right now? Second, how worried are you about my doomsday scenario where there’s a nuclear treaty that gives Iran everything it needs?

LAPID: Well, I don’t think this administration is going to give Iran everything it needs in any agreement. So, here’s my thinking: A, eventually we will attack somehow, I don’t know who the combination, Israel by itself, Israel with American support, Israel with B2s and American bombs, Israel with the American military. Eventually, we will attack Iran’s nuclear facility, because there’s no other choice. But the basic policy should be, and on this President Trump is right, whatever works, let’s see what works. We know what the goal is, we know what the target is, we know what the end is, and we are looking for the right means. What we want is Iran not to have nuclear weapons, not to be a threshold country forever, not to put us in constant suspense of the moment we will wake up in the morning and see, they say, “Well, we’ve just, you know…” Like it happened in North Korea, you are waking up one morning and they have the bomb. So we have to pick up every rock and look behind and see what might work.

I have confidence in the president’s ability to look reality in the face. I mean, the problem with negotiations, always, is if one of the negotiators is hiding himself from the truth, it’s not hiding the truth from yourself, it’s hiding yourself from the truth, meaning not letting himself know the bad news of what the other side is doing. Years ago, I remember I was looking at, I think it was second or third or fourth circle of the negotiations with the North Koreans, and something attracted my – it wasn’t even my mind, it was my eyesight. And then I went back and looked at the negotiators from the Iranian side and from the West. Now there was, I don’t know, 20 circles of negotiation.

The Iranians is always the same people. These are guys who’ve been doing this for 20, 30, sometimes even more years. They are knowledgeable. They know what they’re doing. They are patient and they keep telling themselves, “Okay, maybe this circle is not working for us. We’ll wait for the next circle.” So the fact that the president wants to explore the possibility of putting better negotiators, and I find it very encouraging that Stephen Witkoff [United States Special Envoy to the Middle East] is there because he’s tough. I know his crew is tough. I mean, these are tough people, they’re not going to take any bullshit from nobody, excuse my language. I know it’s the…

DUBOWITZ: That language is completely acceptable on this podcast.

LAPID: I know, but you’re Canadians, so I wasn’t sure.

DUBOWITZ: No, I’m an American Canadian, but in both respects it’s acceptable.

(LAUGHTER)

DUBOWITZ: But you’re right, I mean it’s a tough team, but the question is, what deal would this team find acceptable? Our nuclear and Iran experts at FDD are putting out a report on what a good deal looks like. And our view as an institution, for what it’s worth, is that the only acceptable deal is to completely defang Iran of its nuclear capabilities. No enrichment, no reprocessing, no fissile material, no advanced centrifuges, no enrichment facilities, no plutonium reactors. Iran doesn’t need those capabilities if they want civilian nuclear energy. In fact, there’s 22 countries, including Canada by the way, that buy its fuel rods from abroad and have civilian nuclear energy and don’t enrich or reprocess plutonium. If it’s good enough for our allies, why wouldn’t we be demanding that from our enemy? So that’s the deal that we’re putting out as an acceptable deal. I think anything short of that is an unacceptable deal.

LAPID: I couldn’t agree more. Basically, we have a standard, there is the gold standard. It was set with the Emirates when the Emirates were buying their nuclear plants from the Koreans and it said, okay, here’s – they call it, some call it “gold standard”, some call it “123 Agreement.” But basically, it was the same thing. You have a nuclear industry, you get the fuel from outside, you do not enrich. We are going to have a future interesting discussion about this with the Saudis, because the Saudis got a lot of uranium under the sand, we don’t know…

DUBOWITZ: Or so they claim, yeah.

LAPID: So they claim, and we’re not sure about the quality of the uranium, but there is uranium over there. I don’t know why is it that God has decided to give those people everything, but he did. Basically, it’s a conversation we’re going to have. But right now with Iran, yes, the gold standard is the standard. Anything less of this is a threat. And the fact that they’re telling us, “But we have a fatwa from the supreme leader,” which is a “Star Wars” term, by the way, it doesn’t help to people who understand how vicious and patient the Iranians are.

DUBOWITZ: Right. First of all, it’s not clear there is a fatwa. Second, fatwas are fickle. Fatwas can be given, fatwas can be revoked. And as you say, one should certainly not hang one’s hat on that. Let me ask you a bit about just going back to when you were prime minister and foreign minister. I mean the closest that the United States ever got to rejoining the 2015 JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], the Obama deal, was under your leadership. Tell us a little bit about what happened then, and ultimately – obviously the Biden administration was not successful in getting back into the JCPOA, but I think your government played an important role in standing firm against that.

LAPID: What we said was, we said, “Okay, we know you like the JCPOA.” Interestingly enough, I had a lot of conversations with the French and the British who at one point or another – I went especially to London to meet with [Fmr. British Prime Minister] Boris Johnson about this. I had long conversations with [French President] Emmanuel Macron who’s a close friend, and at one point or another they became more hawkish on the issue than the Biden administration because what we were saying is, “Listen, a lot of time has passed.” I mean, the agreement, the JCPOA was time-limited and there was good reason for it to be time-limited because we wanted – I mean the sunset clause was there. We didn’t like it to begin with, but basically what we said is, we wanted to stop them from developing the nuclear facilities and weapons, and now it was canceled for quite a bit, and now we want to go back.

So what is going on? How are you going to stop the Iranians now when 2025 is the due date if you have lost, I don’t know, three, four years of the agreement? Nobody had a good answer. So we felt that we have a very good base or basis to discuss with the E3 countries [France, Germany, and the United Kingdom] and the United States the fact that this doesn’t make any sense, it should be rewritten.

DUBOWITZ: Yeah. I also recall at the time, and commend you for standing firm on this, that the Biden administration was contemplating revoking the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organization, something that actually an American negotiator had offered. And the Iranians said, “Hey, well, that sounds like a great idea.” Your government stood firm, Congress stood firm.

