FAQ: U.S. To Hold Nuclear Talks With Iran

The United States and Iran are set to hold historic talks on April 12 in Oman. President Donald Trump claims the talks will be face-to-face, while Iran claims that Omani negotiators will serve as intermediaries, shuttling messages between delegations in separate locations. Either way, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a master of deception and delay, expert at obtaining favorable terms when negotiating restrictions on its nuclear program with Western countries. The United States must refuse sanctions relief for Iran or further negotiations if Tehran does not agree to the full, permanent, and verifiable disarmament of its nuclear weapons enterprise.

Q: Why is the U.S. now willing to engage in talks with Iran?

During his first term and the opening period of his second term, Trump has recognized several Iranian threats as intolerable: its proximity to possessing nuclear weapons; its existential threat to Israel’s security; its funding, arming, and direction of terrorist proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and other groups; and its support for the attacks on global shipping by the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Notably, the Trump administration is seeking more than a freeze or modest rollback of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. In 2018, Trump pulled the United States out of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, underscoring its failure to permanently block Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons. Now, the administration says that only Tehran’s full nuclear disarmament is acceptable: a definitive end to nuclear fuel production, weaponization — activities related to the construction of a nuclear device — and development of nuclear-capable delivery systems will constitute a deal that stands the test of time and resolves the Iran nuclear crisis.

Q: What brought Iran to the negotiating table?

Echoing his statements on several occasions, Trump sent Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei a letter in early March demanding that the regime negotiate restrictions on its nuclear program within 60 days or face major consequences, including U.S. military action against Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Trump has greatly amplified U.S. military power in the Middle East in recent weeks by sending additional aircraft carriers, fighter jets, B-2 bombers, and other assets to the region, signaling his willingness to follow up threats with action.

The regime in Iran also likely fears that severe economic pain lies ahead following Trump’s reimposition of a campaign of U.S. “maximum pressure” against Tehran in early February. Trump has threatened secondary tariffs and tougher U.S. sanctions enforcement, particularly on Tehran’s ability to export oil to China and other major buyers in violation of U.S. sanctions, which could trigger the regime’s further slide into domestic and economic crisis and threaten its hold on power.

Q: What prompted Trump’s ultimatum to Tehran — and how close is Iran to making nuclear weapons?

Trump’s ultimatum comes after Iran significantly advanced its nuclear program during President Joe Biden’s four years in office, successfully leading U.S. and European negotiators on a two-year wild goose chase of negotiations at the same time. For example, the regime began producing 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU) in April 2021 and now possesses enough HEU to fuel nearly seven “crude” nuclear weapons. It may be able to make such crude devices within six months. Alternatively, Tehran could further enrich all its uranium stocks to weapons grade, or 90 percent purity, producing material for at least 17 nuclear weapons in four months. Iran would likely need a year or more to produce weapons-grade, uranium-fueled, missile-deliverable weapons.

Other causes for Trump’s concern include that in 2024, U.S. and Israeli intelligence observed Iran carrying out weaponization-related activities. Israel struck an alleged active Iranian weaponization facility named Taleghan 2, located within the Parchin military complex, during an October counterstrike against Iran. The New York Times reported in February that U.S. and Israeli intelligence had also detected a team of Iranian scientists working to short-cut the regime’s route to nuclear weapons. In addition, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is no longer asserting in periodic Iran nuclear assessments that Tehran is not engaged in activities relevant to building a nuclear weapon.

Q: What would constitute a robust nuclear deal with Iran?

Given Iran’s decades of violations of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, the Trump administration is wisely demanding Iran’s full nuclear disarmament.

A 29-point set of terms put forth by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies outlines the essential elements of a disarmament deal, including Iran’s full, permanent, and verifiable adherence to its international nonproliferation obligations; elimination of its access to nuclear fuel through the dismantlement, export, or in-place destruction of related facilities and assets; complete disclosure of past and current weaponization work; and unimpeded International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to suspect sites to ensure verification, among others. Such a deal would ensure that Tehran cannot simply resurrect its nuclear threat once Trump leaves office.

Q: When should America walk away from the negotiating table?

Previous U.S. administrations have rewarded Iran with sanctions relief simply for staying at the negotiating table or making minor concessions. Any reduction in U.S. pressure on the Islamic Republic should occur only if Iran agrees to permanently and verifiably dismantle all of its potential pathways to, and capabilities for, developing nuclear weapons. The regime must agree at the outset, and take actions on the ground to prove, that an agreement will achieve all those objectives. The Trump team should end talks if Iran refuses to agree to the full, permanent, and verifiable disarmament of its nuclear weapons enterprise.

If Iran refuses this deal, the Trump administration should focus on bolstering its maximum pressure campaign, consider following through on military strikes, and explore other policy options against Tehran, to include assisting the Iranian people with their goal of replacing the clerical regime. Only a lasting solution will ensure that one of the world’s most dangerous regimes never acquires the world’s most dangerous weapon.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Andrea on X @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_Iran. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.