FAQ: What Should Be Washington’s Position on Iran’s Nuclear Dismantlement?

Q. What was the Trump administration’s stated position on a new nuclear deal with Iran before negotiations began on April 12?

The Trump administration has previously called for Iran’s full, verifiable, and permanent nuclear disarmament — lest Tehran face U.S. and Israeli military strikes. Soon after reimposing U.S. maximum economic pressure on Iran in February, President Donald Trump said, “There’s two ways of stopping [Iran]. With bombs, or with a written piece of paper.” Trump indicated his preference for Iran’s nuclear disarmament, stating, “I’d much rather see a deal with Iran where we can do a deal — supervise, check it, inspect it and then blow it up or just make sure that there [are] no more nuclear facilities.” He warned on March 30, after a major U.S. military buildup in the Middle East, “If [Iran doesn’t] make a deal, there will be a bombing … the likes of which they have never seen before.” He stated on April 7 that while “doing a deal would be preferable,” military action remains an option if negotiations fail.

Senior members of Trump’s cabinet, such as National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, have also demanded that Iran agree to the full “dismantlement” of its enrichment, weaponization, and missile delivery programs. Waltz said on March 16, “All options are on the table to ensure it does not have” a nuclear weapon. “And that’s all aspects of Iran’s program. That’s the missiles, the weaponization, the enrichment. They can either hand it over and give it up in a way that is verifiable, or they can face a whole series of other consequences.” On March 23, Waltz reiterated the U.S. position on dismantlement.

Q. Has the U.S. position on Iran’s full dismantlement collapsed since the first round of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks in Oman on April 12?

This is still unclear. Secretary of Defense Hegseth did demand on April 13 that Iran “negotiate full dismantlement of your nuclear capabilities” to avoid U.S. military action. But a day later, Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East and leader of America’s delegation to the Oman talks, appeared to acquiesce to continued Iranian enrichment under a new deal. Iran, he said, does not “need to enrich past 3.67 percent” to meet its civilian nuclear needs. This purity level was permitted under the 2015 nuclear deal spearheaded by President Obama, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Trump exited the deal in 2018.

On April 15, the special envoy’s office posted on X a possible clarification: “A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal. Any final arrangement must set a framework for peace, stability, and prosperity in the Middle East — meaning that Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program.” State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce reiterated later that day, “Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon or an enrichment program.”

Yet just before negotiations began, Witkoff maintained that a new Iran nuclear agreement should focus on preventing the “weaponization” of Tehran’s nuclear program — the construction of atomic bombs out of enriched uranium — raising concern that he might broker a deal that allows Iranian enrichment. “I think our position begins with dismantlement of your program,” Witkoff said. “That is our position today. That doesn’t mean, by the way, that at the margin we’re not going to find other ways to find compromise between the two countries.” He added, “Where our red line will be, there can’t be weaponization of your nuclear capability.”

Q. Why is continued Iranian enrichment a dangerous prospect, and why is a deal focused only on preventing weaponization an ineffectual solution to the Iran nuclear threat?

A deal permitting continued Iranian enrichment would leave intact key Iranian capabilities to produce enriched uranium, a key fuel for nuclear weapons. Even if a deal requires caps on the regime’s enriched uranium stockpile and purity level, Tehran could likely maintain its nuclear facilities and capabilities as well as the regime’s enormous stockpile of advanced fast-enriching gas centrifuges. Iran could thus bypass the deal’s limitations at any point, including after Trump leaves office.

Tehran could also hide such weaponization capabilities and resume them in small, non-descript facilities, matching the construction of a nuclear bomb with enriched uranium at a time of its choosing. A holistic, effective approach must therefore entail the full, verifiable, and permanent disarmament of all three pillars of nuclear weapons development — the regime’s nuclear fuel, weaponization, and missile-delivery programs — to ensure it can no longer build nuclear weapons.

Q. What is Iran’s aim in negotiations?

Tehran aims to entice Washington with the illusion of a negotiated resolution, thereby averting military strikes on its nuclear program, by signaling a performative openness to diplomacy. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei backtracked on his March 8 pledge to refrain from negotiations while under U.S. sanctions likely due to fear over America’s military buildup in the region and the U.S. bombing campaign against Tehran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen. Iran also seeks to complicate Jerusalem’s strategic decision-making, as the likelihood of an Israeli strike during U.S.-Iran diplomacy remains minimal.

Engaging in negotiations also enables Tehran to stall European efforts to trigger the snapback of Iran sanctions at the UN Security Council (UNSC) ahead of their scheduled expiration on October 18, 2025. Under UNSC Resolution 2231, parties to the 2015 JCPOA retain the option to restore sweeping pre-deal UN sanctions targeting Iran’s arms transfers, missile development and trade, and enriched uranium activity.

Q. What makes the regime’s internal challenges an opportunity for Washington to affect the outcome of nuclear negotiations?

Iran is contending with internal turmoil that threatens regime stability: devalued currency, water scarcity, and rising discontent from its support base. The Iranian rial plunged to an all-time low of 1,043,000 against the U.S. dollar on April 5 but rebounded to 845,000 following the announcement of direct talks. Record high temperatures, droughts, and the depletion of rivers and lakes have sparked protests. Fearing public backlash, the regime also stalled the enforcement of the controversial Hijab and Chastity law, which imposes harsh penalties on women who refuse veiling. Despite the growing internal strain, negotiations offer the regime temporary relief, stabilizing the rial, potentially calming unrest, and undercutting dissident morale.

By pursuing a strategy of maximum support for the Iranian people, Washington can harness these opportunities to pressure Tehran to commit to full, verifiable, and permanent restrictions on its nuclear program. Such a framework should include providing internet access for Iranians, backing labor strikes, and providing cyber and intelligence support for protesters.

Q. What can Congress do to prevent another weak Iran nuclear deal?

Congress has a key law at its disposal to enable oversight of any nuclear deal or to mount legislative opposition. Under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), the president must submit any Iran nuclear agreement to Congress, triggering a review period during which sanctions cannot be waived and Congress can vote on the deal.

In this context, lawmakers can voice opposition to continued Iranian enrichment as part of any deal and elevate their concerns with the administration. Some members have already done so. A coalition of nine Republican House lawmakers led by Rep. Claudia Tenney (R-NY) wrote in a letter to the president on April 11, “The regime in Iran must understand that there is no situation which allows it to retain a nuclear weapons capability, and there is no scenario in which the United States will accept anything short of its full and permanent disarmament.” Similarly, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) posted on X, “Any diplomatic solution … must include the total dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and include not only U.S. but worldwide supervision. I fear anything less could be a catastrophic mistake.”

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Janatan Sayeh is a research analyst at FDD, where he focuses on Iranian domestic affairs and the Islamic Republic’s malign regional influence. For more analysis from the authors and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Andrea and Janatan on X @StrickerNonpro and @JanatanSayeh. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_Iran. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.