LAPID: Yeah, no, everybody sits in hopes that I won’t say it was Rob Malley.

DUBOWITZ: And it was Rob Malley. He was the lead negotiator at the Iran envoy at the time, who literally offered the Iranians –

LAPID: And also, the ballistic missile industry as a whole. I don’t want to have do injustice to the Biden administration. They were committed, they were smart. I liked them. We worked very well with them and they realized the risks. We had our arguments about how to go about it. But basically, it’s not like [Fmr. U.S. Secretary of State] Tony Blinken or [Fmr. National Security Advisor to the United States] Jake Sullivan didn’t understand the threat of nuclear Iran. We just had some differences about how are we going to deal with it, which is okay, which is part of what you do. And you know what? Politics is always also theater. So in this theater, the fact that I was more hawkish than they were is okay, is part of how you handle this.

DUBOWITZ: Yeah. It’s interesting, you talk about the views of the United States and Israel on the Iran issue. It has struck me that there are many issues in Israel where there is bitter partisan disagreement, no doubt, and obviously very strong political views. Am I right in saying that on the Iran issue and on the threat of Iran’s nuclear program, there is consensus across the political spectrum really from left to right?

LAPID: Yes. I don’t know about the left, but from center to right. I don’t know if you’ve noticed that there’s a new name today for people who are center-right. We call them center-left.

(LAUGHTER)

LAPID: So I would say from the center-left through the center, which I represent, to the center-right and the right, everybody is aligned. I mean, we understand this as an existential threat and I have promised so many times that the opposition will back the government in any way they want to operate in Iran. I’m going to state my views about how to go about it, but I even told this to Netanyahu in person. I said, “Listen, it’s not like I’m going to have a press conference the day after and say I would do it in a different manner. We are going to support you on this. It’s important. It is nothing to do with our quite bitter political rivalry.”

DUBOWITZ: I want to move to the Iranian people for a second because it’s been a long-standing view of mine that really the only long-term solution to this problem, this threat from the Islamic Republic, is not just maximum pressure on the regime in terms of economic pressure, not just neutralizing their nuclear program, but maximum support for the Iranian people as an element of maximum pressure. How are you thinking about this issue of the Iranian people and what can Israel do to really support the millions of people who want to see the end of the Islamic Republic?

LAPID: Supporting people who are fighting for good cause is, in a smart way is, of course, the right thing to do and in our national interest. It’s always funny to me that we’ve been seeing now for, I don’t know, since 1979, we see the demonstrations that the regime is organizing in Tehran and always burning the American and Israeli flags together. And I always look at this and I say, “Okay, where do they get the flags from? How many American and Israeli flags are there in Tehran?”

DUBOWITZ: Yeah, someone’s making a lot of money from flags that are being burned.

LAPID: Probably, yeah. There’s an industry of flags.

DUBOWITZ: I want to inject something because I think it’s really important and it’s really a theme of this podcast, and that is that the Iranian people today, the majority of whom despise this regime, who’ve taken to the streets, as you say, repeatedly 2009, 2017 to 2021, Woman Life Freedom 2022, yelling, “Death to the dictator. Are you with us? Are you with the dictator?” I think today, and I think many of our guests will bring this out in this discussion on this podcast, are looking for support. And the sort of notion that Israel’s touch is toxic I don’t think is true anymore. I think in many respects, Iranians admire Israelis. I think they would love support from anyone at this point who’s willing to take on this regime. And what has struck me as an American Jew is when I’ve gone to pro-Israel rallies in America, I see my Jewish friends, but I see many of my Iranian friends who are at the same rallies, and these are non-Jewish Iranians who are there protesting against Islamic Republic in support of their American Jewish friends and their Israeli friends.

LAPID: Because they know more than anyone what Islamic extremism can cause to the life of people. I would say, I completely agree with you. Interestingly enough, if you look at the Middle East, and I’m not going to name names, but you will understand what I’m describing, you have two types. One is a regime that likes us with the people who do not, and therefore the regime is a reluctant from having a relationship with us or promoting the relationship. Or regimes that hates us and the people who do not. And Iran is the perfect example. I don’t think the Iranian people have anything inherent against Israelis. And there are enough people there who will still remember having peace with Israel until 1979. In the late ’50s, maybe early ’60s, I remember my father, he wrote this. I was too young. He went with [Fmr. Prime Minister David] Ben-Gurion to Burma, and they landed in Tehran just for the fun of it.

There are four historical nations in the Middle East: biblical Egypt, Israel, Turkey, and Iran. Almost everyone else are Sykes-Picot, I mean, this is French and British geographers drawing a map and calling it a country. No wonder we have such interesting relations between those four because it’s rooted into a real past and a real history and the tragedies are there, but the optimism should be there as well. So you are right. We have to support the people of Iran, and maybe we should not be too scared about what they’re going to say. Yeah. They’re not going to say good things about us in Iranian official television anyway.

DUBOWITZ: Well, that’s right. That’s right.

LAPID: So what’s the risk of being supportive?

DUBOWITZ: I just want to hit on just one other, I think, important issue. We’ve talked about it, but I think it’s important to underscore it. I think there seems to be a perception that the Iran file is Bibi’s file. What’s your take?

LAPID: I don’t want to be too impetuous with the answer, but as you have mentioned, when we opened the drawers or looked under the hood, there was more talk than walk. I think every Israeli leader will be part of dealing with it. And then what you have to ask yourself, and I’m being as polite about this as I can, is a different question. How is his results on other issues? Because, you know, people don’t change for a subject. If somebody is not really good about Gaza and not really good about the economy or not really good about running off the extremists in his government, what makes you think he’s going to be really good at dealing with Iran? You are either good with what you’re doing or you not. So as I said, we’re going to be supportive if they’ll do something about Iran, but this doesn’t mean I think he’s the right person for the job, because I do not.

DUBOWITZ: Mr. Lapid, thank you for coming in.

LAPID: I’m thankful that you have allowed this to happen.

DUBOWITZ: Thank you, sir.

Really pleased to have my dearest friend and FDD colleague, Eyal Hulata, on this podcast. And Eyal, maybe the best place to start is with your background. Tell us a little bit about yourself.

HULATA: Mark, I’m so happy to be on this podcast. I love the title, Iran Breakdown, very, very sharp, and then with a twist, and I like it. It’s amazing.

Well, about me, in my last position before joining FDD, I was Israel’s National Security Advisor, appointed by Prime Minister [Naftali] Bennett, and served with Prime Minister [Yair] Lapid and left in June of ’23. And before that I served for about 23 years in Israel’s intelligence community.

DUBOWITZ: In Mossad?

HULATA: Yeah. Most of my work during that time was on Iran. This was the main focus of the organization for many years. But this became a cornerstone of the organization just when I was joining, assuming managerial roles. And this period of time is so formative to me because I had the opportunity to watch it both from a technological perspective, but also from a policy perspective, from within the organization. I worked a lot with the agencies around the Western world of course, specifically here in the United States. And we’ve done wonderful things over the years, and this all have created in my mind a very solid understanding of how dangerous that threat is and how serious we need to be, and how capable we can be when we put our minds together to do the right things in the right way.

DUBOWITZ: In terms of your personal background, because I always find it fascinating, tell us a little bit also about your educational background and the Hulata family. Where does your family come from? I assume that there’s some background that is relevant in this conversation.

HULATA: Yeah, so, I mean, you know me well. My mother’s family is from Persia. My grandfather was born in a small village not far from Shiraz, and came to Jerusalem at the beginning of the 20th century at the age of four in a box on a donkey. They marched to India and then in a boat to Egypt and then in a train to Jaffa. And then they arrived in Jerusalem and he built his home there. And my grandfather and his wife, also from Persian origin, they raised 10 children in a small house, but a very warm one in the heart of Jerusalem. And this, of course, was very formative in my being brought up in this environment; was very meaningful for me. My father’s family are Holocaust survivors from the Netherlands. They came to Israel after the war with nothing with them, and they all built beautiful families. So for me, there is a sense of duty and mission in what I do.

DUBOWITZ: So let’s jump in. You were a national security advisor for two prime ministers. You came into office with Prime Minister Bennett, and I assume at that point you had all the highest clearances, and you were able to kind of look under the hood and look at where Israel’s programs were, its military programs, its intel programs with respect to countering the threat from Islamic Republic. What did you find?

HULATA: So, I have to say that for me, this was not a surprise. I mean, I retired from the establishment seven months before, so there was nothing that I didn’t know about what was going on. The reality was that even though – as of the middle of ’18, when President Trump, in the first term, left the JCPOA and it was clear that things are going to be very, very volatile, Israel needed to put a lot of effort to prepare for contingencies. It wasn’t clear that this will work out. It wasn’t clear that the Americans have a strategy what to do if Iran decides to dash for a bomb or make great progress as unfortunately they did. During the four years, especially starting from ’21, Iran made a lot of progress. And Israel was supposed to understand that we shouldn’t be waiting for someone else regardless of who’s the president of the United States, Trump, Biden, doesn’t– we need to be able to do something.

And those years must have been used to prepare, to prepare for military capabilities and for other capabilities. And this wasn’t the case. I knew this when I was still in the establishment. Now, when I became National Security Advisor, I had a broader understanding, broader reach, and I had a Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett, which took this very, very seriously. And he didn’t like what he saw. He didn’t like that there was more talk than action in the years before that. And the military did not put Iran in a high priority. Prime Minister Bennett instructed me to lead the national effort on this. And this is what we did. We’ve built new forums that were cross-organizational. We made sure that the organizations shared the intel. We made sure that they got the resources, or more resources, to do what they needed to do.

We made sure that they knew that there was accountability. We met every few weeks to see what was going on, and we made the priorities ready and formulated the goals that they needed to follow. So it became something that was, within the system, more of weight. That government, unfortunately in my perspective, survived only a year and a half. So, there was a limit to what we’re able to do, but I think we did quite a lot and we left a good piece of – especially in the terms of resources, one of the last things that were done before Lapid finished his role as Prime Minister was to allocate money that would be used for very important force buildup. And this was important. I think Israel knows how important that was.

DUBOWITZ: And you feel comfortable that this has been continued under Prime Minister Netanyahu? And politically, Eyal, if you could just speak a little bit about this. I mean, Israelis obviously are a fractious bunch, a lot of disagreements about a lot of issues across the political spectrum. On the question of the threat from the Islamic Republic, what’s your assessment of where Israelis are and where the Israeli political establishment is?

HULATA: Yeah, that’s a good question. Also because one can think that it has a political element. I’m not a politician, I’m a professional. I worked for two prime ministers, one that is right wing, more right than Netanyahu, and one that is definitely more center than Netanyahu. And the Minister of Defense was Benny Gantz, which is a third party, and it was very clear for that government that nobody’s joking around about Iran. Iran is not a problem that was created by Prime Minister Netanyahu. People in past years used to say that Netanyahu is enlarging this problem to make it a political issue because it helps him. This isn’t true. Iran is a real problem. And if Iran, God forbid, becomes nuclear, this will pose an existential threat to Israel. This is not a political issue. This is a very serious professional issue. And I think that there is no discussion about it.

There is no questions about it from Bennett, Lapid, Gantz, [Fmr. Deputy Prime Minister Avigdor] Lieberman. All of the senior ministers of the previous administration took it very, very seriously. I will say some of them might’ve taken more seriously than previous governments, definitely were willing to allocate more resources into it and to devote more of their time into it. You follow their statements. Just listen to what Bennett says on Iran, what Lieberman says on Iran, what Yair Lapid said from FDD stage just a few days ago and earlier in this episode. The Israeli establishment understands that Iran’s nuclearization could be existential. This is something that Israel should prevent at all costs. This is not a political issue. For me, it’s a mission. It has become a life mission and not just for me. And I think that this is recognized across the Israeli public. People have different views. Not everyone understands the problem in full. Not everyone have been through and seen intel or been engaged in this, so they might have different views, but I don’t know one person that was within the establishment doesn’t understand how serious this problem can be.

DUBOWITZ: So let me ask you this. You serve at the highest levels of the Israeli government, obviously, of both political and intel and while you were a national security advisor, you worked with your counterparts in the United States with Jake Sullivan, who was then National Security Advisor, and Brett McGurk, who was the senior coordinator of the Middle East.

And you negotiated a, I thought, very interesting document, which has kind of gone down the memory hole, which was the Jerusalem Declaration. Tell us a little bit about that document, why that was an important document in your mind, and then we can discuss, if you can, in a little more detail your interactions with the Biden administration on the Iran issue, and specifically on the desire of the Biden administration to go back into a nuclear agreement.

HULATA: So I think what was important in this process that when the administration started planning President Biden’s visit to Israel in the summer of 2022, it so happens that Yair Lapid was the Prime Minister when this happened. Of course, we started planning this when the Prime Minister was Naftali Bennett and in this joint understanding on the leadership of the government, it was clear that we’re going to want this visit to be very, very meaningful, not only in what is said in it, but what are the deliverables, what is given in it. There were many things that were discussed, some of them very contentiously, between the government and the American administration, things relating to Palestinians and West Bank and policies and various things.

People think that everything was peaches and cream. Nothing was peaches and cream. I think we had a very constructive dialog with the administration, but there were many things that were in disagreement, and it was important to use this visit, Biden being who he is and truly he says on himself, and I think we all understand, Biden is indeed a Zionist, right? Biden used to say that he was in good relationship with every Prime Minister in Israel since the time of Golda Meir, as he says. That was true. We wanted to cement that. We wanted to formulate that. Once every few decades, a President delivers a written, signed declaration to Israel. It’s been a long time since that happened and we thought this would be very, very appropriate to put it. And we told the Americans that this would be a good opportunity to put in written all of the ironclad commitments that they’ve always been talking about, that Biden was fully committed to, and Iran, of course, is one of them.

And I have to say on Iran, the fact that the administration was willing to put their – few very important fundamental things: first is a commitment that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon. This is trivial, but it’s important. And I’ll talk a little bit about why this is important. But at the same time, there is a sentence there that Israel has the right to defend itself, by itself, in the context of the Iranian issue, which is very telling because it means that President Biden understood that if it gets to that and Israel thinks that we need to do something militarily on Iran, the message in this document is Israel will have a right to do it regardless of American interest. And this was very important to get in written. And only later there’s another sentence that was very important. Of course, I would’ve wanted the strongest wording possible that the United States of America will use all instruments of national power to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear. Of course, this is for the Americans to decide what that means.

DUBOWITZ: But let’s stop there cause there’s three very important elements of that Jerusalem Declaration, right? Iran will never get a nuclear weapon. Israel can act by itself for itself. In other words, effectively saying that Israel, even if Israel is getting a red light or an orange light from the Americans with respect to using military force to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, Israel has the right to do that. And then the third element, which I think as an American I think is most important, is that it’s the United States that actually should be using all instruments of national power to stop Iran from a nuclear breakout and not subcontracting this to a small country of 10 million people with a small air force and a small intelligence community. Highly competent, obviously, as Israel has shown over recent months against Iran and its axis of misery, but at the end of the day that this is a strategic threat to the United States and we should be using all elements of national power. So there’s the Declaration.

Now, let’s fast-forward to two key events that occurred during the Biden administration. The first is that Joe Biden and his team wanted to go back into the nuclear agreement, into the 2015 JCPOA that President Obama had negotiated while Biden was Vice President. Talk a little bit about that time. I assume Israel was not supportive of going back into an agreement that Israeli political and security establishment had seen as fatally flawed. And the second was October of last year when Israel had decided after sustaining, on two occasions now, hundreds of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles being fired at Israel from Iran in April and October [2024] and was looking to plan a retaliatory strike, and Israel had a whole set of targets they wanted to hit, and President Biden had some different ideas.

HULATA: So, the Biden administration made it clear from the beginning that they wanted to go back to JCPOA. We need to recall when President Biden was elected, the Prime Minister was Benjamin Netanyahu. The new government came in only the summer of 2021. So the discussion started even before our government came in. When I came in, when I made the White House for the first time in a visit, I think it was August of ‘21, they were not shy about it. They said, “We want to go back to the JCPOA.” And I will be very careful from disclosing things from the internal discussions, but I can tell what I said. My argument was, “Look, of course this agreement is fundamentally flawed.” And I was very specific with what I thought were the flaws of JCPOA. The audience of this podcast might disagree or most of them might – do agree, and we can get into that in a second, but regardless of what was that was fundamentally flawed in it, it was close to being expired anyway, even back in 2021. Of course now in 2025, it’s even closer to being expired.

And I said, “The question is not whether or not you go back to JCPOA. The question is are you going to leave Israel with an Iran that can do whatever they want? And with all of that money come 2025, or 2026, or fundamentally 2031, what is the message to Israel? That we’re going to need to deal with all of this? Are we going to war? Because you’re going back to JCPOA. What’s going to happen after JCPOA? It’s about to expire.” And President Biden made a commitment to Prime Minister Bennett and also to Prime Minister Lapid that his intention was not just to go back to JCPOA, but to renegotiate a new deal…

DUBOWITZ: Longer, stronger, broader.

HULATA: … what he called, “longer, stronger, broader.” Longer because he understood that the sunsets were a problem; stronger because they understood that the agreement did not deal with weaponization. I mean they allowed Iran to have enrichment, which I think is the most fundamental problem with the JCPOA in the first place. But even if you’ve done so, how can you not make sure that they cannot work on weaponization. And JCPOA, as you know very, very well, does not deal with weaponization almost at all. And it’s not broad in the sense that Iran can use all of the money that they got to fund terrorism and “ring of fire” of proxy organizations around Israel and the ballistic missile and delivery systems, because the agreement was it was meant to deal only with the nuclear problem and even with that, it didn’t deal well. And I think that President Biden, in his message of “longer, stronger, broader”, was actually cognizant of that, understanding that a new deal will need to be better.

My argument to them was you are never going to get two concessions from Iran. You are never going to get Iran to agree to go back to JCPOA and then open another negotiation to get to a longer and stronger. This will never happen. You’re going to push, use all of your political credit, all of your pressure on the Supreme Leader to agree to come to the JCPOA, and then you expect him also to agree to more concessions after he gets the relief of going back to JCPOA. This was my argument. I think it was the right argument, but at the same time, the message from Prime Minister Bennett and then from Prime Minister Lapid to President Biden was, “If you want to go back to JCPOA, we will not come to Washington and stand in front of the two houses of Congress and give a speech and make you look bad.”

We conducted all of these negotiations behind closed doors. I will not share content, but you can imagine the amount of hours and meetings that I had with my American counterpart on this topic was immense. This might have been, for sure, the thing that we talked about the most. And eventually, when in the summer of ‘22, President Biden announced to Prime Minister Lapid that they’re not accepting the Iranian terms, which were absurd, Iran wanted to not only go back to JCPOA, they wanted in any way or form to remove IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] from the FTO [Foreign Terrorist Organization] list, they wanted to close all of the open files of the weaponization in the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], they wanted concessions, they wanted commitments. They basically wanted that there will be a commitment not to get into another negotiation. This was the wording they were trying to squeeze out of the Americans.

And while there were people in the administration that might’ve agreed to that, I actually trust Jake [Sullivan] when he said that this is wording that President Biden’s not willing to sign off and eventually, the Americans told the Iranians, “This is not what we’re willing to get in. If it means that we don’t get back to JCPOA, so be it.” And that was it in the summer of ‘22. It wasn’t easy. A lot of deliberations, a lot of sharing of understandings, of intel with administration. I spent maybe the hardest days of my life by way of tension here in Washington during this time. But at the end, this is what the outcome was. And I think by that time it was clear that there was no going back to JCPOA. That door was shut in summer of ‘22.

DUBOWITZ: Right.

HULATA: The question, of course, emerges, I wasn’t there to continue the dialog, is okay, now that we’re not, you – the United States are not going back to JCPOA, what are you going to do about it? What’s the plan B? What’s the new strategy?

DUBOWITZ: Right.

HULATA: What are the ways to deal with Iran? Because they continue to make progress by the week, by the day, by the hour.

DUBOWITZ: Right. It’s worth noting that most of Iran’s nuclear expansion occurred after the election of President Biden when he explicitly abandoned the maximum pressure campaign of President Trump and went to a strategy of call it, maximum diplomacy, maximum engagement, some would say maximum appeasement. Didn’t enforce sanctions and then tried to get the Iranians back into JCPOA; they refused. Wanted to get a longer, stronger and broader deal. Clearly didn’t have the leverage to do that. And I would argue the Islamic Republic also didn’t fear American military force. So despite the Jerusalem Declaration and President Biden’s commitment to use all instruments of national power to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, I don’t think the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei really believed that Joe Biden was prepared to use military force to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities.

So, let’s go to October of last year, right? The Iranians have launched 400 ballistic and cruise missiles at your country in April and October. The Israeli Air Force clearly has been working for years on a strike plan. There are literally hundreds of targets, nuclear, economic, leadership targets that you can hit. And there’s an impressive operation mounted, but quite limited. Tell us a little bit about why limited, what kind of political pressure was coming from Washington, and what is your assessment of that operation and its opportunities for potential future operations against the Islamic Republic?

HULATA: Right. So first, just for the audience, during this time I’m here in Washington as a senior fellow at FDD. I’m no longer an official in the Israeli system, so everything that I’ll say now is from an outsider looking at what happened.

With your permission, the response must start in April because I think April was the more significant precedent because this in April, 13th of April, the night between the 13^th and 14^th, was the first time Iran fired directly ballistic cruise [missiles] and drones in Israel. I would say almost out of the blue, except Iran made sure that everybody knew that they were going to do this. Maybe they were hoping to squeeze something out of the United States. There was a saying that Iran did this because they didn’t really want to attack, but then at the end of the day or that specific night, the amount of ammunition they fired at Israel was larger than anything that anyone has ever seen.

At first, we need to say that by way of defense, that night was an amazing demonstration of joint-ness of the entire region led by CENTCOM and the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] in defending against that attack. So many of those drones and ballistic missiles and cruise missiles did not even come close to Israel because they were shot down by American pilots over Iraq, or mostly over Iraq, maybe Jordan. Our air defense system, anti-ballistic missile system, performed very, very well. We shot down many of the missiles, and when that day ended, everybody remembers because it was all leaked out. President Biden told Prime Minister Netanyahu, “Take the win. We’ve succeeded. We’ve defended. Take the win.”

DUBOWITZ: Meaning, don’t respond?

HULATA: Meaning don’t respond. Now I thought, my personal belief was, there is no way we cannot respond. The fact that they failed is because we were good on defense.

DUBOWITZ: Not because they didn’t have the intention to murder Israelis.

HULATA: Definitely. And it was the most expensive defense apparatus ever performed during that. And you cannot deter by defending, you cannot deter by denying. You deter by attacking. You deny by causing the other side pain and suffering.

DUBOWITZ: Well, you got to kill the archer, not just knock out the arrows.

HULATA: Right. Now, of course, our arrows worked very well, to use your analogy, and that’s fine, and Iran knew that. And there was this thinking that, if we show them that our defense is really, really good and that we’re also restrained, they won’t attack again. Now, at the end, there was a symbolic attack. I thought it was well thought. We demonstrated to the Iranians back in that night, or the night of our response, that we can hit their most sophisticated air defense capabilities, won’t get into details because I’m not sure that this was cleared, but a lot of has been put in the press. So based on what I’ve read in the press, it seems that Israel has delivered a very surgical effective message, “We can hit anywhere in Iran.” But it wasn’t painful.

So come October when Iran does it again, and now they fire only ballistic missiles because by this time they understood that their drones would be shot down, their cruise missiles will be shot down. There were some cruise missiles there but most of it were ballistic missiles, almost 300 of them trying to overwhelm our defense systems because here no one can help us. It’s just what we have. How many arrows and what is the capacity of our defenses? This is more tricky. Now, again, I won’t get into the details, but I think Israel defense performed very, very well. Very, very well. We shot all of the right ballistic missiles. We were able to discriminate who are the ones we need to shoot down, which ballistic missile are going to fall in places where we don’t care and not waste our defense capabilities because there was budget in everything. I think we performed very, very well.

DUBOWITZ: And again, in close coordination with the United States?

HULATA: Amazing coordination. General [Michael] Kurilla was, I think, there that night.

DUBOWITZ: The CENTCOM Commander?

HULATA: CENTCOM Commander, brilliant guy, brave, love him, amazing guy, and a lot of coordination, of course, with the White House. The White House knew exactly what was going on and they got all of the immediate responses. And I think there was a lot of fear, genuine fear that maybe this time the Iranians will be able to cause damage and to hurt, because definitely this is what they were trying to do, they were after blood. They were firing at our towns.

DUBOWITZ: So you’re looking…

HULATA: … in Tel Aviv…

DUBOWITZ: Right.

HULATA: … in Jerusalem. If we didn’t have air defenses, the October attack would’ve been devastating. And the only fact this didn’t happen is because Israel has invested decades in preparation for such attack, developing, deploying, having the intel to know. Many things were all playing in sync, so that that night ended up with one injured Bedouin girl in the Negev.

DUBOWITZ: So, you’re planning a retaliatory strike. There are thousands of potential targets. We talked about nuclear, economic, leadership targets and clearly, Israel has to respond and should respond in a meaningful way. Iran’s nuclear program is expanding. The ballistic missile production capability is significant, they’ve got maybe the largest ballistic missile inventory, I think, in the Middle East and clearly, important economic assets, refineries, pipelines, ports that sustain and support their most important source of earnings, which is their energy sector, and leadership assets, right? This is from the Supreme Leader to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, entire security apparatus. You’ve got thousands of targets.

I imagine your security service has been working for years and identifying this, and yet President Biden doesn’t say, “don’t”, or, “take the win”, he starts taking off targets off the table. “Don’t go after nuclear, don’t go after economic, don’t go after leadership.”

So despite the declaration in the Jerusalem Declaration, that Israel has the flexibility to do what is necessary to defend itself, and a commitment that the United States will use all instruments of national power against the Islamic Republic of Iran, you have a President of the United States not giving you a red light, but perhaps giving you an orange light: be cautious, be limited in your response. Talk a little bit about that political pressure that’s now on Prime Minister Netanyahu, and what did the Israelis decide to do in order to not infuriate an American president, but still send significant message to the Islamic Republic that this will not go unanswered?

HULATA: Right. So first, I won’t be shy of describing the situation, and I have to say and I’ll say it in the beginning, there’s a lot of credit to be given to Prime Minister Netanyahu and the way he dealt with this October event because nothing was easy in that event. We need to remember, we’re talking about October of 2024, we’re weeks from the American election, the signal from the Biden administration, as you said, was clearly, do not go after things that will either give Iran an excuse to dash for a bomb should we attack the nuclear facilities, and not reach the outcome that was necessary or to create an economic ripple effect all across the world just weeks before an American election. These were the American interests. I’m an Israeli, I’m not an American. I do not give grades to American interests.

DUBOWITZ: I imagine the third consideration is also don’t do anything too profound because it’s going to create a retaliation and an escalation, and we don’t want to be in the middle of a Middle East war…

HULATA: Definitely.

DUBOWITZ: … weeks before the election.

HULATA: Now, I can tell you from an Israeli perspective. Okay, now, I’m not talking about the American policy of this, I’m talking about my first personal understanding. We were already in regional war. This fear that any attack of Iran will result a regional war, what does that mean? I mean, in October of ’24, this is after Israel has done whatever it did to Hezbollah. This is after Hezbollah used whatever they could. Hamas at this point is no longer an immediate threat to our population. The Houthis are firing for months, and months and months already. There is not much more that they can do. And Iran just fired 300 ballistic missiles at Israel. So, how much more regional can it be? What is that “regional war” that everybody were afraid of in October of ’24, giving the real situation?

We’re not before October of ’23, where Hezbollah is in full force, everybody is afraid from rockets, including Israel. This is not the case. So, this fear of a regional war, I think in October it was more of an excuse. I can understand why the Americans didn’t want any kind of retaliation and escalation weeks before an election, but I don’t think that fear of a massive regional war at that point in time was real, because Israel is already fighting seven fronts at this point.

DUBOWITZ: To be fair, I mean this really was the core of the philosophical difference between Israeli governments under three prime ministers, two of whom you served, and President Biden, which is that the Americans were afraid of escalation. So, they would always call on Israel to de-escalate. And the Israelis, I thought, at least my assessment, is that Israel believed in escalation to de-escalate. You’re going to escalate against the enemy, against Islamic Republic and its proxies. You’re going to inflict as much damage as possible in order to get them to stand down and restore the deterrence that had been, I think, shattered after October 7th.

HULATA: Even before October 7^th, in the Iranian context, I think that if we would’ve continued exactly like you say, to escalate proportionately in the sense that we would incur the damage and pain on the other side, but in surgical and sophisticated way when there is no war, and put them on the defense, make them always guess when is the next thing coming or should we worry. What more do the Israelis know? What more can they do to us? I think that if we had continued and even broadened this strategy over the years, I think Iran would’ve been more deterred. I will say that. But in any case, in October, deterrence no longer matters. They just fired 300 ballistic missiles in Israel.

But I think Prime Minister Netanyahu is now understanding these constraints. He had a very hard choice to make. Now, I wasn’t in that deliberation, but I think I can imagine how this went through. I think that if there was a conviction in Israel, that we could raid the Iranian nuclear program and succeed in high level of confidence. And by that, what I mean is, that the next morning Iran cannot take whatever was left from our attack and say, “You know what? Now, we’re dashing from the bomb,” which is a very serious risk, has always been a very serious risk. Then maybe there was a point in confronting President Biden, telling him, but you just wrote a year ago the Jerusalem Declaration, and we’re going to do this because now is the time.

I assume that the level of conviction in the Israeli establishment was not high enough to do this. And they can understand why. When you’re Israel, you don’t go after the Iranian nuclear program, make a decision on Monday and execute it on Friday. We’re a small, we’re robust, we punch above our weight. But this is serious stuff. So, I think in that circumstance, it probably wasn’t a real option to execute right then in October.

DUBOWITZ: I want to now fast-forward to today, where the skies are empty, or let’s say the skies are available to Israeli fighter jets. Iran’s ballistic missile production capability has been severely degraded. We haven’t even spoken about this. But I mean Hezbollah has been severely degraded, thanks to some extraordinary work that was done, not only by the Israeli Air Force, but by the Israeli intelligence community, walkie-talkies and pagers that blew up. I would note, and I’m sure a lot of that work was done at a time where you were sitting in some of those offices. So, extraordinary work and extraordinary capabilities were demonstrated by Israel. And Israel[sic] now gets a new president, President Trump, who’s certainly known as an Iran hawk. During the first Trump administration, he imposed devastating economic pressure on the regime.

The Islamic Republic is reportedly been trying to kill him. He’s come into office, and the Israeli political and security establishment says, “All right, well, there’s a new commander-in-chief in town. We have an opportunity now. We have an opportunity to finish the job that we didn’t complete last October.” However, the President now has come in and said, “Actually, Israel, before you launch military strikes, I want to do a deal.” So, another U.S. president wants to do a deal with the Islamic Republic on its nuclear program. Talk a little bit about what an acceptable deal would look like for Israel, if there’s an acceptable deal for Israel.

HULATA: So, I’ll answer from my personal opinion, because if Prime Minister Netanyahu were sitting here and you would’ve asked him if is there an acceptable deal, he’d probably say no for a host of reasons. Some of them are tactics of negotiation, because it’s never good to tell anyone what your red lines are and what is an acceptable deal, because this is where the negotiation will start. And then you are sure you’re only going to get less than what we got before. But I think the proper way to answer that is to put spotlights on the major flaws of the JCPOA. And by that, my message is that whoever is envisioning a new deal, if it’s not going to be substantially better in those flaws, then it’s going to be as bad as the JCPOA. And because I’m sure that President Trump does not intend to do a bad deal, but to do a good deal, then the benchmarks at the very minimum need to face the core problems of the JCPOA.

DUBOWITZ: Right. So, any deal that President Trump could sign must include a commitment to dismantle Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure, including enrichment, including reprocessing?

HULATA: I think so, because otherwise it’s going to be a time-bound agreement. And when we do talk about time-bound agreements, the JCPOA was bound to 10 or 15 years at most. And after 15 years, the JCPOA stipulates that Iran can have any size of industrial nuclear facility as they want with no sanctions. In the thinking, that I thought was fundamentally flawed, and in 15 years, Iran will change and become an ally perhaps, or a country that is not posing a risk. And if that is the case, then they can have all of that goodies. I don’t understand why anyone could’ve thought that by 2031, Iran will become a country that we can trust.

DUBOWITZ: Because you’re not an American. Americans, we are very optimistic people. And in a sense, we’re “material girls”. We believe that if you flood countries with cash, if you integrate them into the global economy, you’ll moderate them. You’ll turn them into “responsible global stakeholders.” And again, it’s the same American delusion with Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards. We thought that if we did a nuclear deal with them and flood them with cash, that would embolden the moderates. We believe in life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. I think we don’t give enough respect to the fact there are hard men with dangerous ideas, who actually at the end of the day, don’t want to live a “material life.” They want power. And in the Islamic Republic of Iran is one such beast.

HULATA: Yeah. They’re a revolutionary regime. And I don’t think that anyone should trust them, which means that any idea of a new negotiation that is time-bound from such a philosophy or ideology is going to be very, very dangerous.

DUBOWITZ: Now, let me ask you this, Eyal. Your background, your family background in Persia, your connection to the Iranian people, your connection to Persian culture. I think one of the real frustrations of many of our listeners who are Iranian-American, Iranian-Canadian, Iranians around the world, is that they must be feeling that once again, because it’s been happening for years, the issue of the Islamic Republic is now narrowly being discussed as a nuclear issue. And that when Iranians who’ve been on the streets for decades now, millions of Iranians yelling, “Death to the dictator, America, are you with us? Are you with the dictator?” They find American presidents constantly wanting to engage with the dictator on Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Now, no doubt, the nuclear weapons program is critical. It’s existential to Israel. It’s a strategic threat to the United States. But I think the frustration of our Iranian friends is the real problem. The fundamental problem, it’s not the nuclear program or the missile program or even the proxies, it’s the regime itself. Let’s talk a little bit about the regime itself and let’s talk about Israel’s approach to the regime. The idea of weakening the regime, undermining the regime, and ultimately toppling the Islamic Republic, has that been a fundamental pillar of Israeli strategy for decades? And if not, has that changed?

HULATA: So, for decades, it was clear to all of the Israeli stakeholders that the revolutionary regime in Iran, when they say they want to eradicate Israel from the face of the Middle East, the map of the Middle East…

DUBOWITZ: They mean it.

HULATA: … they say it because they mean it. And we’re not aware of many examples in the world where a country puts in its official statements said by their leader, that one of their objectives is to eradicate a different country. This is why this is existential for Israel. We cannot just believe that they say that for political reasons and they don’t actually believe it. So, this has been understood in Israel for many years. I think that for many years, even though we understood it, maybe we didn’t take it too seriously. Maybe there was this belief that as long as we can make sure that they cannot implement their strategy, then so be it.

And I have to say, I never thought this was a good strategy, especially when we’re talking about something that can be existential. And I think that after October 7, there isn’t a serious person in Israel that thinks that we can again underestimate our enemies. And again, to give credit to Prime Minister Netanyahu, that credit is deserved. Things have changed in Israel. And I think that in recent months we see more and more. First of all, the Prime Minister himself talking directly to the Iranian people, calling for them to do what is right for them. Calling for them and reaching a hand or extending a hand, telling them we have no fight between the peoples.

It’s not the Jews and the Iranians. It’s not the Israelis and the Persians. It’s a revolutionary regime that is committed to get at us. They call us Zionists; they don’t even call us Israelis. But it is certain that this Supreme Leader and its commitment to eradicate Israel, this is not something that we can look away. Maybe the framing is not to topple the regime. Maybe the framing is to assist the people or to support the people. But I think the mindset is that, if again, there is a round of protests like we’ve seen in 2019, or even more so in 2022, after the murdering of Mahsa Amini and the Iranian people go to the streets, they cannot go alone. They need to have support. I would want the Americans to support them. Of course, everything will be easier when a country of the magnitude of the United States is doing this. But Israel definitely cannot stay aside and not contribute dramatically as we can to these efforts.

DUBOWITZ: So, what I hear you saying, and I think it’s very heartening to me, and I’m sure it’s heartening to a number of our listeners, is that maximum support for the Iranian people has become a fundamental pillar of Israeli strategy. It’s become part of Israel’s maximum pressure campaign. And that if we can get the United States to adopt maximum support as part of maximum pressure with Israel and the United States, working closely together and providing our brave Iranians with what they need, the support they need. And we can talk in detail, FDD has published extensively on this. But giving them the platforms, and the tools, and the support and the resources, that when they’re facing this brutal regime on the streets, they know that two countries have their back who are committed to supporting the people, and supporting – and committed to weakening this regime, that’s the long-term strategy.

HULATA: Yes. So, this may take a long period of time, but the Supreme Leader of Iran is not a young man. For many years, we’ve been saying that he’s nearing his end. These people don’t die easy, I guess. They stick hard with what they have. But Iran will go through fundamental changes in the near or further time period. And we need to make sure that when this happens, the outcome will be more favorable to us. And I want to emphasize that from an Israeli perspective, the reason we say all that is because there is no fundamental fight between Israel and Iran. Iran used to be one of our closest allies. Until the revolution of 1979, Iran was an ally of Israel. We didn’t have diplomatic ties because of political reasons, but Israeli companies worked in Iran.

Israel’s defense establishment helped the Iranian military. Israel’s intelligence establishment helped the Iranian intelligence. One of my closest friends was born in Tehran, because his father was working for an Israeli company back in those days. I want to go back to that time. I want to be able to go back and visit the village where my grandfather came to Israel from, not far from Shiraz. It can never happen with this regime in Iran. Maybe it will not happen in my lifetime. Maybe our next generations will be able to do this. This is what we should strive for. But until that time happens, what needs to be clear to everyone, every Israeli, every Iranian, and every American: Israel cannot allow Iran to go nuclear.

Whatever happens, however this will play out, if Iran becomes nuclear, this poses an existential threat not only to Israel, but to the Jewish people. I think this is not just an Israeli problem. I think this is a problem of the entire world and of the Western world. The liberal world for sure, the Americans for sure. But if we’re left alone to deal with this, Israel is committed to defend ourselves, by ourselves. And we will do whatever it takes with whatever we have so that Iran does not become a nuclear power.

DUBOWITZ: I really thank you for your service in defending democracies. And thank you for being a wonderful colleague. And also, thank you for speaking from the heart to the Iranian people. I think it’s incredibly important that they hear from you as an Israeli, because I think Iranians, most Iranians understand that Israel is not their enemy, Israelis are not their enemy, Their enemy is the Islamic Republic of Iran. And I hope, as they say, Inshallah. And B’tzerat Hashem in Hebrew. I don’t know what the Farsi version of it is, I have to learn it, but maybe next year in a free Iran.

HULATA: I’m in.

DUBOWITZ: Thank you.

HULATA: Thank you.

DUBOWITZ: It should come as no surprise that the autocratic regime and Tehran’s hatred for Israel is matched only by its hatred for the United States. Always remember that immediately after “death to Israel, the little Satan”, it’s “death to America, the great Satan” that they chant. And the regime’s intentions towards the United States are indeed hostile. Intercontinental ballistic missiles. or ICBMs, feature prominently in Islamic Republic’s rapidly expanding arsenal, so that Iranian missiles, including those capable of delivering a nuclear payload can reach the United States. We’ll unpack more of this in a later episode. And sharing democratic values, the United States and Israel also share enemies. And this along with the reasons we discussed today with two former Israeli officials, is exactly why the perspective of our Israeli friends matter and why U.S. officials should be keen to listen.

I’m Mark Dubowitz, and this has been The Iran Breakdown.